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**WHAT DO**

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**AMERICANS THINK**

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**ABOUT JEWS?**

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**Tom W. Smith**

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## FOREWORD

Tom W. Smith's *What Do Americans Think About Jews?* is the eighth in a series of Working Papers on Contemporary Anti-Semitism published by the American Jewish Committee.

The Working Papers series seeks to enrich our understanding of contemporary anti-Semitism by inventorying current knowledge, providing analytical perspectives, and suggesting avenues for further research. Among the issues that call for analysis are the following: Is contemporary anti-Semitism a direct continuation of the Jew-hatred of the past, or is it in some sense a new phenomenon? Has the Holocaust finally delegitimated anti-Semitism, or has it merely driven it underground? What are the images of Jews that currently circulate in society? Are there population subgroups that are especially susceptible to anti-Semitism? How has the reality of the State of Israel affected expressions of anti-Semitism?

Dr. Smith reports on a rich body of recent survey data focusing on images that Americans have of Jews. His general conclusion is that for "most indicators, anti-Jewish attitudes are at a historic low." At the same time, however, Smith notes that "it is uncertain to what extent further improvement is occurring." Moreover, he observes, "there are several signs of a latent anti-Semitism that could be activated under certain circumstances."

In bringing the tools of quantitative research to bear on the question *What Do Americans Think About Jews?* Dr. Smith adds greatly to our understanding of this vital issue.

David Singer, *Director*  
*Department of Research and Publications*

## WHAT DO AMERICANS THINK ABOUT JEWS?

Since World War II anti-Semitism in the United States has been in decline (Gordon 1986; Martire and Clark 1982; Quinley and Glock 1979; Rosenfield 1982; Smith and Dempsey 1983; Selznick and Steinberg 1969; Stember 1966; Tobin 1988).<sup>1</sup> Negative appraisals of Jews have diminished and prejudicial stereotypes about Jews have waned. Similarly, various discriminatory barriers such as college admission limitations and exclusions from membership in clubs and associations have fallen away. Additionally, organized anti-Semitic campaigns by neo-Nazis and other hate groups have been relegated to the furthest political fringes.

Despite the real and demonstrable decline, anti-Semitism has not disappeared. In both latent and manifest forms it remains a part of contemporary American society. While prejudicial attitudes about Jews have diminished, stereotypes continue to be widely held (Driedger and Mezoff 1981; King and Clayson 1984; Newport 1986; Smith and Dempsey 1983; Weil n.d.; Wuthnow 1982). Moreover, there is some concern that the documented decline may be only superficial and that, rather than being eradicated, anti-Semitism has only become dormant, retaining its full horrific potential. Even now overt anti-Semitic incidents occur with alarming frequency (Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith 1991). While anti-Semitic political groups are isolated in the lunatic fringe, lunatics can be dangerous -- as was amply demonstrated by the murder of Denver radio host Alan Berg in 1984.

Moreover, there are signs of new streams feeding the old pool of anti-Semitism. Over the last two decades, Black anti-Semitism has emerged as a special problem (Berube and Gittell 1969; Capeci 1985; Gans 1969; Harris and Swanson 1970; Perry and White 1986; Pinkney 1978-79; Rose 1981). The traditional Jewish-Black alliance in the civil

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<sup>1</sup> In this report we use the term "anti-Semitism" broadly to cover less favorable or lower ratings and evaluations of Jews. We are not limiting it only to the stronger forms of anti-Semitism that involve hostility and overt prejudice.

rights movement and various other liberal political activities began to break down in the late 1960s. Cooperation was replaced by Jewish-Black conflicts over various community issues in several cities. Jews became the targets of Black militants like Louis Farrakhan and the objects of an ethnic slur from Jesse Jackson.

The continuing turmoil in the Middle East between Israel and the Arabs represents another possible source of anti-Semitism. While the actual relationship between attitudes toward the Middle East and domestic anti-Semitism is both complex and fairly weak, there is a potential for a surge in anti-Semitism because of sympathy for the Palestinians and/or economic hardships resulting from the Arabs' control of oil (Feingold 1985; Gilboa 1987; Harris 1980; Lachman 1978; Martire and Clark 1982; Raab 1986; Rosenfield 1982; Schneider 1978).

Finally, Jewish material success and prominence in certain businesses and professions may play into certain traditional stereotypes (e.g., the Jew as crafty businessman, usurer, international banker) and evoke envy among the less successful or downwardly mobile (Selznick and Steinberg 1969; Tobin 1988).

While anti-Semitism remains an important, if not virulent, social problem in contemporary America, no wide-ranging, national study of anti-Semitism has been carried out since the 1960s. The lack of a comprehensive recent study greatly hinders the examination of contemporary anti-Semitism. It is especially difficult to assess latent aspects of anti-Semitism, the factors that associate with and cause anti-Semitism, and the ways that anti-Semitism relates to racism, anti-Zionism, and other intergroup prejudices.

Fortunately, a number of studies do shed some light on the matter. First, the General Social Survey (GSS) of the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago (Davis and Smith 1990), has included various items on intergroup relations, including items on attitudes toward and interaction with Jews. Second, the American National Election Studies, University of Michigan, have had several items on feelings toward groups. Finally, various public opinion polls (Associated Press/Media General, the Center for Communication Dynamics, Gallup, Los Angeles Times, Princeton Survey Research Associates, and Roper) have included a number of useful questions. These items will be discussed below and are presented in the relevant tables. While less than ideal, the available items allow us to explore some aspects of contemporary anti-Semitism. We will be able to examine: (1) the perceived social standing of Jews compared to other

ethnoreligious groups; (2) the images that people have of Jews compared to those of other ethnoreligious groups; (3) the perceived influence and power that Jews have compared to other groups; (4) the warmth or closeness that people feel toward Jews compared to other groups; (5) social interactions between Jews and non-Jews in the areas of friendship and intermarriage; and (6) the perceived loyalty of Jews and the connection between anti-Israel and anti-Semitic attitudes.

### **The Perceived Social Standing of Jews**

Within American society all ethnic groups are not regarded equally; they are accorded varying degrees of social acceptance and different places in the social hierarchy.

The 1989 GSS evaluated the "social standing" of various ethnic groups by having respondents rate the social positions of groups on a nine-rung ladder (Table 1). Two factors explain most of the differences in the social ordering of ethnic groups. First, "race" divides ethnic groups into two large, distinct categories -- Europeans and non-Europeans. Europeans monopolize the top of the social ladder, while the bottom rungs are mostly populated by non-Europeans. Second, among Europeans ethnic groups are ordered by the period of their immigration. At the top of the list are members of the old-stock host culture -- the British and derivative WASPs who dominated colonial immigration and established their culture and institutions as the foundation of American society. Next come the middle-stock groups such as Germans, Irish, and Scandinavians who immigrated to America in the mid-nineteenth century. They are followed by Italians, Greeks, Poles, Russians, and Jews, who came to America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After the Europeans come the immigrants from other continents -- Asians, Africans, and Hispanics (Smith and Dempsey 1983).

Given these two ranking principles -- race and order of immigration -- Jews fall just about where they would be expected to. They rank twentieth among fifty-eight ethnic groups, falling below the old- and middle-stock nationalities, but above all other Eastern European groups (Lithuanians, Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, Russians, and Slavs). Thus at first glance the social standing of Jews seems unremarkable. But consideration of their socioeconomic status and dual position as both an ethnic group and a religion raises questions about their social standing.

Table 2 lists groups according to their social standing as reported

in Table 1<sup>2</sup> and gives the average family income (in 1986 dollars) and the years of schooling completed. These figures confirm the fact that income and education generally correlate with social standing (Siegel 1971), the top groups tending to have higher incomes and more education than those at the bottom.<sup>3</sup> Jews, however, who rank first on income and third on education, rank only fifteenth on social standing. Their social standing is clearly being held back from what would be expected on the basis of their objective socioeconomic status. Other groups that suffer similar social devaluation are the Chinese and Asian Indians.

Similarly, if we compare the social standing of Jews to those of other religious groups we find that Jews (5.55) fall appreciably below Protestants (6.39) and Catholics (6.33) but above Mormons (Table 1). The third-place rank of Jews compared to Protestants and Catholics is also found in most other interreligious comparisons (Table 3) and on dimensions other than social standing (see below).

The Protestant-Catholic-Jewish comparison is of limited usefulness, however, since it lumps together all Protestant denominations and excludes other religions. Unfortunately, there is no up-to-date, wide-ranging ranking of the social standing of religious groups. Rankings in 1965 and 1977 suggest that Jews fall near the middle among

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<sup>2</sup> Table 2 lists thirty groups rather than the fifty-eight in Table 1. Socioeconomic information for the omitted groups is lacking because they were not coded separately on the GSS (e.g., Gypsies and West Indian Blacks) or because there were too few observations (less than 25) for reliable estimates (e.g., Arabs).

<sup>3</sup> The education and income of ethnic groups are both positively and independently related to the social standing of the groups. An analysis of the relationship between social standing of these groups and the education and income of group members on the 1978-90 GSS shows standardized regression coefficients of .11 for income and .15 for education.

Standardized regression coefficients measure the association between dependent and independent variables while taking into consideration the impact of other independent variables. The measure expresses the relationship controlling for the other independent variables. Coefficients can range from - 1.0 to + 1.0. A relationship of 0.0 means that the variables are not associated with each other. A relationship of +/- 1.0 means that they are perfectly related (i.e., the independent variable totally explains the dependent variable).

In the above example, the education and income of ethnic groups are moderate and directly related to their social standing. The higher the education and income of group members, the higher the social standing of the group.

religious groups, generally below the mainline Protestant denominations (e.g., Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian) but above fundamentalist churches (e.g., Seventh-Day Adventist, Mormon, Evangelical).

Over time there has been a slight improvement in the social standing of Jews (Table 4). While the average rating of ethnic groups rose 8.8 percent from 1965 to 1989, the rating of Jews increased 17.8 percent. Similarly, their rank inched up from twenty-second to twentieth.

Clearly Jews are not pariahs. They rank near the middle among both ethnic and religious groups. Their social standing, however, is lower than would be expected on the basis of their objective socio-economic characteristics and lower than those of both Protestants (as a whole) and Catholics. This indicates that Jewish identification still places them at a relative social disadvantage.

### Ethnic Images

The differences in social standing that people assign to groups are closely related to the images or stereotypes that people have about them. Groups with high standing are seen as embodying positive attributes, while low-ranked groups are seen as having negative characteristics. In our examination of ethnic images, we use *ethnic* as a general term for the six groups covered in the 1990 GSS (Whites, Jews, Blacks, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Southern Whites), which are defined variously by race, religion, national origin, and region. We utilize *images* rather than *stereotypes* or *prejudices* because we want to avoid some of the baggage that is frequently associated with one or both of these terms. For example, stereotypes and prejudices are often assumed to contain a component of irrationality, including such fallacies as causal misattribution, improper generalization, excessive categorization, and rejecting or ignoring counterevidence (Allport 1954; Schuman and Harding 1964; Stephan and Rosenfield 1982; Jackman 1973). These traits may well be part of the images we measure here, but we have no direct tests of that. Furthermore, stereotypes are also sometimes seen as projections of psychological states (e.g., as either id- or superego-based) and we do not want to adopt this formulation (Bettelheim and Janowitz 1964; Pettigrew 1971). Thus for us ethnic images are beliefs that people have about ethnic groups (and their members) in general and about group characteristics and attributes in particular.

To measure ethnic images we developed a question that (1)



reduced the likelihood of giving offense, (2) facilitated the reporting of group characterizations, (3) permitted the expression of both positive and negative attributions, (4) allowed comparisons across various groups, and (5) included both in- and out-group evaluations of the reference groups. Both the general survey literature on social desirability and self-presentation effects and the specific literature on prejudice and stereotypes suggested that special care had to be taken in devising questions on ethnic images.

Thus we avoided declarative statements of negative attributions such as have often been used in the past (e.g., "The trouble with Jewish businessmen is that they are so shrewd and tricky that other people don't have a fair chance in competition" and "Generally speaking, Negroes are lazy and don't like to work hard": Marx 1967; Selznick and Steinberg 1969; Williams 1964). One problem with using such statements is that their offensive nature may lead to loss of rapport or even a breakoff of the interview. For the same reason, they are frequently not asked of in-group members, thus forgoing the ability to compare in- and out-group images. Declarative statements, moreover, discourage the reporting of group differences because of their violation of norms of politeness and their often absolutist phrasing.

We also wanted to allow the comparison of several groups on various image dimensions. Some formulations avoid the problems of offensive declarations by asking whether two groups (e.g., Blacks or Whites) are more likely to have some attribute (Apostle, Glock, Piazza, and Suelzle 1983; Matthews and Prothro 1966), but this approach does not readily facilitate multigroup comparisons. And we wanted to allow people to express positive as well as negative feelings toward a group. Because of their apparent repercussions (discrimination, minority persecution, etc.), negative stereotypes have been given more attention than more general group depictions covering negative, neutral, and positive evaluations. This focus is clearly unbalanced and ignores the fact that many groups are rated positively on at least some dimensions.

To achieve these goals, we developed an instrument that asked respondents to rate whether people in the designated group were mostly closer to one or the other of two polar characteristics (e.g., rich/poor). The opposing images were fixed at points 1 and 7 with intermediate points of 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. Point 4 was defined as meaning "you think that the group is not toward one end or another." This allowed people to place a group at any point along the continuum. It also allowed study of the comparative positioning of groups by

examining how people rated one group relative to other groups.

The six ethnic groups covered included some of the major cultural groups in American society. Clearly it would have been desirable to have covered certain other groups (e.g., American Indians and other religions) and to have separated subgroups within our broad categories (e.g., Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, etc. among Hispanic Americans), but time constraints necessitated selecting only a few, prominent groups.

Similarly, we would have liked to include more than six characteristics. There are many important general characteristics (e.g., honesty, sexuality, frugality) that we might have added. In addition, we might have included specific characteristics that are mostly (but not exclusively) associated with one group in the public's mind (e.g., Jews and business skills, Asians and Hispanics and family, or Blacks and athletics). Still, we were able to cover a number of important dimensions (wealth: rich/poor; work ethic: hardworking/lazy; violence: violence-prone/not violence-prone; intelligence: unintelligent/intelligent; dependency: self-supporting/prefers to live off welfare; and patriotism: patriotic/unpatriotic) that touch upon commonplace and vital images held about ethnic groups in contemporary society. In selecting this list, we chose wealth as our first dimension because we thought that it would be relatively easy for people to rate groups on this factual dimension and that by getting people used to the idea of rating groups it would improve response to the other, more personality-related characteristics. We chose work ethic, dependency, violence, and intelligence because these are prominent characteristics in traditional and contemporary stereotypes of minorities (Bettelheim and Janowitz 1964; Apostle, Glock, Piazza, and Suelzle 1983; Karlins, Coffman, and Walters 1969; Devine 1989; Pettigrew 1971). Patriotism is a slight reformulation of the traditional image about the "foreignness" of various ethnic groups and of the basic in-group/out-group dichotomy that is central in all ethnic evaluations.

In our analysis of ethnic images, we took the ratings that people gave Whites and subtracted from them the score they gave each of the other five groups. For example, if a person rated Whites as 3 on wealth and rated Jews as 2 and Blacks as 5, we calculated a Jewish wealth-difference score of +1 and a Black score of -2. Scores could range from +6 to -6 (although because Whites were usually rated near the middle, few maximum-difference scores actually occurred). For each characteristic, we coded the dimension so that a positive score meant that a group was rated closer to the positive image (rich, hard-

working, not violence-prone, intelligent, self-supporting, and patriotic) than Whites and a negative score meant that a group was rated closer to the negative image than Whites.

The belief that Americans are approaching a color- and creed-blind society is easily disproved by the ethnic-image data collected on the 1990 General Social Survey (Table 5).<sup>4</sup> First, these scores show that people are willing and able to rate group members on the basis of their ethnicity. Blacks seem to be the easiest minority group to evaluate, with item nonresponse only half as high as for other groups, while Asian Americans receive slightly higher nonresponse than other groups. We suspect this is partly a function of the size and prominence of these (and the other) groups.<sup>5</sup>

Second, with one exception, minority groups are evaluated more negatively than Whites in general. The one exception is Jews, who are rated more favorably than Whites on each characteristic except patriotism. No other group scores above Whites (i.e., has a positive mean) on any characteristic. Looking at how everyone rates groups

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<sup>4</sup> The General Social Survey is a full-probability, personal interview of adults living in households in the United States (Davis and Smith 1990). The ethnic-image questions were part of the 1990 topical module on intergroup relations. This module was designed by the following committee: Lawrence Bobo (chair), Mary Jackman, James Kluegel, John Shelton Reed, Howard Schuman, A. Wade Smith, and Tom W. Smith.

<sup>5</sup> Item nonresponse is moderately high, ranging from 5 to 12 percent for individual-difference scores and from 12 to 19 percent for group scales. If these nonrespondents represented people who were distinctive in their ethnic images, then the distributions reported here would be biased. To test for bias we correlated nonresponse with demographics and measures of political orientation, racial attitudes, and survey cooperation. Nonresponse to the image items was unrelated to education (prob. = .610) and marginally related to region (.019), unrelated to political orientation (political ideology = .145; party identification = .839); unrelated to racial attitudes (affirmative action = .436; busing = .560); but strongly related to uncooperativeness. Interviewers rated nonrespondents low on overall cooperation (prob. = .0000; gamma = .393) and nonrespondents were more likely to refuse to give their income (prob. = .0000; gamma = .490). The image questions employed a relatively difficult scaling procedure and asked people to make more cognitively demanding judgments, and we believe that nonrespondents were mostly people unwilling to make the extra effort that this task required. Since the nonresponse was unrelated to political orientation, racial attitudes, or education, we do not believe that item nonresponse introduced a notable degree of bias.

(including in-group members), we see that Jews are rated most positively overall (first on wealth, industry, nonviolence, intelligence, and self-support and third on patriotism -- second among minorities). Asian Americans and White Southerners are ranked next (second or third) on almost every dimension. Finally, Blacks and Hispanic Americans are ranked last or next to last on almost every characteristic. Looking at a scale that sums up scores on all items, except the more factually grounded wealth dimension<sup>6</sup> (Table 6), we see that Jews are the only positively rated group (+0.75). Southern Whites (-2.32) and Asian Americans (-2.65) are rated immediately below Whites, and Hispanic Americans (-5.70) and Blacks (-6.29) are rated considerably lower. In fact, over 80 percent of respondents rated Hispanic Americans and Blacks lower than Whites on one or more of the five characteristics.

If we look only at how out-groups rate the ethnic groups, the general pattern is for the exclusion of the in-group to lower the overall rating (except for some wealth ratings). For example, among everyone the mean rating of Blacks on being hard working/lazy was -1.24. The mean rating was -1.35 by non-Blacks and -0.40 by Blacks. This does little to change the overall rankings however.

People see the most intergroup variation (differences in the range of group means) on the socioeconomic variables of self-support/welfare, rich/poor, and hard-working/lazy. Thus at least in terms of this limited range of variables, people see ethnic groups differing most on class-related attributes. They see Jews as excelling on the status and achievement variables, and other minorities as falling well below the White standards. Next in terms of intergroup variation come violence and intelligence. On these variables Jews still exceed the White standard and other minorities fall below, but the spread is not as great. Finally, for patriotism the variation is the smallest. It is also the only dimension on which Whites surpass all other groups.

Overall, the position of Jews seems to be quite favorable. They

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<sup>6</sup> We have not used wealth in the summary scale because this dimension is probably based more on sociological knowledge than personal evaluation. In making a scale of positive and negative images we did not want to have the scale become a quiz of sociological knowledge (Apostle, Glock, Piazza, and Suelzle 1983). The special nature of this dimension is shown by the fact that for several ethnic groups in-group members rate themselves lower than they are rated by members of the out-group.

are the most positively ranked group, besting even Whites. However, two factors suggest that a sanguine interpretation is not fully warranted. First, Jews rank third on the patriotism dimension, behind Whites and Southern Whites. We will explore the implications of this in the section on the relationship between anti-Semitism and attitudes toward Israel. Second, it is possible that the positive ratings of Jews on wealth, industriousness, preferring to be self-supporting, and, possibly, intelligence may partly result from images of Jews as overachievers and disproportionately successful. We will examine that possibility in the section on Jewish power and influence.

### **Perceived Power and Influence**

Among the most common prejudices about Jews is the belief that they exercise too much influence and hold too much power in society. On a structural level Jewish power and influence are usually seen as resulting from their positions in the business community (especially retailing and banking) and in various professions (particularly law and medicine). Jews are commonly seen as playing a disproportionate role in these economic areas (Smith and Dempsey 1983). Similarly, on a personal level, the Jewish "edge" is traditionally alleged to result from shrewd-to-dishonest business practices and from Jews being overly ambitious, materialistic, and exploitative.

As we noted above, Jews were the only minority group to be viewed more positively than Whites (on all traits except patriotism). However, the view of Jews as richer, more intelligent, harder working, and more self-supporting has a potentially dangerous side to it. It feeds a traditional stereotype of Jews as powerful manipulators who, through a combination of wealth, cunning, and both shrewd and unethical business practices, control key sectors of the economy and as a result wield crucial political power. This darker connection emerges in the tendency for people who rated Jews as being richer, more intelligent, harder working, and more self-supporting to also think that Jews have too much influence.<sup>7</sup> For example, among those who rated Jews as

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<sup>7</sup> For these achievement characteristics believing Jews have more positive ratings than Whites is directly associated with thinking Jews have too much influence. For violence and patriotism the associations are weak and, in the case of patriotism, inverse. The gamma/probability levels of the images with having too much influence are wealth = .34/.0000; self-supporting = .23/.0000; hard-

poorer than Whites, 13 percent felt they had too much influence; among those rating Jews and Whites as equally wealthy, 17 percent said Jews had too much influence; and among those who thought Jews were richer than Whites, 32 percent thought Jews had too much influence. Similar, but somewhat weaker, patterns exist for intelligence, hard work, and self-support (Table 7). In brief, the positive images of Jews on achievement variables partly reflect a "powerful/successful" stereotype and may indicate envy as much as respect. However, since the evaluations themselves are on their face positive, one must not interpret them as reflecting only anti-Semitism.

We can examine the negative implications of such images of Jewish success by comparing the position of Jews to other socioeconomic and ethnic groups.

Compared to economic interests such as the wealthy, large business corporations, and banks and to government units such as federal departments, the courts, and state governments, relatively few people saw Jews as having excessive power and influence (Table 8). Jews rank well down on the list among criticized groups. However, more people felt that Jews had too much power than believed they had too little (+ six percentage points in 1979 and + seven percentage points in 1982).

A mixed picture emerges when Jews are compared to other ethnoreligious groups. Rankings seem to vary across time and across measures. Sometimes, as in the 1982 Roper measure and the 1976 SRC scale, Jews rank first in net influence, above both establishment groups (e.g., Whites, WASPs, Protestants, and Eastern establishment) and other minorities (e.g., Blacks, Hispanics). In other cases, such as the 1990 GSS, Jews are rated above other minorities, but below establishment groups. And in still other instances, such as the 1984-87 Roper series, Jews fall below several other minorities (Orientals, Blacks, the Catholic church).<sup>8</sup>

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working = .19/.0000; intelligent = .21/.0000; nonviolence = .07/.002; and patriotism = -.025/.002.

Gamma is an ordinal measure of association between variables. It can range from -1.0 to +1.0. A relationship of 0.0 indicates that there is no association between the variables. A relationship of +/- 1.0 indicates a perfect association.

In the above cases, all of the gamma are statistically significant, but they range in strength from the minuscule (e.g., -.025 for patriotism) to fairly strong (e.g., + 0.34 for wealth).

<sup>8</sup> In the context of this question many respondents probably thought that Orientals referred to Asian nations rather than Asian-Americans. This probably explains why the influence of Orientals was rated relatively high.

The variable relative placement of Jews seems to result from changes in the ratings of the various ethnic-religious groups they are being compared to rather than from changes in the ratings of Jews. Since 1976, by small but consistent margins, more people have judged that Jews have too much power and influence rather than too little (Table 9). Thus public concern about Jewish power remains a small but persistent feature of public opinion, while evaluations of several other groups, such as Whites, Blacks, and Orientals, show large swings.

In another area related to power and influence, Jews have shown considerable improvement over the last thirty years (Table 10). Willingness to vote for a Jew for president increased from 61 percent in 1958 to 89 percent in 1987 (with only 6 percent unwilling and 5 percent unsure in 1987). However, there has been no notable change in willingness to vote for a Jewish candidate for president since 1969. There has also been little change in the rank of Jewish presidential candidates among candidates from other ethnoreligious groups. Jews are less favored than Protestants and Catholics and more favored than Blacks, "fundamentalist" Christians, and atheists.

Moreover, even in the presidential area there is one sign that anti-Semitic feeling might still be fairly high. In an unfortunately problematic question in 1988 that pitted Mr. A, a Jewish businessman, against Mr. B, an attorney of unspecified religious affiliation, 44 percent favored Mr. B, 26 percent backed Mr. A, and 30 percent did not choose. While it is likely that Mr. A's Jewish background was the main contributor to his defeat, it is actually impossible to decide on what basis people chose between these candidates.<sup>9</sup>

Jews are rated more positively than Whites on achievement characteristics, and those who see Jews as successful tend to think they have too much power. While only about a fifth of the public believes Jews have too much influence, this share is greater than the 13 percent who believe Jews have too little influence. Willingness to vote for a Jew for president has increased over time and acceptance is now high. However, some evidence remains that a Jewish candidate's religion might notably reduce his/her vote.

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<sup>9</sup> If a factorial vignette design had been utilized, the characteristics of the candidates could have been randomized, and it would have been possible to ascertain the impact of a candidate's religion on public preferences.

## Favorability Ratings of Jews

Most people have generally favorable views of Jews. Both the Gallup 10-point scalometer and the SRC/GSS 101-degree feeling thermometer indicate that the vast majority of Americans view Jews positively. For example, in a 1987 Gallup poll 77 percent gave Jews a positive scalometer rating, 6 percent a negative rating, and 17 percent were Don't Know. On the 1989 GSS, the mean rating for Jews was 61.4 degrees (Table 11).

Jews, however, are rated lower than Protestants and Catholics. For example, in 1987 34 percent were highly favorable (+5 or +4) toward Protestants, 30 percent toward Catholics, and 25 percent toward Jews. Likewise, on the 1989 GSS the warmth toward Protestants was 69.6 degrees, for Catholics 66.3 degrees, and for Jews 61.4 degrees. The differences in ratings appear to be entirely a function of the relative size of the three religious groups. As Table 12 shows, among nongroup members, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews are rated identically. In effect, Protestants are rated most warmly, Catholics in between, and Jews last simply because there are more Protestants and fewer Catholics and Jews.

There has been little change in either the relative or absolute rating of Jews over the last twenty years. On both the scalometer and feeling thermometer Jews have consistently ranked below Protestants and Catholics, above Hispanics, and either a little above or a little below Blacks. On the feeling thermometer Jewish ratings show no trend, starting at 62.5 degrees in 1964 and ending at 62.9 degrees in 1988. On the scalometer, there at first appears to be stability from 1975 to 1981 and then a sharp drop in favorability in 1987. However, Protestant and Catholic ratings dip as much or more than Jewish ratings in 1987. It seems likely that the 1987 declines are artificial, probably due to a context effect.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> In 1987 the scalometer list started with Pope John Paul II. This probably influenced rating of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. First, it probably made people think of average or typical members of these religions rather than religious groups as abstractions. Second, when contrasted to the pope these members were rated lower than normal. On such context effects, see Smith 1990.

An alternative explanation is that the televangelist scandals lowered favorability ratings of all religious groups. An analysis of the impact of these scandals, however, indicates that this is unlikely (Smith 1991b).



## Jewish/Non-Jewish Social Interaction

Amiable intergroup relations are usually characterized by frequent, cordial socializing between group members, and noncompetitive, status-balanced interactions are often seen as further improving such relations (Simpson and Yinger 1985; Stephan and Rosenfield 1982; Williams 1964; Glock, Wuthnow, Piliavin, and Spencer 1975). Among the interactions most likely to both characterize and promote good intergroup relations are friendships, marriage, and teamworking.

Information is available on both actual and hypothetical social interaction between Jews and non-Jews. For actual behavior there are measures of interfaith friendship and marriage. Measures of preferred or hypothetical interactions exist for neighborhood integration and intermarriage.

In 1985 and 1988 the GSS asked people about the religion of people they interacted with. In 1985 respondents were asked to name up to five "people with whom you discussed matters important to you" during the last six months. In 1988 respondents were asked to name up to three "good friends (other than your spouse)." As Table 13 shows, Jews tended to have Jews as confidants and friends, while most non-Jews did not have Jewish confidants or friends. Of course, since Jews make up only a small share of the population, one would not expect many non-Jews to have Jewish confidants and friends. In 1984-89 Jews made up 1.9 percent of adults. If confidants and friends were distributed without regard to religion, we would expect 1.9 percent of the confidants and friends of non-Jews to have been Jewish. Since only 1.1 percent of the confidants and 0.9 percent of the close friends of non-Jews were Jewish, Jews were underrepresented among the confidants and friends of non-Jews. They made up 58 percent of the expected number of confidants and 47 percent of the expected friends. These levels reveal a substantial amount of Jewish/non-Jewish interaction, but also indicate that there are barriers that restrict full social interaction.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> These barriers may mostly be structural rather than intentional. People tend to interact with people (1) they live near and (2) are related to. Since Jews are not randomly distributed around the country, non-Jews in many areas have little practical possibility of having a Jewish friend or confidant. Also, since intermarriage remains limited (as we will see), this limits interreligious social interactions with relatives.

Similarly, most Jews marry other Jews, while few non-Jews marry Jews. In 1984-90 73 percent of the currently married who were raised as Jews had spouses who were also raised as Jews. Among those not raised as Jews, only 0.7 percent had spouses raised as Jews. Of course, as in the case of confidants and friends, one would expect relatively few Jews to be married to non-Jews because of the small number of Jews. Table 14 shows the percentage of out-group marriages as compared to what would be expected given an unrestricted, random intermarriage pattern: 100 percent would mean that a group intermarries with out-groups in a random manner or that there are no restrictions to intermarriage; 50 percent means a group is only half as likely to be married to an out-group member as would be expected on the basis of random marriage. We see that Jewish/non-Jewish marriages occur much less frequently than would be expected and that Jewish/non-Jewish intermarriage is less likely to occur than intermarriage between Protestants and non-Protestants, between Catholics and non-Catholics, and between various Protestant denominations. Similarly, if we compare Jews to ethnic groups we see that Jews have less intermarriage than other groups. However, barriers to interfaith marriage have declined over recent generations. Protestants, Catholics, and Jews are all more likely to intermarry than in earlier generations (Smith 1991a). In brief, compared to other religions and ethnicities, intermarriage is less common among Jews than among a number of other groups. Barriers to intermarriage still exist and are higher between Jews and non-Jews than between many other groups.

Hypothetical questions about living in a neighborhood where half of one's neighbors are members of a specified group or about having a close relative marry a person from a specified background indicate that Americans are much more opposed to integration with Blacks, Hispanics, and Asian Americans than they are to intergration with

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Moreover, when intentional, the barriers arise among both Jews and non-Jews. First, a preference for intrafaith marriage naturally reduces the opportunity for intermarriage, even when there is no particular opposition to or dislike of out-groups. Second, the barrier may result from mutual intentions, from the intentions of only one group, or from some combination. Sometimes barriers are raised by both groups (e.g., many Israeli Jews and Israeli Muslims probably oppose intermarriage), while in other cases the barriers are mostly one-sided (e.g., rich parents are more likely to oppose a child marrying a poor person than poor parents are likely to oppose a child's match to a wealthy person).

Jews (Tables 15 and 16). When we look at out-group members only, we see that 46.8 percent oppose living with Blacks and 65.3 percent object to intermarriage; for Hispanics, 43.2 percent and 41.2 percent; for Asian Americans, 34.6 percent and 41.7 percent; and for Jews, 14.1 percent and 16.8 percent. Objection to Jewish neighbors is even lower than Southerners' objection to Northern Whites (18.5 percent) and only a bit higher than Northerners' objection to Southern White neighbors (11.3 percent). Opposition to North/South intermarriage, however, is lower (11.3 percent of Northerners object to a Southern White, and 12.5 percent of Southerners object to a Northern White). (For attitudes on residential integration and intermarriage among out-groups, see Table 17.)

Acceptance of Jewish/non-Jewish intermarriage has increased over time. In 1968, 59 percent approved of such marriages; in 1983, 77 percent (Table 18).

While non-Jews do not socially interact with Jews as much as would be expected under a purely random contact model, there are still notable levels of socializing and intermarriage. Nor is there strong opposition to Jewish neighbors or in-laws. A majority of Americans neither favor nor oppose such integration.

### **Israel and Anti-Semitism**

Anti-Israel and anti-Semitic attitudes are linked. Anti-Semitic attitudes are more common among those with negative attitudes toward Israel, and anti-Israel attitudes are stronger among those with anti-Semitic beliefs than among others (Martire and Clark 1982; Harris 1980; Schneider 1978). But the linkage is not especially strong. As Schneider (1978) notes, "Attitudes towards Israel are probably related to different causes than anti-Semitic attitudes." Similarly, Raab (1986) observes, "Antisemitism is not today a serious source of anti-Israel feelings. . . . Anti-Israel feeling is not today a serious source of antisemitism."

Anti-Semitism is shaped by numerous factors, and feelings toward Israel, the Palestinians, the Arabs, and Arab oil are among the many relevant factors. We lack detailed information to examine the relationship in depth, but can briefly consider the interrelationship and how it has changed in recent years.

Table 19 shows that positive feelings toward Israel, though remaining high, have declined over the last two decades from a high in the mid-1970s to a low in 1989 and 1990. Egyptian ratings improved

to 1982 and then declined. The Egyptian levels remain more positive than they were in the pre-Camp David period, however. Looking at the relative position of Israel vs. Egypt shows that the Israel ratings were well above the Egyptian ratings before Camp David, but fell below them in 1982. Since then the ratings have swung back and forth between narrow Egyptian and Israeli leads. Since Egypt's relative gain probably comes from its rapprochement with Israel and its moderate stance within the Arab community, the changes in the relative position of Egypt and Israel do not indicate an absolute shift toward the Arab and Palestinian position, but do indicate that Israel is no longer seen more favorably than this one key Arab nation.

Both dislike of Israel and liking Egypt more than Israel are associated with less favorable attitudes toward Jews. First, among people who liked Israel 29 percent rated Jews as less patriotic than Whites, while among those disliking Israel 45 percent considered Jews less patriotic (Table 20). Similarly, among those liking Israel more than Egypt 25 percent rated Jews as less patriotic; among those liking Israel and Egypt equally 37 percent said Jews were less patriotic; and among those liking Egypt more than Israel 43 percent found Jews less patriotic than Whites (Table 20). Second, dislike of Israel is associated with having "warmer" feelings toward Protestants and Catholics than toward Jews. Among those who liked Israel 34.5 percent had colder feelings toward Jews than toward Gentiles, while among those who disliked Israel 53 percent were colder toward Jews than toward Gentiles. Similarly, 48.5 percent of those who liked Egypt more than Israel were colder toward Jews than Gentiles, as were 44 percent of those who liked Egypt and Israel equally, and 38 percent of those who liked Israel more than Egypt.

We do not know whether relative dislike of Israel leads to rating the patriotism of Jews lower or feeling colder toward Jews or whether causality runs in the opposite direction. The correlation does demonstrate that a link exists between attitudes toward Jewish patriotism and feelings about Jews and non-Jews and attitudes toward Israel.

### Trends

Studies from the 1940s until 1981 show a general decline in anti-Semitic attitudes. Our review has focused on attitudes that have been measured since that time. Overall, the available trends indicate relatively little change but some increased acceptance of Jews and a likely decline in anti-Semitic attitudes. To summarize the main

changes:

1. The social standing of Jews slightly increased both in relative and absolute terms between 1965 and 1989.
2. Acceptance of Jews (on both the feeling thermometer and scalometer) has shown little change from the 1960s to the present.
3. Concern about Jewish power and influence has not varied since the mid-1970s, while opposition to a Jewish president declined from 1958 to 1969 and has since been stable.
4. Opposition to Jewish/non-Jewish marriage decreased from 1968 to 1983.
5. On at least one item about Israel, support was stable from 1974 to 1977, fell from 1977 to 1988, then was again stable in 1988-90.

Of course, for several of the items (e.g., the Jewish president and the Roper influence series) the percent opposed to or concerned about Jews had already been so low as to make further improvement difficult. On the other hand, the deterioration in public ratings of Israel, and its connection to feelings about Jews, identifies a potential source of increased anti-Semitism.

### **Factors Associated with Anti-Semitism**

Various causes of anti-Semitism have been suggested by past research. On the basis of the extant literature, a number of hypotheses can be advanced to explain why certain factors -- socioeconomic, psychological, religious, racial, political, age/cohort, region/locality -- seem to be associated with anti-Semitic attitudes among certain groups of people. These hypotheses indicate that anti-Semitism will be greater among the following:

#### *1. Socioeconomic*

a. Those with low incomes, because of envy of Jewish success (Quinley and Glock 1979; Gilboa 1987; Selznick and Steinberg 1969)

b. Those who have experienced a worsening financial situation and/or downward mobility, because they may blame Jews for their economic failings (King and Clayson 1984; Selznick and Steinberg 1969; Martire and Clark 1982)

c. Those with less education, because stereotypical thinking, parochialism, and intergroup hostility are more common among the

less educated (Tobin 1988; Quinley and Glock 1979; Martire and Clark 1982; Wuthnow 1982; Schneider 1978; Weil 1985; Gilboa 1987)

## *2. Psychological*

d. Those with low personal satisfaction, who will use Jews as scapegoats for their personal failings (Selznick and Steinberg 1969; Quinley and Glock 1979)

e. Those alienated from society, who will seek meaning and integration via opposition to Jews (Wuthnow 1982)

f. Those with "authoritarian personalities," whose rigid and simplistic thinking promotes intolerance (Quinley and Glock 1979; Wuthnow 1982)

## *3. Religious*

g. Traditional and Fundamentalist Christians, and

h. Active and committed Christians, who may blame Jews both for "killing Christ" and for failing to accept Christ as their savior (Silberstein and Fogel 1986; Lotz 1977; Middleton 1973a and 1973b; Glock and Stark 1973; Wuthnow 1982; Selznick and Steinberg 1969; Schneider 1978; Harris 1980; Gilboa 1987; Newport 1986; Quinley and Glock 1979; Martire and Clark 1982; Glock and Stark 1966; King and Clayson 1984). Conversely, the least anti-Semitic feeling would be among Jews.

## *4. Racial*

i. Blacks, because of various community-based group conflicts and because merely the success of the Jewish minority casts aspersions on Blacks for their lack of progress (Tobin 1988; Schneider 1978; Gilboa 1987; Quinley and Glock 1979; Martire and Clark 1982; Wuthnow 1982; Waxman 1981)

j. Northeastern WASPs, because it was this group that Jews displaced in the business and professional worlds (Benewick, 1987)

## *5. Political*

k. Conservatives and right-wingers, who are seen as opposing the liberal/Democratic leanings of Jews, against the "alien" culture that Jews represent, and/or simply having outright fascist tendencies (Schneider 1978; Gilboa 1987; Martire and Clark 1982)

## *6. Age/Cohort*

l. Older generations, who were raised in periods when racism in general and anti-Semitism in particular were stronger

m. Post-World War II generations, who were never exposed to the horrors of Nazism and the Holocaust (Selznick and Steinberg 1969; Quinley and Glock 1979; Martire and Clark 1982; Wuthnow 1982; Tobin 1988)

## 7. *Region/locality*

n. Those in areas with few Jews (e.g., the rural South and West), because Jews are seen as aliens and outsiders

o. Those in areas with many Jews (e.g., the urban Northeast), because of competition from Jews for jobs, political power, etc. (Selznick and Steinberg 1969; Gilboa 1987; Quinley and Glock 1979; Martire and Clark 1982; Middleton 1976)

Some of these hypotheses are overlapping and reinforcing. For example, the less-educated person also tends to be poorer. This means that these traits will tend to move individuals in the same direction and also that it is harder to separate out which factor (e.g., low education or low income) actually leads to anti-Semitic attitudes. Other hypotheses are distinct but compatible. For example, the two racial hypotheses suggest that Blacks are more anti-Semitic than Whites and that, among Whites, Northeastern WASPs are more anti-Semitic than other Whites. (The hypotheses do not indicate whether WASPs or Blacks would be more anti-Semitic.) Finally, some hypotheses are contradictory. For example, the age/cohort and region/locality hypotheses point in opposite directions.

To test these hypotheses we used the following variables from the GSS:

### 1. *Socioeconomic*

a. Total household income last year (INCOME86)<sup>12</sup>

b. Change in financial situation in recent past (FINALTER) and intergenerational occupational mobility (father's occupational prestige [PAPRES16], respondent's occupational prestige [PRESTIGE])

c. Years of schooling (EDUC)

### 2. *Psychological*

d. Satisfaction with finances (SATFIN), satisfaction with job (SATJOB), and personal happiness (HAPPY)

e. Social alienation scale (three Srole Anomia items: ANOMIA5, ANOMIA6, ANOMIA7)

f. Authoritarianism scale (OWNTHING, TALKBACK, TWO-CLASS, OPENMIND)

### 3. *Religious*

g. Belongs to fundamentalist, moderate, or liberal denomination (FUND) and Jewish vs. not Jewish (RELIG)

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<sup>12</sup> The capitalized words in parentheses are the GSS mnemonics for these variables as used in Davis and Smith (1990).

h. Frequency of church attendance (ATTEND)

4. *Racial*

i. Black/not Black (RACE)

j. British ancestry (ETHNIC) and living in Northeast (REGION)

5. *Political*

k. Political party identification (PARTYID) and self-placement on liberal/conservative scale (POLVIEWS)

6. *Age/Cohort*

l. and m. Year of birth (AGE)

7. *Region/Locality*

n. and o. Percent Jewish in respondent's place of residence (RELIG, REGION, and community type, SRCBELT)

As our dependent, anti-Semitism measures we used the variables that we have already discussed:

1. Influence of Jews: Too much, about the right amount, too little (INFLUJEW)

2. Image of Powerful Jews: Summed difference scores of the ratings of Whites and Jews on the images of rich/poor, hard working/lazy, self-supporting/preferring welfare, and intelligent/unintelligent ([WLTHWHTS - WLTHJEWS] + [WORKWHTS - WORKJEWS] + [FAREWHTS - FAREJEWS] + [INTLWHTS - INTLJEWS])<sup>13</sup>

3. Patriotism of Jews: Difference score of the ratings of Whites and Jews on images of patriotic/unpatriotic (PATRWHTS - PATRJEWS)

4. Social Distance: Willingness to live with Jews (LIVEJEWS) and have a close relative marry Jew (MARJEW)

5. Religious Feeling Thermometer: Average warmth toward Protestants (PROTTEMP) and Catholics (CATHTEMP) divided by 2 minus warmth toward Jews (JEWTEMP)

6. Attitude toward Israel: Scalometer rating of Israel (ISRAEL) minus scalometer rating of Egypt (EGYPT)

Before conducting the general, multivariate analysis, we examined each of the hypothesized sources of anti-Semitism separately. Job satisfaction and intergenerational mobility were deleted from further analysis because they were unrelated to our anti-Semitism items, because their inclusion would have eliminated from analysis people without jobs and those not raised by their fathers, and because there

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<sup>13</sup> All variables coded so a positive difference score means that Jews are rated more toward the positive image than Whites and a negative score that Jews are rated below Whites.



were other variables to test relevant hypotheses. We also eliminated the Northeast WASP hypothesis because WASPs were actually less concerned about Jewish influence than non-WASPs and WASPs in the Northeast were less concerned than WASPs in other regions.

Table 21 shows how each of the hypothesized sources of anti-Semitism holds up. First, we will examine how well our hypotheses and independent variables performed. Then we will consider what factors explain our six dependent variables.

Table 21 indicates that many of the hypothesized relationships either did not materialize or had only weak-to-moderate associations in the predicted directions.

### *1. Socioeconomic*

a. Income bears little association to our measures. Those with higher income are more likely to think Jews have too much influence, but are also more likely to rate Jews higher than non-Jews.

b. Worsening personal financial conditions do not affect attitudes toward Jews.

c. Education does influence attitudes toward Jews. The better educated are less likely to want to be separated from Jews, to consider Jews as unpatriotic, and to rate Jews below other religions. But the better educated are more likely to see Jews as successful and as having too much influence.

### *2. Psychological*

d., e., and f. Lack of personal psychological well-being, social alienation, and authoritarianism are not related to our anti-Semitic measures.

### *3. Religious*

g. and h. Non-Jews are more likely to think that Jews have too much influence, are less likely to favor socializing with Jews, rate Israel above Egypt, and feel warmer toward Jews than non-Jews. Among non-Jews, fundamentalism does not promote anti-Semitic attitudes. Fundamentalists are even slightly more likely to rate Israel above Egypt. Frequent church attenders are also more likely to like Israel more than Egypt. But those who attend church frequently are less likely to favor intermarriage and to rate Jews as warmly as non-Jews.

### *4. Race*

i. Blacks are more likely than Whites to think that Jews are successful, but race is not related to evaluations of influence. Blacks are less likely to rate Israel higher than Egypt.

### *5. Political*

k. Party identification has little relationship with attitudes about

Jews. Conservatives are more likely to see Jews as successful, but liberals are more likely to favor Egypt over Israel. There is thus little support for the idea that conservatives or right-wingers are especially anti-Semitic. There appears to be little ideological/partisan basis for contemporary anti-Semitism and to some extent the small currents of anti-Semitism to the left and right may offset one another (Schneider 1978).

#### 6. *Age/Cohort*

l. and m. Older adults are more likely to consider Jews as successful and as having too much influence. However, they are also more likely to feel Jews are patriotic and to like Israel more than Egypt. For social distance there is no relationship. For an extended discussion see below.

#### 7. *Region/Locality*

n. and o. The percent of Jews in the local area is only related to the perceived influence of Jews. People living in Jewish areas tend to think that Jews have too much influence. For details see the discussion below.

### *Age/Cohorts and Anti-Semitism*

As the contradictory hypotheses about age suggested, the relationship between age and anti-Semitism is rather complex. Table 22 shows that sometimes anti-Semitic feeling does vary by age. It sometimes increases with age, sometimes decreases with age, and sometimes has a curvilinear relationship with age. While complex, these results are informative. Younger adults are the least likely to believe that Jews have too much influence and that they are more successful than Whites. However, younger adults are also the most likely to favor Egypt over Israel and to question Jewish patriotism. Adults over 50 are most concerned about Jewish influence and most likely to think Jews are more successful than Whites. However, they are less likely to question Jewish patriotism and to rate Egypt above Israel. For warmth toward Jews vs. non-Jews, adults 40-49 are the least likely to rate non-Jews higher than Jews, with both younger and older adults showing relatively less warmth toward Jews. Similarly, adults in their 30s or 40s are least likely to object to Jewish neighbors or in-laws.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> But since the variation is not statistically significant, this pattern should not be given great importance.

Altogether these age patterns supply little support for a cohort effect related to the Holocaust. Other measures, however, might show such an effect.<sup>15</sup> These results do suggest that other generational changes in attitudes may have occurred. It appears that traditional, stereotypical concerns about Jewish influence and success have declined across recent cohorts, but that negative attitudes toward Israel and about Jewish support for Israel have increased among the youngest generation of adults (those turning 18 in the last ten or fifteen years).

### *Jewish Influence and Presence*

As the proportion of Jews in the local area increases, the proportion of people thinking Jews have too much influence "in American life and politics" also rises. Dividing local areas into quintals, we see that when Jews make up 0.1 percent or less of the population, 16 percent think Jews have too much influence. At 0.2-0.4 percent it's 18 percent, at 0.5-1.7 percent it's 22 percent, at 1.8-3.6 percent it's 28 percent and at 3.7+ percent it's 37 percent. This suggests that many judgments about Jewish influence are made on the basis of personal or local observations rather than from the national perspective used in the question.

In part the relationship reflects the simple fact that, on average, Jewish influence is greater where there are more Jews. Presumably the percentage of elite positions (business, professional, and civic leader-

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<sup>15</sup> It is not clear that people who first learned about the Holocaust in the immediate aftermath of World War II when the concentration camps were freed or from the Nuremberg trials were more exposed to or more affected by these events than later generations who learned about them via various subsequent prosecutions of Nazi war criminals (e.g., the trials of Eichmann in 1961 and Barbie in 1987) or through the many powerful fictional and nonfictional accounts of the Holocaust. Neither the World War II generation nor subsequent generations of the general American public personally experienced the event (as they did the Great Depression or the turmoil of the 1960s) and had to learn about it from secondary accounts. While the events may be cognitively closer to those who lived through the period, the long series of prosecutions of Nazi war criminals, the creation of Holocaust museums and memorials, and the frequent portrayal of the Jewish persecutions in popular books and movies (both fictional and nonfictional) may have succeeded in making the Holocaust unforgettable. As a result, the cognitive basis for a cohort effect may not exist.

ship roles) held by Jews rises along with the Jewish share of the population. In addition, a larger Jewish population also creates a more visible community marked by various Jewish institutions such as synagogues, schools, hospitals, community organizations, etc.

However, people from local areas with more Jews did not say merely that Jewish influence was greater, but that Jews had too much influence. This suggests that either competition with Jews and/or the visibility of Jews in elite positions does lead to concern about Jewish influence and perhaps to resentment. At the same time it is important to remember that a greater number of Jews in the local area is not related to other attitudes such as neighborhood or marital integration or the relative ratings of Protestants, Catholics, and Jews.

### *Dependent Measures of Attitudes Toward Jews*

Turning from examining the explanations for anti-Semitism, we next focus on how the hypothesized factors affected each of our dependent measures of attitudes toward Jews. Overall, the explanatory power is fairly modest, and the relevant factors differ from issue to issue.

First, Jews are seen as more powerful by the better educated, Blacks, conservatives, and older adults. Jewish influence is more likely to be deemed excessive by those with higher incomes, by the better educated, by those living in areas with more Jews, by non-Jews, and by older adults. There is thus a rather poor match between factors that are associated with seeing Jews as successful and those that are related to perceived Jewish influence. Only older adults and the better educated are more likely both to see Jews as successful and to be more concerned about Jewish influence. This difference results from the fact that many people who have positive images of Jews on the achievement variables are not especially concerned about Jewish influence.

Second, only not being Jewish consistently predicts wanting to maintain a social distance from Jews. In addition, the better educated are somewhat less likely to object to Jewish neighbors, and those who infrequently attend church are less likely to oppose a relative marrying a Jew. This suggests that maintaining a distance from Jews is mostly associated with individualistic characteristics and is not strongly rooted in socio-demographic factors

Third, Jews are rated more warmly than Protestants and Catholics by Jews, the better educated, and those who infrequently attend church and marginally more warmly by younger adults and those with higher

incomes. There is thus a clear secular vs. religious difference in feeling warm toward Jews, but it is not closely related to fundamentalism.

Finally, Jewish patriotism is more likely to be questioned by the less educated and by younger adults. Israel tends to be rated lower than Egypt by non-Jews, liberals, Blacks, younger adults, non-Fundamentalists, and those who attend church infrequently. Thus being a young adult is the only factor related both to questioning Jewish patriotism and to rating Israel relatively low.

### **Conclusion**

While no recent comprehensive study of attitudes toward Jews exists to allow a full appraisal of contemporary anti-Semitism, the available evidence indicates no reversal in its long-term decline. On most indicators anti-Jewish attitudes are at historic lows. In addition, typically only minorities have negative attitudes toward Jews (Tables 5, 7, 10-13, 17-19) and conflict between Jews and non-Jews is seen as less serious than clashes between many other ethnic groups (Table 23).

However, it is uncertain to what extent further improvement is occurring. In addition, there are several signs of a latent anti-Semitism that could be activated under certain circumstances.

First, as opposed to such minorities as Blacks and Hispanics, Jews are seen as more successful than Whites. While these evaluations are positive on their face, they identify Jews as a possible target of envy and resentment. This possibility shows up in the fact that people who consider Jews more successful than Whites are also more likely to believe that Jews have too much influence. Also, people who live in areas with relatively large numbers of Jews are more likely to think Jews have too much influence. But the lack of a relationship between low income, worsening personal finances, and social alienation and concern about Jewish influence indicates that envy of Jews is not presently an active force among the socially or economically distressed. Possibly a combination of economic hard times and a growing disparity between the economic status of Jews and non-Jews could activate this factor.

Second, attitudes toward Israel and toward Jews are at least partly linked in the public's mind. A growth in opposition to Jewish treatment of the Palestinians and/or a pro-Arab tilt as a result of Arab control of oil resources could worsen attitudes toward American Jews, especially if they were seen as favoring Israeli over American interests (e.g., as in the Pollard case). The public's perception that Jews may

support Israel at the expense of the United States probably also explains why Jews are considered less patriotic than Whites. Moreover, the relatively lower ratings of Israel among younger adults and their greater questioning of Jewish patriotism suggests that this connection may be of growing concern.

Third, Blacks are less pro-Israel than other Americans and more likely to believe that Jews are more successful than Whites. These tendencies, however, are not especially strong. In addition, Blacks are not more likely to say Jews have too much influence or to reject residential or marital integration.<sup>16</sup> While Black anti-Semitism is not a major force at present, it is the only potential source of an invigorated anti-Semitism that is being pushed by leaders with nontrivial followings.

Today anti-Semitism in America is neither virulent nor growing. It is not a powerful social or political force. Nor are the latent sources of anti-Semitism closely connected and likely to sustain one another. Anti-Semitic tendencies in one area are usually unconnected to those in other areas. For example, concern about Jewish influence and Jewish patriotism have little relationship to one another, and those who feel that Jews are less patriotic than Whites are actually slightly less likely to think Jews have too much influence. Similarly, demographics push people in different directions from issue to issue. For example, age has different relations to anti-Semitism depending on the measure.

But neither is anti-Semitism a spent force. Jews are recognized as an ethnic and religious out-group and are judged and treated in a distinctive manner accordingly. While at present the negative repercussions of Jewish identity are limited, hostility to Jews because of their material success, ties to Israel, or some other reason could manifest itself in the future.

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<sup>16</sup> The literature indicates that economic stereotypes about Jews are more common among Blacks than among Whites. We lack information on whether this pattern still prevails (Martire and Clark 1982; Marx 1967; Selznick and Steinberg 1969).

## **Abbreviations Used in Tables**

**AP/MG = Associated Press/Media General**

**CCD = Center for Communications Dynamics**

**GSS = General Social Survey, NORC**

**LAT = Los Angeles Times**

**NORC = National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago**

**PSRA = Princeton Survey Research Associates**

**SRC = Survey Research Center, University of Michigan**

**Table 1**

**Social Standing of Ethnic Groups**

NORC-GSS: America is a land made up of many different kinds of people. Some of these groups of people have higher social standing than others do. Here is a card with the name of one such group on it. (HAND RESPONDENT THE FIRST "ETHNICITY" CARD.) (a) Please put the card in the box at the top of the ladder if you think that group has the highest possible social standing. (b) Put it in the box at the bottom of the ladder if you think that group has the lowest possible social standing. (c) If it belongs somewhere in between, just put it in the box that comes closest to representing the social standing of that particular group of people. (AS BEFORE, OBSERVE THE RESPONDENT'S PLACEMENT OF THE CARD AND REPEAT THE ABOVE INSTRUCTIONS FOR HIM IF HE APPEARS UNCERTAIN AS TO HOW TO PERFORM THE TASK.) (d) Here are a few more groups. (HAND RESPONDENT "ETHNICITY" CARDS.) As you did before, just put them in the boxes on the ladder which match the social standing you think those groups have. Place them the way you think people actually treat these groups, not the way you think people *ought* to treat them. If you want to, you can change your mind and move a card to a different box.

1989

GROUP	MEAN	% MISSING
Native White Americans	7.03	9.7
People of my own ethnic background	6.57	10.1
British	6.46	7.6
Protestant	6.39	13.4
Catholics	6.33	7.1
French	6.07	12.6
Irish	6.05	11.3
Swiss	6.03	20.1
Swedes	5.99	18.5
Austrians	5.94	24.4
Dutch	5.90	23.1
Norwegians	5.87	25.2
Scotch	5.85	18.9
Germans	5.78	11.8
Southerners	5.77	11.7
Italians	5.69	10.1



Danes	5.63	29.8
French Canadians	5.62	15.5
Japanese	5.56	7.6
Jews	5.55	9.7
People of foreign ancestry	5.38	23.1
Finns	5.34	23.1
First-generation immigrants	5.34	21.0
Mormons	5.19	16.8
Greeks	5.09	18.1
White South Africans	4.97	19.3
Lithuanians	4.96	32.8
Polynesians	4.96	23.9
Spanish Americans	4.79	14.3
Chinese	4.76	9.2
Hungarians	4.70	23.5
Czechs	4.64	25.2
Poles	4.63	21.0
Russians	4.58	13.0
Israelis	4.54	15.9
Argentineans	4.49	25.6
Latin Americans	4.42	18.1
Asian Indians	4.29	23.1
Filipinos	4.28	25.2
American Indians	4.27	6.7
Armenians	4.19	28.6
Negroes	4.17	7.5
Koreans	4.16	13.9
Slavs	4.15	29.8
Wisians <sup>1</sup>	4.12	60.9
African Blacks	3.58	12.2
Arabs	3.57	13.4
West Indian Blacks	3.56	18.5
Mexicans	3.52	9.2
Guatemalans	3.48	32.4
Vietnamese	3.47	11.3
Nicaraguans	3.46	23.1
Haitians	3.45	22.7
Puerto Ricans	3.32	14.3
Cubans	3.18	10.5
Refugees	3.17	13.0
Iranians	2.99	16.8
Gypsies	2.65	16.4

(160-222)

<sup>1</sup>A fictitious ethnicity.

**Table 2****Socioeconomic Standing of Ethnic Groups  
(1978-1990 GSS)**

<b>GROUP<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>HOUSEHOLD INCOME (1986 dollars)</b>	<b>YEARS OF SCHOOLING</b>
British	34,100	13.4
Protestant	28,000	12.1
Catholics	30,900	12.4
French	32,500	13.1
Irish	31,050	12.6
Swiss	33,700	13.4
Swedes	31,700	13.5
Austrians	29,900	11.5
Dutch	29,600	12.0
Norwegians	30,300	12.8
Scotch	33,500	13.3
Germans	31,000	12.6
Italians	31,800	12.3
Danes	32,100	13.5
French Canadians	32,800	11.9
Japanese	37,100	13.9
Jews	48,700	14.5
Finns	25,300	11.5
Mormons	30,300	13.2
Greeks	34,100	11.9
Lithuanians	31,300	12.4
Spanish Americans	26,200	12.0
Chinese	39,400	14.7
Hungarians	34,800	12.8
Czechs	29,400	12.2
Poles	30,400	12.3
Russians	29,990	12.8
Asian Indians	34,300	15.6
Filipinos	31,100	12.5
American Indians	23,800	11.3
Negroes/African Blacks	19,600	10.3
Mexicans	19,600	10.4
Puerto Ricans	19,100	10.7

<sup>1</sup>Ranked according to social standing, see Table 1.

**Table 3****Social Standing of Religions****A.**

NORC: There are many religious groups in America. Some of them have higher social standing than others do. Here are some cards with the names of religious groups on them. (HAND "RELIGION" CARDS TO RESPONDENT.) (a) Please put the card in the box at the top of the ladder if you think that religious group has the highest possible social standing. (b) Put it in the box at the bottom of the ladder if you think it has the lowest possible social standing. (c) If you think it belongs somewhere in between, just put it in the box that matches the social standing of that particular religious group. (AS BEFORE, OBSERVE THE RESPONDENT'S PLACEMENT OF THE CARDS AND OFFER TO REREAD THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN ABOVE IF HE APPEARS UNCERTAIN AS TO HOW TO PERFORM THE TASK.) (d) If you want you can change your mind about where a group goes and move its card to the box that matches its social standing.

5/1964

MEAN

People of my religious affiliation	6.94
Catholics	6.87
Protestants	6.84
Methodists	6.63
Presbyterians	6.62
Baptists	6.36
Episcopalians	6.17
Lutherans	6.07
Congregationalists	5.38
Salvation Army	5.13
Jews	4.96
Greek Orthodox	4.77
Christian Scientists	4.63
Unitarians	4.57
Reformed Church	4.41
Mormons	4.27
Disciples of Christ	4.13
Pentecostal	4.09
Seventh Day Adventist	4.08
Spiritualists	3.34
Jehovah's Witnesses	3.12

(377-446)

B.

Gallup: Now, I'd like to get your opinion about various religious faiths and denominations. You notice that the boxes on this card go from the highest position of plus 5--for something you have a very favorable opinion of--all the way down to the lowest position of minus 5--for something you have a very unfavorable opinion of. How far up the scale or how far down the scale would you rate the following:

6/1977

	% +4, +5	% DON'T KNOW
Protestants	53	14
Baptists	47	16
Methodists	46	16
Catholics	45	13
Southern Baptists	39	22
Lutherans	38	22
Presbyterians	37	22
Jews	34	18
Episcopalians	31	29
Mormons	26	28
Quakers	26	34
Evangelicals	22	43
Eastern Orthodox	22	48
Seventh Day Adventists	21	33
Unitarians	17	53

(1513)

**Table 4**

**Social Standing of Ethnic Groups, 1964 and 1989  
(NORC and GSS)**

GROUP	MEAN	
	1964	1989
Native White Americans	7.25	7.03
People of my own ethnic background	6.16	6.57
British	6.37	6.46
Protestants	6.59	6.39
Catholics	6.36	6.33
French	5.73	6.07
Irish	5.94	6.05
Swiss	5.50	6.03
Swedes	5.41	5.99
Austrians	5.06	5.94
Dutch	5.60	5.90
Norwegians	5.48	5.87
Scotch	5.73	5.85
Germans	5.63	5.78
Southerners	5.25	5.77
Italians	5.03	5.69
Danes	5.20	5.63
French Canadians	5.08	5.62
Japanese	3.95	5.56
Jews	4.71	5.55
People of foreign ancestry	4.84	5.38
Finns	5.08	5.34
Greeks	4.31	5.09
Lithuanians	4.42	4.96
Spanish Americans	4.81	4.79
Chinese	3.44	4.76
Hungarians	4.57	4.70
Czechs	4.40	4.64
Poles	4.54	4.63
Russians	3.88	4.58
Latin Americans	4.27	4.42
American Indians	4.04	4.27
Negroes	2.75	4.17
Mexicans	3.00	3.52
Puerto Ricans	2.91	3.32
Gypsies	2.29	2.65
Overall mean	4.88	5.31
Overall range	4.96	4.38
	(401-447)	(160-222)



	Asians	-0.77	52.8	30.9	16.3	10.6
	Hisps.	-1.64	83.4	10.6	6.0	9.5
	So. Whts.	-0.56	46.6	41.2	12.2	9.0
<b>Hardworking/ Lazy</b>						
	Jews	+0.38	12.5	47.6	39.9	9.0
	Blacks	-1.24	62.2	31.9	5.9	5.8
	Asians	-0.19	34.2	35.8	30.3	11.4
	Hisps.	-0.99	54.1	37.2	8.7	10.0
	So. Whts.	-0.52	38.8	52.1	9.1	10.1
<b>Violence-prone/ Not violence- prone</b>						
	Jews	+0.36	12.0	55.2	32.9	11.1
	Blacks	-1.00	56.1	30.0	13.9	6.9
	Asians	-0.15	29.8	45.0	25.1	13.3
	Hisps.	-0.75	49.5	34.0	16.5	10.8
	So. Whts.	-0.23	28.3	56.0	15.7	11.6
<b>Unintelligent/ Intelligent</b>						
	Jews	+0.15	11.8	76.3	6.9	9.3
	Blacks	-0.93	53.2	40.5	6.3	6.9
	Asians	-0.36	36.3	44.6	19.1	12.3
	Hisps.	-0.96	53.5	40.1	6.4	10.6
	So. Whts.	-0.54	38.4	55.4	6.2	10.4
<b>Self-supporting/ Live off wel- fare</b>						
	Jews	+0.40	9.1	53.2	37.7	8.4
	Blacks	-2.08	77.7	20.4	1.9	5.5
	Asians	-0.75	46.4	37.4	16.2	12.2
	Hisps.	-1.72	72.4	23.7	3.9	10.4
	So. Whts.	-0.71	44.5	49.1	6.5	11.2
<b>Unpatriotic/ Patriotic</b>						
	Jews	-0.57	34.4	60.3	5.4	11.3
	Blacks	-1.03	50.6	46.6	2.7	9.6
	Asians	-1.16	55.2	38.6	6.2	14.5
	Hisps.	-1.34	60.4	35.6	4.0	12.9
	So. Whts.	-0.31	27.4	61.2	11.3	11.3

<sup>1</sup>The scores are based on subtracting the rate assigned to Jews, Blacks, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, and Southern Whites from the White rate. All scales are scored so that negative means closer to the unfavorable characterization (poor, lazy, violence-prone, unintelligent, preferring to live off welfare, and unpatriotic). Thus, if Whites were scored 4 on Rich/Poor and Blacks 5, the score on the Rich/Poor scale for Blacks above would be -1.0.

<sup>2</sup>These percentages are based on the exclusion of missing responses. The % missing is given in the last column.

**Table 6****Summary Group Difference Scores<sup>1</sup>  
(GSS 1990)**

GROUP	MEAN	DISTRIBUTION		
		-	0	+
Jews	+0.75	25.4	50.4	35.1
Blacks	-6.29	84.7	11.4	4.0
Asian Americans	-2.65	60.1	14.5	25.4
Hispanic Americans	-5.70	83.0	12.6	4.4
Southern Whites	-2.32	61.2	25.7	13.1

<sup>1</sup>Sum of group difference on hardworking/lazy, violence, intelligence, self-supporting/welfare, and patriotism.



**Table 7**

**Achievement Images of Jews and Influence  
(GSS 1990)**

IMAGES	% TOO MUCH INFLUENCE	GAMMA/PROB.
<b>Rich/Poor</b>		
Richer than Whites	32	
Equally wealthy	17	.343 (.0000)
Poorer than Whites	13	
	(1148)	
<b>Hardworking/Lazy</b>		
Harder working than Whites	28	
Equally hardworking/Lazy	20	.193 (.0000)
Lazier than Whites	21	
	(1154)	
<b>Self-supporting/Prefer welfare</b>		
More self-supporting	31	
Equally self-supporting	19	.233 (.0000)
Prefer welfare	18	
	(1151)	
<b>Intelligent/Unintelligent</b>		
More intelligent than Whites	32	
Equally intelligent	21	.208 (.0000)
Less intelligent than Whites	22	
	(1145)	

**Table 8**

**Power and Influence Comparisons**

A.

Roper: Of course, the job of running the country is given to the President and the Congress. However, there are those who say that other groups in our society also have power and influence over how our country is run. Here is a list of groups and institutions in our society.

First, would you call off the groups on that list that you feel have too much power and influence over our country's policies?

	1979	1982
The Arab oil nations	66%	46%
The wealthy	58	63
Large business corporations	53	52
Organized crime	53	36
The labor unions	51	39
The press (newspaper and television)	39	41
Government departments and bureaus	34	31
The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation)	25	19
The banks	22	22
The courts	22	21
The blacks	21	12
Environmentalists	20	12
State governments	18	18
The Jews <sup>1</sup>	12	14
Israel <sup>1</sup>	--	18
The Catholic church	10	8
The military	10	14
The public opinion polls	10	8
The Eastern establishment	9	10
The Spanish-speaking (Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, Cubans)	9	8
The WASPS (White Anglo-Saxon Prots.)	8	8
Consumer groups	8	7
Scientists	7	6
The poor	4	3
None	1	2
Don't know	4	4
	(2009)	(2000)

<sup>1</sup>"The Jews" and "Israel" were asked on split samples in 1982.

B.

Roper: Which, if any, of the groups listed on this card do you believe have too much power in the United States? Just call off the letter in front of the groups.

	1/1984	4/1985	5/1986	2/1987	4/1988	4/1989
Business						
corporations	51%	49%	44%	42%	44%	47%
News media	50	42	40	38	39	45
Labor unions	50	45	44	33	20	34
Arab interests	30	30	28	20	20	23
Orientals	--	11	12	12	15	23
Blacks	13	13	11	11	14	14
The Catholic						
church	10	11	10	9	9	8
Jews	8	8	8	7	8	8
Hispanics	4	--	6	5	6	6
None	6	7	7	9	11	8
Don't know	6	6	7	8	8	7
	(2000)	(1988)	(1994)	(1996)	(1982)	(1986)

**Table 9**

**Power and Influence of Ethnic Groups**

A.

SRC: Some people think that certain groups have too much influence in American life and politics, while other people feel that certain groups don't have as much influence as they deserve. Here are three statements about how much influence a group might have. For each group I read to you, just tell me the number of the statement that best says how you feel. The first group is...

1972

	TOO MUCH	ABOUT RIGHT	TOO LITTLE	DON'T KNOW	TOO MUCH-TOO LITTLE
Catholics	8.0%	66.6	7.4	18.0	+ 0.6
Jews	12.9%	50.5	13.7	22.9	- 1.2
Blacks	27.2%	33.2	32.6	7.0	- 5.4
Southerners	6.9%	60.9	15.1	17.1	- 8.2

(2153-2161)

1976

	TOO MUCH	ABOUT RIGHT	TOO LITTLE	DON'T KNOW	TOO MUCH-TOO LITTLE
Jews	16.8%	46.7	10.4	26.0	+ 6.4
Blacks	30.6%	36.3	25.3	7.7	+ 5.3
Catholics	10.1%	61.0	7.2	21.7	+ 2.9
Whites	14.1%	64.2	15.4	6.3	- 1.3
Protestants	9.2%	70.4	6.6	19.1	- 2.7
Southerners	6.8%	56.3	18.7	18.3	-11.9
Chicanos, Mexican-Americans	8.5%	32.4	32.4	26.7	-23.9

(2384-2393)

B.

GSS-NORC: Some people think that certain groups have too much influence in American life and politics, while other people feel that certain groups don't have as much influence as they deserve. On this card are three statements about how much influence a group might have. For each group I read to you, just tell me the number of the statement that best says how you feel.

1990

	TOO MUCH	ABOUT RIGHT	TOO LITTLE	DON'T KNOW	TOO MUCH-TOO LITTLE
Whites	25.2%	64.2	5.8	4.8	+19.4
Jews	21.2%	54.5	12.6	11.7	+ 8.6
Southern Whites	10.4%	61.6	14.7	13.3	- 4.3
Asian Americans	6.3%	41.0	37.3	15.4	-31.0
Blacks	14.2%	31.4	46.9	7.5	-32.7
Hispanic Americans	4.7%	36.9	45.5	12.9	-40.6

(1348-1351)

C.

CCD: Are there any religious groups in America that you think have too much power and influence? IF YES: Which ones? Any others?

12/1987

% MENTIONING

Catholics	12
Evangelicals/Fundamentalists	12
Jews	4
Mormons	2
"Moonies"	1
Cults and sects	1
Other groups	4
Unspecified groups	2
None, no groups	59
Don't know	10
Total	107 (1889)

(Adds to more than 100% because of multiple mentions)

**Table 10**

**Voting for a Jewish President**

**A.**

Gallup: If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President and he happened to be a Jew would you vote for him?<sup>1</sup>

	7-8/1958	9/1958	12/1959	8/1961	8/1963	7/1965
Yes	62.0%	63.4%	71.8%	68.2%	76.9%	79.7%
No	27.6	29.2	22.1	23.2	16.8	15.2
Don't know	10.4	7.4	6.1	8.6	6.2	5.0
	(1610)	(1498)	(1522)	(3156)	(3551)	(3524)
	4/1967	3/1969	7/1978	4-5/1983	1/1987 <sup>2</sup>	7/1987
Yes	81.9%	86.9%	81.0%	88.9%	82%	89%
No	12.8	7.4	12.5	6.9	10	6
Don't know	5.3	5.7	6.4	4.2	7	5
	(3519)	(1630)	(1555)	(1517)	(1889)	(1607)

**B.**

**% YES**

	7-8/1958	9/1958	12/1959	8/1961	8/1963	7/1965	4/1967
Atheist	17.9	18.3	21.6				
Black <sup>3</sup>	37.3	37.7	48.7	50.5	47.8	59.1	53.0
Mormon							75.1
Quaker							78.0
Jew	62.0	63.4	71.8	68.2	76.9	79.7	81.9
Catholic	68.7	66.9	70.3	82.1	83.6	86.7	90.1
Baptist	92.2	92.9	94.4	95.4			
	3/1969	7/1978	4/1983	7/1987			
Atheist		39.3	42	44			
Black	67.1	75.8	77	79			
Jew	86.9	81.0	88	89			
Catholic	88.6	91.1	92				

<sup>1</sup>Wording varies slightly across surveys.

<sup>2</sup>CCD

<sup>3</sup>Negro used until 1978.

C.

AP/MG: I'm going to read a few attributes that might be found in a candidate for president. Tell me if each would make you more likely to vote for that candidate for president, or less likely to vote for that candidate, or if it wouldn't matter?

4/1988

	MORE LIKELY	NOT MATTER	LESS LIKELY	DON'T KNOW	NET VOTE FOR
A Protestant	9%	86	3	2	+ 6
A Catholic	6%	86	5	1	+ 1
A Jew	5%	82	11	2	- 6
A Born-Again Christian	13%	62	23	2	-10
A Black	5%	65	27	3	-22

(1204)

D.

LAT: I'd like to read you the descriptions of two imaginary men--call them Mr. A and Mr. B. Suppose for a moment that both are running for President and you have to vote for one of them. Here are their descriptions: Mr. A is about 55 years old, he was born and raised in Portland, Oregon, he is Jewish, is married with two children and is a businessman. Mr. B is about 60 years old, he was born and raised in Cleveland, Ohio, he is married with one child, and his career has been as an attorney. Which man would you vote for, Mr. A or Mr. B?

3/1988

Mr. A	26%
Mr. B	44
Not sure	23
Refused	7

(2090)

**Table 11**

**Approval of Ethnoreligious Groups**

A.

NORC-GSS: I'd like to get your feelings toward groups that are in the news these days. I will use something we call the feeling thermometer, and here is how it works.

I'll read the names of a group and I'd like you to rate that group using the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group.

If we come to a group whose name *you don't recognize*, you don't need to rate that group. Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one.

If you do recognize the name, but *don't feel particularly warm or cold* toward the group, you would rate the group at the 50 degree mark.

PROTESTANTS

	1986	1988	1989
Mean temperature	70.6	68.6	69.6
% don't know	3.7	4.6	6.1
	(1451)	(1463)	(992)

CATHOLICS

	1986	1988	1989
Mean temperature	67.8	65.9	66.3
% don't know	2.9	4.5	5.4
	(1452)	(1462)	(995)

JEWS

	1986	1988	1989
Mean temperature	62.7	60.5	61.4
% don't know	4.5	5.7	7.7
	(1451)	(1461)	(992)



B.

SRC: There are many groups in America that try to get the government or the American people to see things their way. We would like to get your feelings toward some of these groups -- our first group is \_\_\_\_\_. Where would you put them on the thermometer?<sup>1</sup>

MEAN TEMPERATURE<sup>2</sup>

	1964	1966	1968	1970	1972	1974	1976	1980	1982
Hisps. <sup>3</sup>							55.5	57.8	
Jews	62.5	65.1	64.5		66.4		57.3		
Blacks <sup>4</sup>	63.8	63.2	64.7	61.8	64.0	65.5	60.8	64.2	63.8
Southerners	64.1		61.3		65.9		62.2	66.2	
Easterners	65.7								
Catholics	66.7	65.7	65.3		68.2		63.2		
Protestants	80.4	78.2	79.0		74.3		66.1		
Whites	84.7	84.4	81.1	77.1	78.2	79.1	73.7	77.4	72.8
		1984	1986	1988					
Illegal aliens				35.7					
Palestinians				37.4					
Christian									
Fundamentalists				51.5					
Hispanics		59.4		57.0					
Jews				62.9					
Blacks		64.2	66.6	61.7					
Catholics		63.5		64.2					
Whites		74.2		73.1					

<sup>1</sup>Wording varies. Consult American National Election Studies codebooks.

<sup>2</sup>The highest nonmissing value for the surveys 1964-76 was recoded to 100 since a "100" category was not coded in those years.

<sup>3</sup>Negroes used until 1972.

<sup>4</sup>Chicanos used in 1976.

## C.

Gallup: You will notice that the 10 boxes on this card go from the highest position of plus five--for someone or something you have a very favorable opinion of--all the way down to the lowest position of minus five--for someone or something you have a very unfavorable opinion of. How far up or how far down the scale would you rate the following . . . ?

	JEWS			
	11/1975	6/1977	3/1981	7/1987
+5	24%	23%	28%	12%
+4	10	11	12	13
+3	19	17	18	23
+3	12	7	11	14
+1	16	12	12	15
-1	4	4	4	2
-2	2	2	1	1
-3	1	2	1	1
-4	1	1	. <sup>1</sup>	1
-5	3	3	2	1
Don't know	8	18	11	17
	(1515)	(1513)	(1601)	(1607)
	11/1975	6/1977	3/1981	7/1987
Protestants/ Jews	1.35:1	1.56:1	1.45:1	1.36:1
Prot. - Jews	+ 12	+ 19	+ 18	+ 9
Catholics/ Jews	1.24:1	1.32:1	1.15:1	1.20:1
Cath. - Jews	+ 8	+ 11	+ 6	+ 5

<sup>1</sup>Less than 0.5%.

D.

Gallup: Now, using the same card that you used before, with the highest position of plus five indicating a person or group you have a very favorable opinion of, and the lowest position of minus five indicating a person or group you have a very unfavorable opinion of --how far up the scale or how far down the scale would you rate the following. . . ?

7/1987

	POPE JOHN PAUL II	PROTES- TANTS	ROMAN CATHOLICS	JEWS	VATICAN OFFICIALS
+5	30%	19%	16%	12%	8%
+4	18	15	14	13	10
+3	18	23	20	23	13
+2	10	12	13	14	12
+1	9	14	15	15	14
-1	2	2	3	2	4
-2	1	1	1	1	2
-3	1	1	1	1	2
-4	1	*	1	1	1
-5	2	1	2	1	3
Don't know	9	14	15	17	31

(1607)

**Table 12****Warmth Toward Religious Group By In/Out Group Membership  
(1986-1989 GSS)**

MEAN TEMPERATURE IN DEGREES

RELIGIOUS GROUPS DOING RATINGS

RELIGIOUS GROUPS BEING RATED	In-group	Out-group <sup>1</sup>
Protestants	74.2 (2333)	661.9 (1386)
Catholics	80.4 ( 982)	61.9 (2761)
Jews	79.9 ( 75)	61.2 (3601)

<sup>1</sup>The in-group is the same as the group being rated. For example, Jews rating Jews. The out-group are all nonmembers of the particular religion, including those with no religion and some other religion not listed.

**Table 13****Religion of Confidants and Friends  
(GSS 1985, 1988)**

RELIGION OF RESPONDENTS	% JEWISH	
	CONFIDANTS	FRIENDS
Protestant	0.7	0.5
Catholic	1.6	0.7
Jewish	67.9	73.3
No religion	3.1	1.7
Other religion	0.8	0.8
All	2.5	2.4
Non-Jews	1.1	0.9

**Table 14****% Intermarried Compared to Expected Levels<sup>1</sup>  
(GSS 1984-1990)****IN-GROUP VS. ALL OTHERS****SELECTED RELIGIONS:**

Jews	26.5
Catholics	54.7
Protestants	52.4
Southern Baptists	50.8
United Methodists	76.3
Evangelical Lutherans	65.9
Missouri-Synod Lutherans	70.7
Episcopalians	76.8

**SELECTED ETHNICITIES:**

Jews <sup>2</sup>	24.4
British	75.6
Germans	77.3
Poles	76.5
Italians	68.5
Puerto Ricans	40.0

<sup>1</sup>The number of in-group members married to out-group members divided by the number of expected intergroup marriages assuming random mating.

<sup>2</sup>The Jews' percentages differ slightly because of differing number of missing cases.

**Table 15**

**Acceptance of Residential Integration**

**A.**

NORC-GSS: Now I'm going to ask you about different types of contact with various groups of people. In each situation would you please tell me whether you would be very much in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat opposed, or very much opposed to it happening?

Living in a neighborhood where half of your neighbors were \_\_\_\_\_

	3/1990					
	JEWES	BLACKS	ASIAN AMERS.	HISP. AMERS.	SO. <sup>1</sup> WHITES	NO. <sup>2</sup> WHITES
Strongly favor	6.2%	4.9%	3.4%	3.8%	8.4%	5.0%
Favor	17.4	10.9	10.3	9.6	20.6	16.1
Neither favor nor oppose	61.4	41.7	48.7	42.9	57.7	59.0
Oppose	10.9	28.7	26.3	29.5	9.3	14.5
Strongly oppose	2.8	13.1	9.4	12.3	1.8	3.6
Don't know	1.4	0.7	2.0	1.8	2.2	1.9
	(1362)	(1362)	(1362)	(1361)	( 452)	( 909)

<sup>1</sup>Whites raised in the South. Asked of people living outside the South.

<sup>2</sup>Whites raised in the North. Asked of people living in the South.

**B.**

Gallup: I am going to read you a list of various groups of people. As I read each one, please tell me whether you would or would not like to have them as neighbors . . .

	1/1989		
	YES	NO	NOT SURE
Catholics	94%	3%	3%
Jews	91	5	4
Protestants	92	5	3
Blacks	83	12	5
Koreans	79	14	7
Indians, Pakistanis	78	15	7

Hispanics	78	16	6
Vietnamese	75	18	7
Russians	74	19	7
Religious sects, cults	31	62	7

(1001)



**Table 16**

**Acceptance of Intermarriage**

NORC-GSS: What about having a close relative marry a \_\_\_\_ person? Would you be very in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat opposed, or very much opposed to it happening?

	3/1990					
	JEWS	BLACKS	ASIAN AMERS.	HISP. AMERS.	SO. <sup>1</sup> WHITES	NO. <sup>2</sup> WHITES
Strongly favor	7.2%	7.0%	2.9%	4.4%	11.3%	6.8%
Favor	12.3	4.5	6.6	6.9	17.0	13.7
Neither favor nor oppose	63.1	29.9	46.4	46.4	59.2	65.7
Oppose	11.3	25.1	27.4	25.2	7.7	8.6
Strongly oppose	5.0	32.4	15.0	15.3	3.5	3.7
Don't know	1.2	1.1	1.8	1.4	1.3	1.4
	(1362)	(1362)	(1363)	(1362)	( 453)	( 910)

<sup>1</sup>A white raised in the South. Asked of people living outside the South.

<sup>2</sup>A white raised in the North. Asked of people living in the South.

**Table 17**

**% Objecting to Residential Integration and Intermarriage  
by Members of Out-Groups  
(GSS 1990)**

<b>REFERENCE GROUP</b>	<b>OUT- GROUP</b>	<b>NEIGHBOR- HOOD</b>	<b>RELATIVE MARRYING</b>
Northern Whites	Southern Whites	10.8	8.2
Jews	Non-Jews	14.1	16.8
Southern Whites	Northern Whites	17.5	10.9
Asians	Non-Asians	34.6	41.7
Hispanics	Non-Hispanics	43.2	41.2
Blacks	Non-Blacks	46.8	65.3

**Table 18**

**Approval of Jewish/Non-Jewish Marriages**

**Gallup: Do you approve or disapprove of marriage between Jews and non-Jews?**

	1968	1972	1978	1983
% approve	59	69	70	77
	(1536)	(1516)	(1555)	(1517)

**Table 19**

**Ratings of Israel and Egypt**

NORC-GSS: You will notice that the boxes on this card go from the highest position of "plus 5" for a country which you *like* very much, to the lowest position of "minus 5" for a country you *dislike* very much. How far up the scale or how far down the scale would you rate the following countries?

ISRAEL

	1974	1975	1977	1982	1983
+5	13.3%	9.8%	11.8%	10.8%	9.3%
+4	9.5	8.3	9.9	8.0	7.7
+3	15.6	13.8	13.3	13.7	10.6
+2	11.8	11.3	11.3	11.4	10.8
+1	17.4	18.5	17.6	15.9	17.8
-1	8.6	11.0	9.7	12.1	13.1
-2	3.8	5.5	4.6	6.9	6.6
-3	4.5	5.2	4.2	5.3	6.9
-4	2.2	3.2	2.7	3.5	4.2
-5	6.0	5.1	4.5	5.0	6.4
Don't know	7.2	8.4	10.3	7.5	6.6
Mean <sup>1</sup>	6.6	6.3	6.6	6.3	6.0
	(1484)	(1490)	(1530)	(1506)	(1599)
	1985	1986	1988	1989	1990
+5	11.0%	11.2%	9.7%	8.6%	8.1%
+4	8.1	8.7	6.1	5.6	5.2
+3	13.8	11.9	10.2	10.6	9.3
+2	13.1	12.2	9.2	9.4	10.0
+1	16.6	19.4	15.7	17.6	19.6
-1	10.4	9.8	13.2	10.3	13.8
-2	6.1	5.7	7.8	7.0	7.4
-3	5.3	5.0	7.8	5.9	4.8
-4	3.1	3.6	3.0	4.3	3.2
-5	4.9	7.1	9.5	11.7	10.0
Don't know	7.6	5.4	7.8	8.9	8.5
Mean <sup>1</sup>	6.4	6.2	5.7	5.6	5.7
	(1534)	(1470)	( 988)	(1006)	( 928)

## EGYPT

	1974	1975	1977	1982	1983
+5	3.8%	2.9%	4.7%	5.0%	5.3%
+4	5.5	3.2	4.1	8.4	6.6
+3	9.4	7.6	9.7	14.7	12.6
+2	10.4	10.1	11.0	13.2	12.9
+1	19.1	20.7	21.9	22.4	24.2
-1	13.3	15.0	16.6	10.5	12.8
-2	8.4	8.4	6.0	4.4	6.1
-3	6.8	8.1	4.9	4.9	5.6
-4	5.3	5.4	3.6	2.5	2.7
-5	9.4	8.7	5.4	4.1	3.4
Don't Know	8.6	10.0	12.2	9.9	7.8
Mean <sup>1</sup>	5.4	5.2	5.7	6.3	6.1
	(1484)	(1490)	(1530)	(1506)	(1599)
	1985	1986	1988	1989	1990
+5	4.6%	4.2%	5.9%	3.6%	5.0%
+4	6.3	5.3	5.1	5.2	3.8
+3	13.0	9.7	10.8	8.7	10.7
+2	13.1	14.3	9.9	11.7	11.7
+1	25.2	24.4	23.1	22.7	26.5
-1	11.3	14.3	13.9	14.6	11.9
-2	6.2	6.7	6.4	7.6	6.5
-3	5.3	6.0	5.9	4.5	4.1
-4	2.3	2.7	2.0	2.4	2.5
-5	3.6	6.1	6.1	7.6	6.3
Don't know	9.1	6.4	7.8	11.5	11.2
Mean <sup>1</sup>	6.1	5.8	5.9	5.6	5.8
	(1534)	(1470)	( 988)	(1006)	(928)

<sup>1</sup>The mean is calculated with the Don't Knows excluded and the following values assigned: +5=10, +4=9, +3=8, +2=7, +1=6, -1=5, -2=4, -3=3, -4=2, -5=1. 5.5 represents a neutral position, higher means a positive leaning, and lower means a negative leaning.

**Table 20**

**Attitude toward Israel and Egypt and Jewish Patriotism  
(GSS 1990)**

% BELIEVING JEWS LESS PATRIOTIC THAN WHITES	
Those liking Israel	29
Those disliking Israel	45
	(773)
Those liking Egypt more than Israel	43
Liking Egypt and Israel equally	37
Those liking Egypt less than Israel	25
	(752)

**Table 21**

**Summary of Multivariate Regressions of Anti-Semitism Items<sup>1</sup>  
(GSS)**

INDEPENDENT <sup>3</sup> VARIABLES	DEPENDENT VARIABLES <sup>2</sup>						
	Success	In- fluence	Nghbs.	Inter- marri.	Ratings	Patriot- ism	Israel/ Egypt
Income (high)	*	-.09	*	*	(-.04)	*	*
Finances (better)	*	*	--	--	--	--	--
Education (more)	.09	-.09	(-.07)	*	-.07	.09	*
Happy (very)	(.08)	*	--	--	--	--	--
Financial sat. (yes)	*	*	--	--	--	--	--
Alienated (no)	*	*	--	--	--	(.08)	--
Authoritarian (no)	*	*	--	--	--	--	--
Religion (Jewish)	*	-.13	.19	.23	-.20	*	-.21
Religion (liberal)	*	*	*	*	*	*	-.05
Att. church (less)	*	*	(-.06)	.09	.06	*	.07
Race (not Black)	-.10	*	*	*	*	*	.09
Party id. (Dem.)	*	.03	*	*	*	*	*
Pol. ideology (lib.)	.08	*	*	*	*	*	.06
Age (younger) <sup>4</sup>	.17	-.17	*	*	(-.04)	.10	.07
Jewish area (no) <sup>5</sup>	*	-.19	*	*	*	*	*

<sup>1</sup>Standardized regression coefficients. \* = not statistically significant at the .05 level; ( ) = significant at .05, but not .01 level; -- = omitted from regression.

<sup>2</sup>Meaning and scoring of dependent variables are explained on p. 21.

<sup>3</sup>Category in parentheses is the high category. This is the category hypothesized to show less anti-Semitism.

<sup>4</sup>Younger adults or adults from more recent cohorts are expected to be the less anti-Semitic under hypothesis m, but not under hypothesis l.

<sup>5</sup>Those from areas with few Jews are expected to be less anti-Semitic under hypothesis o, but not under hypothesis n.

**Table 22****Anti-Semitism Measures by Age Groups  
(GSS)**

	18-29	30-39	40-49	50-64	65+	MODEL <sup>1</sup>
Jewish influence (% too much)	13.7	25.3	24.0	34.4	24.6	LC
Jewish success (% greater than Whites)	48.2	60.6	70.7	68.0	73.2	LC
Jewish neighbors (% opposed)	15.5	12.6	8.5	15.6	17.2	LC
Close relative marrying Jew (% opposed)	14.7	12.9	16.4	19.2	20.5	C
Feelings toward Jews (% less warm than toward Protestants/Catholics)	48.3	36.7	34.6	46.3	52.2	NL
Rating of Israel (% rating Egypt above Israel)	33.0	25.8	23.0	24.7	22.5	LC
Jewish patriotism (% less than Whites)	44.7	35.7	30.4	28.4	29.7	L

<sup>1</sup>Based on an analysis of variance of the full, uncollapsed scales. C=constant (no statistically significant variation by age groups); L=linear (no statistically significant variation from a linear relationship with age groups); LC=linear component (linear trend with age groups, but with statistically significant deviation from linearity); NL=nonlinear (statistical significant variation with age groups, but deviation from linearity accounts for most of the variation).



**Table 23****Perceived Intergroup Conflict****A.**

PSRA: We hear a lot these days about the tensions between various groups in this country. Look at this list of groups on this card. In your opinion which, in any, of these groups don't particularly like ...

5/1990

**DISLIKED BY...**

REF. GROUP	Whites	Asians	Blacks	Jews	Caths.	Amer. Inds.	Hisps.
Whites	1%	13	56	4	2	16	19
Asians	29%	1	17	8	5	4	10
Blacks	53%	10	2	11	6	7	18
Jews	14%	9	7	2	16	4	8
Catholics	3%	8	7	24	1	3	2
Amer. Ind.	24%	4	8	4	3	1	4
Hispanics	36%	6	26	7	3	4	2

(3004)

**B.**

Roper: From time to time we hear discussions about how well different groups in society get along with each other. I'd like to get your opinion. For each of the groups listed on this card, please tell me if you think they generally get along very well, fairly well, or not well at all?

5/1987

	VERY WELL	FAIRLY WELL	NOT WELL AT ALL	DON'T KNOW
Christians and Jews	16%	60	13	10
Blacks and Whites	11%	70	16	2
Blacks and Hispanics	8%	45	27	21
Hispanics and Anglos	5%	55	19	20

(1998)

C.

LAT: Is there any one denomination you feel is least compatible with your feelings about religious doctrine and teachings?

8/1987

All compatible	42%
Other Christian	8
Catholic	7
Other non-Christian	5
Baptist	3
Jewish	3
Pentecostal	3
Mormon	3
Other Protestant	1
Not sure	20
Refused	5

(2040)

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