

The Quality of American Jewish Life: Better or Worse?

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FOR DECADES, MOST observers of American Jewish life assumed that American Jewry was steadily and inevitably assimilating. It has been widely supposed that, for the most part, Jews have been growing less intensively Jewish; and, even more critically, that those at the ever-widening periphery have been intermarrying with mounting frequency, setting the stage for large-scale irreversible numerical and qualitative losses to the Jewish people. In so doing, as historian Arthur Hertzberg and others have claimed, American Jews are merely recapitulating what had become classic Jewish responses to freedom: social success for Jews, coupled with cultural disaster for Judaism.¹

However, since the early 1980s, several observers have publicly questioned whether American Jewry is largely assimilating, or even experiencing significant declines in what may be called the “quality of Jewish life.” Charles Silberman’s *A Certain People* goes so far as to contend that Jews have been experiencing a broad-based cultural revival.² Sociologist Calvin Goldscheider, who emphasizes “cohesiveness” as the central factor in Jewish continuity (by which he means the extent to which Jews interact frequently and harmoniously), concludes that American Jewish cohesiveness is strong and getting stronger.³

Participants in this as in most debates are seen as arrayed on two sides. Those who are more gloomy about the American Jewish

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present and future may be called “traditionalists.” They adhere to the traditional view of an assimilating American Jewry, and they tend to apply traditional standards in assessing its character. On the other side are the “transformationists.” They argue that in the transition from traditional to modern societies, Jewish life most certainly changed dramatically and is changing still; but, for them, that change constitutes no serious threat to Jewish continuity, especially if we apply new criteria for judging the quality of Jewish life, criteria appropriate to Jews in modern rather than traditional times.

As it turns out, the simple division of observers into two camps—whether they are called pessimists and optimists, or the less value-laden traditionalists and transformationists—is ultimately distorting. The dichotomy obscures some very important differences within these camps; it glosses over crucial subtleties, nuances, and ambiguities. For, as I shall try to show, one can reject the notion of significant erosion in American Jewish population size and quality of life without endorsing the notion of a broad-based cultural revival.⁴

The controversy over how to understand the past, present, and future of American Jewry is not simply an argument over “facts.” Even when observers agree on the evidence, they may disagree on its meaning; and even if they concur on its meaning, they may differ over its larger implications. The controversy is also an argument over how to assess American Jewry—which standards to apply, which questions to ask, and which trends to judge significant.⁵

TRADITIONALISTS AND TRANSFORMATIONISTS: THE DEBATE

Before proceeding further, I want to make clear which dimensions of American Jewry this paper largely ignores and why. In particular, I largely steer clear of what may be called “demographic” and “structural” criteria for assessing American Jewish life.

Demographic and Structural Criteria

By demographic criteria I mean those processes that bear directly upon Jewish population size: fertility, intermarriage, complete assimilation, migration, mortality. The most recent literature in this area has divided on two critical issues: the birthrates of Jewish

women in their 30s and the eventual patterns of group identification among the children of the mixed married. Regarding birthrates, demographers U. O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola have argued that the small numbers of children born to women in their early 30s portend birthrates around 1.6 children per woman and a resultant shrinkage of the Jewish population. Goldscheider and others contend that women will be having a sufficient number of children to ensure population stability, but they will bear them much later than their mothers did. Only the population studies of the early 1990s can definitively settle this question. As for the impact of mixed marriage upon Jewish identification of offspring, the evidence thus far is both sparse and mixed. In part because these issues are considered in great depth by demographers in recent and forthcoming publications, this paper will refrain from treating them in detail.⁶

Other analysts have focused on a structural standard for assessing American Jewry, one that emphasizes the cohesiveness of American Jews. This perspective is concerned with Jews' location in the social structure, that is, the extent to which they maintain distinctive distributions on the geographic, economic, and political maps of the United States. Insofar as Jews are more structurally homogeneous and differentiated from other Americans, they may be presumed to have a built-in propensity for significant interactions among themselves. Calvin Goldscheider, who has been the most explicit exponent of this perspective, argues that far from uniformly dispersing (as traditionalists often contend) Jews have been reconcentrating in new neighborhoods, as well as in new professions, subspecialties, and companies.⁷ These tendencies stimulate not only harmonious and frequent interaction, but the sharing of political aims, economic interests, social values, and cultural styles as well. The distinctive structural patterns, then, foster new bases for cohesion, embracing even those Jews with no particular explicit ideological interest in perpetuating the Jewish group or any overt motivation for associating with other Jews.

Structural analysis, at least the way Goldscheider undertakes it, explicitly avoids making cultural assessments, even as it claims to explain cultural variations through structural determinants. In this sense, many of those with a passionate investment in Jewish survival and creativity find structural analysis only marginally relevant to their principal concerns. Simply put, most Jews who care deeply about American Jewish continuity (or "Jewish survival")

usually have other things in mind than cohesiveness. They maintain some implicit cultural standards for measuring Jewish vitality and prospects for continuity. Their perspectives, no matter what their ideological coloration, see structural issues as only preliminary to a discussion of the more central questions of Jewish commitment and cultural vitality (however measured). Assessing structure rather than culture may be closer to the *métier* of some social scientists; but then readers with interests in aspects of Jewish life beyond cohesion—such as beliefs, myths, symbols, cognition, and consciousness—need to look elsewhere for immediately relevant assessments.

The problem for the so-called objective analyst exploring the cultural side of Jewish life (as I do here) is the choice of cultural criteria. That choice, to say nothing of the assessment of the relevant evidence, is inevitably a highly subjective, if not often an intensely ideological decision. Neither passionate participants in organized Jewry nor even scientifically trained observers concur on which cultural criteria are most meaningful. A UJA fundraiser, a leftist activist, an Orthodox synagogue member, a Reform rabbi, and a social historian of modern Jewry would have widely divergent views concerning the very definition of core Judaism, let alone which aspects of Jewish life are most crucial for judging its quality.

One other complication is that cultural criteria may be applied to elites—leaders and others intensively involved in Jewish life—or the masses, the Jewish public. The problem is that the quality of Jewish life displayed by elites may bear little relationship to that displayed by the masses. And here may lie one of the sources of confusion in the debate between traditionalists and their opponents.

Elite Achievement

Interestingly, traditionalists and transformationists tend to agree that, by and large, American Jewish elites are doing very well or, at least, not worse than their predecessors in the 1950s or earlier. In this regard, transformationists (optimists) regularly cite the following facts, which many traditionalists (pessimists) readily concede:

(1) Politically, Jews are tremendously active and effective on behalf of Israel and other Jewish causes. In just the last decade, they have supplemented their long-standing infrastructure of membership organizations, defense agencies, local community-relations councils, and Washington lobbyists with a network of dozens of political-action committees that contribute to pro-Israel political

candidates around the country. As Israel's President Chaim Herzog—who is otherwise pessimistic about the American Jewish future—has put it, “Never have Diaspora Jews been so politically powerful since Joseph sat next to Pharaoh's throne.”⁸

(2) American Orthodoxy is vastly stronger than it was just a generation ago. Its members are wealthier and far better educated. Retention rates—the extent to which those with an Orthodox upbringing remain Orthodox—are far higher than ever before.⁹ A day-school education and reasonably strict Sabbath observance have become the norm among the American Orthodox. Their proportion in the American Jewish population seems to be holding steady, and their influence in Jewish communal circles is far greater than it was just 20 years ago.

(3) The American Jewish professoriate is certainly far larger and, very possibly, “better” qualitatively (perhaps owing to its numbers) than it was 20 years ago. As a corollary, the tenor of Jewish cultural life—whether academic scholarship, magazine writing, public lectures, or adult education—is arguably stronger, and certainly no weaker than it was in the mid 1960s. In just the last few years, several universities have announced the funding of new chairs and some new programs in Jewish studies. Books of Jewish interest find ready markets and are frequently reviewed in widely read newspapers and magazines.

(4) The federation world is “more Jewish.” Far more than was the case 20 years ago, leaders affirm a more survivalist rather than integrationist view of the world; professionals have stronger Jewish backgrounds; social-welfare agencies emphasize serving Jewish clientele over nonsectarian purposes; and funding priorities have reflected increased support for Jewish education, particularly day schools.¹⁰

(5) Day-school and yeshiva enrollment has expanded dramatically, among Conservative as well as among Orthodox Jews. To take one indicator, there are now over 70 schools affiliated with the Conservative Solomon Schechter movement, compared to just a handful in the 1960s. This growth means there is a Conservative day school—with supporting networks of parents, professionals, and lay leaders—available to almost every Jewish community of any substantial size across the United States. Today, almost all Orthodox and Conservative Jews have access to a yeshiva or day school, a situation far different from that which prevailed 20 years ago.

Transformationists would argue that these and related pieces of

evidence point to a redefinition of the meaning of Jewishness. By their actions, American Jews are saying that, in effect, intense political activity, a sophisticated intellectual life, and highly developed social services constitute some of the essentials of American Jewishness. In these terms, the quality of American Jewish life is clearly better than it was not too long ago.

For the traditionalists, though, most of these observations, and others like them, are beside the point. They cannot significantly alter the definition of essential Judaism, and they do not constitute evidence of improvement in the quality of Jewish life. First, some of the five points cited above refer to areas of Jewish life that are tangential to what many traditionalists regard as an essential Judaism (be it commitment to halakah—Jewish law—or to a critical social consciousness or to some other aspect of Judaism). Second, all of the five trends refer to the work of elites, who, in their totality, comprise no more than 20–25 percent of American Jews. (This figure includes almost all Orthodox Jews, the most committed Conservative and Reform Jews, all Jewish communal professionals, all day-school students and their families, and all highly active leaders of Jewish federations and other organizations.) Improvements in the orientations, activity, and knowledge of the most involved 1-million-plus Jews certainly have had a visible impact, but what about the vast majority of American Jews who have had no direct role in fostering these noteworthy upbeat trends?

In a very real sense, then, the battleground between traditionalists and transformationists is found in the arena of mass cultural standards. Traditionalists would be prepared to concede the arguments of transformationists with regard to most structural measures and elite cultural tendencies. That is, they may well agree that Jews remain structurally differentiated and are sustaining their cohesiveness. They may concede that Jewish life for the most involved Jews is more interesting, more creative, and more worthwhile than it was not too long ago. But, traditionalists would maintain, the overall trend among the vast majority of Jews is in the direction of less Jewish intensiveness, of greater integration into American society, and of more remoteness from other Jews, ritual practice, and organized Jewry. Transformationists would object to dismissing the significance of Jewish structural differentiation or of elite achievements. But even if they did so, they would still contend that, on balance, the majority's Jewish involvement is no weaker, quantitatively or qualitatively, than it was a generation ago.

To address the heart of this debate, the section on evidence below deals principally with several mass-based cultural measures of Jewishness, primarily ritual observance and communal affiliation, but also orientations toward Israel, God, and the Jewish people. I examine recent trends in these dimensions as a way of understanding not only the American Jewish present, but perhaps a little bit about its future as well.

Conflicting Images of Authenticity and Modernity

When applied to evidence on the quality of American Jewish life, the lens of the traditionalist and that of the transformationist generate vastly different inferences. That is because traditionalists and transformationists have very different ways of viewing not only essential Judaism but the Jewish past, modernity, and Jewish society.

Using their standards, traditionalists tend to see the Jewish past as richer and more “Jewish” than do transformationists. For them, the past sets a viable standard of authenticity by which to judge the present. Some of the more extreme traditionalists maintain that only those aspects of American Jewish life that resemble those found in premodern Eastern Europe can be seen as authentically Jewish. For their part, transformationists accuse traditionalists of idealizing and romanticizing the past. They argue that a critical study of the past reveals far more diversity, far more evolution, and far more influence of non-Jewish cultures than the traditionalists’ usual portrait allows for. Accordingly, for transformationists, the “authenticity” of the Jewish past is a more fluid concept. In its extreme form, this view contends that anything Jews do that distinguishes them from others (even if undertaken without an explicit Jewish motivation) is authentically Jewish.

Not only do the two camps differ about the Jewish past; they part ways over the modern present. Traditionalists see the modern world as inherently threatening to Judaism. In their view, the larger societies in which traditional Jews lived were characterized by several features crucial to the plausibility of traditional Judaism. The societies’ cultural norms venerated the past; they legitimated the pervasive influence of religious symbols, texts, institutions, and leaders; they emphasized communitarian responsibilities; and they severely circumscribed individual discretion in major life decisions. In contrast, the culture of modernity denigrates the past and exalts

the “new and improved”; its secularist tendencies sharply curtail the influence of religious institutions; and it extols both individualism and autonomous decision making in important spheres of life. Even more fundamentally, where the traditional world sharply segregated Jew from Gentile, and sanctioned Jewish self-government, the modern world terminated Jewish autonomy and, at least in theory, opened the doors to full participation as citizens of fully integrated nation-states. All of these contrasts, traditionalists think, have undermined the very basis for Judaism as it has been traditionally understood (that is, historically and by modern-day traditionalists).

Transformationists see the modern world either as neutral or as providing opportunity for developing new forms of Judaism and Jewishness. Certainly the advent of modernity transformed the nature of Jewish community and identity. Most often, these changes presented not perils, but exciting possibilities.

And by extension, the two camps differ over their perspectives on the meaning of America. To traditionalists, America is a potentially seductive and corrupting influence, one that holds out great social rewards in return for social conformity, implying abandonment of many essential elements of Jewish life. To transformationists, the image of a conformist WASP-dominated America is a thing of the past. Since the 1960s, in particular, America has become much more tolerant of all sorts of diversity, ethnic, religious, sexual, and other. And, owing in part to their lengthening generational history in America and their socioeconomic success, Jews no longer regard their group identity as foreign, lower class, or in any other way stigmatizing.

Besides differing over the authenticity of the Jewish past and the perils of the modern American present, the two camps also differ over their ideas of Jewish sufficiency. Since traditionalists see Jewish life in the modern era as inherently precarious, they tend to be alarmed by any declines in measures of Jewish involvement, seeing each of them as yet one more step down the road to assimilation. In most instances, for them more Jewishness is better, less is worse.

Transformationists view declines in measures of Jewish involvement with equanimity. They portray declines in some aspects of Jewishness as inessential to Jewish continuity, often as replaceable by emerging substitutes. And if sometimes no substitutes emerge, transformationists see the declines as transitions to less intensive (or maybe just different) levels of Jewish involvement, rather than

as movement toward assimilation, that is, total abandonment of Jewish expression and connection. In other words, when compared with his East European grandfather, today's Reform Jew who attends services only three times a year, sends his children to Sunday school, and knows little, if any, Hebrew, cannot be termed "more assimilated." He may be more secularized; he may well be just as "Jewish," but in a different way.

These contrasting conceptualizations are so fundamental as to sharply diminish the possibility that an assessment of data alone can resolve the argument to the satisfaction of all sides. Members of both camps derive very different conclusions from the same facts. Thus, no body of evidence on the current state and directions of American Jewry can turn a convinced traditionalist into a confirmed transformationist, or the reverse. The most one can expect from a confrontation with the evidence is a moderation of the most extreme views.

Four Sides to the Debate, Not Two

The more extreme traditionalists tend to believe that American Jewry has sharply departed from any reasonable definition of authentic Judaism, and that large numbers of today's American Jews and their children will sever all meaningful ties with Jews and Jewishness. The more moderate version of traditionalism speaks of polarization.¹¹ According to this view, the more active segments of the Jewish population have been intensifying their attachment to Judaism and elevating the quality of Jewish life. What may be called the least committed, meanwhile, are becoming more distant from Jewish community and involvement. As a result, the vast middle (those situated between the most and least involved and committed) is supposedly shrinking, losing people to the extremes, probably with more of them assimilating than intensifying their Jewish commitment.

Transformationists, by definition, believe that Jewish life has changed dramatically since premodern days, but also that the standards for judging Jewish life ought to be changed as well. The more extreme transformationists believe that Jewish identity and community are generally strong and growing stronger, that perhaps even a revival has been under way for some time now. In contrast with these "revivalists," the more moderate transformationists see several offsetting trends in Jewish life. While the ways in which

Jews connect to one another and express their Jewishness may be changing, taken in their entirety the trends point predominantly neither in a more intensive nor in a more assimilated direction. This view may be termed the "change-and-stability" perspective, in that it sees change in the mixture of Jewish identity patterns but stability in the overall quantity of Jewish activity, sentiments, and interactions.

A debater would have an easier time defending the two moderate versions. The proponents of polarization have places reserved for all trends in Jewish life, positive or negative: up trends are part of the intensifying process, and down trends belong to the contrary assimilating tendencies. The proponents of change-and-stability also can discount trends in either direction. Negative trends can be portrayed as signs of the decay of outmoded forms of Jewish expression, and positive trends can be viewed as their emerging replacements.

Transformationists and traditionalists probably are responding to their different perceptions of the intellectual climate. It is the wont of intellectuals to "swim against the stream," to look for what they regard as mistaken currents of thinking and try to redirect them. Hence, it would come as no surprise that many who have been seen as advancing an upbeat view of the American Jewish future perceive the conventional wisdom as dominated by overly gloomy traditionalists. In like fashion, the perception that American Jewry has become too optimistic about its survival has prompted not a few traditionalists to articulate their views as a warning against complacency.

THE EVIDENCE

Most of the evidence reported below derives from recent surveys conducted nationally and in the Greater New York area.¹² The reason I lean heavily on the New York survey is that I have just completed a monograph extensively analyzing those data. Before proceeding further, a few comments on the adequacy of generalizing from the New York region to the country are in order.

The Greater New York Jewish Population Study was conducted in 1981 on behalf of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of New York. It interviewed over 4,500 respondents, representing a Jewish population of 1.7 million. Thus not only does the data set permit unusually detailed analyses; the population it surveys represents nearly a third of American Jewry, and whatever happens in this

region influences and, to some degree, reflects larger national trends.

The distributions of Jewish identity characteristics in the New York region largely approximate those found in other local and national studies, with some important exceptions. Compared to these other studies, a somewhat higher percentage of New York area Jews are: Orthodox; unaffiliated with any Jewish institution; married to other Jews; and embedded in exclusively Jewish friendship circles.

Intermarriage: An Ambiguous Impact

Almost every expression of doubt about the quality of American Jewish life or about its future includes, or even begins with, a discussion of intermarriage. Thus to traditionalists, intermarriage both signifies and stimulates mounting assimilation. It is the culmination of years of mounting social integration as well as chronologically increasing remoteness of the bulk of the Jewish public from the intense Jewish life of the European past. Transformationists are far more sanguine about the meaning of intermarriage and its consequences for the Jewish future. It is clear, then, that understanding the significance of intermarriage and its implications for the Jewish identity of the couples and their offspring is obviously of no little relevance to the controversy over the current and future condition of American Jewry.

There are no reliable and precise estimates of the extent of out-marriage (the marriage of a born Jew to a born non-Jew) in the United States. Responsible estimates range from more than a quarter to a little more than a third of Jews who marry. It appears that the rate of out-marriage spurted ahead quickly in the late 1960s, while the pace of increase has slowed since then.

Those who out-marry derive disproportionately from weaker Jewish backgrounds.¹³ Thus to traditionalists rising intermarriage signifies mounting assimilation. To transformationists, the concentration of intermarriage among the Jewishly peripheral means it is less threatening to Jewish continuity. In fact, it may operate as a useful escape-and-entry vehicle, one that facilitates the departure of less Jewishly committed individuals and the acquisition of highly committed converts. At the same time, it allows for the retention of the children of mixed marriages.

Roughly one quarter of born-non-Jewish wives convert to Judaism,

as do a very small proportion of non-Jewish husbands.¹⁴ In all likelihood, these conversionary marriages are both quantitative and qualitative assets to the Jewish population.¹⁵ Almost all conversionary marriages raise their children as Jews. Converts tend to equal or surpass born Jews in median ritual practice and synagogue attendance, but fewer such families belong to Jewish institutions or associate with Jewish friends. As several observers have concluded, converts are both more “religious” and less “ethnic” than born Jews. (Possible reasons for this discrepancy include: ethnic traits require a longer time to acquire than religious practices; converts are brought into Judaism under religious—rabbinic and synagogue—auspices; and born non-Jews conceive of Judaism more as a religious rather than an ethnic involvement.)

Clearly, the production of converts by out-marriage must be regarded as a positive outcome from the perspective of those concerned with Jewish continuity. What of the nonconversionary couples, the mixed marriages? Most of them, in fact, participate in some sort of ritual, most often the Passover seder and the lighting of Hanukkah candles. In the New York area, about half have mostly Jewish close friends and more than a quarter belong to a Jewish institution.¹⁶ At the same time, very few observe the Sabbath or kashrut in any apparent way. Most mixed-married Jewish women and some mixed-married Jewish men claim to be raising Jewish children.

There is no doubt that the mixed married are significantly less involved in traditional or conventional aspects of Jewish life than the in-married. However, at the same time, most mixed-married Jews report not one, but several sorts of attachment to Jewish people and Jewish ritual and, less frequently, to organized Jewry.

The net impact of out-marriage on Jewish continuity is different for individuals (or their families) and for the Jewish group as a whole. From the point of view of the individual, the marriages of Jews to born non-Jews vastly increase the chances that the partners will be less involved in various aspects of Jewish life. Put most graphically, the out-marriage of one’s child dramatically improves the likelihood of having non-Jewish grandchildren.

However, the consequences from the entire group’s point of view are far less severe, and are in some ways beneficial. The essential point to bear in mind is that, relative to in-marriage, out-marriage doubles the number of homes with at least one Jewish member. As a result, whatever the measure of Jewishness, out-married house-

holds (including both conversionary and mixed marriages) need to produce only half the number of Jewishly identified offspring as that produced by in-marriages for the Jewish group to "stay even."

For instance, if 50 percent of in-married Jews affiliate with synagogues and only 25 percent of out-marrieds affiliate, synagogue membership is unaffected by out-marriage. If only half the out-marrieds raise Jewish children (who remain Jewishly identified as adults—a serious question), then out-marriage will have no effect on Jewish population size. In fact, the number of converts and born-Jewish partners in mixed marriages who claim to be raising their children as Jews suggests an increase in the next generation's Jewish population of as much as 40 percent of the number who out-marry (New York area data). Since the parents' reports cannot be taken at face value, such a rosy prediction is unwarranted. Many of the children of mixed marriages ostensibly being raised as Jews now will not function as Jewish adults later. Nevertheless, it is clear that, taken in its totality, out-marriage is not now seriously eroding the sheer number of Jews participating in several aspects of Jewish life. (Interestingly, two other studies by other researchers on other data sets arrive at substantially similar conclusions.¹⁷)

All of which is not to say that intermarriage is "good for the Jews." It is to say that intermarriage is not all "bad for the Jews." Too many imponderables make the assessment of the overall impact of intermarriage on the quality of Jewish life and the quantity of Jews a very hazardous business. But several signs—most notably the conversions, the rearing of Jewish children by mixed marriages, the participation of most intermarried Jews in many aspects of Jewish life—all suggest that the impact of intermarriage is far from one-sided or disastrous.

With this said, my sense is that, overall, intermarriage holds out the prospect for more downside losses than upside gains. Intermarriage is at least a mechanism, if not an important impetus, to declines in Jewish involvement for a substantial minority of American Jews. It is true that out-marriers, even if they had not out-married, would have performed fewer rituals and less often affiliated with organized Jewry than Jews married to other Jews. Even so, their marriages to born non-Jews at least augment their tendency to lead less involved Jewish lives. Even from a group perspective, the counterbalancing elements of converts and of Jewishly identified offspring of mixed marriages probably do not compensate for the less quantifiable losses attributable to intermarriage. Among these

must be counted not only the assimilation of some out-marriers and more of their children, but also the implications for Jews as a group. Most critically, intermarriage helps blur the social boundary separating Jews from non-Jews; and less critically, it has stimulated rabbinic conflicts over denominational definitions of Jewish identity.

In sum, were it not for intermarriage, some Jews would be more secure from outright assimilation, some would be more active in ritual and organizational life, there would be fewer reasons for internal Jewish conflict, and Jews as a group would be more socially segregated from others. In light of the converts and other compensating consequences discussed earlier, none of these deleterious consequences, as problematic as they might be, constitutes a grave threat to the Jewish continuity of large numbers of American Jews. Moreover, as we see in the next section, even factoring in the rising intermarriage rate, Jews in the aggregate do not appear to be moving to lower levels of ritual practice, organizational affiliation, or other forms of Jewish involvement and commitment.

The Fallacy of Youthful Apostasy

One element central to traditionalists' fears for the Jewish future is their impression of the Jewishness of today's young people. By any visible standard, younger adults are simply less involved in Jewish life than those just 20 or 30 years their senior. Most American Jews under 30 belong to no Jewish institution as compared to less than a third of the middle-aged.¹⁸ Substantially fewer young people report high levels of interest and involvement with Israel than do their elders.¹⁹ In the 1981 New York area survey, only half the young adults said all three of their closest friends were Jewish as opposed to 80 percent or more of those over 50.²⁰ And, as is well known, young people today intermarry more often than their elders did.

These are only some of the more measurable differences in Jewish identity patterns that divide today's younger adults from their parents' generation. Undoubtedly, they may be supplemented by other, more subtle, if equally significant differences. All of these have suggested to many parents of young adults (if not the young adults themselves) that today's young people just are not "as Jewish" as their parents, and that they lack and will continue to lack their parents' level of commitment to Jewish values. By extension, major declines in Jewish commitment are just around the actuarial corner.

In truth, the situation is more complicated. First, several other

measures of Jewish involvement register just as high (or just as low) levels among young adults as among their parents. In recent studies, three dimensions of Jewishness were nearly identical across age groups. These were: distributions of ritual observance, a composite measure of faith in God, and an index measuring "Jewish familism" (feeling close to other Jews, viewing Jews as one's extended family).²¹ Thus, if there are declines in Jewishness inherently linked to age cohorts, they are found in only certain specific dimensions of Jewish identity.

But, even here, we have reason to doubt the view that some measures of Jewishness are destined to decline. Part of the reason young adults seem so distant from Jewish life is that the measures commonly employed are those most appropriate to the Jewishness of conventional families. Most rabbis, Jewish educators, communal professionals, and volunteer leaders think that Jewish commitment is best measured by affiliating with a synagogue, joining a Jewish organization or community center, and contributing to the centralized UJA/federation campaign. And, it turns out, young people undertake these activities far less than their elders, leading many observers to question the depth of their Jewish commitment. But communal affiliation in all its varieties is very much a function of several sociodemographic characteristics associated with age but unrelated to a psychic commitment to Jewish life. The highly affiliated share the following traits: they are married, they have school-age or older children, they are affluent, and they have been residentially stable for several years.

That these factors rather than an inherent shortcoming in young adults' Jewish motivation accounts for their lower affiliation was demonstrated in my analysis of the 1981 New York data when I controlled for just one such factor—family life cycle. Looking only at those who were married and had school-age or older children, I found that as many young adults affiliated with Jewish institutions as those 30 and 40 years their senior in similar family circumstances.²² This suggests no inherent propensity for younger adults to avoid institutional Judaism.

On the other hand, controlling for family life cycle did not completely explain why fewer young adults have predominantly Jewish intimate friendship networks. Although (in the New York area) vast majorities of both young and old reported that all their three closest friends were Jewish (and even vaster majorities said that at least two were Jewish), the proportion reporting only one or even no

Jewish close friends, though small, was notably higher among the younger married parents.

Coupled with the growth in out-marriage and mixed marriage (observable both in the New York data and other studies), the friendship patterns seem to indicate a trend among young people toward greater social intimacy with non-Jews. At the same time, despite this integration, the age-cohort comparisons indicate no declines in ritual observance, communal affiliation, feelings of closeness to other Jews, or faith in God. Much as those more optimistic about the Jewish future would claim, for the most part younger adult Jews are not "less Jewish" than their elders.

Of course, some traditionalists would object to relying on survey data for drawing such an inference. Survey respondents prefer to give socially acceptable answers, which here are those that affirm participation in Jewish life. In fact, one piece of research documented that a large fraction of respondents who claimed to have contributed to the local federation campaign were absent from the federation's donor list.²³ Respondents also probably tend to exaggerate their participation in other types of affiliation. For example, more respondents claim to belong to a synagogue than report paying membership dues within the last twelve months.²⁴ And, not least, it is clear that survey questions mean different things to different respondents. What is one Jew's Passover seder is just a highly secularized family celebration to the traditionalist.

However, for these methodological objections to have any weight, the skeptics would need to demonstrate that they apply more to younger than to older adults. That is, if reports of seder attendance are flat across the age spectrum (in fact, more young adults report seder attendance than do their elders), then the doubters would need to argue that the seders attended by younger adults are somehow less traditional than those attended by their elders.

In fact, we know very little about the quality of what stands behind the answers to our survey questions. We have no evidence which either supports or refutes the notion that young people are more likely to provide socially acceptable answers than their elders or to report participation in practices that are qualitatively inferior (whatever that might mean). Absent a good reason to think otherwise, it seems reasonable to assume that qualitative or quantitative exaggeration is randomly distributed over the age spectrum. If so, then it does seem fair to conclude that the evidence points to no significant age-related declines or increases in several critical di-

mensions of Jewish involvement, despite and aside from some growth in marriage and friendship with non-Jews.

The Fallacy of Generational Decline

Traditionalists have long held the view that each advance in generational distance from the traditional European wellspring of intense Jewishness results in a further watering down of Jewish intensiveness in the United States. In support of this imagery, study after study has demonstrated that denominational traditionalism, ritual observance, intermarriage, intragroup friendship, and other measures of Jewish involvement decline with each advance in generational status in the United States.²⁵ By extension, some argue that as time passes, as generations advance, the American Jewish community will continue down the path to weaker and weaker forms of Jewish identity and community.

The Greater New York data, with its large number of cases, permitted a very detailed examination of the combined effects of generation and age cohort upon several measures of Jewish identification. The conclusions of that analysis included the following:

- The model of declining Jewish activity associated with generational transitions accurately describes generation-linked differences for older Jews. However,
- The generation-linked differences decline with age. That is, among younger respondents the gaps in religious observance between immigrants and the third generation (grandchildren of earlier immigrants) were far smaller than among older cohorts.
- The rate of ritual abandonment as measured by parent-child differences declined substantially with age. To be more explicit, children of immigrants born in the United States after the Second World War reported unusually high levels of ritual observance, both relative to their parents and relative to older second-generation Jews. Where the prewar second generation abandoned many of their immigrant parents' ritual practices, the postwar second generation largely retained their parents' level of observance.
- The fourth generation's patterns of Jewish involvement varied with age. The older fourth generation (whose great-grandparents immigrated to America, probably arriving from Germany before 1881) manifested two distinguishing characteristics: they

scored somewhat lower on several Jewish-identification measures than the third generation of the same age; but they also exhibited the largest increases over their parents' levels of observance. The younger fourth-generation respondents (probably great-grandchildren of early Russian immigrants) reported Jewish-identity scores on a par with those of third-generation age counterparts.

These findings suggest that the model of generational decline is obsolete. At one time, Jewish immigrants and their children believed that American integration demanded they forgo those Jewish traits which symbolized their foreignness. But America became more hospitable to such activities (largely for reasons unconnected with Jews specifically), and as Jews became more secure as Americans, Jews became more comfortable retaining traditional practices. Moreover, the declines that characterized the first three generations probably ceased with the fourth generation. If all this is so, then a central theoretical component of the traditionalist perspective would be severely undercut.

WIDESPREAD IDENTIFICATION, AFFILIATION, AND DIFFERENTIATION

The traditionalist perspective presupposes that a significant amount of assimilation has already taken place. Assimilation ought to be reflected in a sizable number of Jews lacking any significant involvement in Jewish life. Yet in one survey after another, vast majorities of respondents report one or another sort of ritual activity, formal affiliation, or attachment to other Jews. The totally uninvolved, in fact, comprise a rather small segment of the population, one concentrated among younger adults (who have yet to marry) and among the mixed married (whose remoteness from Jewish life, we have seen, is partially compensated for by the positive consequences of intermarriage for Jewish continuity).

To elaborate, from several recently conducted surveys of American Jewry, we can identify some of the many expressions of Jewish identity, connection, and commitment that characterize not less than roughly two-thirds of American Jewry. Among the ritual activities, these include: attendance at a Passover seder (85–90 percent); lighting Hanukkah candles (about 75 percent, and more with children present); and attending High Holiday services or

fasting on Yom Kippur (at least two thirds).²⁶ Nearly 90 percent of boys' parents provide them with some sort of Jewish schooling,²⁷ and while reliable estimates of the proportion celebrating bar mitzvah are unavailable, the number may approximate that acquiring any sort of formal Jewish education.

Many active in Jewish communal life presume that half of American Jews are "unaffiliated." In fact, roughly half the Jewish population are members of families which report belonging to synagogues (about 70 percent of all Americans say they belong to a church or synagogue). Beyond the synagogue members are those who formally affiliate with other Jewish institutions. The number who are attached to any major Jewish agency (synagogue, organization, or federation campaign) climbs to roughly two-thirds. Since affiliation with Jewish institutions rises and falls through the family life cycle, it seems that the proportion of married couples with school-age children who are in some way affiliated is not less than 80 percent, or even higher. In fact, in Queens and Long Island (in 1986), 90 percent of youngsters 10–12 years old belonged to families whose adult respondents said they were synagogue members.²⁸

Psychic and interpersonal connections with Israel constitute yet another dimension of Jewish involvement characterizing large majorities of American Jews. Over a third of American Jews have been to Israel, over a third have family there, and as many claim to have personal friends there. Over three-fifths report a personal tie with someone living in Israel. And roughly three-quarters claim, in various ways, to care deeply for Israel. About 85 percent say they pay special attention to articles about Israel in newspapers and magazines. From two-thirds to three-quarters say that they would want their children to visit Israel, that Israel's destruction would be one of the greatest personal tragedies in their lives, that Israel is central to their Jewish identity.²⁹

Last, we can examine how Jews feel about each other, non-Jews, and the place of Jews as a minority in American society. From the common responses of roughly three-quarters of respondents to a variety of questions on several national surveys, we can derive a synthetic portrait of the myths and images that inform Jews' understanding of themselves as a separate group.

For the most part, Jews think of each other as part of an extended family. They see themselves (or, more usually, their ancestors) as having suffered many years of persecution, an experience that gives them certain moral insights and a certain moral privilege. Al-

though America has been extraordinarily hospitable to Jewish achievement, anti-Semitism is still seen as a real and potentially serious problem. Jews generally feel somewhat excluded from certain positions of power and social status, and that sense of exclusion influences their political thinking.³⁰

These several elements of what may be called an American Jewish social consciousness characterize the vast majority of Jews of all ages, with one critical exception: fewer younger Jews express anxiety over anti-Semitism than do middle-aged or elderly respondents.

On the political spectrum, the Jewish center remains about 20 percentage points to the left of the national center (the gap varies with different electoral and public-opinion measures). They continue to support liberal positions and Democratic candidates far more than any other ethnic group, and these political tendencies are all the more remarkable in light of Jews' relative affluence.³¹ The enduring nature of these political leanings says something, if only indirectly, about the persistence of an aspect of American Jewish identity. It suggests that whatever factors underlie that liberalism—that is, in whatever ways Jews have been structurally or culturally distinctive—they have been sustaining that distinctiveness. For if not, the Jewish/non-Jewish political gap would have closed.

In sum, the vast majority of Jews perform some rituals, affiliate in some ways with organized Jewry, feel attached to Israel, and see each other as a distinctive family-like, partially excluded minority group in American society. Moreover, insofar as young people or later generations serve as useful indicators of the future, the comparisons with elders and with earlier generations fail to indicate impending across-the-board declines in several measures of Jewish commitment and involvement.

WHY THE MISREADING?

The evidence presented thus far certainly refutes the most extreme versions of traditionalism or transformationism. Contrary to some traditionalists' views, massive assimilation (without a compensating influx) has not and is not occurring. At the same time, the cultural revival that some transformationist observers have claimed does not extend to most American Jews (and if it does, then it does not seem to affect levels of ritual observance, affiliation, in-group

marriage, in-group friendship, and various attitudes of attachment to Judaism and the Jewish people).

Thus, even if the American Jewish condition is not all that outstanding, it certainly is not entirely bad. If so, then we need to ask why so many share the pessimism and alarmism of those predicting a significant erosion in the number of Jews and the quality of Jewishness in the United States. Several reasons for the exaggerated pessimism come to mind.

First, observers tend to derive their images of the near future from their perceptions of the Jewish involvement of today's young adults. And, as I have shown, young adults do participate less frequently in conventional Jewish life, at least until the time they have children.

Second, some observers utilize an outmoded model of Jewish social change. From the Enlightenment in the late 18th century until just a generation (20 years) ago, the predominant anxieties of Western Jews lay in securing their acceptance and integration into the surrounding society.³² During the first two-thirds of the 20th century much of American Jewry also seemed more interested in integrating as Americans rather than surviving as Jews. For several reasons, integrationist anxieties subsided substantially sometime during the late '60s and early '70s. But, as with many sorts of social change, it takes several years for observers to come to utilize a new paradigm by which to organize and understand several disparate observations. And the basic paradigm one uses, the prism through which one observes human behavior, deeply and tellingly influences one's perceptions.

One example may suffice. If one presumes that Jews are looking for ways to escape the stigma of connection with the Jewish community, then the movement of Jews to areas of low Jewish density appears to imply an intentional abandonment of Jewish life. Consequently, Jews settling in outlying suburbs or Sunbelt communities with small Jewish populations are seen as assimilationist-minded. But if one presumes that serious aversion to things Jewish is a historic phenomenon (at best), then movement to areas of low Jewish density takes on a new color. One interprets such movement as part of a market-determined response to employment and housing opportunities.³³ In short, I am suggesting that one reason for the generally downbeat images of American Jewry is that observers tend to organize their perceptions along lines of a largely obsolete paradigm.

Third, many of the most widely publicized and influential assessments of American Jewry are formulated by those who are most involved in organized Jewish life—rabbis, educators, communal professionals, and lay leaders. Such people have several reasons for constructing and publicizing pessimistic assessments. One is that they maintain fairly high standards of involvement against which they measure American Jewish life. Masses typically fall short of the standards of elites, and American Jews are no exception. Moreover, the comparisons are intensified by the involvement of communal leaders in efforts to prompt ordinary Jews to learn more, participate more actively, and express more commitment. Such situations are bound to generate frustration on the part of the leaders and feed the perception that the masses are ignorant, inactive, and apathetic. Last, and not least, institutional interests often impel leaders to paint pessimistic pictures, if only to demonstrate the seriousness of the problem they are addressing or to secure continued financial and political support for their institutions' activities.

Finally, and related to the processes outlined above, two very authoritative networks in organized Jewry—Israeli officialdom and Orthodox rabbis—maintain a strong ideological bent toward perceiving assimilation among non-Orthodox American Jews. In different ways, both Israeli Zionists and Orthodox Americans see themselves as making essential life-long contributions to Jewish survival that less committed Jews are unequipped or unmotivated to undertake. Part of the *raison d'être* of the State of Israel is that only in a sovereign country can Jews in the modern age expect to survive the onslaught of anti-Semitism (in nondemocratic societies) or the ravages of assimilation (in open, Western countries). In like fashion, Orthodox spokesmen lend legitimacy to their movement by calling attention to the perils to Jewish continuity found in Jewish life outside of Orthodoxy. In addition, the assertion that there is rampant assimilation among the non-Orthodox is a highly effective rhetorical instrument in Orthodoxy's conflicts with Conservative and Reform leadership. (None of this is meant to imply that the misreading is intentional and deceitful, nor is it to denigrate the Orthodox contribution to American Jewish vitality and continuity.)

In short, faulty generalization from young people, the persistence of an outmoded paradigm, the cultural elitism of communal leaders, institutional interests, and ideological commitments all operate to make the image of American Jewry perhaps somewhat gloomier and problem-ridden than it ought to be. The truth, it seems, lies some-

where between the extreme views of impending erosion and far-ranging cultural revival.

CHOOSING BETWEEN THE POLARIZATION AND CHANGE-AND-STABILITY MODELS

Of the four broad perspectives on the quality of American Jewish life described earlier, the two more extreme may be rejected as viable summary models. This leaves the two moderate perspectives—polarization and change-and-stability—as candidates for further serious consideration.

These two models agree about what may be regarded as the “upper half” of American Jewry. Both suggest that life for the more involved Jews has certainly improved over the last 20 or 30 years. Earlier I cited such trends as increased day-school attendance, more Jewish commitment among the federations, a richer intellectual life, as well as a more sophisticated, assertive, and intensive style of political activity on behalf of Israel and other Jewish causes.

Where the two schools divide is over how to understand the “bottom half,” the less Jewishly involved segment of American Jewry. Here the major question boils down to how one understands the unmistakable increase in out-marriage and a parallel trend to increasing numbers of non-Jewish intimate friends and neighbors.

The polarization model understands these trends as rather ominous developments. They are important in and of themselves; from a traditionalist perspective, advanced integration with non-Jews constitutes an intrinsic loss of core Jewish identity. And they also are important for what they imply. For some observers, increased integration is a symptom of advanced assimilation for many Jews, and it is an impetus for further assimilation in the years to come.

The change-and-stability model sees the rise in intermarriage and the other forms of social integration primarily as increasing the velocity of Jewish/non-Jewish social, cultural, and biological interchange, but not as in any serious way threatening Jewish continuity. The model points to the overall stability in ritual observance, communal affiliation, and other measures as proof that the state of Jewish identity can withstand increased social integration. It claims that population losses are offset by population gains (converts, Jewish children of mixed marriages). And, last, that the widely conceded intensification of Jewish life among the more in-

volved certainly compensates for whatever small losses have been experienced by the “bottom half” over the last few decades.

The big imponderable for the future concerns the Jewishness of the offspring of mixed marriages. The Jewish partners in those marriages largely claim to be raising their children as Jews. We have no idea of the extent to which these children will continue to identify as Jews, nor the extent to which they in turn will marry non-Jewish spouses, nor the nature of their Jewish identity when they mature.

In short, deciding between the two models may be a matter of objective uncertainty (e.g., we are ignorant of the long-term impact of intermarriage); but it also may be a matter of subjective valuation. Is intermarriage intrinsically “bad,” even if it has few effects on population size or group-wide levels of observance and affiliation? Are the effects of rising integration among the “bottom half” such as to seriously outweigh the improvements in Jewish life among the “top half”?

My own inclinations lead me toward the change-and-stability model. However, I can readily understand how those with a more traditionalist orientation will be inclined to adopt the polarization model.

Whatever our doubts about the future, for those concerned with Jewish survival and creativity in the United States, two things are certain. The Jewish population is not shrinking dramatically due to assimilation (birthrates may be another matter). And the highly touted cultural revival of American Jews is very much an elite phenomenon. If so, then cultural and educational policy ought to be aimed at enhancing the quality of Jewish life for the larger Jewish public rather than averting an impending disaster of massive assimilation. Hope for a better future ought to replace fear of an imminent catastrophe as the motivating spirit and central ethos of Jewish communal life in the latter part of the 20th century.³⁴

NOTES

1. Arthur Hertzberg has written: “Wherever freedom has existed for several generations without a break, the Jews have never in the last two centuries settled down to be themselves. Even in Central and Western Europe in the nineteenth century . . . the rate of falling-away was disastrous. In the third and fourth generation it began to approach one-half. Today in

America we are reaching the stage of the great-grandchildren of the Russian Jewish immigrants of . . . a century ago, and all the indices of disintegration are beginning to rise. Freedom . . . in America . . . is resulting in large-scale attrition . . . continuity is most severely endangered by the very plentitude of freedom which is its most devout wish" (*Being Jewish in America* [New York: Schocken, 1979], p. 208). See also Arthur Hertzberg, "Assimilation: Can Jews Survive Their Encounter with America?" *Hadasah Magazine* 65 (August–September 1983): 16; Herbert Gans, "Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 2 (January 1979): 1–20; Nathan Glazer, "On Jewish Forebodings," *Commentary* 80 (August 1985): 32–36.

2. Charles Silberman, "The Jewish Community in Change: Challenge to Professional Practice," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 58 (Fall 1981): 4–11; "No More Mountain Overhead: Federations and the Voluntary Covenant," paper presented at the General Assembly, Council of Jewish Federations, 1983; *A Certain People: American Jews and Their Lives Today* (New York: Summit Books, 1985).

3. Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change: Emerging Patterns in America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); *The American Jewish Community: Social Science Research and Policy Implications* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986); Calvin Goldscheider and Alan Zuckerman, *The Transformation of the Jews* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

4. For development of this position, see Steven M. Cohen, *American Modernity and Jewish Identity* (New York: Tavistock, 1983) and *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).

5. See Hertzberg's review of Silberman's *A Certain People* in *New York Review of Books*, Nov. 21, 1985, pp. 18–21.

6. U. O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "Some Basic Trends in the Demography of U.S. Jews: A Re-examination," unpublished manuscript, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1986.

7. Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change* and *American Jewish Community*.

8. Response to a question at a conference of American Jewish and Israeli leaders, Sodom, Israel, December 1985.

9. Cohen, *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?*, ch. 5; see also Steven M. Cohen and Samuel Heilman, *Cosmopolitan Parochials: Orthodox Jews in Modern America*, forthcoming.

10. Charles Liebman, "Leadership and Decision-making in a Jewish Federation: The New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies," *American Jewish Year Book 1979* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1979), pp. 3–76; Jonathan Woocher, *Sacred Survival: The Civil Religion of American Jews* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).

11. Donald Feldstein, *The American Jewish Community in the 21st Century: A Projection* (New York: American Jewish Congress, 1984).

12. Cohen, *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?*

13. Fred S. Sherron, "Patterns of Religious Inter-marriage," Ph.D. diss., Department of Sociology, Columbia University, 1971; Fred Massarik and Alvin Chenkin, "United States National Jewish Population Study: A First Report," *American Jewish Year Book 1973* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1973), pp. 264–306; Cohen, *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?*, ch. 2. Goldscheider reports a narrowing in the Jewish identity patterns of mixed-married and in-married couples among younger age groups (*Jewish Continuity and Change*, pp. 24–28).

14. U. O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "Population Trends in U.S. Jewry and Their Demographic Consequences," *American Jewish Year Book 1983* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1983), pp. 141–187; Cohen, *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?*

15. Steven Huberman, "Jews and Non-Jews: Falling in Love," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 55 (March 1979): 265–270; Bernard Lazerwitz, "Jewish-Christian Marriages and Conversions," *Jewish Social Studies* 54 (Winter 1981): 31–46; Egon Mayer, "Jews by Choice: Some Reflections on Their Impact on the Contemporary American Jewish Community," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Rabbinical Assembly, Dallas, 1983, Cohen, *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?*, ch. 2.

16. Cohen, *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?*, ch. 4.

17. Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Population Trends in U.S. Jewry"; Cohen, *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?*, ch. 2.

18. Cohen, *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?*, ch. 4.

19. Steven M. Cohen, *Ties and Tensions: The 1986 Survey of American Jewish Attitudes Toward Israel and Israelis* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1987), pp. 8–17.

20. Cohen, *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?*, ch. 4.

21. Cohen, *Ties and Tensions*, pp. 8–17.

22. Cohen, *American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?*, ch. 4.

23. Bruce A. Phillips, personal communication.

24. Steven M. Cohen and Paul Ritterband, "The 1986 Jewish Population Study of Queens and Long Island," unpublished manuscript, Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, New York, 1987.

25. Morris Axelrod et al., *A Community Survey for Long Range Planning: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston: Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston, 1967); Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Americans* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968); Floyd J. Fowler, *1975 Community Survey: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston: Combined Jewish Philanthropies of Greater Boston, 1977); Harold Himmelfarb, "The Study of American Jewish Identification: How It Is Defined, Measured, Obtained, Sustained, and Lost,"

Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 19 (March 1980): 18–60; Harold Himmelfarb, "Research on American Jewish Identity and Identification," in Marshall Sklare, ed., *Understanding American Jewry* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1982); Steven M. Cohen, *Interethnic Marriage and Friendship* (New York: Arno, 1980); *American Modernity and Jewish Identity; American Assimilation or Jewish Revival?*

26. Gary Tobin and Julie Lipsman, "A Compendium of Jewish Demographic Studies," in S. M. Cohen et al., eds., *Perspectives in Jewish Population Research* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984); Gary Tobin and Alvin Chenkin, "Recent Jewish Community Studies: A Roundup," *American Jewish Year Book 1985* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1985), pp. 154–178.

27. Sergio DellaPergola and Nitza Genuth, *Jewish Education Attained in Diaspora Communities: Data for 1970s* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, Institute of Contemporary Jewry, 1984).

28. Cohen and Ritterband, "1986 Jewish Population Study of Queens and Long Island," separate computer tabulations.

29. Steven M. Cohen, *Attitudes of American Jews Toward Israel and Israelis* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1983); "From Romantic Idealists to Loving Realists: The Changing Place of Israel in the Consciousness of American Jews," in W. Frankel, ed., *Survey of Jewish Affairs 1985* (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1985); *Ties and Tensions*.

30. Steven M. Cohen, *The 1984 National Survey of American Jews: Political and Social Outlooks* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1984).

31. Ibid.

32. Steven M. Cohen and Leonard J. Fein, "From Integration to Survival: American Jewish Anxieties in Transition" *Annals*, July 1985, pp. 75–88.

33. Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change*.

34. Steven M. Cohen, "Outreach to the Marginally Affiliated: Evidence and Implications for Policymakers in Jewish Education," *Journal of Jewish Communal Service* 62 (Winter 1986): 147–157; "The Self-Defeating Surplus," *Moment*, June 1987.