

THE ISRAELI PEACE INITIATIVE AND THE ISRAEL-PLO ACCORD

In September 1993, immediately following the signing of a historic accord by leaders of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, the American Jewish Committee sponsored a survey of American Jewish opinion about the peace initiative.¹ Eleven months later, in August 1994, the AJC returned to the subject with a second in-depth survey examining the specifics of the Israel-PLO agreement, the broader set of issues shaping the Israel-Arab peace process, and the attachment of American Jews to Israel. Since the two surveys employ the identical methodology and make use of many of the same questions, trends over time may be readily discerned. The August 1994 poll was the ninth in a series of AJC-sponsored surveys of American Jews dating back to 1983.

Methodology

The telephone survey was conducted for the American Jewish Committee by Market Facts, Inc., a national survey-research company, during August 11-18, 1994. No interviewing occurred on Friday evening, August 12, or on Saturday, August 13, because of the Sabbath. The sample consisted of 1,000 self-identified Jewish respondents selected from the company's consumer mail panel, designed to be demographically representative of the U.S. adult Jewish population in terms of age, household income, gender, and geographic region. The margin of error is plus or minus three percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level.

¹ The findings are reported in detail in Renae Cohen, *The Palestinian Autonomy Agreement and Israel-PLO Recognition: A Survey of American Jewish Opinion* (American Jewish Committee, January 1994).

Approximately 50 percent of the respondents are men and 51 percent are women.² Thirty-eight percent are under age 40, 32 percent are 40-59, and 31 percent are 60 and over. Seventy-one percent are married and 29 percent are unmarried. Twenty-four percent report their 1993 household incomes as under \$30,000, 33 percent as \$30,000-49,999, 21 percent as \$50,000-74,999, and 20 percent as \$75,000 and over. Sixteen percent have a high-school education or less, 26 percent have attended some college, 23 percent have four years of college, and 31 percent have five or more years of higher education.

Five percent identify as Orthodox Jews, 35 percent as Conservative, 1 percent as Reconstructionist, 34 percent as Reform, and 25 percent as "just Jewish." Fifty-one percent belong to a synagogue or temple. Of the married respondents, 69 percent report having Jewish spouses.

Eighty-one percent always or usually light Hanukkah candles; 77 percent always or usually attend a Passover seder; 35 percent always or usually celebrate Purim; 17 percent always or usually have a Christmas tree. While 65 percent have never been to Israel, 35 percent have visited there at least once. Finally, 57 percent say that being Jewish is "very important" to them, with another 35 percent saying it is "fairly important"; 8 percent consider it "not very important."

As with previous Market Facts samples, the respondents appear somewhat "more Jewish" on a variety of identification indicators than the 1990 NJPS Core Jewish population.³

Key Findings

Among the key findings of the survey with regard to the peace process are the following:

(1) A substantial majority of American Jews endorse the Rabin government's peace initiative. Thus, when asked in general terms if they "support" or "oppose" the "Israeli government's current handling of the peace negotiations with the Arabs," 77 percent support and 10 percent oppose, while 14 percent are not sure. More specifically, 79 percent support

² Throughout the paper, rounding error accounts for the fact that the numbers may add to more than 100 percent.

³ For specific comparisons, see Addendum.

the handling of the peace negotiations with the Jordanians, 70 percent with the Palestinians, and 62 percent with the Syrians.

Asked whether they are “for” or “against” the Israel-PLO accord calling for “Palestinian autonomy to begin in Gaza and Jericho, and to extend at a later stage to other areas in the West Bank,” 66 percent of American Jews are for, 23 percent against, and 11 percent not sure. Fewer respondents support the specifics of the autonomy plan: 61 percent endorse the plan as it applies to the Gaza Strip and 51 percent as it applies to Jericho, while only 34 percent favor “extending Palestinian autonomy to other areas in the West Bank.” Also with regard to the Israel-PLO agreement, 61 percent of American Jews believe that the plan for Palestinian autonomy “increases the chance for peace with the Arabs,” while 24 percent maintain that the autonomy plan “increases the possibility of another war.”

(2) While still high, support for the Rabin government’s peace initiative has declined from the levels observed eleven months ago, immediately following the signing of the Israel-PLO accord. Thus, in September 1993, 84 percent of American Jews expressed support for the “Israeli government’s current handling of the peace negotiations with the Arabs,” as against 77 percent who do so at present. Moreover, in September 1993, 75 percent of American Jews were for the Israel-PLO autonomy agreement, in contrast with 66 percent today. Or again, in September 1993, 73 percent of American Jews believed that the plan for Palestinian autonomy “increases the chance for peace with the Arabs,” while 61 percent take this position at present.

(3) There is significant distrust of the Arabs generally and deep distrust of the PLO specifically. Moreover, this distrust increased between September 1993 and August 1994. With regard to the Arabs, 51 percent of American Jews agree that the “goal of the Arabs is not the return of occupied territories but rather the destruction of Israel,” while 41 percent disagree and 8 percent are not sure. A majority of American Jews—68 percent—take the view that the Jordanians “are interested” in a “true and lasting peace with Israel,” but only a slight plurality—44 percent versus 42 percent—maintain the same about the Palestinians, while a near majority—47 percent versus 33 percent—believe that the Syrians are “not interested” in such a peace.

Views of the PLO are even more negative. Thus 65 percent of American Jews respond no to the question “Can the PLO be relied upon to honor its agreements and refrain from terrorist activity against Israel?” while 18

percent state yes and 17 percent are not sure. Most directly, 53 percent of American Jews agree with the view that “the PLO is determined to destroy Israel,” while 39 percent disagree and 9 percent are not sure.

Distrust of both the Arabs and the PLO has grown over the last eleven months. Thus, in September 1993, 42 percent of American Jews agreed with the statement “The goal of the Arabs is not the return of occupied territories but rather the destruction of Israel,” while 51 percent affirm this position at present. With regard to the PLO, 42 percent of American Jews in September 1993 answered no to the question “Can the PLO be relied upon to honor its agreements and refrain from terrorist activity against Israel?” as against 65 percent who respond no today. As for the contention that “the PLO is determined to destroy Israel,” 34 percent agreed in September 1993, while 53 percent agree in August 1994.

(4) On the question of the Golan Heights, when asked “What should Israel be willing to give up on the Golan Heights in order to reach a peace agreement with Syria?” a majority of American Jews answer “none of it” (32 percent) or “only a small part of it” (27 percent). In contrast, 27 percent favor giving up “some of it,” 4 percent “most of it,” and 3 percent “all of it.” These figures are very close to those obtained in September 1993.

(5) With regard to the status of Jerusalem, when asked “In the framework of a permanent peace with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to compromise on the status of Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction?” 60 percent of American Jews respond no, 32 percent say yes, and 8 percent are not sure. These figures are virtually identical to those of September 1993.

(6) While support for the Rabin government’s peace initiative is widespread among American Jews, relatively less enthusiasm is shown by various subgroups of respondents: those with less education, those with lower incomes, those who feel “very close” to Israel, and women. A majority of Orthodox Jews oppose the peace initiative.

The Israel-PLO Accord and the Peace Process

General Results. Support for the Rabin government’s peace initiative is widespread among American Jews. Thus a strong majority—77 percent—support “the Israeli government’s current handling of the peace negotiations with the Arabs,” while only 10 percent oppose it, and another 14 percent are not sure. Seventy-nine percent support the government’s “current handling of the peace negotiations with the Jordanians,” while 6 percent

oppose it and 15 percent are not sure. Seventy percent support the government's "current handling of the peace negotiations with the Palestinians," while 15 percent oppose it and 14 percent are not sure. And 62 percent support the government's "current handling of the peace negotiations with the Syrians," while 14 percent oppose it and 24 percent are not sure.

Sixty-six percent of respondents are "for" the Palestinian autonomy plan, 23 percent are "against" it, and 11 percent are not sure. Sixty-one percent support the autonomy plan as it applies to the Gaza Strip, while 22 percent oppose it and 18 percent are not sure. Fifty-one percent support the plan as it applies to Jericho, while 23 percent oppose it and 25 percent are not sure. However, only a minority (34 percent) support "extending Palestinian autonomy to other areas in the West Bank," while 43 percent oppose it and 24 percent are not sure. More generally, when asked to respond to the statement "Israel should reject the principle of 'trading land for peace,'" 59 percent disagree, 35 percent agree, and 6 percent are not sure.

Sixty-one percent of American Jews think that the autonomy plan "increases the chance for peace with the Arabs," while 24 percent believe that it "increases the possibility of another war"; 3 percent say that it increases neither the possibility of war nor the chance for peace; and 12 percent are not sure. Correspondingly, 62 percent do not think that "there will be a war between Israel and the Arabs in the near future," while 26 percent predict a war and 12 percent are not sure.

A plurality of American Jews see Israel's overall situation as "very good" (6 percent) or "good" (43 percent); only 12 percent see it as bad ("very bad," 2 percent; "bad," 10 percent); 37 percent see it as "neither good nor bad"; and another 2 percent are not sure. Indeed, 52 percent see Israel's situation as "better now" than it was a year ago; only 8 percent see it as "worse now"; 37 percent see it as "about the same"; 3 percent are not sure.

The survey also probed attitudes toward possible Israeli policies. When asked "As part of a permanent settlement with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to dismantle Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza?" just over half of American Jews (52 percent) answer no, while 37 percent say yes and 8 percent don't know.

A majority of American Jews think that the autonomy plan is likely to lead to a Palestinian state (likely, 60 percent; not likely, 24 percent; not sure, 16 percent), and just over half favor the establishment of such a state (favor, 53 percent; oppose, 34 percent; not sure, 13 percent).

Sixty percent of American Jews say that Israel should not “compromise on the status of Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction,” while 32 percent favor a compromise, and 8 percent are not sure.

When asked how much land Israel should give up on the West Bank in order to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians, 46 percent of American Jews answer either “none of it” (19 percent) or “only a small part of it” (27 percent), while 37 percent answer “some of it.” Fewer respondents favor giving up “all of it” (2 percent) or “most of it” (9 percent); 6 percent are not sure.

When asked what Israel should be willing to give up on the Golan Heights in order to reach a peace agreement with Syria, a majority of American Jews answer either “none of it” (32 percent) or “only a small part of it” (27 percent); 27 percent say “some of it”; 4 percent say “most of it” and 3 percent “all of it”; and 7 percent are not sure.

Asked about the controversy as to whether Israel should allow Yasir Arafat “to visit the Moslem holy places on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem,” 82 percent of American Jews say that Israel should allow this; 13 percent say that Israel should not allow it; and 6 percent are not sure.

Despite the high level of support for the autonomy agreement, there is significant distrust of both the Arabs and the Palestinians. Thus a majority (65 percent) believe that the PLO cannot “be relied upon to honor its agreements and refrain from terrorist activity against Israel”; 18 percent feel that the PLO can be relied upon; and 17 percent are not sure. Or again, just over half (53 percent) agree that “The PLO is determined to destroy Israel,” although 39 percent disagree; 9 percent are not sure.

Moreover, 51 percent of American Jews agree that “The goal of the Arabs is not the return of occupied territories but rather the destruction of Israel,” although 41 percent disagree; 8 percent are not sure. A plurality (47 percent) say that the Syrians “are not interested” in “a true and lasting peace with Israel,” while 33 percent say the Syrians “are interested” in a true peace; 20 percent are not sure. Only a slight plurality (44 percent) say that the Palestinians are interested “in a true and lasting peace with Israel,” with 42 percent saying that the Palestinians are not interested in this; 15 percent are not sure. However, a strong majority (68 percent) say that the Jordanians are interested in “a true and lasting peace with Israel,” while 21 percent say the Jordanians are not interested in a true peace; 10 percent are not sure.

Trends Over Time.⁴ Support for the Rabin government's peace initiative has declined from the levels measured in AJC's 1993 survey of American Jews. In September 1993, 84 percent of American Jews supported the Israeli government's "current handling of the peace negotiations with the Arabs," in contrast with 77 percent who do so at present. In September 1993, 75 percent of American Jews supported the Israel-PLO autonomy agreement, as opposed to 66 percent today. And in September 1993, 73 percent of American Jews believed that the autonomy plan "increases the chance for peace with the Arabs," while 61 percent do so at present.

Moreover, in 1993, 69 percent of American Jews supported the autonomy plan as it applies to the Gaza strip, while 61 percent do so at present. In 1993, 64 percent supported the autonomy plan as it applies to Jericho, while 51 percent do so today. And in 1993, 43 percent supported extending Palestinian autonomy to other areas in the West Bank, as compared with 34 percent who do so at present.

Belief that the autonomy plan "increases the chance for peace with the Arabs" has declined from 73 percent to 61 percent, while belief that the plan "increases the possibility of another war" has increased from 17 percent to 24 percent. Correspondingly, belief that "there will be a war between Israel and the Arabs in the near future" has increased from 20 percent to 26 percent.

Moreover, whereas 65 percent of American Jews in September 1993 saw "Israel's overall situation today" as either very good or good, 49 percent do so at present; those seeing Israel's situation as "neither good nor bad" increased from 26 percent to 37 percent of American Jewry, while those seeing the situation as either very bad or bad increased slightly from 7 percent to 12 percent. Correspondingly, the perception that Israel's overall situation is "better now" than "it was one year ago" decreased from 66 percent to 52 percent; the proportion of those seeing the situation as "about the same" increased from 27 percent to 37 percent, while those seeing it as "worse now" increased from 4 percent to 8 percent.

⁴ This section compares mainly the 1994 and 1993 polls. Comparing these surveys with earlier polls is complicated, since respondents in the 1994 and 1993 polls were less likely to answer "not sure"; this may have resulted from differences in methodology, not just from changes in public opinion. Apparent changes in various views may result from this lessened "not sure" response. Therefore, comparisons between these surveys will be discussed only parenthetically.

In addition, belief that Israel should give up “none” or “only a small part” of the West Bank has increased from 38 percent to 46 percent, while those answering “some of it” have decreased from 44 percent to 37 percent of American Jews. And whereas 27 percent of those in 1993 agreed that Israel should reject the principle of “trading land for peace” (with 68 percent disagreeing and 5 percent not sure), in the present survey 35 percent agree that Israel should reject this (while 59 percent disagree and 6 percent are not sure). (In 1991, 45 percent agreed, 27 percent disagreed, and 28 percent were not sure.)

Opinions about other possible Israeli policies show little change since 1993. In September 1993, 57 percent of American Jews supported the establishment of a Palestinian state, while 30 percent opposed this and 13 percent were not sure; in the present survey, 53 percent are in favor of the idea, 34 percent oppose it, and 13 percent are not sure. (In a 1991 survey fielded just after the Gulf War, 51 percent of respondents agreed that “In the framework of a peace agreement, Israel should be willing to allow for the establishment of a Palestinian state with security arrangements acceptable to Israel,” while 21 percent disagreed and 28 percent were not sure.) Belief that the autonomy plan is likely to result in a Palestinian state has decreased slightly since 1993, from 66 percent to 60 percent of American Jews.

In 1993, 30 percent of American Jews said that Israel should compromise on the status of Jerusalem, while 62 percent opposed this and 8 percent were not sure; the corresponding figures in the present survey are 32 percent, 60 percent, and 8 percent. (In 1991, only 4 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement “As part of any peace settlement with the Arabs, Israel must retain control of a united Jerusalem as its capital city,” while 80 percent agreed and 15 percent were not sure.) And in 1993, 7 percent of American Jews said that Israel should give up all or most of the Golan Heights, while 29 percent supported giving up some of it and 57 percent none or only a small part of it; the corresponding figures in the present survey are 7 percent, 27 percent, and 59 percent.

With regard to attitudes toward the PLO and the Arabs, American Jews have become less likely to express trust since September 1993. Whereas 42 percent of American Jews in 1993 said that the PLO could not “be relied upon to honor its agreements and refrain from terrorist activity against Israel,” with 34 percent saying the PLO could be relied upon and 25 percent not sure, 65 percent today say that the PLO cannot be relied

upon, with 18 percent saying that it can be, and 17 percent not sure. Similarly, whereas 34 percent of American Jews in 1993 agreed with the statement "The PLO is determined to destroy Israel," with 57 percent disagreeing and 10 percent not sure, in the present survey 53 percent agree, with 39 percent disagreeing and 9 percent not sure. (In 1991, 83 percent of respondents agreed that "The PLO is determined to destroy Israel," while 4 percent disagreed and 13 percent were not sure; in 1989, 62 percent agreed, 8 percent disagreed, and 31 percent were not sure.)

Moreover, in 1993, 42 percent of respondents agreed that "The goal of the Arabs is not the return of occupied territories but rather the destruction of Israel," while 50 percent disagreed and 9 percent were not sure; in the 1994 poll, 51 percent agree, 41 percent disagree, and 8 percent are not sure. (When respondents in earlier polls were asked to respond to the statement "You can never trust the Arabs to make a real peace with Israel," 51 percent of those in 1991 agreed, while 23 percent disagreed and 26 percent were not sure; 49 percent of those in 1989 agreed, with 20 percent disagreeing and 31 percent not sure; and 44 percent of those in 1986 agreed, while 23 percent disagreed and 33 percent were not sure.)

Subgroup Differences. On a number of key items, relatively more support for Israel's peace initiatives is expressed by non-Orthodox Jews,⁵ by the better educated, by those with higher incomes, by men, and (with the exception of the Israel-Jordan peace agreement) by those who do not feel "very close" to Israel. Only a minority of the Orthodox express support for the peace initiatives, a shift from the 1993 poll.

For example, Conservative, Reform, and "just Jewish" Jews are more likely than the Orthodox to support the Israel-PLO autonomy plan (Orthodox, 30 percent; Conservative, 62 percent; Reform, 74 percent; just Jewish, 70 percent); to support the Israeli government's handling of negotiations with the Arabs (Orthodox, 35 percent; Conservative, 79 percent; Reform, 83 percent; just Jewish, 75 percent); and to say that the autonomy plan increases the chances for peace (Orthodox, 30 percent; Conservative, 62 percent; Reform, 68 percent; just Jewish, 58 percent).

⁵ Differences in the views of Orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews must be approached cautiously since there are only fifty-four Orthodox respondents. This report highlights such differences only when they are large enough to surpass the statistical margin of error.

Better-educated respondents are more likely than the less educated to support the autonomy plan (high school or less, 62 percent; some college, 62 percent; four years of college, 65 percent; five or more years of higher education, 75 percent); to support the handling of negotiations with the Arabs (high school or less, 67 percent; some college, 76 percent; four years of college, 79 percent; five or more years of higher education, 82 percent); and to say that the autonomy plan increases the chances for peace (high school or less, 54 percent; some college, 58 percent; four years of college, 65 percent; five or more years of higher education, 66 percent).

More-affluent respondents are likelier than the less affluent to support the autonomy plan (under \$30,000, 55 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 66 percent; \$50,000-74,999, 70 percent; \$75,000 and over, 75 percent); to support the handling of negotiations with the Arabs (under \$30,000, 67 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 74 percent; \$50,000-74,999, 82 percent; \$75,000 and over, 85 percent); and to say that the autonomy plan increases the chances for peace (under \$30,000, 51 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 62 percent; \$50,000-74,999, 65 percent; \$75,000 and over, 71 percent).

Respondents who feel "very close" to Israel tend to be less likely than others to support both the autonomy plan and the handling of negotiations with the Arabs, and more likely to oppose the plan. Thus those who feel very close are more likely to oppose the autonomy plan (very close, 36 percent; fairly close, 21 percent; fairly/very distant, 15 percent) and to oppose the handling of negotiations with the Arabs (very close, 20 percent; fairly close, 8 percent; fairly/very distant, 4 percent), and they are somewhat more likely to say that the autonomy plan increases the possibility of another war (very close, 31 percent; fairly close, 21 percent; fairly/very distant, 22 percent). However, those who feel close to Israel tend to express more support for the handling of negotiations with the Jordanians (very close, 89 percent; fairly close, 82 percent) than those who feel fairly/very distant (69 percent).

Inmarried respondents are somewhat likelier than the intermarried to oppose the autonomy plan (inmarried, 26 percent; intermarried, 15 percent); to oppose Israel's handling of negotiations with the Arabs (inmarried, 13 percent; intermarried, 5 percent); and to oppose Israel's handling of negotiations with the Palestinians (inmarried, 19 percent; intermarried, 10 percent). At the same time, the unmarried are likelier to support Israel in its negotiations with the Jordanians (inmarried, 84 percent;

intermarried, 69 percent). (In terms of other aspects of the autonomy plan, no strong and consistent differences in opinion emerge between the unmarried and the intermarried.)

Strong and consistent differences in support for Israel's peace initiatives do not emerge on the basis of age, sex, synagogue membership, or whether respondents have been to Israel.

Subgroup differences also emerge, on some key items, with regard to possible Israeli concessions to the Palestinians and Arabs. For example, Orthodox respondents are more likely than others to oppose such concessions; although these differences are not always statistically significant because there are so few Orthodox respondents, they form a consistent pattern of greater hawkishness among the Orthodox. For example, Orthodox respondents are more likely than others to oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state (Orthodox, 72 percent; Conservative, 34 percent; Reform, 33 percent; just Jewish, 29 percent); to favor giving up none of the West Bank (Orthodox, 54 percent; Conservative, 21 percent; Reform, 14 percent; just Jewish, 17 percent) and none of the Golan Heights (Orthodox, 54 percent; Conservative, 32 percent; Reform, 29 percent; just Jewish, 29 percent); to oppose dismantling Jewish settlements (Orthodox, 74 percent; Conservative, 54 percent; Reform, 48 percent; just Jewish, 51 percent); to oppose compromise on the status of Jerusalem (Orthodox, 81 percent; Conservative, 65 percent; Reform, 60 percent; just Jewish, 47 percent).

On a number of items, less-educated respondents are likelier than the better educated to oppose possible Israeli concessions. For example, the less educated are more likely to oppose dismantling Jewish settlements (high school or less, 62 percent; some college, 56 percent; four years of college, 49 percent; five or more years of higher education, 46 percent) and to say that Israel should give up none of the West Bank (high school or less, 26 percent; some college, 22 percent; four years of college, 20 percent; five or more years of higher education, 12 percent). However, the better educated are likelier to oppose compromise on Jerusalem (high school or less, 45 percent; some college, 54 percent; four years of college, 65 percent; five or more years of higher education, 69 percent).

Less-affluent respondents tend to be likelier than the more affluent to oppose possible concessions—for example, the establishment of a Palestinian state (under \$30,000, 39 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 34 percent; \$50,000-74,999, 32 percent; \$75,000 and over, 29 percent) and the ceding

of land on the West Bank (none: under \$30,000, 23 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 21 percent; \$50,000-74,999, 18 percent; \$75,000 and over, 13 percent). The least-affluent respondents are also more opposed than the most affluent to dismantling settlements (under \$30,000, 57 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 50 percent; \$50,000-74,999, 55 percent; \$75,000 and over, 44 percent). However, the more affluent are likelier to oppose compromise on Jerusalem (under \$30,000, 46 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 58 percent; \$50,000-74,999, 69 percent; \$75,000 and over, 68 percent).

Women tend to be somewhat likelier than men to oppose possible concessions—for example, the ceding of land on the West Bank (only a small part or none: men, 41 percent; women, 51 percent); the ceding of land on the Golan Heights (only a small part or none: men, 55 percent; women, 62 percent); and the dismantling of settlements (men, 49 percent; women, 56 percent). At the same time, men are somewhat more likely to oppose compromise on Jerusalem (men, 63 percent; women, 57 percent).

Those who feel closer to Israel tend to be likelier than others to oppose possible concessions, including the establishment of a Palestinian state (very close, 44 percent; fairly close, 33 percent; fairly/very distant, 28 percent); compromise on Jerusalem (very close, 78 percent; fairly close, 57 percent; fairly/very distant, 50 percent); and the ceding of land on the West Bank (none: very close, 29 percent; fairly close, 14 percent; fairly/very distant, 18 percent).

Strong and consistent differences in support for concessions do not emerge on the basis of age, synagogue membership, whether respondents have been to Israel, or whether they are married to Jews or to non-Jews.

Similar subgroup patterns emerge for attitudes toward the PLO and the Arabs, when a number of key items are examined, with the exception that a pattern emerges for age: those who are younger tend to be likelier to express trust. For example, belief that the PLO is determined to destroy Israel is more prevalent among the Orthodox (Orthodox, 83 percent; Conservative, 55 percent; Reform, 47 percent; just Jewish, 50 percent); among the less educated (high school or less, 67 percent; some college, 56 percent; four years of college, 50 percent; five or more years of higher education, 42 percent); among the less affluent (under \$30,000, 57 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 53 percent; \$50,000-74,999, 50 percent; \$75,000 and over, 46 percent); among women (men, 46 percent; women, 59 percent); and among those who feel “very close” to Israel (very close, 62 percent; fairly close,

51 percent; fairly/very distant, 48 percent). Moreover, those under age 60 are more likely than those over 60 to disagree with this belief (under 40, 41 percent; 40-59, 42 percent; 60 and over, 32 percent).

Belief that the PLO cannot be trusted to honor its agreements and refrain from terrorism is more prevalent among Orthodox respondents (Orthodox, 85 percent; Conservative, 68 percent; Reform, 64 percent; just Jewish, 59 percent); among the less educated (high school or less, 77 percent; some college, 66 percent; four years of college, 61 percent; five or more years of higher education, 60 percent); and among women (men, 58 percent; women, 72 percent).

Belief that the goal of the Arabs is to destroy Israel is more prevalent among Orthodox respondents (Orthodox, 78 percent; Conservative, 53 percent; Reform, 46 percent; just Jewish, 48 percent); among the less educated (high school or less, 61 percent; some college, 59 percent; four years of college, 47 percent; five or more years of higher education, 41 percent); among those who are older (under 40, 42 percent; 40-59, 53 percent; 60 and over, 59 percent); among the less affluent (under \$30,000, 59 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 51 percent; \$50,000-74,999, 49 percent; \$75,000 and over, 42 percent); among women (men, 45 percent; women, 57 percent); and among those who feel closer to Israel (very close, 58 percent; fairly close, 51 percent; fairly/very distant, 46 percent).

Some of these patterns shift when respondents are asked whether the Jordanians “are interested in a true and lasting peace with Israel”: this belief is more prevalent among those who feel “very close” or “fairly close” to Israel (very close, 78 percent; fairly close, 72 percent; fairly/very distant, 57 percent) and among synagogue members (members, 73 percent; nonmembers, 63 percent). It is also more prevalent among three groups who consistently express greater trust in the Arabs—the better educated (high school or less, 52 percent; some college, 62 percent; four years of college, 71 percent; five or more years of higher education, 81 percent), the more affluent (under \$30,000, 59 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 68 percent; \$50,000-74,999, 74 percent; \$75,000 and over, 75 percent), and men (men, 77 percent; women, 60 percent). Moreover, it is more prevalent among those who have visited Israel (visited, 80 percent; not visited, 62 percent) and among those who are married to Jews (inmarried, 75 percent; intermarried, 56 percent). However, no strong differences emerge for denomination and age.

American Jews and Israel

The survey also explored attachment to Israel, finding strong feelings toward the Jewish state on the part of American Jews, despite the fact that only a minority have been to Israel or consider themselves Zionists.

Thus 76 percent of American Jews agree with the statement “Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew,” while 22 percent disagree and 3 percent are not sure. Sixty-seven percent agree with the statement “If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life,” while 30 percent disagree and 3 percent are not sure. And 66 percent report feeling either “very close” to Israel (25 percent) or “fairly close” to it (41 percent), with 32 percent saying they feel either “very distant” (7 percent) or “fairly distant” (25 percent); 1 percent are not sure.

As “compared to three or four years ago,” 81 percent of American Jews say they feel “about the same” now about Israel, while 13 percent feel closer and 6 percent more distant.

Only about a third of American Jews have been to Israel, 21 percent once and 14 percent more than once; 65 percent have never been there. Of those who have not been to Israel, when asked whether there are any reasons for this, nearly half (49 percent) say that it is too expensive. Other reasons include lack of time or opportunity (14 percent), lack of interest (10 percent), concerns about security (10 percent), reluctance to fly (3 percent), greater interest in traveling elsewhere (3 percent), ill health or old age (2 percent), and lack of someone with whom to travel (1 percent). Seven percent cite other reasons, and 14 percent give no reason.

Twenty-two percent consider themselves Zionists and 74 percent do not, while 4 percent don’t know.

Twenty-six percent report following the news about Israel “very closely,” 54 percent “somewhat closely,” and 20 percent “not closely.”

Thirty-three percent of American Jews say that looking ahead three to five years, they think Israeli and American Jews will become closer, while 8 percent think they will drift apart; 56 percent answer “neither”; and 3 percent don’t know.

When asked “As far as you know, do Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu belong to the same political party?” 28 percent correctly answer no, while 10 percent say yes and 62 percent not sure.

When asked “What is your impression of each of the following Israeli leaders?” 82 percent of American Jews react positively to Yitzhak Rabin (very favorable, 38 percent; somewhat favorable, 44 percent), while 9 percent react negatively (very unfavorable, 3 percent; somewhat unfavorable, 6 percent); 9 percent are not sure. Seventy-six percent express a positive view of Shimon Peres (very favorable, 23 percent; somewhat favorable, 53 percent), while 9 percent express a negative view (very unfavorable, 3 percent; somewhat unfavorable, 6 percent); 15 percent are not sure. Forty-nine percent of American Jews have a positive opinion of Benjamin Netanyahu (very favorable, 16 percent; somewhat favorable, 33 percent), while 11 percent have a negative opinion (very unfavorable, 2 percent; somewhat unfavorable, 9 percent); 41 percent are not sure. And 60 percent react positively to Ariel Sharon (very favorable, 12 percent; somewhat favorable, 48 percent), while 17 percent react negatively (very unfavorable, 5 percent; somewhat unfavorable, 12 percent); 24 percent are not sure.

Fifty-nine percent of American Jews agree with the statement “The criticism of Israel that we hear derives mainly from anti-Semitism,” while 36 percent disagree and 5 percent are not sure.

Twenty-nine percent agree with the statement “American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel,” while 68 percent disagree and 3 percent are not sure.

When asked “Which one of the following four reasons is the main reason that the U.S. supports Israel?” a plurality (45 percent) answer “because Israel is a strategic asset”; 29 percent say “because of shared values such as freedom and democracy”; 20 percent select “because of American Jewish influence”; 3 percent say “because of poor relations between America and the Arabs”; and 3 percent are not sure.

When asked “Given the current situation, do you see a need for a continuing U.S. role in the Middle East peace process?” 91 percent of American Jews say yes and 8 percent no, while 2 percent are not sure. Those who answered yes were asked “In which of these ways?” With regard to “providing substantial economic aid to the region,” 74 percent of those respondents (67 percent of the total sample) answer yes and 24 percent (22 percent of the total sample) no, while 2 percent are not sure. With regard to “combating Islamic fundamentalist forces,” 61 percent (56 percent of the total sample) answer yes and 33 percent (30 percent of the total

sample) no, with 6 percent not sure. With regard to “brokering a deal between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights,” 72 percent (66 percent of the total sample) answer yes and 24 percent (22 percent of the total sample) no, while 5 percent are not sure. And with regard to “encouraging further compromise between Israel and the Palestinians,” 72 percent (66 percent of the total sample) answer yes and 25 percent (23 percent of the total sample) no, with 3 percent not sure.

When asked “Should the United States at present provide economic aid to the Palestinians?” 59 percent of American Jews say no and 34 percent yes; 7 percent are not sure.

Trends Over Time.⁶ American Jews’ attachment to Israel has declined somewhat since September 1993. Whereas 75 percent of respondents at that time reported feeling either very close (27 percent) or fairly close (48 percent) to Israel, 66 percent do so today (very close, 25 percent; fairly close, 41 percent). (The figures obtained in previous polls were as follows: 1991, 72 percent; 1989, 62 percent; 1986, 62 percent.) And when asked “Do you consider yourself a Zionist?” 29 percent said yes in September 1993, as opposed to 22 percent who do so today.

Moreover, those saying that they follow the news about Israel “very closely” have decreased from 39 percent to 26 percent of American Jews, while those answering “not closely” have increased from 12 percent to 20 percent.

At the same time, the percentage saying that “Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew” has changed little, from 79 percent in September 1993 to 76 percent at present. (Figures from previous surveys were as follows: 1991, 68 percent; 1989, 73 percent; 1986, 63 percent.) Similarly, 68 percent of American Jews in 1993 agreed with the statement “If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life,” and 67 percent of those in the present survey agree. (In both 1989 and 1991, 65 percent agreed; in 1986, 61 percent did so.)

Other items similarly show little change. Fifty-six percent of American Jews in 1993 agreed with the statement “The criticism of Israel that we

⁶ As mentioned earlier, comparing the 1994 and 1993 polls with earlier surveys is hampered by the fact that these two polls produced fewer “not sure” responses, possibly because of different methodology.

hear derives mainly from anti-Semitism,” and 59 percent do so today. Thirty-two percent of those in 1993 agreed with the statement “American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel,” and 29 percent do so at present.

Or again, when asked “Which one of the following four reasons is the main reason that the U.S. supports Israel?” 34 percent of American Jews in 1993 said “because of shared values such as freedom and democracy,” and 29 percent do so today; 44 percent of those in 1993 answered “because Israel is a strategic asset,” and 45 percent do so today; 17 percent of those in 1993 said “because of American Jewish influence,” and 20 percent do so today; and 2 percent of those in 1993 chose “because of poor relations between America and the Arabs,” with 3 percent doing so today.

Finally, 92 percent of American Jews in 1993 and 91 percent of those in the present survey say yes when asked whether they “see a need for a continuing U.S. role in the Middle East peace process.” Among those answering yes, views of the specific roles that the United States should play have remained stable (“providing substantial economic aid to the region”: 1993, 76 percent; 1994, 74 percent; “combating Islamic fundamentalist forces”: 1993, 63 percent; 1994, 61 percent; “brokering a deal between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights”: both years, 72 percent; “encouraging further compromise between Israel and the Palestinians”: 1993, 74 percent; 1994, 72 percent).

Subgroup Differences. Various subgroups express greater or lesser attachment to Israel. Respondents who are Orthodox or (to a lesser extent) Conservative, who are older, who belong to synagogues, who are married to Jews, and who have visited Israel are more likely to report close feelings toward Israel.

Thus Orthodox or Conservative Jews are more likely than Reform or “just Jewish” Jews to report feeling very close to Israel (Orthodox, 65 percent; Conservative, 35 percent; Reform, 18 percent; just Jewish, 14 percent); to follow the news about Israel very closely (Orthodox, 50 percent; Conservative, 32 percent; Reform, 21 percent; just Jewish, 17 percent); to describe themselves as Zionists (Orthodox, 44 percent; Conservative, 29 percent; Reform, 17 percent; just Jewish, 16 percent); to have been to Israel (Orthodox, 72 percent; Conservative, 42 percent; Reform, 29 percent; just Jewish, 26 percent); to say that caring about Israel is an important part of their Jewishness (Orthodox, 96 percent; Conservative, 87 percent; Re-

form, 74 percent; just Jewish, 59 percent); and to say that Israel's destruction would be one of their greatest tragedies (Orthodox, 89 percent; Conservative, 81 percent; Reform, 62 percent; just Jewish, 50 percent).

Similarly, older respondents are more likely than those who are younger to report feeling very close to Israel (under 40, 21 percent; 40-59, 21 percent; 60 and over, 35 percent); to follow the news about Israel very closely (under 40, 17 percent; 40-59, 24 percent; 60 and over, 38 percent); to have been to Israel (under 40, 33 percent; 40-59, 27 percent; 60 and over, 46 percent); to say that caring about Israel is an important part of their Jewishness (under 40, 71 percent; 40-59, 72 percent; 60 and over, 86 percent); and to say that Israel's destruction would be one of their greatest tragedies (under 40, 57 percent; 40-59, 66 percent; 60 and over, 81 percent).

Synagogue members are likelier than nonmembers to report feeling very close to Israel (members, 35 percent; nonmembers, 15 percent); to follow the news about Israel very closely (members, 35 percent; nonmembers, 16 percent); to consider themselves Zionists (members, 32 percent; nonmembers, 12 percent); to have been to Israel (members, 46 percent; nonmembers, 23 percent); to say that caring about Israel is an important part of their Jewishness (members, 85 percent; nonmembers, 66 percent); and to say that Israel's destruction would be one of their greatest tragedies (members, 77 percent; nonmembers, 57 percent).

Respondents who are married to Jews are more likely than the intermarried to report feeling very close to Israel (inmarried, 34 percent; intermarried, 11 percent); to follow the news about Israel very closely (inmarried, 33 percent; intermarried, 10 percent); to consider themselves Zionists (inmarried, 25 percent; intermarried, 16 percent); to have been to Israel (inmarried, 44 percent; intermarried, 19 percent); to say that caring about Israel is an important part of their Jewishness (inmarried, 83 percent; intermarried, 61 percent); and to say that Israel's destruction would be one of their greatest tragedies (inmarried, 76 percent; intermarried, 50 percent).

Finally, those who have visited Israel are more likely than others to report feeling very close to Israel (visited, 51 percent; not visited, 12 percent); to follow the news about Israel very closely (visited, 46 percent; not visited, 15 percent); to consider themselves Zionists (visited, 38 percent; not visited, 14 percent); to say that caring about Israel is an important part of their Jewishness (visited, 89 percent; not visited, 69 percent); and to say

that Israel's destruction would be one of their greatest tragedies (visited, 84 percent; not visited, 58 percent).

Some subgroup differences also emerge for the items about criticism of Israel. For instance, the belief that "The criticism of Israel that we hear derives mainly from anti-Semitism" is stronger among the less educated (high school or less, 69 percent; some college, 62 percent; four years of college, 56 percent; five or more years of higher education, 53 percent); among those age 60 and over (under 40, 55 percent; 40-59, 55 percent; 60 and over, 68 percent); among those with incomes of less than \$75,000 (under \$30,000, 64 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 61 percent; \$50,000-74,999, 62 percent; \$75,000 and over, 48 percent); among women (men, 53 percent; women, 65 percent); and among those who have not visited Israel (visited, 51 percent; not visited, 63 percent).

The belief that "American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel" is stronger among the less educated (high school or less, 44 percent; some college, 34 percent; four years of college, 23 percent; five or more years of higher education, 21 percent); among those age 60 and over (under 40, 22 percent; 40-59, 25 percent; 60 and over, 41 percent); among those with incomes of less than \$30,000 (under \$30,000, 41 percent; \$30,000-49,999, 26 percent; \$50,000-74,999, 28 percent; \$75,000 and over, 22 percent); and among women (men, 24 percent; women, 34 percent).

Summary and Conclusion

The results of the 1994 survey of American Jews demonstrate broad support for the Rabin government's peace initiative. A large majority of American Jews support the Israeli government in its negotiations with the Arabs, and they tend to predict that the autonomy plan will result in peace. Moreover, a majority agree that Israel should trade land for peace.

However, support for the peace initiative has declined since the September 1993 poll conducted by the American Jewish Committee. Support for the government in its negotiations with the Arabs has lessened by seven points; support for the autonomy plan has decreased by nine points; and belief that the plan increases the chances for peace has declined by twelve points.

In addition, favorable views of some aspects of the autonomy plan tend to be at least somewhat lower than support for the plan in general.

Moreover, support for the Israeli government's handling of negotiations with the Palestinians and with the Syrians is lower than with regard to the Jordanians or "the Arabs" in general. In addition, just over half of the sample opposes the dismantling of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, while majorities reject compromise on Jerusalem and recommend that Israel cede "none" or "only a small part" of the Golan Heights. A majority of American Jews believe that the PLO cannot be trusted, and this belief has increased by twenty-three points since September 1993; just over half believe that the goal of the Arabs is to destroy Israel, and this has increased by nine points.

While only minorities of American Jews have been to Israel and call themselves Zionists, a majority say they feel close to Israel. Attachment to Israel is more prevalent among Orthodox and Conservative Jews, those who are older, synagogue members, the unmarried, and those who have visited Israel.

Table 1

“On September 13, 1993, Israel and the PLO signed an agreement calling for Palestinian autonomy to begin in Gaza and Jericho, and to extend at a later stage to other areas in the West Bank. From what you know, are you for or against this plan?” (in percents)

Subgroup	For	Against	Not sure
Total	66	23	11
Sex			
Male	68	23	8
Female	64	22	14
Age			
Under 40	66	22	12
40-59	70	22	8
60+	62	24	14
Income			
<\$30,000	55	28	17
\$30,000-49,999	66	23	11
\$50,000-74,999	70	22	8
\$75,000+	75	17	8
Education			
High school or less	62	24	14
Some college	62	24	13
Four years of college	65	23	13
Five or more years of higher education	75	18	7
Denomination			
Orthodox	30	61	9
Conservative	62	25	13
Reform	74	18	8
Just Jewish	70	17	13
Synagogue member			
Yes	66	25	9
No	67	20	13
Visited Israel			
Yes	63	28	9
No	68	20	12
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	58	36	6
Fairly close	69	21	10
Fairly/very distant	69	15	17
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	66	26	9
Spouse not Jewish	72	15	13

Table 2**“Overall, do you support or oppose the Israeli government’s current handling of the peace negotiations with the Arabs?” (in percents)**

Subgroup	Support	Oppose	Not sure
Total	77	10	14
Sex			
Male	77	11	11
Female	76	8	16
Age			
Under 40	75	9	16
40-59	81	8	11
60+	74	12	14
Income			
<\$30,000	67	12	21
\$30,000-49,999	74	12	14
\$50,000-74,999	82	9	9
\$75,000+	85	4	11
Education			
High school or less	67	10	22
Some college	76	11	13
Four years of college	79	9	12
Five or more years of higher education	82	8	10
Denomination			
Orthodox	35	54	11
Conservative	79	9	13
Reform	83	6	11
Just Jewish	75	6	19
Synagogue member			
Yes	77	11	12
No	76	8	16
Visited Israel			
Yes	74	15	11
No	78	7	15
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	71	20	9
Fairly close	81	8	12
Fairly/very distant	77	4	19
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	76	13	11
Spouse not Jewish	77	5	18

Table 3
“More specifically, do you support or oppose the Israeli government’s
current handling of the peace negotiations with the Palestinians?” (in
percents)

Subgroup	Support	Oppose	Not sure
Total	70	15	14
Sex			
Male	74	16	10
Female	67	14	18
Age			
Under 40	70	15	15
40-59	74	14	13
60+	68	17	15
Income			
<\$30,000	63	17	21
\$30,000-49,999	68	17	15
\$50,000-74,999	73	17	10
\$75,000+	78	12	9
Education			
High school or less	61	17	21
Some college	67	18	15
Four years of college	71	14	15
Five or more years of higher education	79	12	9
Denomination			
Orthodox	37	54	9
Conservative	68	19	13
Reform	78	9	13
Just Jewish	71	11	18
Synagogue member			
Yes	71	18	11
No	70	13	18
Visited Israel			
Yes	69	20	10
No	71	13	16
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	65	27	8
Fairly close	74	14	12
Fairly/very distant	71	8	21
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	69	19	11
Spouse not Jewish	71	10	19

Table 4**“Do you support or oppose the Israeli government’s current handling of the peace negotiations with the Jordanians?” (in percents)**

Subgroup	Support	Oppose	Not sure
Total	79	6	15
Sex			
Male	84	5	11
Female	74	6	19
Age			
Under 40	74	6	19
40-59	83	5	12
60+	82	5	14
Income			
<\$30,000	69	7	24
\$30,000-49,999	80	6	14
\$50,000-74,999	83	7	10
\$75,000+	86	2	12
Education			
High school or less	70	7	23
Some college	76	8	16
Four years of college	79	4	17
Five or more years of higher education	87	4	9
Denomination			
Orthodox	69	19	13
Conservative	85	5	10
Reform	81	4	15
Just Jewish	71	6	23
Synagogue member			
Yes	84	5	10
No	74	6	21
Visited Israel			
Yes	88	4	8
No	75	6	19
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	89	4	7
Fairly close	82	6	12
Fairly/very distant	69	6	25
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	84	6	11
Spouse not Jewish	69	7	23

Table 5

“Do you support or oppose the Israeli government’s current handling of the peace negotiations with the Syrians?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Support	Oppose	Not sure
Total	62	14	24
Sex			
Male	66	16	18
Female	58	11	30
Age			
Under 40	60	12	28
40-59	66	14	20
60+	61	16	23
Income			
<\$30,000	51	14	35
\$30,000-49,999	62	16	22
\$50,000-74,999	61	17	22
\$75,000+	76	8	16
Education			
High school or less	53	17	31
Some college	62	16	22
Four years of college	62	12	26
Five or more years of higher education	68	12	19
Denomination			
Orthodox	41	44	15
Conservative	65	14	21
Reform	67	10	23
Just Jewish	56	13	32
Synagogue member			
Yes	65	15	20
No	59	12	29
Visited Israel			
Yes	66	16	18
No	60	13	27
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	62	20	18
Fairly close	67	14	19
Fairly/very distant	56	9	35
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	63	18	19
Spouse not Jewish	59	11	30

Table 6

“Do you think the plan for Palestinian autonomy increases the possibility of another war, or increases the chance for peace with the Arabs?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Increases possibility of another war	Increases chance for peace with the Arabs	Neither increases the possibility of war nor the chance for peace	Not sure
Total	24	61	3	12
Sex				
Male	22	67	3	8
Female	25	56	3	16
Age				
Under 40	24	60	3	13
40-59	23	65	3	9
60+	23	58	3	15
Income				
<\$30,000	27	51	4	18
\$30,000-49,999	25	62	4	9
\$50,000-74,999	21	65	1	13
\$75,000+	18	71	3	8
Education				
High school or less	25	54	1	20
Some college	27	58	4	11
Four years of college	22	65	3	11
Five or more years of higher education	21	66	3	10
Denomination				
Orthodox	59	30	2	9
Conservative	26	62	3	9
Reform	17	68	3	12
Just Jewish	21	58	3	18
Synagogue member				
Yes	24	62	3	11
No	23	60	3	14
Visited Israel				
Yes	26	60	4	10
No	23	62	2	13
Closeness to Israel				
Very close	31	57	2	10
Fairly close	21	66	3	10
Fairly/very distant	22	59	3	16
Marital status (if married)				
Spouse Jewish	26	63	3	8
Spouse not Jewish	21	61	3	15

Table 7**“Given the current situation, do you favor or oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state?” (in percents)**

Subgroup	Favor	Oppose	Not sure
Total	53	34	13
Sex			
Male	55	35	10
Female	51	33	16
Age			
Under 40	50	36	14
40-59	58	31	11
60+	51	36	14
Income			
<\$30,000	45	39	16
\$30,000-49,999	54	34	12
\$50,000-74,999	58	32	10
\$75,000+	57	29	13
Education			
High school or less	46	39	15
Some college	52	32	15
Four years of college	54	34	11
Five or more years of higher education	56	32	12
Denomination			
Orthodox	19	72	9
Conservative	53	34	13
Reform	56	33	11
Just Jewish	56	29	15
Synagogue member			
Yes	52	35	14
No	54	34	12
Visited Israel			
Yes	48	39	13
No	55	32	13
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	44	44	12
Fairly close	56	33	11
Fairly/very distant	56	28	15
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	51	37	11
Spouse not Jewish	57	28	15

Table 8

“How much land should Israel be willing to give up on the West Bank in order to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians?” (in percents)

Subgroup	All of it	Most of it	Some of it	Only a small part of it	None of it	Not sure
Total	2	9	37	27	19	6
Sex						
Male	3	12	38	22	19	6
Female	2	5	37	31	20	6
Age						
Under 40	2	7	39	28	19	4
40-59	3	12	37	25	17	5
60+	1	6	36	26	22	8
Income						
<\$30,000	2	5	32	29	23	9
\$30,000-49,999	3	8	39	26	21	4
\$50,000-74,999	1	10	42	23	18	5
\$75,000+	2	15	36	28	13	6
Education						
High school or less	2	5	36	24	26	6
Some college	2	6	34	30	22	7
Four years of college	2	9	39	26	20	4
Five or more years of higher education	3	13	40	26	12	6
Denomination						
Orthodox	0	2	6	35	54	4
Conservative	3	7	38	28	21	4
Reform	1	9	42	26	14	7
Just Jewish	2	12	38	23	17	8
Synagogue member						
Yes	2	9	36	29	20	5
No	2	9	39	24	19	7
Visited Israel						
Yes	2	12	35	24	21	5
No	2	7	38	28	18	6
Closeness to Israel						
Very close	2	8	31	26	29	4
Fairly close	1	9	41	29	14	5
Fairly/very distant	3	8	37	25	18	8
Marital status (if married)						
Spouse Jewish	2	10	38	25	21	5
Spouse not Jewish	2	10	37	25	18	8

Table 9

“What should Israel be willing to give up on the Golan Heights in order to reach a peace agreement with Syria?” (in percents)

Subgroup	All of it	Most of it	Some of it	Only a small part of it	None of it	Not sure
Total	3	4	27	27	32	7
Sex						
Male	5	6	27	27	28	6
Female	2	2	26	27	35	8
Age						
Under 40	2	3	26	28	32	9
40-59	3	4	28	30	28	6
60+	4	5	26	24	34	7
Income						
<\$30,000	3	4	20	31	34	9
\$30,000-49,999	4	4	29	23	34	6
\$50,000-74,999	4	3	27	29	30	7
\$75,000+	2	6	31	29	26	6
Education						
High school or less	1	4	27	25	36	8
Some college	2	2	26	30	33	7
Four years of college	5	2	27	26	31	9
Five or more years of higher education	4	6	29	28	27	6
Denomination						
Orthodox	0	0	15	30	54	2
Conservative	3	3	29	28	32	5
Reform	3	4	26	29	29	8
Just Jewish	4	5	28	23	29	11
Synagogue member						
Yes	3	4	24	29	33	6
No	3	3	29	25	30	9
Visited Israel						
Yes	5	6	26	27	34	3
No	2	3	27	28	30	10
Closeness to Israel						
Very close	4	4	20	28	41	3
Fairly close	2	5	29	27	30	7
Fairly/very distant	3	3	28	28	27	11
Marital status (if married)						
Spouse Jewish	3	5	26	28	32	6
Spouse not Jewish	2	2	29	24	32	11

Table 10

“As part of a permanent settlement with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to dismantle Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Yes	No	Not sure
Total	37	52	8
Sex			
Male	43	49	6
Female	32	56	9
Age			
Under 40	33	60	5
40-59	41	49	7
60+	38	47	11
Income			
<\$30,000	30	57	10
\$30,000-49,999	40	50	6
\$50,000-74,999	35	55	6
\$75,000+	45	44	7
Education			
High school or less	29	62	8
Some college	32	56	7
Four years of college	41	49	6
Five or more years of higher education	43	46	9
Denomination			
Orthodox	17	74	6
Conservative	36	54	6
Reform	40	48	9
Just Jewish	38	51	9
Synagogue member			
Yes	40	50	8
No	35	55	7
Visited Israel			
Yes	41	47	7
No	35	55	8
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	36	53	7
Fairly close	43	48	6
Fairly/very distant	31	57	10
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	43	48	6
Spouse not Jewish	32	58	9

Table 11

“In the framework of a permanent peace with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to compromise on the status of Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Yes	No	Not sure
Total	32	60	8
Sex			
Male	29	63	7
Female	35	57	8
Age			
Under 40	26	65	9
40-59	37	57	6
60+	35	57	7
Income			
<\$30,000	38	46	16
\$30,000-49,999	35	58	6
\$50,000-74,999	28	69	3
\$75,000+	26	68	5
Education			
High school or less	42	45	13
Some college	39	54	8
Four years of college	29	65	6
Five or more years of higher education	25	69	6
Denomination			
Orthodox	11	81	7
Conservative	30	65	5
Reform	31	60	9
Just Jewish	42	47	11
Synagogue member			
Yes	28	66	6
No	37	53	10
Visited Israel			
Yes	22	72	6
No	38	53	8
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	19	78	4
Fairly close	36	57	7
Fairly/very distant	39	50	11
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	29	67	5
Spouse not Jewish	38	51	11

Table 12
“The PLO is determined to destroy Israel.” (in percents)

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	53	39	9
Sex			
Male	46	45	9
Female	59	33	8
Age			
Under 40	50	41	9
40-59	50	42	8
60+	58	32	10
Income			
<\$30,000	57	33	10
\$30,000-49,999	53	41	6
\$50,000-74,999	50	40	10
\$75,000+	46	44	10
Education			
High school or less	67	25	8
Some college	56	36	8
Four years of college	50	40	10
Five or more years of higher education	42	50	8
Denomination			
Orthodox	83	13	4
Conservative	55	38	7
Reform	47	44	9
Just Jewish	50	39	11
Synagogue member			
Yes	53	39	8
No	52	39	9
Visited Israel			
Yes	52	39	10
No	53	39	8
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	62	30	9
Fairly close	51	43	7
Fairly/very distant	48	41	10
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	54	38	8
Spouse not Jewish	52	38	10

Table 13**“Can the PLO be relied upon to honor its agreements and refrain from terrorist activity against Israel?” (in percents)**

Subgroup	Yes	No	Not sure
Total	18	65	17
Sex			
Male	23	58	19
Female	13	72	15
Age			
Under 40	20	63	17
40-59	17	68	15
60+	15	65	20
Income			
<\$30,000	17	66	17
\$30,000-49,999	20	66	14
\$50,000-74,999	16	66	19
\$75,000+	19	64	17
Education			
High school or less	10	77	13
Some college	19	66	15
Four years of college	19	61	20
Five or more years of higher education	20	60	20
Denomination			
Orthodox	6	85	9
Conservative	16	68	16
Reform	19	64	17
Just Jewish	20	59	21
Synagogue member			
Yes	17	65	18
No	19	65	16
Visited Israel			
Yes	17	64	20
No	18	66	16
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	14	71	15
Fairly close	19	64	17
Fairly/very distant	19	63	18
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	15	67	18
Spouse not Jewish	20	63	18

Table 14**“The goal of the Arabs is not the return of occupied territories but rather the destruction of Israel.” (in percents)**

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	51	41	8
Sex			
Male	45	47	8
Female	57	36	8
Age			
Under 40	42	50	8
40-59	53	41	6
60+	59	30	10
Income			
<\$30,000	59	30	11
\$30,000-49,999	51	43	6
\$50,000-74,999	49	43	8
\$75,000+	42	51	8
Education			
High school or less	61	31	7
Some college	59	34	7
Four years of college	47	44	10
Five or more years of higher education	41	52	8
Denomination			
Orthodox	78	17	6
Conservative	53	39	7
Reform	46	47	7
Just Jewish	48	40	11
Synagogue member			
Yes	53	39	7
No	48	43	9
Visited Israel			
Yes	50	40	10
No	52	41	7
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	58	34	8
Fairly close	51	41	8
Fairly/very distant	46	46	8
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	55	37	8
Spouse not Jewish	48	45	6

Table 15**“Do you think that the Palestinians are interested, or are not interested, in a true and lasting peace with Israel?” (in percents)**

Subgroup	Are interested	Are not interested	Not sure
Total	44	42	15
Sex			
Male	49	36	15
Female	38	48	15
Age			
Under 40	47	40	13
40-59	46	42	12
60+	38	42	20
Income			
<\$30,000	31	50	19
\$30,000-49,999	48	39	12
\$50,000-74,999	46	42	13
\$75,000+	49	34	17
Education			
High school or less	29	55	15
Some college	45	42	13
Four years of college	43	43	14
Five or more years of higher education	51	33	16
Denomination			
Orthodox	19	70	11
Conservative	43	42	15
Reform	48	38	14
Just Jewish	42	40	17
Synagogue member			
Yes	43	40	16
No	44	43	13
Visited Israel			
Yes	43	40	17
No	44	42	14
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	37	46	17
Fairly close	46	41	13
Fairly/very distant	46	39	15
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	44	42	14
Spouse not Jewish	43	42	16

Table 16

“Do you think that the Jordanians are interested, or are not interested, in a true and lasting peace with Israel?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Are interested	Are not interested	Not sure
Total	68	21	10
Sex			
Male	77	15	8
Female	60	28	13
Age			
Under 40	65	24	11
40-59	69	22	9
60+	72	17	11
Income			
<\$30,000	59	27	14
\$30,000-49,999	68	23	8
\$50,000-74,999	74	17	10
\$75,000+	75	16	9
Education			
High school or less	52	34	14
Some college	62	26	11
Four years of college	71	20	9
Five or more years of higher education	81	12	8
Denomination			
Orthodox	67	24	9
Conservative	71	21	8
Reform	70	19	11
Just Jewish	62	25	12
Synagogue member			
Yes	73	17	9
No	63	25	11
Visited Israel			
Yes	80	14	6
No	62	25	13
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	78	16	6
Fairly close	72	19	9
Fairly/very distant	57	28	15
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	75	17	9
Spouse not Jewish	56	31	13

Table 17

“Do you think that the Syrians are interested, or are not interested, in a true and lasting peace with Israel?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Are interested	Are not interested	Not sure
Total	33	47	20
Sex			
Male	36	45	20
Female	31	49	20
Age			
Under 40	39	44	18
40-59	38	43	18
60+	21	55	24
Income			
<\$30,000	25	52	23
\$30,000-49,999	35	49	16
\$50,000-74,999	33	45	22
\$75,000+	43	36	21
Education			
High school or less	25	54	21
Some college	30	51	19
Four years of college	32	45	23
Five or more years of higher education	42	41	17
Denomination			
Orthodox	17	69	15
Conservative	31	50	19
Reform	41	42	17
Just Jewish	29	45	27
Synagogue member			
Yes	32	49	19
No	34	45	21
Visited Israel			
Yes	29	50	21
No	35	45	19
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	29	54	17
Fairly close	31	48	21
Fairly/very distant	39	40	21
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	31	49	20
Spouse not Jewish	39	43	18

Table 18**“How close do you feel to Israel?” (in percents)**

Subgroup	Very close	Fairly close	Fairly distant	Very distant	Not sure
Total	25	41	25	7	1
Sex					
Male	25	45	24	5	1
Female	26	38	27	9	1
Age					
Under 40	21	35	33	9	2
40-59	21	40	30	8	1
60+	35	51	11	3	1
Income					
<\$30,000	28	42	21	7	1
\$30,000-49,999	23	43	24	9	1
\$50,000-74,999	25	41	27	5	2
\$75,000+	23	41	31	5	1
Education					
High school or less	24	40	25	9	2
Some college	23	43	25	9	0
Four years of college	24	44	25	7	0
Five or more years of higher education	29	40	26	4	2
Denomination					
Orthodox	65	30	2	2	2
Conservative	35	48	15	2	1
Reform	18	41	35	5	1
Just Jewish	14	36	32	16	2
Synagogue member					
Yes	35	45	16	3	1
No	15	38	35	11	1
Visited Israel					
Yes	51	39	7	2	1
No	12	43	35	9	1
Closeness to Israel					
Very close	100	0	0	0	0
Fairly close	0	100	0	0	0
Fairly/very distant	0	0	79	21	0
Marital status (if married)					
Spouse Jewish	34	45	16	3	1
Spouse not Jewish	11	29	44	16	1

Table 19
“How closely do you follow the news about Israel?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Very closely	Somewhat closely	Not closely	Not sure
Total	26	54	20	0
Sex				
Male	30	54	15	0
Female	21	53	25	0
Age				
Under 40	17	52	31	0
40-59	24	56	21	0
60+	38	54	7	0
Income				
<\$30,000	24	53	23	0
\$30,000-49,999	24	51	25	0
\$50,000-74,999	26	55	18	0
\$75,000+	30	54	16	0
Education				
High school or less	16	59	25	0
Some college	25	52	23	0
Four years of college	20	59	21	0
Five or more years of higher education	35	49	16	0
Denomination				
Orthodox	50	41	9	0
Conservative	32	58	9	0
Reform	21	56	23	0
Just Jewish	17	48	35	0
Synagogue member				
Yes	35	54	11	0
No	16	53	30	0
Visited Israel				
Yes	46	46	8	0
No	15	58	27	0
Closeness to Israel				
Very close	62	35	3	0
Fairly close	21	69	10	0
Fairly/very distant	4	49	47	0
Marital status (if married)				
Spouse Jewish	33	57	10	0
Spouse not Jewish	10	50	40	0

Table 20
“Do you consider yourself a Zionist?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Yes	No	Not sure
Total	22	74	4
Sex			
Male	20	76	4
Female	25	71	4
Age			
Under 40	24	72	5
40-59	21	76	3
60+	21	74	5
Income			
<\$30,000	23	70	7
\$30,000-49,999	18	76	5
\$50,000-74,999	26	72	2
\$75,000+	24	74	2
Education			
High school or less	13	81	6
Some college	18	77	5
Four years of college	24	73	3
Five or more years of higher education	29	67	4
Denomination			
Orthodox	44	48	7
Conservative	29	66	5
Reform	17	80	3
Just Jewish	16	81	4
Synagogue member			
Yes	32	64	4
No	12	84	4
Visited Israel			
Yes	38	57	6
No	14	83	3
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	51	44	5
Fairly close	18	78	4
Fairly/very distant	5	91	4
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	25	71	4
Spouse not Jewish	16	82	3

Table 21
“Have you ever been to Israel?” (in percents)

Subgroup	Yes—once	Yes—more than once	No
Total	21	14	65
Sex			
Male	25	14	61
Female	18	13	69
Age			
Under 40	20	13	67
40-59	17	10	74
60+	28	18	54
Income			
<\$30,000	21	11	68
\$30,000-49,999	21	12	67
\$50,000-74,999	19	13	68
\$75,000+	24	18	57
Education			
High school or less	17	7	77
Some college	20	10	71
Four years of college	19	13	67
Five or more years of higher education	26	20	54
Denomination			
Orthodox	22	50	28
Conservative	25	17	58
Reform	22	7	71
Just Jewish	15	11	74
Synagogue member			
Yes	26	20	54
No	16	7	77
Visited Israel			
Yes	61	39	0
No	0	0	100
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	31	39	30
Fairly close	24	8	67
Fairly/very distant	9	1	90
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	26	18	56
Spouse not Jewish	15	4	81

Table 22
“Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew.” (in percents)

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	76	22	3
Sex			
Male	76	22	2
Female	75	21	3
Age			
Under 40	71	26	4
40-59	72	26	2
60+	86	12	2
Income			
<\$30,000	78	20	2
\$30,000-49,999	75	21	5
\$50,000-74,999	77	21	1
\$75,000+	71	28	2
Education			
High school or less	82	16	2
Some college	77	19	4
Four years of college	72	26	2
Five or more years of higher education	73	24	3
Denomination			
Orthodox	96	2	2
Conservative	87	12	1
Reform	74	23	3
Just Jewish	59	36	5
Synagogue member			
Yes	85	13	2
No	66	30	4
Visited Israel			
Yes	89	9	2
No	69	28	3
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	98	1	0
Fairly close	84	14	3
Fairly/very distant	47	48	5
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	83	16	1
Spouse not Jewish	61	34	5

Table 23**“If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life.” (in percents)**

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	67	30	3
Sex			
Male	67	30	2
Female	67	30	3
Age			
Under 40	57	40	3
40-59	66	31	3
60+	81	17	2
Income			
<\$30,000	72	26	2
\$30,000-49,999	66	33	1
\$50,000-74,999	67	30	3
\$75,000+	59	36	5
Education			
High school or less	74	24	2
Some college	68	30	2
Four years of college	61	35	4
Five or more years of higher education	66	31	3
Denomination			
Orthodox	89	11	0
Conservative	81	17	2
Reform	62	36	2
Just Jewish	50	46	5
Synagogue member			
Yes	77	21	3
No	57	40	3
Visited Israel			
Yes	84	14	2
No	58	39	3
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	94	5	0
Fairly close	76	21	3
Fairly/very distant	34	62	4
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	76	22	2
Spouse not Jewish	50	46	4

Table 24**“The criticism of Israel that we hear derives mainly from anti-Semitism.” (in percents)**

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	59	36	5
Sex			
Male	53	43	4
Female	65	28	7
Age			
Under 40	55	40	5
40-59	55	41	4
60+	68	24	8
Income			
<\$30,000	64	26	9
\$30,000-49,999	61	36	4
\$50,000-74,999	62	35	2
\$75,000+	48	46	5
Education			
High school or less	69	25	7
Some college	62	32	6
Four years of college	56	39	5
Five or more years of higher education	53	42	5
Denomination			
Orthodox	63	31	6
Conservative	59	37	5
Reform	57	37	5
Just Jewish	60	33	7
Synagogue member			
Yes	57	37	6
No	61	34	5
Visited Israel			
Yes	51	42	7
No	63	32	5
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	61	33	6
Fairly close	61	35	5
Fairly/very distant	55	40	5
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	58	38	4
Spouse not Jewish	59	36	5

Table 25**“American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel.” (in percents)**

Subgroup	Agree	Disagree	Not sure
Total	29	68	3
Sex			
Male	24	74	2
Female	34	62	4
Age			
Under 40	22	74	3
40-59	25	73	3
60+	41	56	3
Income			
<\$30,000	41	54	4
\$30,000-49,999	26	70	3
\$50,000-74,999	28	69	2
\$75,000+	22	78	0
Education			
High school or less	44	52	5
Some college	34	63	3
Four years of college	23	74	3
Five or more years of higher education	21	77	2
Denomination			
Orthodox	41	54	6
Conservative	34	64	2
Reform	22	75	3
Just Jewish	28	68	3
Synagogue member			
Yes	30	67	3
No	28	69	3
Visited Israel			
Yes	29	67	3
No	29	69	3
Closeness to Israel			
Very close	34	63	3
Fairly close	28	69	3
Fairly/very distant	26	72	3
Marital status (if married)			
Spouse Jewish	29	68	3
Spouse not Jewish	24	72	4

Table 26
Number of respondents in each subgroup.

Subgroup	<i>N</i>
Total	1000
Sex	
Male	495
Female	505
Age	
Under 40	376
40-59	314
60+	309
Income	
<\$30,000	228
\$30,000-49,999	319
\$50,000-74,999	206
\$75,000+	190
Education	
High school or less	163
Some college	261
Four years of college	232
Five or more years of higher education	306
Denomination	
Orthodox	54
Conservative	349
Reform	335
Just Jewish	253
Synagogue member	
Yes	513
No	487
Visited Israel	
Yes	349
No	651
Closeness to Israel	
Very close	254
Fairly close	414
Fairly/very distant	321
Marital status (if married)	
Spouse Jewish	490
Spouse not Jewish	219

ADDENDUM

Comparison of 1994 Market Facts Telephone Sample with 1990 NJPS (Core Jews Only) and 1991 Market Facts Mail Samples and 1993 Market Facts Telephone Sample.

	Samples				1990 NJPS*
	1994 Market Facts	1993 Market Facts (R. Cohen)	1991 Market Facts (R. Cohen & S. Rosen)	1991 Market Facts (S. Cohen)	
Belong to synagogue or temple	51	56	48	53	33
Light Hanukkah candles (always, usually)	81	82	78	NA	60
Attend Passover seder (always, usually)	77	80	76	NA	62
Have Christmas tree (always, usually)	17	14	19	NA	28
Been to Israel	35	33	31	37	26
Spouse Jewish	69	79	72	91	NA
Denomination					
Orthodox	5	7	10	7	6
Conservative	35	35	34	38	35
Reform	34	33	33	31	38
"Just Jewish"	25	24	21	23	10
Other	1	1	2	1	11

* 1990 NJPS figures obtained from Sidney Goldstein, "Profile of American Jewry: Insights from the 1990 National Jewish Population Survey," *1992 American Jewish Year Book*, p. 172.

QUESTIONNAIRE

(All responses in percents)

1. To begin, how closely do you follow the news about Israel?

Very closely	26
Somewhat closely	54
Not closely	20
Not sure	0

2. How close do you feel to Israel?

Very close	25
Fairly close	41
Fairly distant	25
Very distant	7
Not sure	1

3. Compared to 3 or 4 years ago, do you now feel closer to or more distant from Israel, or about the same?

Closer	13
More distant	6
About the same	81
Not sure	0

4. Do you consider yourself a Zionist?

Yes	22
No	74
Not sure	4

5. Have you ever been to Israel?

No	65
Yes - once	21
Yes - more than once	14

5a. Are there any particular reasons why you have not visited Israel? (ASKED OF AND BASED ON RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED "NO" TO QUESTION 5) (MULTIPLE RESPONSES ACCEPTED)

No reasons	14
Not interested	10
Too expensive, haven't had the money	49
Too busy, haven't had the time or opportunity	14
Do not fly, uncomfortable flying (or flying long distances)	3
More interested in other travel des- tinations, prefer to travel elsewhere	3
War, conflict, terrorism (security issues)	10
No one to go with, don't like traveling alone	1
Not well or too old now to travel	2
Other, SPECIFY	7

6. Overall, do you support or oppose the Israeli government's current handling of the peace negotiations with the Arabs?

Support	77
Oppose	10
Not sure	14

6a. More specifically, do you support or oppose the Israeli government's current handling of the peace negotiations with the Palestinians?

Support	70
Oppose	15
Not sure	14

6b. Do you support or oppose the Israeli government's current handling of the peace negotiations with the Jordanians?

Support	79
Oppose	6
Not sure	15

6c. Do you support or oppose the Israeli government's current handling of the peace negotiations with the Syrians?

Support	62
Oppose	14
Not sure	24

7. On September 13, 1993, Israel and the PLO signed an agreement calling for Palestinian autonomy to begin in Gaza and Jericho, and to extend at a later stage to other areas in the West Bank. From what you know, are you for or against this plan?

For	66
Against	23
Not sure	11

8. Are you for or against the Palestinian autonomy plan as it applies to the Gaza Strip?

For	61
Against	22
Not sure	18

9. Are you for or against the Palestinian autonomy plan as it applies to Jericho?

For	51
Against	23
Not sure	25

10. Are you for or against extending Palestinian autonomy to other areas in the West Bank?

For	34
Against	43
Not sure	24

11. How much land should Israel be willing to give up on the West Bank in order to reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians?

All of it	2
Most of it	9
Some of it	37
Only a small part of it	27
None of it	19
Not sure	6

12. Do you think the plan for Palestinian autonomy increases the possibility of another war, or increases the chance for peace with the Arabs?

Increases the possibility of another war	24
Increases the chance for peace with the Arabs	61
Neither increases the possibility of war nor the chance of peace	3
Not sure	12

13. Do you think there will be a war between Israel and the Arabs in the near future?

Yes	26
No	62
Not sure	12

14. Do you think that the current plan for Palestinian autonomy is likely, or is not likely, to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza and the West Bank?

Likely to lead to a Palestinian state	60
Not likely to lead to a Palestinian state	24
Not sure	16

15. Given the current situation, do you favor or oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state?

Favor	53
Oppose	34
Not sure	13

16. In the framework of a permanent peace with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to compromise on the status of Jerusalem as a united city under Israeli jurisdiction?

Yes	32
No	60
Not sure	8

17. Can the PLO be relied upon to honor its agreements and refrain from terrorist activity against Israel?

Yes	18
No	65
Not sure	17

18. What should Israel be willing to give up on the Golan Heights in order to reach a peace agreement with Syria?

All of it	3
Most of it	4
Some of it	27
Only a small part of it	27
None of it	32
Not sure	7

19. As part of a permanent settlement with the Palestinians, should Israel be willing to dismantle Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza?

Yes	37
No	52
Not sure	8
Other; SPECIFY	3

20. Should Israel allow, or not allow, Yasir Arafat to visit the Moslem holy places on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem?

Should allow	82
Should not allow	13
Not sure	6

21. How do you see Israel's overall situation today?

Very good	6
Good	43
Neither good nor bad	37
Bad	10
Very bad	2
Not sure	2

22. Is Israel's overall situation better now, worse now, or about the same now as it was one year ago?

Better now	52
Worse now	8
About the same	37
Not sure	3

23a. Do you think that the Palestinians are interested, or are not interested, in a true and lasting peace with Israel?

Are interested	44
Are not interested	42
Not sure	15

23b. Do you think that the Jordanians are interested, or are not interested, in a true and lasting peace with Israel?

Are interested	68
Are not interested	21
Not sure	10

23c. Do you think that the Syrians are interested, or are not interested, in a true and lasting peace with Israel?

Are interested	33
Are not interested	47
Not sure	20

24. The goal of the Arabs is not the return of occupied territories but rather the destruction of Israel.

Agree	51
Disagree	41
Not sure	8

25. Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew.

Agree	76
Disagree	22
Not sure	3

26. If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies in my life.

Agree	67
Disagree	30
Not sure	3

27. The criticism of Israel that we hear derives mainly from anti-Semitism.

Agree	59
Disagree	36
Not sure	5

28. Israel should reject the principle of "trading land for peace."

Agree	35
Disagree	59
Not sure	6

29. The PLO is determined to destroy Israel.

Agree	53
Disagree	39
Not sure	9

30. American Jews should not publicly criticize the policies of the government of Israel.

Agree	29
Disagree	68
Not sure	3

31. What is your impression of each of the following Israeli leaders?

	Very favorable	Some-what favorable	Some what unfavorable	Very unfavorable	Not sure
Benjamin Netanyahu	16	33	9	2	41
Shimon Peres	23	53	6	3	15
Yitzhak Rabin	38	44	6	3	9
Ariel Sharon	12	48	12	5	24

32. As far as you know, do Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu belong to the same political party?

Yes	10
No	28
Not sure	62

33. In your view, which one of the following four reasons is the main reason that the U.S. supports Israel?

Because of shared values such as freedom and democracy	29
Because Israel is a strategic asset	45
Because of American Jewish influence	20
Because of poor relations between America and the Arabs	3
Not sure	3

34. Given the current situation, do you see a need for a continuing U.S. role in the Middle East peace process?

Yes	91
No	8
Not sure	2

34a. (ASKED OF AND BASED ON RESPONDENTS WHO ANSWERED "YES" TO QUESTION 39) In which of these ways?

	Yes	No	Not Sure
a. Providing substantial economic aid to the region?	74	24	2
b. Combatting Islamic fundamentalist forces?	61	33	6
c. Brokering a deal between Israel and Syria over the Golan Heights?	72	24	5
d. Encouraging further compromise between Israel and the Palestinians?	72	25	3

35. Should the United States at present provide economic aid to the Palestinians?

Yes	34
No	59
Not sure	7

36. How important would you say being Jewish is in your own life?

Very important	57
Fairly important	35
Not very important	8
Not sure	1

37. Do you belong to a synagogue or temple?

Yes	51
No	49

38. Do you think of yourself as ...

Orthodox	5
Conservative	35
Reconstructionist	1
Reform	34
Just Jewish	25

39. Are you currently married?

Yes	71
No	29

39a. (IF YES IN 39, ASK:) Is your spouse Jewish?

Yes - spouse Jewish	49
No - spouse not Jewish	22

40. Does your household do the following things all the time, usually, sometimes, or never?

	All Time	Usually	Sometimes	Never
a. Light Hanukkah candles	72	9	11	8
b. Attend a Passover seder	67	10	15	8
c. Have a Christmas tree	14	3	8	76
d. Celebrate Purim	27	8	32	33

41. Looking ahead 3 to 5 years, do you see Jews in Israel and in the United States becoming closer, drifting apart, or neither?

Becoming closer	33
Drifting apart	8
Neither	56
Not sure	3

42. What is your age as of your last birthday?

Under 30	13
30-39	25
40-49	20
50-59	12
60-69	15
70 or over	16
Refused	0

43. I'm going to read a series of income ranges, and please stop me when I read the one that includes your total household income in 1993 before taxes.

Under \$20,000	12
\$20,000 to under \$30,000	12
\$30,000 to under \$40,000	16
\$40,000 to under \$50,000	17
\$50,000 to under \$75,000	21
\$75,000 to under \$100,000	10
\$100,000 and over	10