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The Fourth Generation Grows Up: The Contemporary American Jewish Community

By CHAIM I. WAXMAN

ABSTRACT: Because there are no religious questions in the studies conducted by the United States Bureau of the Census, much of the data on the demographic patterns of Jewish-Americans comes from more limited studies of local communities. An examination of the major studies conducted during the 1950s and early 1960s might have led one to predict a gradual but steady process leading to the almost total assimilation of America's Jews into the larger society. However, a number of major events occurred in the second half of the 1960s and early 1970s that may have altered that process. This article examines recent trends in anti-Semitism and a series of contemporary American Jewish social patterns, including size, geographic distribution, occupation, education, income, political attitudes and behavior, relationship to the state of Israel, intermarriage, and denominational life, from which several significant but divergent trends emerge.

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Left in Chicago in August 1967, which drove many Jews out of the New Left; repeated anti-Israel resolutions adopted by the United Nations since the Six-Day War; the prima facie emergence of new religious consciousness; the so-called rise of ethnicity; the maturation of a Jewish educational system that established institutions for intensive Jewish education on the elementary school, high school, and post-high school levels across the country; the intensified awakening to the significance of the Holocaust following the Eichmann trial and the Six-Day War; and the emergence of a new Orthodox element composed of highly educated and affluent professionals who felt sufficiently secure and did not hesitate to assert themselves within all spheres of the Jewish communal structure.

However, an examination of recent social patterns indicates that there is no single, unidirectional trend within the fourth generation. Rather, within the same group there are various and even contrasting trends manifesting themselves simultaneously. The implications of these will be discussed following a summary analysis of recent social patterns and characteristics of American Jewry.⁴

SIZE

According to the most reliable figures available, the Jewish population of the United States in 1980 numbers 5,860,000,⁵ or about 2.7

4. The terms "American Jewry," "America's Jews," "American Jews," and "Jewish-Americans" are used fairly interchangeably in this article.

5. Milton Himmelfarb and David Singer, eds., *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 80 (New York and Philadelphia: American Jewish Committee and Jewish Publication So-

percent of the total population of the country. When these figures are compared with those of the 1930s, when the Jewish population made up 3.7 percent of the total population, it can readily be seen that the Jewish component of the American population is becoming increasingly smaller. It is decreasing relative to the total population and is decreasing in absolute terms as well. The American Jewish birthrate is estimated to be even lower than the 2.1 that is generally accepted as the replacement level.

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION

Until relatively recently, Jews in the United States were concentrated in the major urban centers and in the northeastern part of the country.⁶ However, during the 1970s, the residential patterns of Jews in the United States underwent significant change. By 1979, the percentage of American Jews residing in the Northeast had declined to 57.9, while the percentage of American Jews residing in the South increased from 10.3 in 1968 to 15.8 in 1979, and in the West the increase was from 13.2 percent in 1968 to 14.3 percent in 1979. Table 1 gives a detailed picture of the changes in the geographic distribution of America's Jews from 1968 to 1979.

ciety of America, 1980), p. 159. The *Year Book* is a standard reference work, published annually (hereafter cited as *American Jewish Year Book*).

6. Marshall Sklare, *America's Jews* (New York, Random House), pp. 44-45. For a study of small-town Jews, see Peter I. Rose, *Strangers in their Midst* (Merrick, NY: Richwood Publishing Co., 1977); see also Sidney Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970: A Demographic Profile," *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 72, 1971, p. 38; and Alvin Chenkin, "Demographic Data," *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 71, 1970, p. 35.

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION, IN PERCENTAGES, OF U.S. JEWISH POPULATION, BY REGIONS, 1968, 1975, AND 1979

REGION	YEARS		
	1968	1974-75	1979
Northeast	64.0	60.0	57.9
New England	6.8	7.1	6.6
Middle Atlantic	57.1	53.0	51.3
North Central	12.5	12.6	11.9
East North Central	10.2	10.1	9.6
West North Central	2.3	2.4	2.3
South	10.3	14.1	15.8
South Atlantic	8.1	9.4	13.5
East South Central	0.7	0.7	0.7
West South Central	1.5	1.6	1.7
West	13.2	13.0	14.3
Mountain	0.9	1.3	1.8
Pacific	12.2	12.1	12.5

SOURCE: *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 71, 1970, p. 347; vol. 75, 1974-75, p. 306; and vol. 80, 1980, p. 163 (New York and Philadelphia: American Jewish Committee and Jewish Publication Society of America).

In addition to their moving away from the Northeast to all regions of the country, America's Jews are becoming less urban. A report based on data from the National Jewish Population Study⁷ indicates that only 42 percent of those aged 30-34 years were, in 1970, living in the same city in which they resided in 1965. For those aged 35-39, the percentage was somewhat higher, 49 percent, but 19 percent of that age group stated that they were planning to move, and 9 percent stated that their plans were immediate. When the figures for several age cohorts are combined, the data reveal that only 62 percent of the Jews in the United States aged 20 and over were, in

1970, living in the same city in which they resided in 1965. For those aged 25-39, less than 50 percent were still living in the same city in which they resided in 1965, and more than 20 percent were living in a different state. These patterns of dispersion are also reflected in a recent study of the geographic distribution and change of the American Jewish population between the years 1952 and 1971, by counties.⁸ The authors found that while the Jewish population was, in 1971, still much more concentrated than the general population, they were, also much more dispersed than they had been in 1952. In short, Jews are spreading out around the country.

The declining American Jewish population and its changing geographic distribution have significance for both the inter- and intragroup

7. Fred Massarick, "Mobility: Facts for Planning," in *National Jewish Population Study* (New York: Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, 1974). The National Jewish Population Study, sponsored by the Council of Jewish Federations, was conducted during the very late 1960s and early 1970s. A complete report of the findings has yet to be published and would, in any case, now be much outdated.

8. William Newman and Peter Halvorson, "American Jews: Patterns of Geographic Distribution and Change, 1952-1971," *J. Scientific Study of Religion*, 18:183-93 (June 1979).

relations of American Jewry. Perhaps it would be best to begin this discussion with the observation that there is a difference between American Jews and the members of the American Jewish community. Not all of the former are part of the latter. Of the approximately five and one half to six million Americans who identify themselves as Jews, only about 60 percent are affiliated with the organized Jewish community, that is, belong to a synagogue, Jewish organization, and/or contribute annually to a local Jewish Federation—organized Jewish philanthropy/United Jewish Appeal or any other recognized Jewish philanthropic fund-raising campaign.⁹ It is, basically, this approximately 60 percent of America's Jews that are involved with and support the many national and local religious, educational, cultural, and community relations; overseas aid and social welfare; and social, mutual benefit, Zionist, and pro-Israel organizations that make up the American Jewish community.¹⁰ The declining American Jewish population, therefore, means that there are fewer numbers who are affiliated with and who support the organizations and institutions of the American Jewish community. Changing occupational patterns also have an impact, as will be discussed in the following pages.

Geographic mobility also has significant implications for at least two major reasons. If, as is assumed, one's ethnoreligious identification and the likelihood that that identi-

fication and identity will be transmitted from one generation to the next are inextricably related to one's involvement with the ethnoreligious community, then the high rate of geographic mobility is significant in that it may upset if not rupture the patterns of communal involvements and may lead to a weakening of community ties. And since many will likely anticipate moving again within a relatively short period of time, they may not care to invest their energies in becoming involved with a community which, for them, is only temporary. Nor will the community seek to exert itself, to reach out to many who may be seen as transients.

That geographic mobility weakens ethnic group ties has been the predominant assumption among sociologists of ethnic groups in general,¹¹ and of American Jews in particular.¹² However, as far as Jews are concerned, geographic mobility has different implications for different subgroups. For the Reform/Nonaffiliated subgroup, geographic mobility does weaken ethnic group ties. For the Orthodox/Conservative subgroup, however, mobility does not appear to weaken ties. In some cases, it even promotes ethnic participation.¹³

Geographic mobility also places heavy strains on institutional structures that were developed at a

11. See, for example, Robert E. Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," *Am. J. Soc.*, 33:881-92 (May 1928); and Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," *Am. J. Soc.*, 44:3-24 (July).

12. Sidney Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970: A Demographic Profile," *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 72, 1971, p. 50.

13. Charles Jaret, "The Impact of Geographic Mobility on Jewish Community Participation: Disruptive or Supportive?" *Contemporary Jewry*, 4(2):9-21 (spring/summer 1978).

9. Daniel J. Elazar, *Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewry* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1976), pp. 70-75.

10. A descriptive listing of national Jewish organizations may be found in each volume of the *American Jewish Year Book*.

time when the Jewish community was centrally located within a single densely populated area. Population dispersion requires that institutions and organizations branch out to establish new facilities and provide services in many new and different areas, as compared with the more or less centralized structures of the past. The new reality requires major policy decisions both in terms of design and in terms of financial feasibility.

OCCUPATIONAL PATTERNS

Since the beginning of the century, Jews have been moving at a relatively rapid rate out of the blue-collar occupations and into managerial, proprietary, professional, and technical occupations. As Sklare points out, however, it cannot be assumed that Jews are randomly distributed throughout any occupational category, and it is not known precisely what ranks they hold within those occupational spheres. While discrimination against Jews has, apparently, declined in the field of law as well as in other fields, there is no evidence to indicate whether Jews are well represented in the more prestigious law firms. The same holds for the world of corporate executives.¹⁴

By the early 1960s, a new trend in the occupational patterns of America's Jews had emerged, namely, an increase in entrance into professional categories and a decline in the numbers of those in the managerial and proprietary occupations.¹⁵

A number of observers have expressed concern about the impact these new occupational trends will have upon the American Jewish community.

Sklare has expressed concern that as Jews enter the professions, they will increasingly adopt new professional life-styles and relinquish the old ethnic ones.¹⁶ Apparently, he did not envisage many of these professionals as capable of integrating traditional Jewish norms with their new life-styles, though the potential for such integration is much greater today than in the past due to changes in American culture and technology.

Cohen has recently argued that there are other consequences of the rising professionalism of American Jewry that affect the communal structure of the American Jewish community.¹⁷ On the basis of his analysis of data from the 1965 and 1975 Boston Jewish community studies, he suggests that the shift from entrepreneurial to professional status results in a reduction in the number of millionaire donors who have played a major role in the ability of Jewish organizations to raise large sums of money. Also, salaried people do not have access to the many different methods of hiding their income which are open to businessmen, resulting in the former having less to contribute to philanthropic ventures. Finally, there is less social and economic pressure upon professionals to contribute, and they have less of a need to identify with the Jewish community. It should, however, be remembered that the Boston Jewish community is hardly repre-

14. Sklare, pp. 60-65.

15. Goldstein. See also Floyd J. Fowler, Jr., *1975 Community Survey: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston: Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston, 1977), p. 17.

16. Sklare, p. 66.

17. Steven M. Cohen, "Trends in Jewish Philanthropy," *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 80, 1980, pp. 29-51.

sentative of American Jewry, as Cohen himself points out when he indicates the growing number of self-employed professionals who do contribute quite substantially to Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston.¹⁸

EDUCATIONAL PATTERNS

While some questions have been raised as to the precise nature of the relationship,¹⁹ the occupational patterns of American Jews are not independent of their educational patterns.²⁰ A study conducted through Columbia University in the mid-1960s compared the educational mobility of eight different ethnic and religious groups in New York City and found that 89 percent of the native-born Jews surveyed had significantly exceeded their fathers' levels of education. Furthermore, the difference between sons' and fathers' levels of education was far greater among native-born Jews than for any other group.²¹

A study by the Bureau of the Census in 1965 indicated that the educational plans of Jews were significantly different from those of non-Jews. For example, 86 percent of the Jews and 53 percent of the

non-Jewish students interviewed indicated that they planned to go to college. When intelligence, mother's education, occupation of head of household, and family income were controlled for, the findings showed that 70 percent of the Jewish students and only 53 percent of the non-Jewish students planned to go to college.²²

INCOME PATTERNS

According to the most recent data available, which are admittedly dated since they are based upon information which is about 10 years old, the median family income of America's Jews is significantly higher than that of the total U.S. population. Whereas the median family income in 1971 for the total population was \$10,285, that of Jews was \$12,630.²³ This fact should not be surprising, given the high educational and occupational levels of Jews. However, since we do not have sufficient data to make comparisons on the basis of the number of employed household members, it is possible that part of the difference in median family incomes may lie in the disproportionate number of dual-career families among America's Jews.²⁴

To give a more accurate picture of the income patterns of American Jews, two more points must be

18. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

19. For a Marxian analysis of the relationship between the educational and occupational patterns of American Jews, especially in the first generation, see Sherry Gorelick, *City College and the Jewish Poor: Education in New York, 1880-1924* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1981) (in press).

20. This section is, of course, referring to secular education. For an examination of trends in Jewish cultural and religious education, see David A. Resnick, "Toward an Agenda for Research in Jewish Education," in *Understanding American Jewry*, ed. Marshall Sklare (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1981) (in press).

21. Sklare, p. 57.

22. Goldstein; and A. Lewis Rhodes and Charles B. Nam, "The Religious Context of Educational Expectations," *Am. Soc. Review*, 35(2):253-67 (April 1970). See also Andrew M. Greeley, *Ethnicity in the United States* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), p. 65.

23. Alvin Chenkin, "Demographic Highlights: Facts for Planning," in *National Jewish Population Study* (New York: Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, 1972), p. 10.

24. Florence A. Ruderman, *Child Care and Working Mothers* (New York: Child Welfare League of America, 1968), pp. 134-35.

made. First, while America's Jews, as a group, do have higher median family incomes than the national median, there is still a relatively substantial number of Jews who fall below the Bureau of Labor Statistics' "moderate income" level.²⁵ This is especially the case in the nation's major metropolitan centers, and as was indicated previously, these are still the areas with substantial Jewish populations. Furthermore, while Jews have moved up the income ladder, and while there are some Jews who have entered the category of millionaires, it would appear that very few Jews have made it to the top rung, which Dye refers to as "America's Centimillionaires," or those who have fortunes of over \$100 million.²⁶

POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

The political liberalism of American Jews in the twentieth century has been well-documented, though a comprehensive and satisfactory explanation of that phenomenon remains elusive.²⁷ Despite the peren-

nial spate of empirical data showing that Jews hold liberal political attitudes and vote liberally to a degree which is very much inconsistent with their socioeconomic status, every few years the rumor spreads that America's Jews are becoming conservative.²⁸ The fact that if, indeed, they were, they would only be conforming to patterns that have long been characteristic of the general population is invariably overlooked by many of those who foretell of a Jewish swing to political conservatism.

Among the data of the past decade one finds that, for example, in 1972, despite George McGovern's mishandling of the so-called Jewish issues and Richard Nixon's strong support for Israel, approximately two thirds of America's Jews who voted, voted for McGovern for president. In 1976, Jews, as a rule, voted for Jimmy Carter and, in New York, about 80 percent did so, whereas Whites in the country as a whole, especially those of similar income and education, moved to the right. In a nationwide *New York Times*-CBS survey in the fall of 1978, which questioned close to 9000 voters on both domestic and foreign policy issues, Jews were found to be more liberal than any other white group.²⁹ And, in a study of the 1978 "Vote White" City Charter campaign in Philadelphia, both more prosperous and less prosperous Jews aligned themselves with Blacks to

25. See Naomi Levine and Martin Hochbaum, eds., *Poor Jews: An American Awakening* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1974). For a critique of education for Jewish communal service, with respect to its lack of focus on Jewish poverty, see Chaim I. Waxman, "Bringing the Poor Back In: Jewish Poverty in Education for Jewish Communal Service," *Forum*, no. 35 (spring/summer, 1979), pp. 133-43.

26. Thomas R. Dye, *Who's Running America?* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 40-42. Dye's list is based on *Fortune*, May 1968.

27. See Charles S. Liebman, *The Ambivalent American Jew* (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1973), pp. 135-59; see also Arthur Liebman, *Jews and the Left* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979).

28. See, for example, Orlando Patterson, *Ethnic Chauvinism* (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), p. 165; and Martin Kilson, "Blacks and Neo-Ethnicity in America," in *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience*, eds. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 259-60.

29. Adam Clymer, "Voting Jews Remain Liberal, Poll Finds," *New York Times*, 12 Nov. 1978, p. 27.

help defeat Mayor Rizzo's Charter change proposal.³⁰

Virtually all of the evidence, from both national and local elections, belies what Michael Ledeen refers to as "a major hoax in the conventional wisdom,"³¹ namely, the projection that America's Jews are turning to the political right. On the contrary, on issues concerning welfare, civil rights, women's rights, civil liberties, and even internationalism, except on the question of support for the United Nations because of its overt hostility toward Israel, American Jews have been and remain liberal.³² While the country as a whole has moved right, Jews remain "off the graph,"³³ that is, they maintain their left-of-center position on the American political spectrum.

RELATIONSHIP TO THE STATE OF ISRAEL

Since 1967, Israel has become a central, if not *the* central focus of American Jewry. Zionism has come to be defined as pro-Israelism for

30. Sandra Featherman and William L. Rosenberg, *Jews, Blacks and Ethnicities* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1979).

31. Michael Ledeen, "Liberals, Not the Jews, Have Changed," *Society*, 16(4):5 (May/June 1979).

32. Alan M. Fisher, "Where is the New Jewish Conservatism?," *Society*, 16(4):5, 15-18 (May/June 1979); and Alan M. Fisher, "Realignment of the Jewish Vote?" *Political Science Quarterly*, 94 (no. 1):97-116 (spring 1979). For a thoughtful discussion of recent Jewish agonizing over the issue of racial quotas, see Nathan Glazer, "American Jews: Three Conflicts of Loyalties," in *The Third Century: America as a Post-Industrial Society*, ed. Seymour Martin Lipset (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), pp. 224-41 (hereafter cited as "American Jews").

33. Milton Himmelfarb, *The Jews of Modernity* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 65-116.

American Jews,³⁴ and all empirical studies show the overwhelming pro-Israelism of American Jews. Liebman indicates how support for Israel has been incorporated into the religious behavior of American Jews, while for Glazer, "Israel has become *the* religion for American Jews."³⁵ It should, however, be clear that the American Jewish support for Israel does not necessarily mean that American Jews support all of the policies of a particular government in the state of Israel. Many American Jews have, for example, openly dissented from some of the settlement policies of the current government in Israel. For the vast majority, however, their dissent is within the framework of the loyal opposition, and in the final analysis, their emphasis is more on the loyal than on the opposition. In no way would most of the dissenters identify or wish to be associated with antagonists of the state of Israel.

That support for Israel has become part of the religious behavior, or the religion, of American Jews means that, disclaimers notwithstanding, the relationship of American Jews to Israel is different from the relationship that other ethnic groups have with their respective homelands. American Jews contribute huge amounts to fund-raising campaigns, invest in development bonds for Israel—despite the precariousness of Israel's economy—read and

34. For an analysis of the ideological and social-psychological differences between Zionism and pro-Israelism, see Chaim I. Waxman, "The Centrality of Israel in American Jewish Life: A Sociological Analysis," *Judaism*, (2):175-87 (spring 1976); and Simon N. Herman, *Jewish Identity: A Social-Psychological Perspective* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977), pp. 115-42.

35. Charles S. Liebman, pp. 88-108; Nathan Glazer, "American Jews," p. 233.

listen to news about Israel, visit Israel, buy Israeli products, and lobby for Israel, despite the fact that very few of them have any intention of emigrating there. Though they have no questions about their identity as Americans, most American Jews define the survival and well-being of Israel as *sine qua non* for the survival of Jewry. They therefore define any attempt to distinguish between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism as an exercise in sophistry.

PATTERNS OF ANTI-SEMITISM

In 1966, Stember identified a clear trend of gradually declining anti-Semitism in the United States from the end of World War II to 1962, the last date for which data were available to him.³⁶ Between 1963 and 1975, a series of nine studies on different aspects of anti-Semitism, sponsored by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith and carried out by the Survey Research Center of the University of California at Berkeley under the direction of Charles Y. Glock, generally found the continuation of that trend of gradual decline in anti-Semitism.³⁷ Perhaps the most consistent finding was that those of lower socioeconomic status, in terms of education, occupation, and income, invariably scored higher on questions measuring anti-Semitic beliefs and discriminatory attitudes than did those of higher status; and of the three variables, education is the most predictive. With respect to anti-Semitism

among Blacks, it was found that Blacks scored higher than white non-Jews on an index of anti-Semitic beliefs when the indicators dealt with economic practices of Jews. On noneconomic indicators, less of a difference was found between black and white non-Jewish beliefs. Moreover, contrary to what many, especially Jews, believe, Blacks were not found to selectively, or specifically, evaluate Jews any more negatively than they did Whites in general.

In a more limited study, during 1970, of a sample of Blacks aged 20 years and older in two areas in south-central Los Angeles, Tsukashima found that, in contrast "to popular opinion," black anti-Semites, that is, those who are prejudiced specifically against Jews, tended to come from less ghettoized areas, to be of higher socioeconomic background, and to be characterized by a limited range of contact with Jews, as compared with those who are not prejudiced toward Jews in particular. He interprets his findings as suggestive of an emerging "class conflict between aspiring, middle-class blacks competing with middleman Jews."³⁸

The most extensive recent analysis of anti-Semitism in the United States is a lengthy report by William Schneider, prepared for the American Jewish Committee at the end of 1978.³⁹ Briefly, Schneider's analysis of recent opinion surveys found a relatively low level of anti-Semitism, lower, in fact, than most Jews assume, despite the energy crisis and

36. Charles Herbert Stember et al., *Jews in the Mind of America* (New York: Basic Books, 1966).

37. A "wrap-up" volume, *Anti-Semitism in America*, by Harold E. Quinley and Charles L. Glock, was published in New York, The Free Press, 1979.

38. Ronald Tadao Tsukashima, "Selective Black Hostility Toward Jewish and Non-Jewish Whites," *Contemporary Jewry*, 4(2): 51-59 (spring/summer 1978).

39. William Schneider, "Anti-Semitism and Israel: A Report on American Public Opinion," American Jewish Committee, Dec. 1978 (unpublished).

economic recession. In terms of percentages, Schneider found, on the average, about one third of non-Jews "willing to accept anti-Semitic stereotypes or willing to say that Jews differ from others in ways that might be interpreted negatively."⁴⁰

As to black anti-Semitism, Schneider's findings were similar to those of previous studies, namely, that it is most pronounced in the case of economic stereotypes and that there has been an apparent gradual decline in black anti-Semitism. However, he also found significant differences between young Blacks and older Blacks and young Blacks and young Whites. His data indicated a higher rate of anti-Semitism among young Blacks than among older Blacks. Also, young Blacks were significantly more anti-Semitic than young Whites. Moreover, comparing survey data from 1964 and 1974, Schneider found white anti-Semitism to have decreased at a faster rate than black anti-Semitism, with the result that, by 1974, Blacks were relatively more anti-Semitic than Whites.⁴¹

INTERMARRIAGE

With the advent of the modern era, the socioeconomic position of Jews in the United States and urban centers of Europe improved. Along with rising political and social equality, there were increased informal social contacts and interpersonal relationships. Predictably, the intermarriage rate of Jews increased somewhat, but the group as a whole remained rather highly endogamous.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 18. It may be noted that while Schneider found anti-Semitism to decline with higher education, he also found that anti-Israel sentiment rises with increased education; *idem*, pp. 114-27; see also Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, *Israel and the Jews in American Public Opinion*, 1979 (manuscript).

41. Schneider, pp. 88-94.

In his review of studies of intermarriage, Rosenthal reported that data from a study of greater Washington by Stanley Bigman in 1956 indicated that there was an overall Jewish intermarriage rate of 13.1 percent, with that rate rising to about 18 percent for third-generation American Jews. Moreover, "the Washington data revealed that the children in at least 70 percent of mixed families are lost to the Jewish group."⁴² While Washington is not representative of the country at large, Rosenthal implies that the intermarriage patterns there are indications of those in the rest of the country. By 1965, the National Jewish Population Study estimated the intermarriage rate to be 29.1 percent and rising. As of 1972, it estimated that the rate of intermarriage had risen to 48.1 percent.⁴³

As evidence of rising intermarriage rates mounted during the 1960s, the public expressions of concern for the Jewish future of the intermarried couples and their children grew louder. In 1964, Marshall Sklare, widely regarded as the foremost authority on the sociology of American Jewry and whose analyses emanate from a "survivalist" perspective,⁴⁴ decried the "Jewish complacency about the rate of intermarriage." Rejecting the prevalent arguments used by those who attempted to dissuade couples from intermarrying by citing questionable studies suggesting that intermarriage is

42. Erich Rosenthal, "Studies of Jewish Intermarriage in the United States," *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 64, 1963, p. 32.

43. Fred Massarik, "Intermarriage: Facts for Planning," in *National Jewish Population Study* (New York: Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, 1973), p. 11.

44. Chaim I. Waxman, "Psalms of a Sober Man: The Sociology of Marshall Sklare," *Contemporary Jewry*, 4(1):3-11 (fall/winter 1977-78).

symptomatic of individuals with psychological maladies and that it invariably leads to marital instability, Sklare asserted that "it is precisely the 'healthy' modern intermarriages which raise the most troubling questions of all to the Jewish community."⁴⁵ He warned that the rising intermarriage rate posed a most formidable threat to "the Jewish future." In 1970, he reiterated his warning and asserted that it is a threat which overshadows all of the recent positive developments in the American Jewish community. "It strikes," he argued, "at the very core of Jewish group existence."⁴⁶

However, despite the stern warnings and dire predictions of Sklare and many others, no strategy for dealing with the issue has emerged on the Jewish communal agenda. What appears to have developed is an attitude that it is inevitable, and the community will have to reconcile itself to "living with intermarriage"⁴⁷ and making the best of it.

Moreover, Fred Massarik, scientific director of the National Jewish Population Study, has reconsidered the data and the issue and suggests that the issue for Jewish survival is not really intermarriage, per se, but fertility, and that "the net effect of intermarriage may be an increase in Jewish population rather than a decrease."⁴⁸ While not arriving at an unequivocal conclusion, Massarik argues that the issue of

intermarriage as it affects the Jewish future is more complex than was previously evident. It is only one variable which itself has many variable features, such as whether the originally non-Jewish spouse converted or did not and whether the Jewish spouse was male or female. Each of these variants has a differential impact upon the future identification and the plans for involvement of the intermarried couple and their children with the Jewish community and Jewish religious-cultural life.

Similarly, in their summary report of a national study,⁴⁹ sponsored by the American Jewish Committee on "intermarriage and the Jewish future," Mayer and Sheingold⁵⁰ argue as follows. Since the rate of Jewish intermarriage will, doubtlessly, continue to increase "in the foreseeable future," and since the study confirmed the earlier findings of Lazerwitz⁵¹ that what they term "conversionary marriages," in which the previously non-Jewish spouse converts to Judaism, compare favorably, in terms of religious affiliation and observance, not only with "mixed marriages," in which the non-Jewish spouse does not convert, but also with endogamous Jewish marriages, that "the Jewish community would do well to examine what steps it can take to encourage" conversion.⁵² However, while this argument accepts the inevitability of

45. Marshall Sklare, "Intermarriage and the Jewish Future," *Commentary*, vol. 37, April 1964, p. 51.

46. Marshall Sklare, "Intermarriage and Jewish Survival," *Commentary*, vol. 49, March 1970, p. 51.

47. David Singer, "Living With Intermarriage," *Commentary*, vol. 58, pp. 48-53.

48. Fred Massarik, "Rethinking the Intermarriage Crisis," *Moment*, vol. 3, June 1978, p. 33.

49. Egon Mayer, *Patterns of Intermarriage Among American Jews* (New York: American Jewish Committee, Jewish Communal Affairs Dept., 1978).

50. Egon Mayer and Carl Sheingold, *Intermarriage and the Jewish Future: A National Study in Summary* (New York: American Jewish Committee, Institute of Human Relations, 1979).

51. Bernard Lazerwitz, "Intermarriage and Conversion: A Guide for Future Research," *Jewish J. Soc.*, 13:41-63 (June 1971).

52. Mayer and Sheingold, p. 32.

an increasing rate of intermarriage, it remains to be seen to what extent the extended familism of America's Jews will prevail and, more significantly, to what extent this kind of extended family will serve to reinforce and transmit Jewish identity and identification.

DENOMINATIONAL PATTERNS

In the second generation, social class and time of arrival in America were highly significant variables in the denominational structure of American Jewry. The general pattern was for those of upper-class status and most length of time in the country to be associated with Reform Judaism, middle-class Jews with Conservative Judaism, and lower-class Jews and those with the least time in the country to be associated with Orthodox Judaism. Thus in the third generation, Conservative Judaism was the largest branch; Reform, second; and Orthodox, the smallest. In their analysis of data from the 1970 National Jewish Population Study, Lazerwitz and Harrison⁵³ found Reform affiliates to include fewer foreign-born and more third-generation Americans than Conservative affiliates, and found Orthodox to include the largest percentage of foreign born. Socioeconomic differences between the denominations remain, but they are considerably smaller than in the past.

In analyzing the affiliational patterns of America's Jews, Lazerwitz⁵⁴

found that, as of 1971, 11 percent identified with Orthodox, 42 percent with Conservative, 33 percent with Reform, and 14 percent had no denominational identification. With respect to membership, about 50 percent of American Jews were synagogue members. Holding generation constant, significantly different affiliational patterns emerge between foreign-born Jews and those with both parents having been native born. The Orthodox declined from 26 percent among foreign born to 3 percent among native born, and, respectively, the Conservative declined from 47 to 30 percent, the Reform rose from 14 to 41 percent, and those with no denominational identity rose from 13 percent to 26 percent.

On the basis of data from both the National Jewish Population study and the 1965 survey of the Jewish community of greater Boston, Lazerwitz predicted that in the foreseeable future the Orthodox will become a very small denomination of only a few percentage points. The Conservatives, too, will decline because of the decline of the Orthodox, who were a major source of new members for the Conservatives, and also because of some loss to the Reform branch, which will probably become the largest branch of American Judaism.

There does, nevertheless, seem to be an incongruence between these data and a variety of as yet unquantified manifestations of a resurgence of Orthodox Judaism throughout the 1970s.⁵⁵ Himmel-

53. Bernard Lazerwitz and Michael Harrison, "American Jewish Denominations: A Social and Religious Profile," *Am. Soc. Review*, 44:656-66 (August 1979).

54. Bernard Lazerwitz, "Past and Future Trends in the Size of American Jewish Denominations," *J. Reform Judaism*, 26(3): 77-82 (summer 1979).

55. See "Introduction," in *Dimensions of American Orthodox Judaism*, ed. Reuven P. Bulka (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1981) (in press). Also see Egon Mayer and Chaim I. Waxman, "Modern Jewish Orthodoxy

farb⁵⁶ suggests that the impressions of a resurgence of Orthodoxy may actually merely be the result of its increased wealth and greater organizational sophistication and institutional proliferation, even though the actual numbers of Orthodox are decreasing.

On the other hand, the findings in a recent study of the membership of Conservative synagogues by Liebman and Shapiro suggest a source of actual gain in numbers for Orthodox Judaism. Briefly, their analysis points to a significant decline in membership for the Conservative movement in the 1980s, with the larger, less traditional component moving to Reform or ceasing to affiliate denominationally, and the smaller, more traditional component within Conservative Judaism moving into the Orthodox branch.⁵⁷ If that prediction proves accurate, it may realign the denominational patterns of American Judaism in such a way that eventually, Reform would become the largest branch; Ortho-

dox, the second largest; and Conservative, the smallest.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

From the evidence presented, several divergent trends manifest themselves within American Jewry at this time. As was projected by almost all students of the third generation in the 1960s, there is a clear and, apparently, dominant trend of accelerated cultural and, to a lesser degree, structural assimilation. While some of the earlier theorists of ethnicity may not have realized its intensity and complexity, they were probably correct in predicting that rapid acculturation, cultural and structural assimilation, would invariably lead to what Gordon refers to as "identificational assimilation,"⁵⁸ the loss of identification with the ethnic group. Thus it would not be unreasonable to predict that some of the fourth generation will no longer be part of America's Jewish population. They will not perceive themselves as members of the American Jewish community nor will they consciously attempt to live their lives in any way that would identify them as being Jews.

For most of the fourth generation, however, it would be highly presumptuous to make such a prediction, especially in light of the many studies that indicate the persistence of ethnicity in American society even as cultural and some structural assimilation prevails. Particularly at this point in American social history, their identification as Jewish-Americans is likely to prevail because the stigma of ethnicity, which had been a powerful incentive to consciously reject one's ethnic iden-

in America: Toward the Year 2000," *Tradition*, 16(3):98-111 (spring 1977); and William B. Helmreich, *The Yeshiva in America* (New York: The Free Press, 1981) (in press). For a study of the largest Orthodox Jewish community in the United States, numbering more than 50,000 members, see Egon Mayer, *From Suburb to Shtetl* (Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1979).

56. Harold S. Himmelfarb, "Patterns of Assimilation—Identification Among American Jews," *Ethnicity*, 6(3):249-67 (Sept. 1979).

57. Charles S. Liebman and Saul Shapiro, "A Survey of the Conservative Movement and Some of Its Religious Attitudes," Released at the 1979 Biennial Convention of the United Synagogue of America, Nov. 11-15, 1979; and Charles S. Liebman, "The Future of Conservative Judaism in the United States," *Jerusalem Letter: Viewpoints*, no. 11, Center for Jewish Community Studies (31 March 1980).

58. Milton M. Gordon, pp. 70-71.

tity, has been greatly alleviated by the prevalent ideology of cultural pluralism. While there is, and will probably continue to be, a growing pattern of nonparticipation in the organized Jewish communal structure as the American Jewish occupational structure continues its pattern of increasing professionalism, this does not necessarily portend large-scale identificational assimilation. Evidence indicates that most Jews in the professional categories continue to identify as Jewish despite their tendency toward communal nonaffiliation.

There is, in addition, another trend, albeit not as strong, in the opposite direction of what might have been anticipated even by many of those who do not hold to overly simple melting-pot or assimilation theories. There were few students of third-generation American Jews who foresaw, or could have foreseen, the possibility of a revitalization of "intrinsic" Jewish cultural patterns at the same time that there has been a virtual disappearance of "extrinsic" Jewish cultural patterns in the fourth generation of Eastern European American Jewry. As Milton Gordon uses these terms, "intrinsic cultural traits" refer to such patterns and traits as "religious beliefs and practices," "literature," and "a sense of a common past," among others, while "extrinsic cultural traits" refer to such patterns and traits as "dress, manner, patterns of emotional expression, and minor oddities in pronouncing and inflecting English."⁵⁹

There are, in fact, various manifestations of the intensification of intrinsic Jewish culture within the contemporary American Jewish community. Marshall Sklare observed

many of them when, in the mid-1970s, he revisited the pseudonymous community, "Lakeville," he and Joseph Greenblum had originally studied a decade earlier.⁶⁰ He describes, among other manifestations, the building of a Jewish day school, the movement of the community's oldest Reform temple closer to normative Judaism, an increased emphasis on Jewish survival in two temples that had originally been established with a strong classical Reform ideology, a greater traditionalism in the community's newest Reform temple, the establishment of new synagogues, the teaching of Hebrew in high school, communal support for the cause of Soviet Jewry, and a much greater involvement with and support of Israel. He sums up the recent developments by saying, "What has been accomplished in Lakeville in the past twenty years is an encouraging sign of Jewish affirmation."⁶¹

These developments reflect patterns in the larger American Jewish community that Nathan Glazer analyzed within the context of the overriding American Jewish concern with "survival," which has emerged since 1967 and is at the root of the numerous manifestations of Jewish self-consciousness he discusses.⁶² The revitalization of intrinsic Jewish culture possibly manifests itself most clearly in the now-explicit and virtually universal pro-Israel stance of American Jews, if for no other reason than that this is both the cause and effect of a more explicit sense of

60. Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 333-405.

61. *Ibid.*

62. Nathan Glazer, *American Judaism*, 2nd ed. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 151-86.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

identification with a larger common core, which in turn, intensifies a sense of a common past.

In a thoughtful elaboration of a notion that he developed almost a quarter of a century ago, Herbert Gans has recently applied the term "symbolic ethnicity" to the analysis of many of the patterns and traits that have herein been defined as the revitalization of intrinsic Jewish culture, as well as to many other manifestations of the so-called ethnic revival in the larger American society.⁶³ As he sees it, "It is characterized by a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and a pride in a tradition that can be felt without having to be incorporated into everyday behavior."⁶⁴ It appears that, without saying so in so many words, Gans implicitly sees "symbolic ethnicity" in a perjorative light. In any event, he explicitly considers it neither as

an ethnic revival nor a "third generation return." Rather, in accord with "straight-line" assimilation theory,⁶⁵ Gans sees these manifestations as nothing but another point on the line toward assimilation.

Granted that he is correct in suggesting that one reason for the emergence of symbolic ethnicity is that cultural pluralism now has legitimacy in American society, does that, ergo, render the ethnicity any less real? With respect to a significant segment of the American Jewish community, as has been pointed out, there have emerged a surprising number of patterns that appear to be manifestations of not only "public ethnicity," which may be no more than a passing fad, but a sincere return to intrinsic Jewish culture. The future of this trend is as difficult to predict as was its emergence. And its impact upon intergroup relations, that is, relations between Jews and others, remains to be seen. In the meantime, it adds an interesting touch to the reality of America as a multicultural society.

63. Herbert J. Gans, "Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America," in *On the Making of Americans: Essays in Honor of David Riesman*, eds. Herbert J. Gans, Nathan Glazer, Joseph R. Gusfield, and Christopher Jencks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), pp. 193-220.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 204.

65. Gans borrows the term "straight-line theory" from Neil C. Sandberg, *Ethnic Identity and Assimilation: The Polish-American Community* (New York: Praeger Special Studies, 1974).