—*Other Topics*—

ETHNIC MEDIATION IN POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION: CONCEPTS OF POWER AND LEGITIMACY IN THE ORTHODOX JEWISH COMMUNITY

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Early studies in political socialization have laid the groundwork for discovering the mechanisms through which children are inducted into American political society. These investigations were of the general population and did not differentiate among subcultural groups. However, Nelson (1979: 1031) concludes that ethnicity is a better indicator than socioeconomic status for attitudes toward particpation and that ''if ethnic divisions are going to be enduring features of the socio-political landscape, social scientists and policy makers need to understand more fully the nature and implications of such divisions.''

Ethnic identification in the United States has become more salient than at any time since the period of mass immigration. This article holds that the ethnic group operates as a mediating variable in the politicizing process. Transmissions of the political values of the larger society are filtered through group perceptions. The group socialization is more conscious, overt and controlled than that of the larger system.

This article presents a case study of one ethnic group, the Orthodox Jews, who have practiced bilingualism/biculturalism for generations. The focus is on status-power relationships and attitudes toward authority. The subjects were elementary school children.

Although it was once thought that political stability would be impossible unless ethnic and linguistic differences disappeared, this has not been substantiated. Critics of bilingual/bicultural programs question whether citizenship education takes place. Proponents maintain that it does and that the American ideal of cultural assimilation should be replaced by that of cultural pluralism (Spolsky, 1972).

The Orthodox Jewish community was chosen for the investigation because it has maintained a separate subcultural community within many political systems, contributing support to some of these systems and withholding it from others. The community's history of separate institutions is

instructive for the institutions being set up in bilingual/bicultural programs today.

The study of political socialization is a study of system persistence generated through diffuse support. Various agents are used in the transmission/acquisition process. The primary agents in the United States include the family, school and peer group. These agents dominate at different stages of a child's development and are linked to more inclusive social reference groups. Practices of child rearing and familial roles are influenced by the cultural context.

Ethnic subcultures also give texture to the socialization experiences of members. Ethnic groups, like socioeconomics classes, are not themselves agents of political socialization. Rather, they serve as the "social carriers of political traditions" (Berelson, et al., 1954: 73). The ethnic child usually identifies with the subcultural group within the larger political framework and through this identity interprets that framework. There is simultaneous development of the subgroup and the political community. The subgroup influences the individual's selection of the messages he reacts to. Ethnic groups operate as interest groups seeking gains for members, but they are more than this. They also project their own *weltenschauung*. Because so many Americans have rediscovered a sense of non-Anglican ties, investigation of ethnic groups provides insight into how the American system is maintained.

Early diffuse support by its members enables a political system to persist over time even when it is seen by those members as not fulfilling its stated purposes. The affective stage of gaining support is later reinforced by reason. Feelings of loyalty are first directed toward the primary group, the family. These are then extended outward. The ethnic group structures the values and attitudes of its members. If the group perceives its self-interest to be tied to the persistence of the state it will extend loyalty to the state. If, however, the group perceives the state to be destructive of the group, that support will be withheld. Children will be socialized into group norms. The messages of the larger society will be filtered by the group through its agents. The more isolated a group is, the more power the group holds in preventing undesirable messages from reaching the child.

METHODOLOGY

Five different groups of children, aged nine through eleven, attending Halacha Institute, a private Orthodox Jewish elementary day school in a large metropolitan area, were the subjects of observation between 1971 and 1974. (The names of the children and school have been changed to protect their identity. The essence of the names has been retained, i.e., Hebrew or

English names are substituted in kind.) The children were from both mod-
ern and traditional Orthodox families. Very few were Chasidim. The
community was available for study because I was already in a teaching
position which allowed for participant observation.

The Halacha Institute (hereafter referred to as H.I.) children were in a
relatively isolated situation. Although they lived among others, they did
not associate with them. The modern Orthodox interacted with non-group
members at work; the traditional did not. The traditional group also did not
expose themselves or their children to mass media so that conflicting cues
could be kept at a minimum. They controlled the information passed to the
children through a set of parallel institutions, the school being one.

According to Davies (in Dennis, 1973: 105) by twelve years of age chil-
dren have

> a firm sense of nationality, a rudimentary ideology (who is powerful, who
> should be more powerful, who are ally and enemy groups, external and domes-
> tic), a knowledge of the prestige of occupation, of the class structure, and which
> class one belongs to; of the party images and which party one would be for; and
> the working of the political system (what leading politicians do and what they
> are like).

Some methodological issues deserve comment. First, as a participant
observer, the researcher had to guard against those being studied being un-
duly influenced. Second, in a teacher-student relationship children might
subordinate the truth in favor of their perceptions of what the teacher wants
to hear. Finally, implications for generalizations are not clear cut because
quantitative measurement could not be widely used to supplement obser-
vation.

The problem of influence was controlled by conscious effort. It is ac-
knowledged that I am more politically aware than most elementary school
teachers and that my classes were better informed on political issues than
were most other classes. In the normal course of the school experience,
however, one year a student may be exposed to a teacher who is proficient
in mathmatics and weak in social studies, and the following year to another
with different strengths and weaknesses. Nevertheless, I attempted to
minimize the effect of exposure to me by using questionnaires, simulations
and discussions as part of the social studies curriculum, and by limiting my
participation until reasearch in a given area was completed.

The children became accustomed to value questions being placed to
them without regard to "right" or "wrong" answers. A great deal of in-
formation was gleaned through observations of simulated activities, such
as inhabiting a desert island and setting up a community. I remained an ob-
server and offered no input to these exercises. Records were kept in a daily

log of events. The children's written work was collected and analyzed. Interviews of students, parents and teachers were conducted informally. Previous experiences I had had in the community and with other students were incorporated.

POWER AND STATUS

There are two aspects to the study of power. One is the process that pervades the daily interactions among individuals. The other is the social process, derived from the first, which governs the complex structures of communities and societies (Blau, 1964: 2). Political socialization literature concentrates on power as it relates to governmental authority and children's perceptions of it at different ages, the dimension of power people understand themselves to hold in relation to government (efficacy), and the obligation to obey authority (compliance).

Power relations begin early in a child's life. One is born into a power structure, the family, a structure determined by its immediate community. School usually presents the child with his/her first experience with organized power outside the home. Compliance to rules and regulations is stressed. Power relationships in peer groups, while informal, are just as real.

One manifestation of power is status as derived from roles. According to Blau (1964), the factors intrinsic to status are support from the social structure and subordinates. Roles are ranked in terms of prestige. Benoit (in Biddle & Thomas, 1966) sets forth five criteria for identifying high prestige: if the individual is a source of admiration, deference, imitation, suggestion, and/or attraction.

In the Orthodox community, there are three avenues to high status which are derived from the Eastern European *shtetl*: learning, wealth, and *yikhus* (roughly, a family background associated with learning and wealth). Ideally, learning is considered the primary value and wealth the subsidiary. A man of great learning automatically belongs to the *sheyna leiten* (literally, beautiful people, the elite) regardless of wealth. A man of great wealth with little learning must use his money in accordance with *halacha* (religious law) and in the promotion of learning in order to be considered *sheyn* (Zborowski & Herzog, 1952: 75).

Good deeds are rewarded by symbolic acknowledgment more than by the granting of actual power in the H.I. community. For example, the school building was named for the wife of a large donor to the school. Other forms of acknowledgment include holding dinner in tribute to or dedicating a journal in someone's honor.

Low students, *prost* (common), is ascribed to those who lack both learning and the attributes of responsibility, community service, and social conscience associated with it, regardless of wealth. By contrast, *yikhus* is a derivative of learning and wealth. It is related to family background and position, but is not birthright. It is achieved and must be revalidated with every generation. The son who becomes a scholar brings *yikhus* to his family. The daughter of a family with *yikhus* brings it with her in marriage to the son of *prosteh* parents so that the boy's parents gain *yikhus* in the match (Zborowski & Herzog, 1952: 217).

The family with the greatest *yikhus* in the H.I. community was the Ammonbaums. There were three Ammonbaum boys in the school. They came by their *yikhus* through the scholarship of the paternal grandfather, validated by their father, a learned teaching rabbi, and the good family of their mother. Mrs Ammonbaum gave private Hebrew lessons. The family had a modest income.

One morning the school was abuzz. Rabbi Ammonbaum, the grandfather, was to visit the school from out-of-state. He was considered an eminent scholar. The children were excited about the prospect of getting a glimpse of him. As he was shown around the building, he conferred with the principal and some of the Hebrew teachers. The children crowded around the stairways and halls to catch sight of him. His visit lasted a short time. A moment or two after he had left the building, Ricky came running down the stairway. He had missed seeing the rabbi. He was so upset he started to cry. "My chance to see the *Ish Hador* (man of the century), and I missed him. I can't believe I missed him." I permitteed him to leave the building to see Rabbi Ammonbaum just as he was entering a car. Ricky came back beaming. He sighed, "I saw him. I saw him."

The Ammonbaum boys wielded great power among their peers. They were expected by their parents and teachers to do well and to behave in a manner that befit their position.

Yiddishkeit and *menschlichkeit* are two words that describe a way of life. Literally, they mean Jewishness and humanness. However, a literal translation does not convey the meaning. *Yiddishkeit* is the acceptance of the obligations a Jew has, a veneration of learning, optimism of ultimate reward, and an acceptance of the grief and joy that comes with membership in the Jewish community. *Menschlichkeit* is behaving toward others according to the Golden Rule. It is compassion, pathos, understanding and empathy (Donin, 1972: 46). These two norms of behavior best describe the ideals toward which Jewish life aims, and the expectations of the *sheyna leiten*.

It was conference night at H.I. Most of the parents were in attendance.

Many of the more traditional fathers did not confer with the general studies teachers. Rather, they went to the rabbis who taught Judaic studies, while the mothers went to the general studies teachers. However, on this occasion, Rabbi Ammonbaum came to speak to me about Duvid, his son in fourth grade.

We spoke for a few minutes. He kept his eyes averted from me because he was not supposed to have direct contact with a woman. I told him how well Duvid was doing in his studies. He nodded. I had had his older son Zemur in my classes in third and again in fifth grade, but this was the first time we had ever spoken. I then told him that Duvid, as Zemur had also been, was more than a good student, he was a good boy and a sensitive person who cared about others' feelings. His eyes lit up; he looked directly at me, smiled, nodded, and said, "Ah, *menschlichkeit*. That's the best thing that you could tell me about Duvid. I am very proud. Learning, I know he will do, but to be a *mensch* . . ." With that, he thanked me, eyes averted again, and left.

I had Duvid as a student in fourth and fifth grades but never taught Asher, the middle brother in the school. There were seven Ammonbaum children during my stay at H.I. Zemur's class was the highest grade, the first to graduate, and so the older siblings were in different schools. During my last year, when Duvid (the youngest) was in fifth grade, another child was born. The oldest children were in their twenties at the time.

When the children in fourth grade were asked to name their best friends, all the boys chose Duvid. Each month there were elections for class officers. The office of president was rotated between girls and boys. Every month the boys were to hold office, Duvid was elected unless he chose not to run. The first time he decided not to run, the other boys were excited and began lining up votes. It appeared that Damon had the edge and he confidently looked forward to election day. On that day, Duvid nominated Shem, not a very popular boy, and advised the class, "I would like all those who would have voted for me to vote for Shem." Damon protested. "It's not fair," he said. "This was supposed to be an open election. You said you wouldn't run. You were giving the rest of us a chance. It's not fair." Duvid replied, "I'm not forcing anyone to vote for Shem, but he's my choice. Anybody who respects me will respect my choice, but I won't know who does and who doesn't because it's a secret vote." The election was a runaway win for Shem.

On another occasion, the children were forming new monthly teams for the games played in class and outdoors. Those included in class were geography, dictionary skills, spelling and anagrams. Outdoor games included stickball, soccer, kickball and the like. The two top officers for the

month had first choice in being team captains. The two captains then chose the rest of their teams. Duvid usually demurred and let another child be captain. The second time he did this, I asked him why he did not chose to be captain himself. He shrugged. Damon answered for him, ''Duvid doesn't have to. Everyone always listens to him anyway.'' And indeed they did. Whenever a dispute arose in a game, if I was not officiating, Duvid was the arbiter.

Whenever committees were formed, Duvid was always elected as chairman. When the fourth grade simulated settlement on a new planet, Duvid led the group in designing laws for the new settlement. An interesting incident occurred when the children were asked what form of government they wanted to institute on the planet. I conducted a roll-call vote. The first boy, Jon, said, ''Where the people vote for what they want.'' The following seven children said the same. Then it was Duvid's turn and he said, ''Where one person makes the decision for what's best for the group and I would be that person.'' The discussion that followed was lively and centered around both the concept and the person:

> Martin—It depends on the person. If it's a good person it's okay, but what happens after Duvid? Suppose I wanted to be the dictator. Would you feel the same way, Duvid?
> Reiche—It's not fair. We live in a democracy. Everyone should be able to decide. If we vote for Duvid for President, he can lead us. We can decide to keep voting for him for President, but we shouldn't have a form of government where we lose our say.

To all the discussion, Duvid's response was, ''I'll leave it up to the rest of you to decide.''

The class was told that the vote would continue on the form of government alone. On the continued vote the rest of the children voted for the democratic form. The children were then told that a vote would now be taken between having Duvid as the supreme leader or having a democratic form of government. In this vote, six children changed their vote to Duvid. The fourteen others prefaced their votes for a democratic form with a justification based on fear of what would happen after Duvid.

Duvid's brother Asher was in the fifth grade at the time. He was not as assertive as Duvid. In the fifth grade, Mandel was an instigator and co-leader with Asher, but if they went their separate ways, Asher was the one whom the rest of the class would follow. Therefore, Mandel would first convince Asher to go along with him, then everyone else would fall into line. Mandel was also from a family with *yikhus*, but not on the level of the Ammonbaums. He was also mischievous and somewhat of a behavior

problem in class. His action often prompted other students to misbehave and cause problems for the teacher. After some thought, Mrs. Jose hit upon a solution. If she could convince Asher to assert himself against Mandel, the rest of the class would undoubtedly follow him.

She set about doing this by first gaining Asher's acknowledgment that it was not proper for the class to misbehave. When the class got out of control, she would nod to Asher who would then tell them to quiet down. In desperation, Mandel would say, "Ah, Asher." Asher would reply, "It's time to get back to work," and that was that.

On one occasion, a trip was being planned for the class. Mandel said it was a "dumb trip" and he didn't plan to go. The others agreed, though Asher was silent. They refused to have the permission slips needed signed, which meant that they would not be able to go. Mrs. Jose spoke to Asher. He said he didn't care about the trip one way or another so he wasn't going to say anything to the others. Mrs. Jose asked what would his parents' reaction be if she called and told them there was a trip. Did Asher think they would want him to go? He said, "Probably." Then he thought a moment and said, "Okay. You don't have to call. I'll tell everyone I'm going. We'll see what happens." Shortly thereafter, all the children had their slips signed, including Mandel.

Not every class at H.I. has an Ammonbaum. If there was not a member of another family with exceptional *yikhus*, leadership was assumed by those children who fit into the general pattern described by Stone and Church (1968: 383).

> Certain individual children—usually the best looking, the biggest, the strongest, the most physically mature, in some circles the brightest, the most energetic, the wittiest—acquire a great deal of popularity and, with it, some power of leadership. However, children of this age are in many respects hard-headed pragmatists, and when it comes to engaging in particular activities—a game of baseball, say, or staging a play—they look for leadership to those children competent in that activity.

Most of the families of H.I. were in the *sheyn* status. Traditional families had more *yikhus* then did modern. However, when there was not a member of a recognized superior family, the children tended to select their leaders in the above manner. When most of the children in a class were modern Orthodox, girls sometimes took this leadership role. However, this was not usually a consideration since the classes were separated by sex by the fifth or sixth grade. Of the characteristics listed above, intelligence was an important attribute sought in leaders. Power, in these instances, was limited; whereas in the case of the Ammonbaums it was quite extensive.

It was the status of the Ammonbaums that was responsible for their power. No coercion was used. The Ammonbaums led by "example" or by letting their position be known. No punishment was hinted at. They often made a point of indicating that they would not know who supported them and who did not.

POWER AND LEGITIMACY

The norms regarding the legitimate distribution of power are basic to the messages transmitted in the political socialization process. Power arises from the differentiation of roles and manifests itself first in the family. The children of H.I. are in the process of internalizing norms about this process. They have gone through the early development that Dawson and Prewitt (1977) and Piaget (1965) characterize as a stage of no recognition of rules and authority to the second stage where rules are considered absolute, coming from higher authority.

At this point the H.I. children differ in their further development into the stage of the recognition that rules are agreed upon conventions. Rules of the polity are seen as conventions, but absolute validity is attributed to cultural rules, to Jewish Orthodoxy. These are seen as coming from the Deity. The laws of the state are accepted as long as they do not conflict with the laws of Judaism. Because of the nature of Judaism as culture-religion, *Halacha* is considered absolute even into adulthood.

In the *shtetl*, the synagogue served as the town hall. Since *shtetl* Judaism was a way of life, religious and secular functions of communal affairs were not clearly distinguished. In the United States, and especially among the Orthodox, the synagogue still serves as a meeting place.

During meetings majority rule is followed. The minority tends to continue to believe in its correctness. Disagreement is on the issue. As a result, a leader's views are subject to analysis and criticism rather than commanding blind support. Since everyone feels he has the right to his own interpretation, an individual resents any attempt to deny him the opportunity to express his own version of the truth (Zborowski & Herzog, 1952).

This seems to run counter to the conclusion one might reach from the attitudes of the H.I. children toward the Ammonbaums. However, in the final analysis, the children did not give up their right to decide, as evidenced in the issue of a democratic form of government for their settlement. The *sheyna leiten* have the power of influence in the adult community as well as in the children's. In religious matters, certainly, the rabbi's judgment's are law. In secular matters, the esteemed are given every opportunity to prove their case. However, sometimes they too are split on issues. The people retain the right to decide.

All social groups make rules which define situations and appropriate behavior, specifying some acts as right and others as wrong. Legitimacy is attributed to a system of rules and models of behavior when persons bound by these rules accept them. These rules are fully elaborated and transmitted from adults to children. A group's right and wrong becomes a government's legal and illegal. When religion enters this sphere, these concepts are then translated into "moral" and "immoral" or "virtuous" and "sinful," leading to Heaven or Hell (Skinner in Biddle & Thomas, 1966: 321-323).

To the Orthodox Jew, there are two legitimizing sources, one being the word of God established in *halacha*. Even here, however, reason and judgment are used to try to discern the reason for the acts. This is one reason for the need for study. However, if reason is not satisfied, compliance is still the rule because there is no higher authority than God, and man may not be capable of understanding all of God's ways. The other legitimizing source is the stability of the community. Compliance is given to the community, but only if the rules are reasonable and do not conflict with God's laws. Under compulsion the Orthodox Jew will obey within limits, but this is done under duress and does not stem from legitimacy. If ever community law demands disobedience to God's law, compliance is not given even under the most severe penalty. "The only absolute authority is the spirit of the Torah" (Zborowski & Herzog, 1952).

The combined fourth/fifth classes of boys was asked, "Should one obey the law? Are there times when one ought not? Why?" The consensus was that one ought to obey for the following reasons:

Elihu—They would be punished if they didn't.

Daniel—People can't live together unless they know what the rules are and that other people can be expected to act that way.

Roy—You expect people to follow rules so that you know how they will probably act. Otherwise we couldn't depend on anything.

Joel—A country can't exist unless the people obey the law.

Times when they ought not?

Daniel—If a law is bad, it shouldn't be obeyed.

How do you know if a law is bad?

Daniel—If it goes against Torah, it's bad. You don't have to obey any laws if they mean disobeying God's laws because they're not really laws anyway.

Why not?

Daniel—A real law can't be against God's laws.

Ned—A person who knows *halacha* knows a good law from a bad law.

Caleb—Nobody can make you act bad and say it's good because it's a law. Only ignorant people would be fooled. That's why it's important to study.

Steven—Look at Hitler. He had a whole bunch of laws that were evil. The Germans shouldn't have listened.

Joel—And a country like that shouldn't exist, which is what would have happened if nobody listened.

These responses reveal a model of legitimate law being equated with natural law. Hillenbrand (1949) asserts that the only validity for the demands of obligation in an ethical political system is that which is thought to be founded in the natural order. If the existence of a moral order is posited (and this is certainly the case with the Orthodox community), then the meaning of good and evil can be known. The good is to be promoted, the evil avoided. Obligation to the law is therefore linked to the congruity of the law to God's law, the natural order. Freedom of conscience cannot then be regulated by a political system. The H.I. children had no problems with this issue. A person should not obey the law if the law is wrong, the determination of which is made by God. Children obey their parents and the law of the community because behind parental guidance is God's word. Until they are old enough and learned enough to understand and interpret the Word themselves, their parents and the *sheyna leiten* of the community interpret this for them (Zborowski & Herzog, 1952).

Piaget (1965) relates a number of stories about children who are asked which act of two is worse. In these stories, an incident involves a child who doesn't know better when he/she does wrong and another child who does. The older children took into consideration the intent of the wrongdoer. The younger children did not.

When the fifth grade children were asked, "Should a person be judged by what most of the people of his group feel is right (group norms) or by his own values? Why?" By a ratio of 4:1, they indicated that group norms were the basis of judgment. Example: Diana—"How most of the people in his group feel, because if Jim did something wrong and no one cared then Jim doesn't think he's done anything bad. But if Bill does something wrong and he is put in jail, then he should know better but Jim doesn't know any better."

In connection with their study on slavery they were also asked, "Who is more evil, a man living in a slave society who feels slavery is wrong but is a slaveholder anyway or a slaveholder who does not see anything wrong in slavery?" They overwhelmingly felt that evil is an absolute. Nevertheless, some struggled with the dilemma as illustrated in the following interaction:

Tara—They both act just as evil and that's what counts, the actions. Does the slave care that one owner knew better and the other didn't?

Daniel—Maybe the slave doesn't care but I care. Sometimes you do something and you don't know it's wrong. How do you know what's right and wrong anyway unless you're taught? So if you're not taught, you're stupid but you're not evil.

Diana—If someone in the community, a *chochem* (wise man), tells you it's wrong and you still do it, you're evil.

Tara—Take Hitler, he thought he was doing right. Does that make him better than if he knew he was doing wrong?

Larry—Some things are so bad that you don't have to have somebody tell you it's wrong. Killing is like that. But other things you do have to, so it depends on what.

Steven—God tells us what's right and wrong. If a whole country disobeys then the whole country is wrong and all the people doing it are wrong. It's not more evil and less evil, it's evil, period.

We see in these two discussions of community norms and individual responsibility the ambiguities of judging good and evil by relative standards, i.e., those of the particular society of which one is a member. It is only with reference to God's law that ambiguity ceases. If a community's norms and laws are consistent with higher law, then obligation to obey is paramount.

Laws are based on normative standards which define the parameters of permissible conduct. Piaget (1965: 13) tells us, "All morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules." Since the system of law depends finally on the supportive attitudes of the people, stable communities are characterized by favorable feelings toward the law.

Because there is a strong feeling of collective responsibility within the Jewish community, restraints on unacceptable behavior are important to the whole group. If a person adheres to the limits placed on him, he provides *naches* (roughly, a credit or a source of pride) to the community. If he deviates, it is a *shanda* (shame, embarrassment) for the community. Man is free to choose between right and wrong. What is right and wrong has been given by God and interpreted by the *sheyna* in the community (Zborowski & Herzog, 1952; 225).

The sense of collective responsibility acts as a restraint on the Orthodox Jew in the out-community because in addition to the usual criteria for obedience, there is the added element of his being a "representative of a unique community" which he would like outsiders to respect (Yaffe, 1968; 120). Any misconduct that does take place should be done in private. Pub-

lic misconduct in the outside community would reflect negatively on his group. Public misconduct within the community might influence others toward wrongful behavior (Zborowski & Herzog, 1952).

When misconduct is uncovered, as in the case in New York City, where it was discovered that a traditional Orthodox Jew was being fined by the courts as a slumlord (his ownership of the property had been concealed through a dummy corporation), the outside community reacts to the perpetrator as a hypocrite pretending to abide by *halachic* norms while behaving covertly against them. Since it is accepted that if misconduct occurs it should be done in private, how did the H.I. children judge such wrongdoing? Tamara summed up the feelings of the children:

> The bad thing was in owning the houses that people shouldn't have to live in and treating them so bad. But if he's going to do it, of course he should do it in private because he doesn't want people to know he's doing a bad thing. The worst thing is when everybody knows because then they say, "Look at that Jew. They pretend to be good and they're really all bad. They're all out to cheat you. See, this is proof." So even though you shouldn't do anything bad, if you do do it you should be sure you're not caught because then, it isn't only you who gets punished but right away all the Jews are blamed and that's a double sin. One, for what you did and two, for getting everybody else in trouble.

This is an example of the collective responsibility incumbent on each individual's actions. The norms of the community as well as the intent of the individual performing the action are important in establishing individual responsibility.

The norms underlying the behavior of members of a community are important for understanding the community. The children in fourth grade learned how the colonists established laws based on the norms of behavior they brought with them to the New World. The children illustrated their understanding of the relationship between norms and laws. Among the reasons they gave for the necessity of law were social control and welfare functions of the state. The important and enforceable norms became laws. Agents of government, such as police, were seen as the enforcers of law, while parents, teachers and peers were seen as the controllers of undesirable behavior.

June explained in detail:

> People have to listen to both laws and norms. They are both social controls. Laws are stronger than norms. A lot of times norms are made into laws because they are getting more important. Say "Thank you" is a norm because it is not so important. It wouldn't be made into a law. To pay taxes is a law because it's very important for government.

When asked about the necessity to have law, the children responded in a similar way as to the question of obedience put to them at another time. The major reasons given were:

"Otherwise we would act like animals."

"To keep people from danger."

"There would be confusion and riot and physical violence."

There was no carryover of the concept that norms might keep people from behaving in so anti-social a manner. The children understood that punishment was a possible consequence of deviation from both norms and laws, but in their analysis of the need for law this consideration was excluded.

The concern for the stability of the community was also evident in the responses, that a system cannot exist without obedience, and that people depend on the expectations of how others will act. For the purpose of coordinating the activities of the group toward the goals of society, positions of authority are needed. This principle is at the base of political systems. Organized power exists in all societies because it performs a necessary function, that of maintaining order as the society understands it. This includes methods of resolving differences (Lynd in Kornhauser, 1957). The need for political authority is accepted by the H.I. children for social cohesion through effective decision-making and for the benefit of humankind.

The fifth grade class was given a role-playing situation involving conflict. There was no clearly accepted leader in this class. The group consisted of three boys and five girls, intentionally having one group, the girls, with a larger numerical size, numbers being one criterion of power.

The situation was that two groups of children want to use an empty lot for play. The lot's owner tells them they can use it if they clean all the trash, which is extensive, and if they can agree on how to share the area. The problem is that they each want it and they do not play together. The children were asked to solve the problem and come to a decision on the use and cleaning of the lot.[1]

The children met together. They were all talking at the same time. The girls said they had plans. They wanted to divide the field with different hours for the different groups with voting as the method of selecting the times each one is to meet. The boys objected to the idea of voting as a procedure since they were outnumbered. One boy, Steven, kept interjecting, "Let's beat them up. We're stronger than they are." He also suggested that the boys play on the lot and the girls clean it. A more serious suggestion was that of having one representative from each group vote. This was rejected with the observation that, "Naturally, they're not going to agree

with each other." They finally agreed, by consensus, to a compromise arrangement of using the field on alternate days and voted on the compromise. One of the girls, Chana, demanded, "Everybody has to sign the plan and give it to the owner. Then everybody promises to do it."

In the ensuing discussion of the process of decision-making, the students noted that too many people were involved, that voting is not always fairest, and that fighting becomes an attractive alternative especially "if you know you can never win (by voting) but if you fight you will win." The children related their exerience to governmental decision-making by noting that "fighting a war and deciding is politics."

Another observation was that there should be rules to follow "on how to decide." An authority system defines the rules of the game and role of the leaders. Leaders coordinate as well as cause events. In an exercise with the fourth grade the children accepted the leader's right to punish to obtain compliance. They also showed some insight into the differences between power and legitimacy.

Mira said that power is in the "people who have the money or the brains," and authority, "the right." However, she said there was no difference between the two, perhaps because she perceived that those with money and brains also had the right in the community. Others saw definite differences. Ahava said, "One (power) is because you conquered some country. Other (authority) is when you're elected." Minda tied authority to the goal of the leaders, "Power is being ruler," authority "is power being used for us." In all, 18 children tied power to the ability to act or make others do as you wish and 19 defined authority in terms of its legitimacy to act.

By sixth grade, the children had a more sophisticated understanding of power and authority. Two of the boys cited Hitler as an example of power without authority. Rishon explained, "Power is being able to get things which you want done, done through influence or force," whereas "authority is when people choose to come to you to get things done for themselves." Ted demonstrated the use of both influence and strength in power by stating, "If someone wants to become powerful he must show that he's strong, and to be on the safe side he should try to make them think his way." By underscoring the importance of influence for the stability of the system, "to be on the safe side," Ted implies agreement with Aldous Huxley's (1958: 5) observation that for the maintenance of a political system, " . . . government through terror works on the whole less well than government through the non-violent manipulation of the environment and of the thoughts and feelings of individual men, women, and children."

The children in fifth grade were asked, "How does the federal govern-

ment get legitimate power and how does it keep it?'' The children saw the legitimate power of government coming from the people and being tied to its responsiveness to the people. When asked how people get political power and how they exercise it, their replies indicated that it was through participation, the act of voting being the most visible means to the children. This is consistent with previous political socialization studies showing that the act of voting is the tool of power earliest learned and best known to American children. Glenn (in Masssialas, 1972) found that in grades three through six, voting and letter writing were favored as means for political change while protesting and demonstrating were less so. However, the H.I. children accepted these alternative methods as equally legitimate. In fact, they and members of their community were involved in such ethnically related demonstrations as marching for Soviet Jewry, handing out pamphlets when the Soviet Hockey team appeared in the city, and protesting the appearance of Arafat at the United Nations.

CONCLUSION

Individuals judge legitimacy on two criteria: the method used to achieve power, and the purposes for which power is used. On the first level, it is expected in a liberal democracy that power be attained through the consent of the people. The H.I. children demonstrated their belief that political power rested with the people and that voting was the primary means for selecting government leaders. In setting up simulated societies the children opted for democratic forms to select leaders. On a personal level, power was accorded to those individuals with high status, and learning was the prime source of such status. Children from families of recognized scholarship were afforded the same respect as their parents were due. Nevertheless, the right to decide was not forfeited.

With regard to the purposes for which power was used, the children held that a legitimate government operated for the ''good of the people,'' and this ''good'' is determined by the people. Obligation to the state is manifested by obedience to the laws. Freedom is voluntarily surrendered for the benefits the polity can offer. The legitimacy of law and its attendant obligation for obedience are dependent upon their compatibility with God's laws in the H.I. community. Complete freedom is equated with chaos. Therefore, the norm of compliance is strengthened by Judaic interpretation in a ''good'' society. An ''evil'' society has no legitimate expectations of obedience. Whether a society is good or evil is culturally determined with the subgroup's values being the basis for the decision. Since American society's norms and goals are highly consistent with Jewish norms, compliance is the rule.

It would seem that separation and biculturalism in themselves are not inconsistent with good citizenship. Only if the subcultural group were to see itself as threatened by the polity would it transmit values for its own persistence at the expense of the state.

This article is a description of behavior and attitudes of one small group. Much more research needs to be done in this area to understand the complexities of ethnic mediation in the political socialization process.

NOTE

1. The situation was taken and modified from the *Teacher's Edition of Principles and Practices in the Teaching of the Social Sciences, Level Five* (1970: 239).

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