Demographic Transformations of American Jewry: Marriage and Mixed Marriage in the 1980s

Sergio DellaPergola
(THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY)
and
Uziel O. Schmelz
(THE HEBREW UNIVERSITY)

INTRODUCTION: THE DEBATE

The analysis of Jewish population trends in the United States has recently expanded beyond the professional interests of a few specialists in demography and sociology to become part of a general and spirited debate over the Jewish experience in America. Scholars in fields remote from demography as well as laymen, authors and journalists have become involved in the discussion of complex technical matters.[1] Although the role of non-specialists has been important in popularizing the themes of a Jewish population debate that would otherwise be limited to a small group of researchers, their contribution has been, at times, marred by lack of familiarity with demographic techniques and quantitative research. What is more, the tone of the debate has gone well beyond neutral and objective academic and scientific discussion to embrace such terms as "pessimism" and "optimism" and even to the suggestion of an Israeli school versus an American school. An unfortunate and increasingly emotional tenor has begun to affect the debate on Jewish population; to say the least, this has contributed little to its quality.

The core of this debate is the disagreement between those who argue that a number of erosive processes are currently at work in the demography of the Jewish family in the United States and Canada and those who believe that such a demographic erosion either does not exist or is only temporary and insignificant in the long run.

According to the former point of view,[2] the combined effects of reduced and later marriages, very low fertility, increasing divorce, growing frequencies of out-marriage, relatively low proportions of children of mixed marriages raised as Jews and a negative balance between identificational inflows to, and outflows from, the Jewish

community create a serious population problem for American Jewry. Some of these processes simply reflect general population trends in more developed societies and in America in particular; others stem from the particular status of the Jews as a relatively small minority group whose socioeconomic stratification differs significantly from that of other religious-ethnic groups and of the total American population. But, whatever the cause, the cumulative consequences of these trends are aging of the population and, eventually, a negative balance both between Jewish births and Jewish deaths and between accessions and secessions—leading to Jewish population decline.

The opposite view[3] tends to emphasize the high level of socioeconomic and public achievement of Jews in the United States and the continuing importance of ethnicity in American society as a factor leading to community cohesiveness and continuity. Compared to these major positive forces, whatever demographic erosion processes exist are of minor significance. But, in any event, according to this view, no Jewish population erosion is occurring. High marriage propensities continue to characterize American Jews, fertility levels are sufficiently high for generation replacement, out-marriage is not as frequent as is claimed and, in the end, may even produce net numerical gains for the Jewish population.

The aim of this essay is to present a fact-oriented review of several major issues relevant to the demography of Jewish family formation in America. Based on a substantial amount of quantitative evidence, attention is paid here to marriage and mixed marriage; other topics of cardinal importance such as fertility and population aging are only dealt with tangentially, being treated in greater detail elsewhere.[4] It is recognized from the outset that the empirical bases of research are far from satisfactory and that, consequently, the analysis of the sociodemographic trends of American Jewry is complex, subject to a significant margin of error and open to conflicting interpretations.[5]

Data Resources and Limitations

The analysis of U.S. Jewish demography is handicapped by a dearth of data sources and serious deficiencies in many of those that do exist. Jews cannot be distinguished as such in the decennial population censuses, in the Current Population Surveys conducted by the Bureau of the Census or in the regular vital statistics issued by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics. The one countrywide Jewish sample survey, the *National Jewish Population Study* (NJPS) of 1970–71, was underutilized as a data source for analytical and policy purposes, though it did yield some important research. Today, however, its usefulness is mainly retrospective as a past bench mark. There are a number of national surveys in the United States from which interesting information about the Jews can be gauged, but the proportion of Jews in the total population (between 2 and 3 percent) results in very small Jewish subsamples that preclude more detailed cross-classifications and in-depth analysis.

Recent information derives primarily from local Jewish surveys, of which dozens have been conducted over the last decade and a half.[6] Although these surveys have nominally covered over 70 percent of U.S. Jewry, their main purpose has been to serve the interests of local planning and communal services rather than to generate

data suitable for demographic research and amenable to countrywide synthesis. Moreover, the topics of inquiry, concepts, definitions and classifications, sampling methodology and publication of results have not been coordinated, and there is a lack of quite basic demographic information. Studied comparatively, their data present a disconcerting array of local variations compounded by technical incompatibilities. Moreover, data collected on Jewish initiative are subject to biases because of the possible over-representation of the more Jewishly committed sections of the community.

Nevertheless, these limitations do not seem to have deterred scholars from arriving at far-reaching generalizations about national processes based on the study of a certain specific local situation.[7] Such an approach is of dubious validity given the documented differences in demographic, socioeconomic and Jewish characteristics of various regional and local Jewish communities deriving from both general and group-related variables.

In this study an attempt will be made to address Jewish family patterns at the countrywide level through a combined use of several national and local sources and an assessment of the range of variation and central trends emerging from them. We also suggest that data on the Jewish population of Canada—where official decennial censuses and marriage statistics customarily distinguish the Jews as a separate religious and/or ethnic category—offer a reasonable proxy where comparable data on U.S. Jews do not exist. Indeed, comparisons of parallel information for the Jewish populations in the two countries show similar basic levels and trends. Canadian official statistics are continuous over time and quite free, moreover, from those limitations that affect most available data on U.S. Jews.[8]

MARRIAGE PATTERNS

Background

Marriage can be generally viewed as the resultant of three major groups of determinants: sociocultural, or the desirability of marriage; socioeconomic, or the feasibility of marriage; and demographic, or the availability of marriage partners.[9]

A brief overview of Jewish marriage patterns in the past with regard to each of these factors provides an appropriate background for the assessment of recent marriage trends among American Jews. The abundant evidence points to a number of conclusions. The sociocultural factors—the normative centrality of the family in traditional Jewish culture—generally produced a greater propensity to marry among the Jews than among other religio-ethnic groups. The socioeconomic factors—the peculiar occupational stratification of Jewish communities—produced differences in the frequency of marriage as affected by general socioeconomic change. Finally, the demographic factors—the relatively small size and segmented structure of the pool of potential Jewish marriage candidates—tended to lessen marriages among the Jews.[10]

From a comparative perspective, marriage patterns of Jews in the United States and Canada generally featured significantly lower rates of singlehood, accompanied

by lower ages at marriage, than among Jews in Europe.[11] Moreover, after the Second World War and until recently, North American Jews tended to marry later but more frequently than did the general white population.[12] In the United States, for example, according to the 1970–71 NJPS, the proportion never-married at ages 45 to 49 was 2.4 percent among Jewish women and 1.6 percent among Jewish men versus 5.2 percent and 6.2 percent, respectively, among all whites. This was consistent with the model of nearly universal marriage that applied to Jewish communities in a more distant past. Moreover, Jewish families were comparatively more stable, the rate of divorce being about one-half the level of total whites.[13]

Recent Jewish community surveys in the United States, however, have shown a slow but uninterrupted increase in rates of singlehood, especially among younger adults, which is in line with a significant decline in marriage frequencies among the general white population. By the mid-1980s the rate of marriage per one thousand single adults in the United States had reached an unprecedented low.[14] Besides, a substantial increase in divorce has been recorded for the total population of the United States. Although divorce rates continue to be lower among the Jews than among the total population and in spite of a higher-than-average tendency to remarry among Jews with a terminated marriage, the proportions of currently divorced individuals and of one-parent households have rapidly increased in recent years.[15]

Unfortunately, with few exceptions,[16] these changing Jewish family patterns have not been studied systematically. The basic questions of maintenance or abandonment of nearly universal marriage and of substantial family stability and the related question of choice of partner from within or outside the Jewish community—as well as their implications for other aspects of Jewish demography such as cohort replacement and population size—need clarification.

Propensity to Marry

A few examples of the findings available since the early 1970s on the proportion of never-married Jewish adults in different places are given in Table 1. Despite inconsistencies in age classification and in breakdown by gender in the original data, Table 1 clearly documents the recent increase in singlehood among U.S. Jews. The proportion single in age groups 25–34 increased twice or more—from a countrywide level of about 16 percent for males and 10 percent for females in 1970–71 to levels in the range of 30 to 45 percent among males and 17 to 33 percent among females—in several local surveys conducted between 1975 and 1985. Among persons in age groups 35–44, the proportion single in 1970–71 was about 4 percent for males and 2 percent for females; the corresponding figures in the more recent surveys were 4 to 10 percent among males and 3 to 7 percent among females. Clearly, Jewish singlehood rates in the United States have increased two or three times in fifteen years.

Similar trends are clearly evident in the data from recent decennial Canadian censuses, which in 1971 reported substantially higher proportions of never-married Jews in all age groups over 25 than did the NJPS.[17] If we focus only on the oldest age group, by 1981 the proportion never-married in the Canadian Jewish population

age group 45–54 had fallen somewhat to 3 percent among women, and to 6.3 percent among men. Nevertheless, when compared with 6.4 percent and 7.3 percent respectively, among the total population, the data indicate that comparatively higher marriage propensities continue to characterize the Jewish group at the end of the reproductive age.[18] At the bottom end of the scale the opposite prevailed: among younger adults, relatively fewer Jews than total Canadians were ever-married. In 1981, for example, in the 25–34 age group, 80.3 percent of the Jewish women and 65.8 percent of the Jewish men were ever-married as against 84.4 percent and 76.6 percent, respectively, in the total population. The difference was even greater among the 20–24 age group: only 28.4 percent of Jewish women and 12.2 percent of Jewish men had already married, as compared with 49 percent and 28.2 percent, respectively, in the total population. The Canadian census figures indicate a general a general rise in the proportions of ever-married among Jewish women (aged 20 to 24) and young Jewish men (aged 25 to 34) from 1931 to 1961, followed subsequently by a sharp decline for both sexes. The drop among Jews is more marked than similar declines among the general Canadian population, so that overall the gap between Jews and others has increased.

When the proportion of Canadian Jews already married at ages 20 to 24 in 1981 is compared with that observed from previous censuses, clear changes are evident. Among Jewish women that proportion was 25.8 percent in 1931, it increased to 32 percent in 1941, 57.7 percent in 1951 and 62 percent in 1961, and then declined to 44.9 percent in 1971 and 28.4 percent in 1981. The trend in Canada's total female population was similar, but the recent decline in younger marriages was much more marked among Jewish women. Among Jewish men aged 25 to 34, the proportions ever-married were 64 percent in 1931, 60.7 percent in 1941, 70.2 percent in 1951, 71.3 percent in 1961, and 72.8 percent in 1971, declining to 65.8 percent in 1981. Again, these percentages follow the same trend as those in the total male population, but they are systematically lower. Overall, the gap between the proportion married for Jewish and total males has increased continually between 1951 and 1981.

This diminished nuptiality of younger adults since the early 1960s is open to two different interpretations: no basic change in the ultimate propensity to marry, but the postponement of marriage; a decline in the propensity to marry. Some clues as to the correct interpretation are to be found in Table 2. Decennial increases in the proportion ever-married by age can be computed for three ten-year periods between 1951 and 1981. The calculation assumes that the persons reported in the earlier of two successive censuses reappear—ten years older—in the next one.[19] By summing up the increases in the proportions ever-married of all relevant age groups during an inter-censal interval we can estimate the percentage ever-married around age 50 within a hypothetical cohort passing through these ages. We shall refer to this measure as the period proportion ever-marrying (PEM).

The PEM differed somewhat for men and women in Canada. Among women, PEM tended to decline over the years. It was exceptionally high during the 1950s, reaching values greater than 100 percent among both the Jewish and total populations. This incongruous but computationally possible finding was due to the very high marriage frequencies that characterized most age groups during the 1950s, as a

Table 1. Percentage of Jews Never-married, by Age and Sex—United States and Canada, 1931–85

Community	Year	Males				Females			
		20–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	20–24	25–34	35–44	45–54
Canada									
Total	1931	89.4	36.0	7.3	3.0	74.2	21.5	2.8	1.4
Total	1941	87.8	39.3	12.7	5.6	68.0	29.0	9.1	2.5
Total	1951	78.1	29.8	11.7	7.2	42.3	14.3	9.9	6.3
Total	1961	80.4	28.7	10.1	7.0	38.0	7.7	5.0	6.5
Total	1971	79.7	27.2	9.2	8.2	55.1	13.3	4.4	4.1
Total	1981	87.8	34.2	8.2	6.3	71.6	19.7	6.0	3.0
United States[a]									
Total (NJPS)	1970–71	78.3	16.0	3.9	1.6	56.9	9.8	1.9	2.4
Pittsburgh	1975	95.3	36.2	6.0	3.9[b]	82.6	18.2	6.6	6.5[b]
Boston	1975		62.9[c]	10.4[d]	2.1[e]		54.3[c]	8.0[d]	9.1[e]
Minneapolis	1981	91.4	30.6	8.1	6.0	80.0	17.5	5.2	2.8
St. Paul	1981	95.8	35.9	3.7	4.0	72.7	17.2	6.6	3.0
Washington	1983	96.9[f]	46.0	8.0	1.4	90.9[f]	33.0	7.1	2.5
Baltimore	1985	96.9[f]	38.0	10.0	3.0[g]	80.0[f]	27.0	3.0	2.0[g]

		Both Sexes			
		20–24	25–29	30–39	40–49
Boston	1965		42.0[h]	11.0	3.0
	1975		55.0[h]	9.0	6.0
	1985		63.0[h]	23.0	4.0
Los Angeles	1967		50.9	6.2	4.8
	1979		58.8	16.1	3.7
Rochester	1980		72.0[c]	7.1[d]	2.8[g]
Chicago	1981	95.0[i]	56.0[j]	15.0	3.0
Denver	1981	76.5[f]	39.8	15.5	2.8
Nashville	1982	95.3[i]	41.9[j]	7.8	4.8
Miami	1982		26.2[k]	7.5[l]	
Milwaukee	1983		70.7[c]	13.2	5.0
Kansas City	1985	93.7[f]	25.0[m]	5.0[n]	1.0[g]

Notes: [a]Only places with data for all Jewish individuals—as distinguished from respondents or heads of households—were included here.

[b]40 and over [f]18–24 [i]18–22 [l]35–49
[c]18–29 [g]45–64 [j]23–29 [m]25–34
[d]30–44 [h]21–29 [k]20–34 [n]35–44
[e]45–59

Sources: CANADA: Statistics Canada, various censuses: UNITED STATES: NJPS data file, authors' processing; Morris Axelrod, Floyd Fowler and Arnold Gurin, *A Community Survey for Long Range Planning—A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston: 1967); Floyd J. Fowler, *1975 Community Survey—A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston: 1977); Peter Friedman et al., *Metropolitan Chicago Jewish Population 1981: Preliminary Tables* (Chicago: 1982); Lois Geer, *The Jewish Community of Greater Minneapolis 1981 Population Study* (Minneapolis: 1981); Lois Geer, *1981 Population Study of the St. Paul Jewish Community* (St. Paul: 1981); Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change: Emerging Patterns in America* (Bloomington: 1985); Nancy Hendrix, *A Demographic Study of the Jewish Community of Nashville and Middle Tennessee* (Nashville: 1982); Sherry Israel, *Boston's Jewish Community: The 1985 CJP Demographic Survey* (Boston: 1987); Bruce Phillips, "Los Angeles Jewry: A Demographic Portrait," *American Jewish Year Book* 86 (1986), 126–195; Bruce A. Phillips and Eleanore P. Judd, *The Denver Jewish Population Study, 1981* (Denver: 1982); Bruce A. Phillips and Eve Weinberg, *The Milwaukee Jewish Population: Report of a Survey* (Chicago: 1984); Peter Regenstreif, *The Jewish Population of Rochester New York (Monroe County) 1980* (Rochester: 1981); Alvin Rogal, *Demographic Committee Report* (Pittsburgh: 1977); Ira M. Sheskin, *Population Study of the Greater Miami Jewish Community* (Miami: 1982); Gary A. Tobin, *Jewish Population Study of Greater Baltimore* (Baltimore: 1986); Gary A. Tobin, *A Demographic Study of the Jewish Community of Greater Kansas City—Executive Summary, Summer 1986* (Kansas City: 1986); Joseph Waksberg, Janet Greenblatt and Gary A. Tobin, *A Demographic Study of the Jewish Community of Greater Washington, 1983* (Bethesda: 1984).

Table 2. Decennial Increases in Percentage Ever-married Among Total and Jewish Populations, by Sex and Age—Canada, 1951–81

Age	Total Population			Jews		
	1951–61	1961–71	1971–81	1951–61	1961–71	1971–81
Females						
5–14 to 15–24	32.0	30.9	28.2	33.1	24.2	15.9
15–24 to 25–34	60.7	55.5	53.9	58.7	53.6	56.1
25–34 to 35–44	8.3	5.8	5.9	9.3	3.3	7.3
35–44 to 45–54	2.5	1.8	1.4	3.3	0.9	1.4
Period sum = PEM[a]	103.5	94.0	89.4	104.4	82.0	80.7
Males						
5–14 to 15–24	14.3	16.1	14.8	8.6	11.1	6.7
15–24 to 25–34	63.4	65.7	60.5	59.4	64.2	54.7
25–34 to 35–44	15.6	13.5	11.7	19.7	19.5	19.0
35–44 to 45–54	2.6	3.1	2.5	4.7	1.9	2.9
Period sum = PEM[a]	95.9	98.4	89.5	92.4	96.7	83.3

Notes: [a] Percentage ever-marrying, assuming that age-specific increases in percentage ever-married during given period remain constant.

Sources: Computed and adapted from Statistics Canada, various censuses; Jim Torczyner, *The Jewish Family in Canada, 1981* (Montreal: 1984).

result of the postponement of marriages in the 1940s and the advancement by a few years of marriages that otherwise would have taken place during the 1960s. The intensity of this 1950s marriage boom was among women similar in the Jewish and general population.

During the 1960s marriage propensities declined in each age group among both populations, especially at relatively older ages and among younger Jews. In the later 1960s it should be noted, the early baby boom cohorts of women—born soon after the Second World War—reached marriageable age. This produced a number of potentially marriageable women larger than the number of potentially marriageable—(i.e., slightly older) men. The impact of this squeeze was more significant for the Jewish women than for the total Canadian female population. The PEM fell considerably, to 94 percent among all Canadian women and to a much lower 82 percent level among Jewish women.

The trend in women's nuptiality in the 1970s was mixed. On the one hand, marriage propensities at younger ages continued to decline. On the other hand, there were relatively more marriages by Jewish women at older ages, although only small increases were involved. Indeed, 7 percent of the respective Jewish women married between the ages 25 to 34 and 35 to 44 during the 1970s versus 3 percent during the 1960s. The more frequent older marriages were not sufficient, however, to compensate for the much reduced younger marriages, and the PEM, therefore, continued to decline slightly, to 89.4 percent among total women and to 80.7 percent among Jewish women.

The overall declining trend in PEM appeared also for males, but the timing was different and the magnitude smaller. Male PEMs increased during the 1960s as compared to the 1950s. At least part of the increase can be attributed to the favorable position of men in the marriage market because of the large baby boom cohorts of women reaching marriageable ages. Facing a substantially expanding number of potential marriage mates, men were able to make their choice more easily and quickly. However, during the 1970s, the male PEM declined to 89.5 among all men and 83.3 among Jewish men, despite a spouse-supply situation that was mostly favorable to males. During the whole period studied here, the PEM was lower among Jewish males than among all Canadian males. The difference was smaller during the period of relatively greater male nuptiality of the 1960s, but it widened again somewhat during the 1970s. In this instance the fewer marriages at younger and intermediate ages were not compensated for in the 1970s by increased marriages at older ages and consequently, PEM declined.

The data in Table 2 indicate that if the age-specific marriage rates observed among the Jewish population during the 1970s persisted, about 20 percent of the Jewish women and 17 percent of the men under 25 in 1981 would never marry. This would constitute a very substantial departure from universal marriage. By the same token, the data do not support the alternative interpretation that marriages are simply being postponed, with little or no effect on the proportion of a cohort who eventually marry. To the contrary, variations in marriage frequencies—even if they reflect the specific conditions of a certain period of time—seem to have quite permanent effects for the overall marriage history of a particular cohort.

It must be noted, however, that this inference is influenced by the analytical

method used in Table 2, which combined for each period the experience of different cohorts. Among women, the diminished nuptiality of the 1970s led to increased proportions of single individuals in each age group in 1981. Applying a cohort approach and assuming that the marriage rates of the 1970s per 100 singles in each age group will remain unchanged in the 1980s, some increase in the overall frequency of marriages might be expected. The PEM for Jewish women could increase to 85 to 90 percent (depending on different assumptions). But even this figure is markedly lower than the proportion ever-married actually found among Jewish women aged 45 to 49 in 1981 (97 percent), which reflected the high marriage propensities of young adults during the 1950s. Among Jewish men, the persistence of the age-specific marriage rates of the 1970s during the 1980s would cause a further decline of the PEM to 75 to 80 percent (vs. an actual proportion of 94 percent in 1981).

More refined measurements, including transition probability techniques, might improve the prediction of marriage trends among Jews. But at this stage it is clear that the recent pattern of reduced nuptiality is conducive to increased proportions of permanent singlehood among both Jewish men and women.

The reduced frequency of marriage among younger adults—since the 1960s among women and since the 1970s also among men—has obviously produced a considerable increase in the average age at marriage. Later marriages have contributed to the overall decline in fertility that has occurred in America since the 1960s.

Divorce

A further demographic transformation that has considerably affected both general and Jewish populations in the United States is the continuing growth of divorce. Past studies have shown that the Jews tended to divorce less than the total population, and they tended to re-marry more frequently after divorce. According to the NJPS,[20] 1.4 percent of Jewish males and 3.4 percent of Jewish females aged 35 to 44 were currently divorced in 1970–71. The proportions of Jews ever-divorced at the same ages were higher—11.8 percent among males and 12.9 percent among females—and yet substantially lower than among the total U.S. whites, where the corresponding figures were 21.1 percent among males and 25.9 percent among females. The greater tendency of Jews toward family life was also shown by the higher percentages of re-married individuals among those with terminated marriages. Among ever-divorced Jews aged 35 to 44, 82.3 percent of males and 68.4 percent of females had married again, compared with 75.6 percent and 64.6 percent, respectively, among the total white population.

Some of the evidence on divorce from the more recent Jewish community surveys is reported in Table 3. In most places surveyed during the first half of the 1980s, between 8 percent and 16 percent of adults in their thirties and early forties were currently divorcées—an increase of three to six times over the levels in the early 1970s. In Canada, where the 1971 frequencies of Jewish divorcées were slightly lower than those of the NJPS, there has also been a visible increase. The proportion divorced or separated among Jews of both sexes aged 35 to 44 rose from 3.1 percent in 1971 to 11.1 percent in 1981.[21] The comparable figures for the total Canadian

Table 3. Percentage of Jews Currently Divorced or Separated, by Age and Sex—United States and Canada, 1965–85

Community	Year	Males				Females			
		20–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	20–24	25–34	35–44	45–54
Canada									
Total	1971	0.3	1.9	2.9	2.4	0.8	3.1	3.3	2.2
United States[a]									
Total (NJPS)	1970–71	0.4	6.5	1.4	1.1	0.9	2.8	3.4	4.8
Pittsburgh	1975	1.2	3.2	1.2	1.1[b]	0.0	2.4	2.5	3.3[b]
Boston	1975	2.6[c]		6.3[d]	11.4[e]	1.8[c]		4.8[d]	4.2[e]
Minneapolis	1981	0.0	2.6	9.0	8.1	0.0	6.7	13.3	8.4
St. Paul	1981	0.0	1.0	6.0	3.2	0.0	2.8	6.6	8.0
Washington	1983	0.0[f]	4.5	14.3	8.4	0.0[f]	7.8	8.5	15.2
Baltimore	1985	0.0[f]	3.0	9.0	4.0[g]	3.0[f]	6.0	8.0	5.0[g]

		Both Sexes			
		20–24	25–29	30–39	40–49
Boston	1965		0.0[h]	1.0	0.0
	1975		2.0[h]	3.0	2.0
	1985		0.0[h]	8.0	12.0
Los Angeles	1967		5.5	3.9	6.8
	1979		7.2	12.6	13.6
Rochester	1980		—[c]	5.9[d]	2.8[g]
Chicago	1981	0.0[i]	4.0[i]	10.0	10.0
Denver	1981	0.0[f]	6.0	10.6	21.3
Nashville	1982	0.0[i]	3.5[j]	7.8	7.7
Miami	1982		11.3[k]	16.2[l]	
Milwaukee	1983		1.4[c]	9.6	7.6
Kansas City	1985	1.0[f]	4.0[m]	13.0[n]	6.0[g]

Notes: [a]Only places with data for all Jewish individuals—as distinguished from respondents or heads of households—were included here.

[b]40 and over [f]18–24 [i]18–22 [l]35–49
[c]18–29 [g]45–64 [j]23–29 [m]25–34
[d]30–44 [h]21–29 [k]20–34 [n]35–44
[e]45–59

Sources: See Table 1.

population were 1.9 percent in 1971 and 9.2 percent in 1981—an indication that the past difference between Jews and non-Jews with regard to divorce and remarriage may be fading away.

Further analyses of the frequency of terminated marriages among selected subsections of the Jewish population in Greater New York around 1981 point to striking internal variations.[22] The proportion ever-divorced among Jews aged 35 to 54 ranged from a low of 6.4 percent among those with high ritual observance to a high of 51.3 percent among those with low ritual observance. The frequency of divorce was significantly associated with several other indicators of Jewishness—in terms of both parental background and personal behavior and attitudes. Levels of marital instability among the least identified sections of the Jewish population seem, therefore, to have become equal to those of the U.S. total white population, among which the cumulative rate of divorce has been estimated at 50 percent and over for recent marriage cohorts.[23] On the other hand, a wide gulf remains between the family behavior of the more observant and closely knit sections of the Jewish population and the majority of Americans.

Although the available data are still partial and fragmentary, the continuous growth in the percentages of currently divorced Jews—shown by most of the recent community surveys—almost certainly reflects both more frequent divorces among the ever-married and less frequent re-marriages among the ever-divorced. The trend has significant effects for Jewish population composition and creates new needs from the point of view of Jewish communal services, especially with regard to the rapid increase of one-parent households.

MIXED MARRIAGE PATTERNS

Background

The frequency and demographic consequences of out-marriage constitute a central theme in the debate about the implications of present population trends for the future of American Jewry. The frequency of out-marriage can be posited as one of the most symptomatic sociodemographic indicators of group cohesion. It is thus of interest both at a descriptive level, as a measure of group cohesion, or for the comparison between several groups within the same population; and, at a more theoretical level, as a criterion for assessing the nature of interaction between different religio-ethnic groups in the context of changing social norms and social structure.

The recent social science literature on American Jewry has not arrived at a consensus on the frequency of out-marriage and/or mixed marriage in recent years. Neither is there agreement as to the significance of these observed trends for Jewish continuity. Although the dispute arises, in part, from competing theoretical frameworks—the hypotheses of assimilation, pluralism and transformation[24]—it is largely due to fragmentary and often unclear statistical documentation. What is more, the definitions of basic concepts adopted in different studies are often inconsistent and, at times, obscure, which obviously hinders the comparability of find-

ings and their interpretation. There are also methodological lacunae and biases. Most of the data now available on U.S. Jewry derive from Jewish community surveys that often do not fully cover non-affiliated or marginal Jewish households and are, therefore, likely to underestimate the actual frequency of out-marriage. Finally, findings from such surveys can be affected by local or regional factors that may not reflect countrywide trends.

A further complicating feature of the debate is that comparatively little effort has been made to define clearly the types of marriages to which cited frequencies refer. In this discussion, we shall use the term "out-marriage" to refer to all weddings in which one of the spouses was not born Jewish or was not Jewish at the time the two partners first met. Where the non-Jewish partner does not change his or her original identification, the term "mixed marriage" will be employed. In case of conversion, the term "conversionary marriage" has been adopted.[25]

Much of the uncertainty in the current understanding of levels of out-marriage and mixed marriage is due to the fact that at least eight different percentages can be computed from the same survey data. Such percentages may relate, respectively, to: married/marrying Jewish *individuals* versus *couples* with at least one Jewish spouse; *all marriages* (couples) in a given population versus *marriages* (weddings) *performed in recent years* only; and marriages by religion of spouses *at birth* (or when they first met) versus marriages by religion *at the time of survey* (i.e., after allowing for cases of conversion).

The wide range of percentages that can be obtained in the United States according to different combinations of measurement criteria is illustrated by the results of the 1970–71 NJPS:[26]

	Percentage of Out-marriage (by religion at birth)		Percentage of Mixed Marriage (by religion at time of survey)	
Marriages	Individuals	Couples	Individuals	Couples
All	8.1	15.0	6.8	12.5
Recent (1965–71)	29.2	45.1	22.5	34.8

On the face of these data, it is legitimate to quote the NJPS as showing out-marriage rates as low as 6.8 percent or as high as 45.1 percent. To avoid misleading or haphazard practices, clear explanation and justification of the type of rate used should be provided.

In our present analysis, we focus on the *frequency of Jewish individuals recently contracting a mixed marriage,* that is, on the *percentage of Jews with a non-converted non-Jewish-born spouse among recent marriage cohorts or younger age groups* (see bold figure in the NJPS table).

Frequency of Mixed Marriage

Besides the data from the March 1957 *Current Population Report,*[27] the bulk of countrywide information on mixed marriage comes from the 1970–71 NJPS. For

reasons that we have detailed elsewhere, early figures from the NJPS were inconsistent and not free of error. Utilizing a data-file cleaning procedure, we obtained a revised series of out-marriage rates.[28] This revealed that nationally the percentage of Jewish individuals married to a non-Jewish-born partner who had not converted, regardless of year of marriage, grew from 4 percent in 1957 to 7 percent in 1970–71 (see Tables 4 and 5). Individual rates of mixed marriage among U.S. Jewry were very low until the 1950s: less than 2 percent during the first quarter of this century, 3 to 5 percent during the 1930s and 1940s and 5 percent during the 1950s. The percentage doubled to a still relatively modest level of 10 percent in 1960–64, and it increased again by twice or more to 22.5 percent in 1965–71.

These NJPS findings indicate a discontinuity in the mixed marriage patterns after 1965 owing to one or more of a number of factors. The third generation of American Jews—although becoming structurally more assimilated into American society—was coming of age and marrying. College studies were becoming almost universal among the Jews, leading to intensified patterns of interaction between young Jews and non-Jews.

The trend to increasing frequency of mixed marriage is confirmed by repeated observation of certain communities over time (see the data for Boston, Los Angeles and Kansas City in Table 4). However, the salient finding from the more recent surveys is the enormous local variation that prevails in the United States (see Table 4). Among the younger age groups and more recent marriage cohorts surveyed during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the proportion of Jewish spouses with a non-converted non-Jewish partner ranged between 11 percent in New York[29] and 61 percent in Denver.[30] It also appears that the NJPS estimates are quite close to the central values of ranges obtained from these recent community surveys for comparable years of marriage or ages of spouses. Tables 4 and 5 clearly indicate that the rate of mixed marriage has continued to increase throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.

Jewish women's heterogamy has increased more significantly than that of Jewish men and the previous clear and consistent sex differential has tended to narrow.[31] It can be assumed that this, at least in part, reflects a temporary imbalance between the numbers of potential Jewish grooms and brides in the late 1960s and during the 1970s—namely, the excess of young Jewish women belonging to large baby boom cohorts over the smaller numbers of males born a few years earlier.

The overall religious composition of couples in Table 4 exhibits several other interesting features. A relatively large variation of the frequency of mixed marriage exists between, as well as within, major metropolitan areas. In the Greater New York area, very low levels of mixed marriage characterize the more densely Jewish boroughs and suburbs, whereas higher rates appear in some of the urban and suburban counties where the Jewish population has significantly relocated in recent years.[32] With regard to all existing marriages, the proportion of Jewish individuals with currently non-Jewish spouses ranged between 3 to 5 percent in Brooklyn, Queens and Nassau County—probably the lowest levels in the United States—to about 12 percent in Manhattan and Suffolk County—a level found in several other U.S. cities. Frequencies of mixed marriage among children of respondents in Kansas City in 1976[33] were much higher than among the respondents themselves in the

same survey—and almost identical to those of the respondents in a more recent study of the same community.[34] In all the survey data published so far, the highest percentages of currently mixed couples among all existing households were in Seattle.[35] There seems to be a clear rise in the frequency of mixed marriages as one moves from the northeastern United States to the South and West—controlling for size of community. These findings confirm the significant relationships between age, generation, geographic mobility and frequency of mixed marriage pointed out in earlier studies of mixed marriage among American Jews.[36]

Once again, Canadian data lend support to these patterns and trends. In Canada, too, the striking regional differentials are consistent with those observed in the United States. In 1981 the proportion of Jews in mixed families[37] ranged between relatively low levels of 6 percent in Montreal; 8 percent in Toronto and Winnipeg; 14 to 16 percent in Ottawa, Hamilton, Calgary and Edmonton; 19 percent in Vancouver (the fourth largest community in Canada); and 25 percent in the small communities in the North Atlantic Maritime Provinces.[38] The current levels of mixed marriage among recently married Jews were much higher. When comparisons could be made for communities of similar size and regional location—particularly for the east–west continuum—percentages of mixed marriage were generally higher in the United States than in Canada.

In the past the frequency of mixed marriage among recently formed couples was quite similar for Jews in the United States and Canada. A comparison of Canadian official marriage statistics with the NJPS data, however, suggests that the recent increase began earlier and was more marked in the United States. The individual percentages of mixed marriage in Canada moved from 3 percent during the 1930s to 5 percent in the late 1940s, 7 percent in the 1950s, 9 percent in 1961–65, 12 percent in 1966–70, 19 percent in 1971–75, and 25 percent in the late 1970s. By 1980–82, excluding the province of Quebec, 28 percent of Jewish spouses in Canada married a non-Jewish partner.[39] As noted earlier, a somewhat lower mixed marriage level is documented for Montreal from census data of existing couples;[40] therefore, the Canadian countrywide average of mixed weddings at the outset of the 1980s can be put at around 25 percent. Data provided by Statistics Canada—excluding the provinces of Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta—confirm an individual level of mixed marriage of about 25 percent in 1985.[41] Given the lower than average frequency of mixed marriages in Quebec and the past higher levels for Alberta and especially British Columbia, the latter figure cannot be far from the average for the entire country.

A countrywide estimate of levels of mixed marriage for the United States can be arrived at by computing an average, weighted according to Jewish population size that (1) takes into account the empirically ascertained proportions of mixed marriage in the numerous localities investigated and (2) assigns other localities to categories of presumed intensity in the level of mixed marriage in accord with geographic region and Jewish community size. An exercise of this kind—carried out by Silberman[42]—gave an average of between 22 and 27 percent. In addition to some serious inconsistencies in the data included,[43] the consistently higher figures in several later community reports suggest that Silberman's calculations have underestimated the levels. Taking more recent surveys into consideration, the individual

Table 4. Percentage of Jews with Currently Non-Jewish Spouse, by Year of Marriage/Age—United States and Canada, 1950–86

Community	Year	Percentage of Jews in Current Mixed Marriages								
		Couples	Individuals, by Year of Marriage							
		Total[a]	Total[a]	1980–84	1975–79	1970–74	1965–69	1960–64	1955–59	1950–54
Canada	1981	18[b]	10[b]	28[c]	25[c]	19[c]	12[c]	9[c]	8[c]	6[c]
United States										
Total (CPS)	1957	7.6	4							
Total (NJPS)	1970–71	12.5	7				22.5	10	5	4
Seattle	1978	44	28							
Oklahoma City	1980	15	8							
Rochester	1980	11	6							
New York	1981	10	6			11		9		4
Brooklyn		6	3							
Queens		7	4							
The Bronx		9	5							
Staten Island		17	9							
Manhattan		19	11							
Nassau County		5	3							
Westchester County		11	6							
Suffolk County		20	12							
St. Louis	1981	13	7		25[d]		19[d]		6[d]	
Minneapolis	1981	18	10							
St. Paul	1981	11	6							
Atlanta	1984	20	12							
Kansas City	1985	31	21		46		26		11	
Boston[d]	1985	24	14	29	29	20	27	10	5	0
Metro West, N.J.	1986	12	7							

			Individuals, by Age				
			Total[a]	18–29	30–39	40–49	50–59
Boston	1965	7	4	11	4	4	2
	1975	11	6	13	10	12	2
Kansas City	1976						
Respondents		7	4	6[e]	3[g]	2[h]	
Children[f]		31	18	27[e]	10[g]	13[h]	
Los Angeles	1967	10	5				
	1979	19	12	33	13	7	8
Cleveland	1980	18	11	24	19	14	5
Chicago	1981	17	9	16	18	8	4
Denver	1981	30	18	61	32	8	7
Miami[d]	1982	10	5	22[e]		13[i]	8[j]
Milwaukee	1983	19	11	28	20	9	6
Phoenix	1983	24	14	40	17	14	7
Washington, D.C.	1983	25	15	28[k]	21[l]	14[g]	10[m]
Philadelphia	1983–84	22	12	34	23	13	8
Pittsburgh	1984						
Respondents		10	5				
Children[n]		26	15	29	20	6	4
Richmond	1984	33	20	44	29	21	6
Baltimore[d]	1985	22	12	24	23	12	6

Notes: [a]A simple arithmetical relationship exists between the percentages of mixed marriage for couples and for individuals within the same population, assuming the number of spouses of each sex is roughly the same. When only one type of percentage was available from a survey report, we computed the other one as well.

[b]1981 census (all countries).
[c]Official vital statistics. Quebec Province not included.
[d]Including persons converted to Judaism.
[e]18–34.
[f]Regardless of place of residence.
[g]35–44.
[h]45 and over.
[i]35–54.
[j]55 and over.
[k]18–24.
[l]25–34.
[m]45–64.
[n]Pittsburgh residents.

(*continued*)

Table 4. *(Continued)*

Sources: CANADA: Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada* (Ottawa: 1983); Statistics Canada, unpublished tabulations provided to the authors (Ottawa: 1987); Jim Torczyner, *The Jewish Family in Canada, 1981* (Montreal: 1984): UNITED STATES: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population of the United States: March 1957," *Current Population Reports*, ser. P–20, n. 79 (Washington, D.C.: 1958); Uziel O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demographic Consequences of U.S. Jewish Population Trends," *American Jewish Year Book* 83 (1983), 141–187; Morris Axelrod, Floyd Fowler and Arnold Gurin, *A Community Survey for Long Range Planning—A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston: 1967); Sarah Caldwell, *Demographic Profile and Community Survey* (Oklahoma City: 1982); Floyd J. Fowler, *1975 Community Survey—A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston: 1977); Peter Friedman et al., *Metropolitan Chicago Jewish Population 1981: Preliminary Tables* (Chicago: 1982); Lois Geer, *The Jewish Community of Greater Minneapolis 1981 Population Study* (Minneapolis: 1981); Lois Geer, *1981 Population Study of the St. Paul Jewish Community* (St. Paul: 1981); Sherry Israel, *Boston's Jewish Community: The 1985 CJP Demographic Survey* (Boston: 1987); Albert Mayer, *The Jewish Population Study of the Greater Kansas City Area* (Kansas City: 1977); James McCann and Debra Friedman, *A Study of the Jewish Community in the Greater Seattle Area* (Seattle: 1979); Bruce A. Phillips, "Los Angeles Jewry: A Demographic Portrait," *American Jewish Year Book* 86 (9186), 126–195; Bruce A. Phillips and William S. Aron, *The Greater Phoenix Jewish Population Study 1983–84* (Phoenix: 1984); Bruce A. Phillips and Eleanore P. Judd, *The Denver Jewish Population Study, 1981* (Denver: 1982); Bruce A. Phillips and Eve Weinberg, *The Milwaukee Jewish Population: Report of a Survey* (Chicago: 1984); Peter Regenstreif, *The Jewish Population of Rochester New York (Monroe County) 1980* (Rochester: 1981); Paul Ritterband and Steven M. Cohen, "The Social Characteristics of the New York Area Jewish Community, 1981" *American Jewish Year Book* 84 (1984), 128–161; Ann Schorr, *Survey of Cleveland Jewish Population, 1981* (Cleveland: 1982); Ann Schorr, *Pittsburgh Jewish Population Data, 1984* (Pittsburgh: 1984); Ann Schorr, *Demographic Survey of the Jewish Community of Richmond* (Richmond: 1984); Ira M. Sheskin, *Population Study of the Greater Miami Jewish Community* (Miami: 1982); Gary A. Tobin, *A Demographic and Attitudinal Study of the Jewish Community of St. Louis* (St. Louis: 1982); Gary A. Tobin, *Jewish Population Study of Greater Baltimore* (Baltimore: 1986); Gary A. Tobin, *A Demographic Study of the Jewish Community of Greater Kansas City—Executive Summary, Summer 1986* (Kansas City: 1986); Gary A. Tobin, *Jewish Population Survey of Metro West, New Jersey* (personal communication to the authors, 1987); Joseph Waksberg, Janet Greenblatt and Gary A. Tobin, *A Demographic Study of the Jewish Community of Greater Washington, 1983* (Bethesda: 1984); Jay Weinstein, *Metropolitan Atlanta Jewish Population Study: Summary of Main Findings* (Atlanta: 1985); William L. Yancey and Ira Goldstein, *The Jewish Population of the Greater Philadelphia Area* (Philadelphia: 1984).

Table 5. Percentage of Jews Out-marrying and Percentage of Spouses Converting to Judaism, by Year of Marriage/Age—United States, 1900–85

Year of Survey and Year of Marriage/Age at Survey	Percentage Married with Spouse:		Percentage Converted to Judaism Out of All Non-Jewish-Born Spouses
	Non-Jewish at Birth	Non-Jewish at Survey	
NJPS National Survey, 1970–71, by Year of Marriage			
1900–24	1.7	1.4	18
1925–34	3.0	2.6	15
1935–44	4.9	4.6	7
1945–54	5.8	5.4	8
1955–64	9.1	7.4	19
1965–71	29.2	22.5	23
Local Community Surveys, 1972–85, by Age at Survey[a]			
30–39	23–27	18–22	19–23
18–29	35–39	28–32	16–20

Note: [a]Figures in this part of the table are central values in the observed range of local survey results.

Sources: See Table 4.

proportion of mixed marriages in the United States is currently between 28 and 32 percent, or an average of about 30 percent.

This, it will be recalled, is the estimated proportion of Jewish *individuals* of either sex currently marrying a non-Jewish-born spouse who does not convert to Judaism. It corresponds to about 45 percent of all newly formed *couples or households* with at least one Jewish partner. Although these U.S. estimates entail some margin of error, the actual couple rate of mixed marriage for Canada was 39 percent in 1985 (without Quebec, British Columbia or Alberta) against 31 percent in 1971–75 and 17 percent in 1961–65.[44] These estimates indicate clearly the considerable extent of the increase in mixed marriages in the United States and Canada over the past twenty years. The pace of this diffusional process since the mid-1960s demands careful analysis and explanation. The substantial proportion of Jewish children reared in mixed families has implications for the religious identification and upbringing of the next generation that are as yet unassessed (discussed later). Moreover, these are the current proportions of mixed marriage only; the total proportions of out-marriage, including conversions in either direction, must be still greater.

In spite of this recent increase, Jewish out-marriage is comparatively infrequent in the context of American society. Comprehensive countrywide data such as the U.S. 1957 *Current Population Report* and the more recent Canadian censuses show that the proportion of mixed households is generally lower among Jews than among

other religious or ethnic groups, especially after controlling for the size of the group. However, the general frequency of heterogamy has continually increased in North America.[45] A study of ancestry origin conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in 1979 showed a steady increase, by age, in the frequency of persons reporting multiple ancestry. Frequencies increased from 44 percent among persons aged 65 or more to 67 percent among those below 18; among persons belonging to at least the third generation in the United States, the respective percentages were 59 and 75 percent.[46] Although the figures reflect, even if indirectly, the rising general trend of inter-ethnic marriages, they do not relate to religion. Inter-religious heterogamy may, in fact, be somewhat less frequent, whereas inter-racial heterogamy in America is not very frequent at all. In any event, the convergence among different groups with a common European background—including the Jews—continues to be substantial.

Jewish levels of out-marriage may, on current trends, be expected to increase. The influence of three sociodemographic factors till now connected with increased heterogamy is likely to be maintained in the foreseeable future. The first is countrywide population redistribution in the United States, particularly from the Northeast to the South and West, that is consistently associated with higher regional out-marriage rates—other things such as Jewish community size being equal.[47] Further Jewish population redistribution toward the southern and western regions can therefore be expected to be associated with a continuing rise in countrywide average levels of out-marriage. The second factor concerns the relationship between marital stability and choice of partner. Although out-marriages have usually been found to be comparatively less stable than in-marriages, divorcées are more likely to be involved in out-marriage in the re-marriages that frequently follow a divorce—as compared to persons marrying for the first time.[48] Divorce has been comparatively rarer among Jews than among the general population; among other things, this means that its potential for increase is far from exhausted. The third factor is related to the continuation of gender imbalances in the marriage market. These, as we have seen, are determined by changes in natality levels that occurred twenty to thirty years earlier. After the excess female spouse supply of the late 1960s and 1970s, from the 1980s onward, we may expect again an excess of unmarried males over slightly younger females. From the perspective of a given sub-population within a total national population—as is the case with North American Jewry—a deficiency of potential spouses of a given sex within that sub-population may stimulate the quest for partners from outside.[49]

The cultural determinants of family formation and choice of partner are also highly relevant. The social norms that formerly underpinned Jewish endogamy are now maintained less in the Jewish community than in the past. The social acceptability of out-marriage has substantially increased, especially among the young generation of Jews.[50] Although the percentage of persons with an indifferent or even positive attitude toward out-marriage has till now generally been much higher than the proportion who eventually out-marry, heightened acceptability of out-marriage among younger Jews indicates clearly that the upper boundary in the frequency of mixed marriage has not yet been reached.

Spouses and Children of Out-Marriages

The frequency of marriage and the choice of spouse do not affect population size directly, but they do so as a result of three other factors: the possible addition or loss of adults through identificational changes because of out-marriage, the different fertility levels of homogamous versus heterogamous couples and the possible demographic gains or losses arising from the identification choice made by, or for, children of mixed marriages.

The impact of these factors on American Jewry in recent years is perhaps the most difficult and controversial aspect of the current debate. Identificational changes among partners of out-marriages may occur both before and after the wedding. When they grow up, children of out-marriages may change the identification originally decided on by their parents. The analytical context of the problem encompasses the interactions within both the nuclear family and the extended families of the respective spouses.

Ideally, the effects of out-marriage on the identification and demographic behavior of the adults and their children should be investigated in a longitudinal study with periodic follow-up. At least integrated data files should be constructed by linking the records of the spouses and children in out-married households in any given survey. Conventional, cross-sectional data on individuals alone, collected by means of typical Jewish community surveys are not capable of assessing correctly the effects of out-marriage. Some such surveys, moreover, have virtually overlooked those households in which the out-married Jewish spouse has converted *from* Judaism. Silberman's implicit claim[51]—based on Jewish survey data and on impressionistic evidence—that conversion occurs only *to* Judaism is wrong, both methodologically and substantively.

Nevertheless, despite the biased and inadequate nature of most of the available data on spouses and children of out-marriages, a brief overview of some relevant findings can be attempted. One problem concerns the frequency of conversion to Judaism[52] in the context of family formation. The absolute number of individuals who were not born Jewish and who later identified as Jews at the time of a given survey has increased substantially since the 1950s. According to the NJPS data, the proportion of non-Jewish-born wives who were reported as Jews in 1970–71 increased from 12 percent among those married in 1945–54 to 28 percent among the 1955–64 marriage cohort. This clearly reflects an actual increase in these wives' propensity to convert to Judaism at a time when the proportion of out-marriages was slowly growing.[53] However, a slight decrease in the conversion of wives—to 26 percent—occurred among the 1965–71 out-marriages, which themselves represented a much greater proportion of new marriages with at least one Jewish partner than had been the case in any previous cohort. Thus, although the absolute number of conversions had increased, the propensity to convert had not—and may even have declined. In both instances the proportion of non-Jewish-born husbands converting to Judaism was extremely small.

More recent community surveys consistently indicate that only a minority of the spouses of out-married Jews report their religious affiliation to be Jewish at the time

of the interview. Among the younger non-Jewish-born spouses, aged 18 to 29 and 30 to 39 at the time of surveys between 1972 and 1985, the proportion embracing Judaism ranged between 7 and 42 percent, depending on the localities reported in Table 4.[54] The central values of this substantial range were 19 to 23 percent among the 30–39 age group, and 16 to 20 percent among the 18–29 age groups (see Table 5). The NJPS finding of relatively fewer conversions along with more out-marriages is therefore confirmed by the latest batch of Jewish community studies.

The relevance of this finding lies in its connection with the substantial differences between conversionary and mixed households in the degree of Jewishness. Evidence from the NJPS,[55] local community surveys[56] and specially designed surveys of out-married couples[57] shows that the Jewishness of conversionary households, as measured by a variety of attitudinal and behavioral indicators, does not differ much from the average of in-married households and is, in fact, stronger than that of the least Jewishly identified among the latter. Mixed households, on the other hand, display much weaker patterns of Jewishness. Given the declining tendency of the non-Jewish-born spouses to convert to Judaism, mixed households now constitute the vast majority of Jewish out-marriages.

A related issue, requiring systematic investigation, are the personal feelings of Jewish identity and communal participation of the newly converted. Exploratory research points to the complexity and ambivalence of the psycho-social transition involved in conversion, which in some cases may be long-lasting or even remain unresolved.[58] The balance between personal feelings of belonging to a Jewish community, on the one hand, and of community acceptance, on the other, is likely to play an important role in shaping a convert's Jewish identity. This, in turn, may significantly affect the patterns of family life and transmission of Jewish identity to the next generation within conversionary marriages (discussed later).

The NJPS yielded the most systematic information to date on the respective fertility levels of Jewish in-marriages and out-marriages and on the levels of and relationships between demographic and identificational variables,[59] unmatched by any subsequent local survey. Its data in this regard are still relevant today. The NJPS found first, that in 1970–71 in most marriage cohorts, the fertility of out-married couples was much lower than that of homogamous Jewish couples, regardless of the religion of the children. The average difference in the number of children ever-born was 24 percent. This difference can be attributed partly to the later age at marriage and higher educational level of the out-married, both of which are generally associated with lower fertility. Deliberate childlessness or reduction in the number of children among couples apprehensive that the upbringing of children might be a source of conflict may also have been a factor.

Second, the proportion of Jewish children among all children of out-married couples can be compared with a hypothetical equal split between the two parental identifications. If all NJPS out-marriages are considered together, this factor had caused only a minor loss by 1970–71: 49 percent of all children of the reported out-married couples were defined as Jews by their parents. Among currently mixed couples, the proportion of Jewish children was 44 percent. However, among couples married in 1965–71, only 25 percent of the children of all out-marriages and 15 percent of the children of mixed marriages were defined as Jews. In consequence of

this new trend, about 25 percent of all children aged 0 to 4 in the enlarged Jewish population (including the non-Jewish household members) were not identified as Jews in 1970–71.

Third, on the whole, when the influences of differential fertility and of the identification of children are combined, the average number of *Jewish* children (according to parents' definition) per Jewish parent was 26 percent lower in out-marriages than in in-marriages. Because at that time only 14 percent of total reported couples with at least one Jewish partner were out-married, the consequent diminution in fertility of the entire U.S. Jewish population amounted to no more than 4 percent. Although this effect was only marginally negative overall—and had even been moderately positive for one of the earlier marriage cohorts—the last NJPS marriage cohort (1965–71) recorded a net Jewish fertility loss of 15 percent as a result of out-marriage.

Fourth, as measured by the NJPS, the reported religious identification of the children of out-marriages varied in relation to the conversion status of the non-Jewish-born spouse. The proportion Jewish among all children of out-married couples was 94 percent if the mother had converted to Judaism, 86 percent if the mother was Jewish and the father was not and 17 percent[60] if only the father was Jewish. The proportion of Jewish children was 87 percent if the mother indicated preference for one of the three major Jewish denominations (Orthodox, Conservative or Reform); 22 percent if the mother indicated another preference or none at all, with most non-converted mothers in the last category.

A few more recent studies provide comparable data to bring the picture up-to-date. In New York in 1981[61] where the proportion of mixed marriages—11 percent—stood at the low end of the national range during the late 1970s, less than one out of four non-Jewish-born spouses converted to Judaism. The proportion of children of mixed marriages who were raised as Jews was 73 percent if the mother was Jewish and 35 percent if the father was. This replicates the NJPS pattern. In America the majority of children of mixed marriages are identified with the mother's group of origin.[62] However, because of the more rapid increase of mixed marriage among Jewish women than among men in recent years, the distribution of mixed couples by the sex of the Jewish spouse was more evenly balanced in New York in 1981 than found by the NJPS in 1970–71. This largely explains why the overall proportion of children of mixed couples raised as Jews was greater in New York (53 percent) than in the NJPS (44 percent).

The 1985 study of the Jewish community in Baltimore[63] paints a picture substantially similar to that of New York. In households with a non-Jewish-born spouse (including converts), 54 percent of the children under 18 were identified as Jewish, 4 percent had more than one religion, 24 percent other religions and 18 percent none.[64] In Chicago in 1981, on the other hand, 40 percent of all children of mixed couples were identified as Jews, whereas an additional 12 percent were raised both as Jews and members of another religion.[65] In Kansas City in 1985—where the proportion of mixed marriages was among the highest of the recently surveyed communities—38 percent of the children of currently mixed marriages were Jewish.[66]

Another study, conducted in Philadelphia in 1983–84,[67] provides a more in-

depth examination of the relationship between the religious composition of respondent couples and of their parents. Whereas 99 percent of the respondents born to a Jewish couple were raised as Jews themselves, only 59 percent were if the parental marriage was mixed. In the respondent couples, the proportion of Jews married to a non-converted non-Jewish spouse was 11 percent if they were children of in-marriages but 38 percent if their parents' marriage, too, had been mixed. Adding the converted spouses in the respondent couples makes the difference in the proportion of out-married Jews even more striking: 12 percent were out-married if the parents were in-married, compared with 65 percent out-married if the parents had been a mixed couple. The inter-generational relationship between out-marriage and children's Jewishness can be extended one stage further to the children of current mixed marriages among whom only 31 percent were raised as Jews compared with 83 percent among conversionary marriages and 97 percent of the children of two Jewish spouses. If the parents of the Jewish respondent in a current mixed marriage were in-married, 37 percent of his or her children were Jewish, but if the parental marriage had been mixed, the Jewish proportion of children reported in Philadelphia was nil. Again, children of respondents in mixed marriage were more often Jewish if the mother was Jewish (40 percent) than if the father was (22 percent).[68]

On the basis of the comparison between the New York, Baltimore, Chicago, Philadelphia and Kansas City findings, it seems reasonable to infer that in general an inverse relationship exists between the frequency of mixed marriage and the proportion Jewish among the respective children. The greater the degree of mixed marriage, the fewer the number of children who are raised as Jews. The predominant indication of the recent surveys so far analyzed is that less than one-half of the children of mixed marriage are Jewish. Most children of conversionary marriages are raised as Jews, but conversionary marriages constitute a minority of all out-marriages. The overall identificational balance of the children of out-marriage points to losses for the Jewish side.

The more recent Jewish community studies also point to a diminishing difference between the patterns of Jewishness of the in- and out-married couples. As out-marriages have become more frequent, heterogamous and homogamous couples have tended to become increasingly similar. This reflects both a somewhat greater diffusion of Jewish rituals and other specific behaviors among out-married couples and an overall decline of Jewishness among the in-married. Much greater social acceptance of out-marriage[69]—once stigmatized in the Jewish community as a form of social deviance[70]—must be conducive to less friction with relatives and greater self-esteem for the out-married. Improved attitudes toward the out-married may have beneficial effects for their relationship with the Jewish part of the family and with the Jewish community in general. Whether this, by itself, guarantees transmission of Jewish identity to the coming generations is a matter for further scrutiny.

In fact, investigation of the characteristics, attitudes, behaviors and relational networks of the children of out-marriages points to a pattern that, on balance, seems negative for the Jewish group. In a specific eight-city study of out-married families and their offspring, as expected, many more children of conversionary marriages were Jewish—and participated in Jewish life—than children of mixed marriages.[71]

Eighty-four percent of the former, in contrast to only 24 percent of the latter, considered themselves Jewish. More significant, when the prevalence of Jewish or non-Jewish religious practices (synagogue and/or church attendance, major holidays) was compared, *both* types were often adhered to by the same individuals. Jewish rituals prevailed among a majority of children from conversionary marriages, whereas non-Jewish religious practices more clearly predominated among children of mixed marriages.

These findings provide an important corrective to the truncated portrayal of out-married households furnished by Jewish community surveys. Many of the latter have shown the presence of Jewish patterns—including current or planned Jewish education for the children of out-marriages—but have ignored totally the simultaneous existence of non-Jewish patterns within the same households. Moreover, the same study of out-married households found that the social networks of the children of both conversionary and mixed marriages included more non-Jews than was the case with their Jewish-born parents. As compared to the parent generation, the adult children of out-marriages were characterized by more frequent out-marriage and less frequent conversion to Judaism of the non-Jewish born partner.[72]

Although the indications that emerge from the empirical evidence are somewhat tentative and preliminary, they do raise questions about the extent to which the transmission of Jewish identity to the children of out-marriages is effective. Given the increase in out-marriages, this issue is of prime importance for the demographic dynamics and population balance of American Jewry. On the basis of the current evidence, the prevalent process cannot be described as a sudden and complete loss of the out-married and their children; rather, a chain of events seems to be set into motion as each step affects the likelihood and direction of the next. The growing body of recently available survey data shows that as a result of more frequent out-marriage, particularly mixed marriage, Jewish identity is generally weakened, often amalgamated with the ethnocultural heritage of an originally non-Jewish spouse or parent and frequently lost in the longer run.

Overall Identification Balance

There is hardly any statistical evidence on secession from the Jewish population through either adherence to a different religious group or complete lack of identification with any such group. Most of the data collected by Jewish organizations, including those derived from interview surveys, are prone to bias, especially when samples are derived from lists of those who are in some way Jewishly active. A similar bias has also been attributed to surveys based on samples of households bearing distinctive Jewish names.[73] Such surveys tend to picture Jewish wives in out-marriages as attached to Judaism and raising their children Jewishly. But they are marred by an insufficient representation of the opposite: out-married ex-Jewesses who live in non-Jewish surroundings, have lost all attachment with Judaism and the Jewish community and are missed in Jewish-sponsored surveys.

An independent check of the findings obtained through Jewish surveys comes from the General Social Surveys (GSS) conducted since 1972 by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago. The GSS has

included a question on religion and some of these data have been recently published.[74] According to this source, Jews have had the lowest ratio of conversions to disaffiliations among fourteen religious groups—including persons reporting no religion. The Jewish group gained forty persons from other groups per every one hundred it lost. We do not recommend giving too much credence to this exceedingly low ratio because the data file included less than five hundred interviews with self-declared Jews (as distinct from ex-Jews), and this number was aggregated from surveys scattered over a dozen years. Nevertheless, this rare piece of information on the direction of the Jews' identificational balance among the total U.S. population should not be overlooked altogether.

CONCLUSIONS: DECLINE OF THE CONVENTIONAL JEWISH FAMILY

Since the late 1960s or early 1970s, according to the more recent U.S. Jewish community surveys and Canadian censuses and vital statistics, the proportion of Jews who were never-married, were currently divorced or separated or who were married with a currently non-Jewish spouse has substantially increased. Changes in the different aspects of family formation can be synthesized through an index of conventional Jewish family that provides the proportion of Jewish adults who are *currently married and with a Jewish partner* (regardless of the spouse's religion at birth). Such was the normative situation of Jewish adults throughout history; it still overwhelmingly predominated among American Jews throughout the 1960s—much more so than in other Jewish communities in Western countries. Back in 1970–71, according to the NJPS data, 87 percent of Jewish adults aged 30 to 39 (79 percent of Jewish males and 95 percent of Jewish females) lived in conventional Jewish families. By the mid-1980s this proportion had declined to an estimated range of between 70 and 50 percent—depending on locality—and it has probably continued to decline since then.

What do these figures mean? Contrary to the course of most of Jewish history, including the very recent past, the conventional Jewish family is no longer *the* cardinal structural component of Jewish community. Although it still predominates in most Jewish surroundings, more generally, it coexists with several alternative and increasingly visible types of family experience, namely non-marriage, past-marriage and mixed marriage. The impact of such changes is, first of all, demographic. Jewish inter-generational replacement starts with Jewish family formation. Decline in the latter almost unavoidably foreshadows decline in the former, unless marital fertility increases or reproduction is significantly transferred out of the family—neither of which has been, nor is likely to become, the case among the Jews.

Demographically, the larger size of the baby boom cohorts reaching marriageable age during the 1970s should have enhanced more frequent and younger marriages by facilitating mate selection. Our analysis indicates the contrary—that for North American Jewry the marriage patterns of the 1970s are reminiscent of those of the Depression years of the 1930s. Even if we make proper allowance for the increased

rates of unemployment during the 1970s, especially among younger adults, the economic situation of the 1970s is in no way comparable to the crisis of the 1930s. Clearly, profound changes were under way in cultural perceptions about the centrality of marriage as a worthwhile personal goal and its priority relative to other goals such as higher education, women's participation in the labor force and professional careers.[75]

Indeed, the different aspects of Jewish family formation reviewed here are largely consistent and closely intertwined with the socioeconomic structure and mobility characteristics of American Jews, particularly their high rate of urbanization and suburbanization, the very high proportions with college or university educational attainment and their concentration in selected branches of the white-collar occupational range. In spite of diminished nuptiality, weakened family stability and increasing heterogamy, evidence persists of a stronger familistic orientation among the Jews than among other groups, *after controlling for socioeconomic differences.*[76] But, in the context of the greater Jewish familism of the past, the recent changes in Jewish marriage patterns constitute a greater departure from the previous sociodemographic course for Jews than they do for other groups.

Of special interest, here, is the process of, or at least the aspiration to, individuation (i.e. moving out of the parental family without forming one's own family or procreating). This appears to be especially intensive among young Jews, where individuation may be connected with greater economic resources and a persisting stronger attraction toward university education, but it also weakens ethnic ties with the community of origin. Indeed, the other young adult group whose preferred mobility characteristics most resemble those of the Jews is the one reporting no religio-ethnic preference.[77]

Will the recent shifts in the personal preferences of young adults be reversed in the future? In the shorter term, a new marriage boom would be necessary to return the proportions of ever-married Jewish adults to levels comparable to those of past decades. Whether such a marriage boom will occur, will depend (as in the past) on the interplay of social norms concerning the family with socioeconomic and demographic factors. It is likely that marriage may still constitute a widely held ideal among the younger Jewish generation.[78] But, in the general context of American society, some of the forces that produced the recent changes have probably not run their full course and may yet produce further changes in the same direction.[79] In particular, the declining role of the family in fulfilling economic and educational functions, the changing status of women in society and the ambivalent response of men to such changes and the disjunction between sex and procreation are all consistent with the diminished salience of (stable) marriages in society. Considering the extensive participation of Jews in most general societal transformations in America, the simple extrapolation that as Jews have tended to marry in the past, so they will continue to do in the future, can no longer be accepted.

The observed changes in family formation are in keeping with, partly explain and reinforce the effects of the decline in fertility recently documented.[80] Fewer and later marriages together with low fertility are erosive forces for the Jewish population in America. Mixed marriage and the weak or composite Jewish identification of the children of such marriages magnify the demographic consequences of recent

Jewish population trends. The processes at work in the Jewish community support the assimilation hypothesis regarding the interpretation of the contemporary relations and interactions between religious and ethnic groups in American society. From the group-specific perspective of the influence of these processes on the current population dynamics of the U.S. Jews, the consistent indication is that of attrition.

These findings have significant historical and communal implications that reach beyond the present and the future of Jews in America. Historically, the Jewish family was not only the product of a certain type of traditional culture it also was the main agency of cultural continuity. In the traditional communities of the past, demographic reproduction and cultural reproduction went together; to some extent, this was also true of American Jews until the mid-1960s. The past and current changes have substantially reduced the previous sociodemographic differences between American and other Western Jews. Thus, they seem to contradict the major theoretical axiom, and prediction, that America would be different.

The cultural pluralism of American society was expected to combine with the large size of the Jewish population in promoting a higher degree of cultural and sociodemographic cohesiveness and distinctiveness among American Jews than elsewhere in the Diaspora. But the fact that the basic trends of family patterns in the United States—as measured by the index of conventional Jewish family—are quite similar to those observed in, say, France,[81] indicates that the theoretical framework on which these assumptions are based is inadequate. An alternative analytical approach that stresses the similar structural position and cultural vulnerability of Jewish population minorities everywhere is therefore necessary. At the same time, the evidence of the rapidly diminishing distinctiveness of Jewish family patterns raises significant questions about the salience of ethnicity in America in the long term.

From the policy perspective, the community now being redefined is one in which the conventional Jewish family plays a smaller role than in the past as the basis of social interaction and the creator of Jewish continuity. Consequently, if the current trends are not dramatically reversed—this does not seem likely in the near future—the development of a viable Jewish community life will require new approaches to Jewish continuity. This, in turn, will necessitate a firmer and more systematic base of scientific research than the present one—a base that can provide the foundations for Jewish policy decisions aimed at strengthening Jewish identification and at ensuring a meaningful Jewish life in America.

Notes

Parts of this paper were originally presented at the Conference on New Perspectives in American Jewish Sociology: Findings and Implications, American Jewish Committee, New York, 28–29 May 1986. Sidney Goldstein read the original manuscript and provided valuable comments. Judith Even and Arin Poller, Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, ably assisted in the preparation of this paper.

1. See, for example, Charles E. Silberman, *A Certain People: American Jews and Their Lives Today* (New York: 1985).

2. Roberto Bachi, *Population Trends of World Jewry* (Jerusalem: 1976); Sergio DellaPergola, "Patterns of American Jewish Fertility," *Demography* 17, no. 3 (1980), 261–273; Uziel O. Schmelz, "Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors," *American Jewish Year Book* 81 (1981), 61–117; *idem, World Jewish Population: Regional Estimates and Projections* (Jerusalem: 1981); Uziel O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "The Demographic Consequences of U.S. Jewish Population Trends," *American Jewish Year Book* 83 (1983), 141–187; Uziel O. Schmelz, *Aging of World Jewry* (Jerusalem: 1984).

3. Steven M. Cohen and Calvin Goldscheider, "Jews More or Less," *Moment* 9 (September 1984), 41–46; Calvin Goldscheider and Alan S. Zuckerman, *The Transformation of the Jews* (Chicago and London: 1984); Steven M. Cohen and Leonard M. Fein, "From Integration to Survival: American Jewish Anxieties in Transition," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* 480 (July 1985), 75–88; Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change: Emerging Patterns in America* (Bloomington: 1985); *idem, The American Jewish Community—Social Science Research and Policy Implications* (Atlanta: 1986).

4. Uziel O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, *Basic Trends in U.S. Jewish Demography* (New York: 1988).

5. Sidney Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970: A Demographic Profile," *American Jewish Year Book* 72 (1971), 3–88; *idem,* "Jews in the United States: Perspectives from Demography," *American Jewish Year Book* 81 (1981), 3–59; *idem,* "Jewish Demography: The Research Challenges," in Jerry A. Winter and Lester I. Levin (eds.), *Advancing the State of the Art: Colloquium on Jewish Population Studies* (New York: 1984), 7–15; *idem,* "American Jewish Demography: Inconsistencies that Challenge." (Paper presented at the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1985); *idem,* "Population Trends in American Jewry," *Judaism* 36, no. 2 (1987), 135–146.

6. Steven M. Cohen, Jonathan S. Woocher and Bruce A. Phillips (eds.), *Perspectives in Jewish Population Research* (Boulder and London: 1984); Winter and Levin, *Advancing the State of the Art.*

7. Goldscheider, *American Jewish Community;* Steven M. Cohen, "Vitality and Resilience of the American Jewish Family," in Steven M. Cohen and Paula Hyman (eds.), *The Jewish Family: Myths and Reality* (New York and London: 1986), 221–229.

8. At the time of this writing, an effort at centralization of available survey data in the U.S. Jewish community is being undertaken at the North American Jewish Data Bank—a joint project of the Council of Jewish Federations and the Center of Jewish Studies of the City University of New York. The data bank is directed by Professor Paul Ritterband and Dr. Barry Kosmin; it operates in cooperation with Brandeis University's Center for Modern Jewish Studies and the Hebrew University's Institute of Contemporary Jewry. It is hoped that the data now being accumulated will make possible, in due course, systematic comparisons of major sociodemographic variables across different communities in the United States as well as quasi-national syntheses.

9. Ruth Dixon, "Explaining Cross-Cultural Variations in Age at Marriage and Proportion Never Marrying," *Population Studies* 25, no. 2 (1971), 215–233.

10. Bachi, *Population Trends;* Sergio DellaPergola, *La trasformazione demografica della diaspora ebraica* (Turin: 1983).

11. Uziel O. Schmelz, "Demographic Evolution of Jews in Germany from the Mid-nineteenth Century Until 1933," *Zeitschrift für Bevölkerungswissenschaft* 8, no. 1 (1982), 31–72; DellaPergola, *La trasformazione demografica;* Doris Bensimon and Sergio DellaPergola, *La population juive de France: socio-démographie et identité* (Jerusalem and Paris: 1984).

12. Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences."

13. Andrew Cherlin and Caren Chelebuski, "Are Jewish Families Different? Some Evidence from the General Social Survey," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 45 (1983), 903–910.

14. U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, *Monthly Vital Statistics Report* (1984).

15. Gary A. Tobin and Julie A. Lipsman, "A Compendium of Jewish Demographic Studies," in Cohen, Woocher and Phillips, *Perspectives*, 137–166; Gary A. Tobin and Alvin Chenkin, "Recent Jewish Community Population Studies: A Roundup," *American Jewish Year Book* 85 (1985), 154–178.

16. Frances E. Kobrin and Calvin Goldscheider, *The Ethnic Factor in Family Structure and Mobility* (Cambridge: 1978); Jim Torczyner, *The Jewish Family in Canada, 1981* (Montreal: 1984); Goldscheider, *Continuity and Change*, chap. 5.

17. Such differences between the NJPS and Canadian data may arouse the suspicion that the NJPS tended to over-sample married persons or persons in households where there were married persons. Because some of the same biases also affect the subsequent local Jewish community surveys, the recent growth in reported singlehood clearly reflects a real trend, not a change in data quality.

18. Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada* (Ottawa: 1983).

19. The effects of external migrations, mortality and—in the case of the Jewish population—identificational changes have been ignored.

20. The authors' processing of the NJPS data file.

21. Includes a small proportion of widowers. No detailed tabulations on the structure of Jewish population by sex, age and marital status have been published from the Canadian census of 1981. The data reported here were obtained through the processing of a special data file made available by Statistics Canada to the Council of Jewish Federations and the School of Social Work of McGill University. See Torczyner, *Jewish Family*.

22. Jay Y. Brodbar-Nemzer, "Divorce and Group Commitment: The Case of the Jews," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 48, no. 3 (1986), 329–340.

23. Arlan Thornton and Willard L. Rodgers, *Changing Patterns of Marriage and Divorce in the United States* (Ann Arbor: 1983).

24. Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: 1964); Andrew M. Greeley, *Ethnicity in the United States* (New York: 1974); William L. Yancey, E. P. Ericksen and R. N. Juliani, "Emergent Ethnicity: A Review and Reformulation," *American Sociological Review* 41, no. 3 (1976), 391–403.

25. The term "intermarriage" is found in the literature as a synonym for each of the three terms: "out-marriage," "mixed marriage" and "conversionary marriage," thus creating considerable confusion. As a result, in this essay we have refrained from using the term "intermarriage."

26. Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences," 162.

27. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population of the United States: March 1957," *Current Population Reports*, ser. P-20, n. 79 (Washington, D.C.: 1958).

28. Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences," 161–164. For earlier analyses of the same data, see Fred Massarik, "Explorations in Intermarriage," *American Jewish Year Book* 74 (1973), 292–306; Bernard Lazerwitz, "Jewish-Christian Marriages and Conversion," *Jewish Social Studies*, 43, no. 1 (1981), 31–46.

29. Steven M. Cohen and Paul Ritterband, *Intermarriage: Rates, Background, and Consequences for Jewish Identification* (New York: 1985) (mimeograph.)

30. Bruce A. Phillips, "Factors Associated with Intermarriage in the Western United States." (Paper presented at the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1985.)

31. Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences," 164.

32. Paul Ritterband and Steven M. Cohen, "The Social Characteristics of the New York Area Jewish Community, 1981," *American Jewish Year Book* 84 (1984), 128–161; Gary A. Tobin, *Jewish Population Survey of Metro West, New Jersey*. (Personal communication, 1987.)

33. Albert Mayer, *The Jewish Population Study of the Greater Kansas City Area* (Kansas City: 1977), 23–32.

34. Gary A. Tobin, *A Demographic Study of the Jewish Community of Greater Kansas City—Executive Summary, Summer 1986* (Kansas City: 1986).

35. James McCann and Debra Friedman, *A Study of the Jewish Community in the Greater Seattle Area* (Seattle: 1979).

36. Erich Rosenthal, "Studies of Jewish Intermarriage in the United States," *American Jewish Year Book* 64 (1963), 3–53.

37. This is quite similar to the percentage of individual Jews currently in mixed marriages. The data, though, may include relatives other than spouses.

38. Torczyner, *Jewish Family,* 53.

39. Morton Weinfeld, William Shaffir and Irving Cotler (eds.), *The Canadian Jewish Mosaic* (Rexdale: 1981), 369; Statistics of Canada, *Vital Statistics Annual Reports.*

40. Torczyner, *Jewish Family,* 53.

41. Unpublished tabulations on marriages by religion of spouses supplied to the authors.

42. Silberman, *A Certain People,* 422–424.

43. Silberman's synopsis does not sufficiently distinguish between estimates that relate, respectively, to individuals or couples, recent weddings or all marriages, mixed marriages or all outmarriages of Jews.

44. Statistics Canada, *Vital Statistics Annual Reports,* various issues; unpublished data. See also Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences," 163.

45. Richard D. Alba and R. M. Golden, "Patterns of Ethnic Marriage in the United States," *Social Forces* 65, no. 1 (1986), 202–224.

46. Stanley Lieberson and Mary C. Waters, "Ethnic Groups in the Flux: The Changing Ethnic Responses of American Whites," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (September 1986).

47. Phillips, "Factors Associated with Intermarriage." For a general analysis of internal migration trends among U.S. Jewry, see Sidney Goldstein, "Population Movement and Redistribution Among American Jews," in Uziel O. Schmelz, Paul Glikson and Sergio DellaPergola (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography 1981* (Jerusalem: 1983), 315–341.

48. Lazerwitz, "Jewish-Christian Marriages"; Phillips, "Factors Associated with Intermarriage."

49. Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences," 149–151, 164.

50. Goldscheider, *Continuity and Change,* 12–24.

51. Silberman, *A Certain People,* 297–318.

52. Modalities of passage from other religious-ethnic groups to the Jewish and vice versa are not discussed in this essay. Self-identification of the respondents when interviewed in a survey is the principal means for establishing to which group they belong.

53. Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences," 165.

54. These proportions related to the ascertainable instances. If out-conversionary marriages of Jews could have been adequately included in the denominators, the percentages of spouses converted to Judaism would have been reduced accordingly.

55. Bernard D. Lazerwitz, "Current Jewish Intermarriages in the United States," in Uziel O. Schmelz, Paul Glikson and Sergio DellaPergola (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography 1977* (Jerusalem: 1980), 103–114.

56. Cohen and Ritterband, *Intermarriage.*

57. Egon Mayer and Carl Scheingold, *Intermarriage and the Jewish Future: A National Study in Summary* (New York: 1979); Egon Mayer, "Regular Jews, New Jews and Non-Jews: Some Methodological Reflections and New Data on Diversity Within the American Jewish Population." (Paper presented at the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1985.)

58. Steven Huberman, "Becoming a Reform Jew: Problems and Prospects," *Journal of Reform Judaism,* no. 1, 1981, 58–67; Steven Huberman, "From Christianity to Judaism: Religion Changers in American Society," *Conservative Judaism* 36, no. 1 (1982), 10–28.

59. Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences."

60. Not 27 percent as misprinted in Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences," 166.

61. Cohen and Ritterband, *Intermarriage.*

62. This may have been influenced somewhat by differences in the proportions of

fathers or mothers who have seceded from Judaism; such persons are usually not included in Jewish community surveys.

63. Gary A. Tobin, *Jewish Population Study of Greater Baltimore,* (Baltimore: 1986).

64. *Ibid.,* 144.

65. Peter Friedman et al. *Metropolitan Chicago Jewish Population 1981: Preliminary Tables* (Chicago: 1982).

66. Tobin, *Jewish Community of Greater Kansas City,* 5.

67. William L. Yancey and Ira Goldstein, *The Jewish Population of the Greater Philadelphia Area* (Philadelphia: 1984), 129–166.

68. *Ibid.* Some of these findings come from very small sample figures, therefore, they should be treated with caution.

69. Goldscheider, *Continuity and Change,* 14–16.

70. Bernard Lazerwitz, "Intermarriage and Conversion: A Guide for Future Research," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 13, no. 1 (1971), 41–63.

71. Egon Mayer, *Children of Intermarriage: A Study in Patterns of Identification and Family Life* (New York: 1983). Mayer's samples are likely to be biased toward the more Jewishly oriented sections of the out-married population, as he himself explains in both Mayer and Sheingold, *Intermarriage and the Jewish Future,* 7–8; and Mayer, *Children of Intermarriage,* 4–6.

72. See n. 71.

73. Fred Massarik, "New Approaches to the Study of the American Jew," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 8, no. 2 (1966), 175–191; Bernard Lazerwitz, "Some Comments on the Use of Distinctive Jewish Names in Surveys," *Contemporary Jewry* 7 (1986), 83–91.

74. Tom W. Smith, "Religious Mosaic," *American Demographics* (June 1984), 19–23; Fred Massarik, "A Changing Era in U.S. Jewish Population Research: Multiple Research Strategies—Indexes and Heuristics," in Schmelz, Glikson and DellaPergola, *Jewish Demography 1981,* 105–127.

75. Rela Geffen Monson, *Jewish Campus Life: A Survey of Student Attitudes Toward Marriage and Family* (New York: 1984), 16–20.

76. Jay Y. Brodbar-Nemzer, "Marital Relationships and Self-Esteem: How Jewish Families Are Different," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 48, no. 1 (1986), 89–98; Goldscheider, *Continuity and Change,* 69–73.

77. Calvin Goldscheider and Frances K. Goldscheider, "Moving Out and Marriage: What Do Young Adults Expect?", *American Sociological Review* 52, no. 2 (1987), 278–285.

78. A survey of the U.S. high-school class of 1972 indicated that about 95 percent of young Jewish adults expected to marry—a higher percentage than among other religious-ethnic groups. The expected age at marriage was higher among Jews than among others. See Calvin Goldscheider and Frances K. Goldscheider, "Family Size Expectations of Young American Jewish Adults." (Paper presented at the Ninth World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1985.)

79. Charles F. Westoff, "Fertility in the United States," *Science* 234 (31 October 1986), 554–559.

80. *Ibid.;* Schmelz and DellaPergola, *Basic Trends in U.S. Jewish Demography.*

81. Sergio DellaPergola, "Contemporary Jewish Family Patterns in France: A Comparative Perspective," in Cohen and Hyman, *Jewish Family,* 148–171.