


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JEWISH SOCIOLOGY PAPERS

# **B**ASIC TRENDS IN AMERICAN JEWISH DEMOGRAPHY



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## Foreword

Ben Wattenberg, in *The Birth Dearth*, recently warned that below-replacement fertility levels endanger America's future. Wattenberg maintained that America's ability to sustain an aged population, defend itself against external foes, and assert its values on the international scene depend upon an increasing birthrate.

American Jewry has particular reasons for concern about its own projected "birth dearth." The health and vitality of Jewish communal institutions depend upon a critical mass of Jews willing to utilize and sustain the services these institutions provide. Moreover, Jewish political strength in America presupposes a sizable and stable Jewish vote. Finally, as a small people which only recently experienced the losses of the Holocaust, Jews cannot afford further numerical shrinkage, which would surely undermine Jewish cultural vitality and self-confidence.

There is considerable controversy over the Jewish demographic future. Some claim that American Jewish fertility is sufficient for replacement of the parent generation, if not for modest growth. Others believe that intermarriage will offset low fertility by opening the Jewish community to large numbers of Jews-by-choice. In this essay, specially prepared for a 1986 American Jewish Committee Conference on the Future of the Jewish Community, Uziel Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola seek to provide realistic assessments of the

demographic future of American Jewry. The authors emphasize that Jewish fertility has always lagged behind overall white American fertility, and posit a birthrate of 1.5 children for the average American Jewish couple (2.1 is needed for replacement, factoring for those who never marry and for child mortality). Moreover, the authors argue that we cannot base fertility estimates upon the desired family size of unmarried individuals or childless couples. The fact that young Jewish women say they want two children is no indicator that they in fact will have two children.

Nor do the authors see any demographic gains through intermarriage. Intermarried couples tend to have fewer children, and most children of intermarriages are not raised as Jews. Although conversion of the non-Jewish spouse makes the family Jewish, the rate of such conversions has been declining, and they occur in only a minority of intermarriages. The authors also argue that intermarriage is accompanied by a long-term decline in Jewish identity. They cite local studies to the effect that, absent conversion, grandchildren of intermarried couples no longer identify as Jews.

The authors are not sanguine about Jewish demographic trends or, for that matter, about communal demographic policies. They do urge widespread dissemination of accurate information about Jewish population trends and demographic realities. Individuals, to be sure, will always make their personal choices concerning childbearing and family size on the basis of individual values and family aspirations.

This publication is one of a series of American Jewish Committee papers assessing the Jewish condition in America toward the close of the twentieth century and highlighting significant developments in Jewish religious and communal life.

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## BASIC TRENDS IN AMERICAN JEWISH DEMOGRAPHY

The demographic continuity of a subpopulation, such as U.S. Jews, depends on two sets of factors: biological (births and deaths) and cultural (the subpopulation's ability to preserve its group identity and transmit it to future generations).

Until a few years ago, some trends in the American Jewish population gave cause for concern. It was thought that very low fertility, increasing out-marriage and secession, and marked aging could not fail, if they persisted, to affect the composition and size of the population. This sociodemographic picture was crystallized in a series of studies by Sidney Goldstein.<sup>1</sup> Many other researchers have contributed to its elucidation, including ourselves.<sup>2</sup>

Recently some scholars -- especially Calvin Goldscheider and Steven M. Cohen -- have challenged this assessment and put forward rather sanguine views.<sup>3</sup> A widely read book, *A Certain People* by Charles E. Silberman, has taken information from these sources for its demographic chapter. We shall refer to these views as revisionist, borrowing the designation from Marshall Sklare.<sup>4</sup>

The disparity between the customary and revisionist views of the American Jewish future requires a reexamination of the available demographic evidence and of the conclusions derived from it. The following pages address this task, though within the limited compass of this paper we obviously cannot present all the technical evidence.

The analysis of U.S. Jewish demography is handicapped by a deplorable paucity of sources and by serious deficiencies in many of the sources that do exist. Jews cannot be distinguished as such in the decennial population censuses, in the Current Population Surveys conducted by the Bureau of the Census,<sup>5</sup> or in the regular vital statistics. The so-far-unique instance of a

country-wide Jewish sample survey, the National Jewish Population Study of 1970-71 (hereafter abbreviated NJPS), was not sufficiently utilized as a data source for practical purposes although it yielded important research findings. By now, however, the usefulness of the NJPS data is mainly retrospective as a benchmark on the road to the present, considerably altered situation. Most survey samples of the general population contain few Jews and are therefore of limited assistance to Jewish demography.

Thus we have to depend for recent information primarily on local Jewish community surveys conducted over the last dozen years to serve local planning and communal service needs rather than to supply data for demographic research. Because these surveys have been uncoordinated with respect to topics of inquiry, concepts, definitions and classifications, sampling methodology, publication of results, etc., and often lack quite basic demographic information, they are not susceptible to country-wide synthesis. Moreover, data collected on Jewish initiative are often distorted by the overrepresentation of the more Jewishly committed sections of the community.

The unsatisfactory character of the available data denies the U.S. Jewish public a reliable and clear-cut representation of its demographic situation. Instead, it gets at best fragmentary bits of information that vary in purpose and quality. The present revisionist controversy over demographic issues may have been rendered possible by lacunae in the data, which permit sweeping statements without sufficient substantiation.

Faced with poor sources of data on U.S. Jewry, we have found it useful to examine the Jewish community in neighboring Canada. There data are obtained in a manner that is quantitatively and qualitatively superior to that for U.S. Jewry. One part of the official Canadian population census of 1981 consisted of a 20-percent country-wide sample that included about 60,000 Jews. Its questionnaire inquired about religion and ethnicity. Our investigations suggest that there is a remarkable parallelism in patterns of nuptiality, fertility, and aging between American and Canadian Jews, although the latter are structurally somewhat different -- for example, they comprise a larger proportion of recent immigrants. We shall adduce some of this Canadian evidence in our discussion of U.S. Jewish demographics.

At present the four major problem areas of U.S. Jewish

demography are fertility, nuptiality, mixed marriage, and aging. Aging is well documented and clearly explainable; it can therefore be treated briefly here. Nuptiality and, even more so, mixed marriages and their intergenerational consequences are complex subjects that have not been satisfactorily documented since NJPS; they too will be treated here in summary fashion. Fertility and birthrates present several aspects on which some documentation, though insufficient, does exist; hence we shall devote a comparatively large share of our paper to this subject.

## FERTILITY AND BIRTHRATES

### Evolution of Fertility in the United States

Fertility trends in the Jewish minority in the United States have clearly been influenced by those in the total white population. Therefore we shall first trace the well-documented changes of fertility among U.S. whites.

Two concepts that we shall repeatedly have to use are the following:

a. "Cohort fertility" is that attained by specified groups of women -- defined according to their years of birth or of marriage -- up to given ages or marriage durations, and particularly their completed fertility.

b. "Period fertility" indicates synthetically the fertility displayed at a given time by all the separate cohorts that then occupy the various reproductive ages; it is measured by the "total fertility rate" (hereafter abbreviated TFR). Under present conditions of minimal mortality, a TFR of 2.1 children per woman -- irrespective of marital status, i.e., including the unmarried -- is necessary to assure population replacement.<sup>6</sup>

The TFR of total whites in the United States dropped as low as 2.1 during the Great Depression of the 1930s (Table 1). It rose remarkably during the "baby boom" that extended approximately from the mid-1940s to the end of the 1950s, peaking at 3.5 in the second half of the 1950s. Then it declined sharply, falling in 1972 below replacement level. Since 1973 it has stood at about 1.7, with remarkably small annual fluctuations. Thus the period fertility of total U.S. whites has for more than a

decade remained considerably below replacement level. As this time span already exceeds the average duration of effective childbearing by white American women, the TFR level of about 1.7 must approximate the completed fertility of at least some cohorts. Furthermore, fertility in nearly all developed countries has been below replacement level since the 1970s; in Canada, for instance, it was 1.7 in the early 1980s, just as in the United States. Very low fertility implies low rates of births and natural increase -- the latter may even turn negative -- as well as intensified aging of the respective populations.

**Table 1**  
**Total Fertility Rates and Birthrates: Jews and All Whites,**  
**United States, 1920-1984**

Year <sup>a</sup>	Total fertility rate (TFR)			Birthrate, all whites
	Jews	All whites	% difference	
1920	. .	3.17	. .	26.9
1930	1.67	2.41	-31	20.6
1935	1.25	2.13	-41	17.8
1940	1.54	2.27	-32	19.2
1945	2.39	2.74	-13	22.7
1950	2.54	3.08	-18	23.7
1955	2.80	3.47	-19	23.8
1960	2.49	3.50	-29	22.5
1965	1.92	2.83	-32	18.6
1970	(1.60)	2.38	(-33)	17.4
1975	] (below 1.5)	1.69	. .	13.6
1980		1.75	. .	14.9
1984		1.72	. .	14.5

(a) For 1930-1965, the five-year period around year stated.

The NJPS data of 1970-71 have made it possible to reconstruct previous changes in American Jewish fertility. Its course ran parallel to that of white fertility generally, though at a consistently lower level and with somewhat earlier turning points. During the 1930s and early 1940s the Jews' TFR was below replacement level, plummeting as low as 1.25; it rose during the baby boom, but returned to a low level in the mid-1960s (Table 1). The lower level of Jewish fertility can be largely accounted for by the Jews' concentration in those socioeconomic strata that were most active in birth control (metropolitan, well educated, affluent); by their quest for upward social mobility; by the desire of many



Jewish wives for careers and economic independence; and by the Jews' wide acceptance and efficient use of contraception. Fertility of Jews was usually the lowest or one of the lowest of the U.S. religious or ethnic groups investigated in various studies.

NJPS supplied a TFR of 1.9 for U.S. Jews around 1965. The National Natality Survey of 1967-69 yielded an estimate of 1.7-1.8 for the Jewish TFR,<sup>8</sup> compared to 2.4 for the white U.S. population at that time. An estimate somewhat below 1.7 for the "effectively Jewish" TFR<sup>9</sup> in the five years preceding NJPS could be computed from the data of that survey itself. These figures indicate that the period fertility of Jews dropped below replacement level before the middle of the 1960s, nearly a decade earlier than for total U.S. whites. In the second half of that decade, it reached about 1.7, a level that has prevailed among total whites since 1973.

Cohort fertility of Jewish women, which could also be studied from NJPS data, ran a similar though somewhat smoother course, with lower peaks and less profound troughs. The quinquennial birth cohort of Jewish women that was most affected by the Great Depression averaged only 1.35 children, whereas the completed fertility of the cohorts most influenced by the baby boom remained slightly below 2.4 children.<sup>10</sup> The fertility of subsequent cohorts was still incomplete when NJPS was conducted in 1970-71, but their specific birthrates at younger ages gave evidence of a drastic decline, in keeping with the generally downward trend of reproduction in the United States during the 1960s.

Detailed analysis of NJPS data points to a shorter reproductive span among Jewish women compared to all white women in the United States, due to a later start and earlier cessation of reproduction, as well as to a later peak age of childbearing among Jewish women.

### **Recent Birthrates of the Jews**

Birthrates are the result of both the fertility and the age-sex composition of a population. Of two populations at any given level of fertility, that with a higher proportion of persons in the most reproductive ages will have a higher birthrate. Table 1 traces changes of the birthrate among total whites in the

United States. Those changes roughly parallel those of the TFR, with a sharp decline in the 1970s.<sup>11</sup>

Because of the paucity of data on Jewish fertility since the NJPS, we shall first consider birthrate estimates for U.S. Jews and only then return to an assessment of fertility. There are no comprehensive statistics of Jewish births, since official birth records in the United States do not specify religion. Nevertheless, approximations are possible. Many local Jewish community surveys supply age distributions indicating the percentages of children aged 0-4, 5-9, and 10-14.<sup>12</sup> From the percentage of children aged 0-4 years it is possible to estimate a community's average annual birthrate during the 5-year period preceding the survey. These are "effectively Jewish" birthrates,<sup>13</sup> since they relate only to those children who were reported as Jews.

Table 2 shows, for various communities and years, the percentage of the population aged 0-4, 5-9, and 10-14 and then the estimated birthrate for the 5-year period preceding each survey. The outstanding findings are:

a. In general, the younger the age group, the smaller its proportion of the community's total population. This reflects the decline in the Jewish birthrate coinciding with the decline among total U.S. whites (cf. Table 1).

b. Local Jewish birthrates ranged, with few exceptions, between 8 and 13 per 1,000.<sup>14</sup> The seven largest Jewish communities, each comprising 150,000 persons or more, were surveyed in the comparatively short span 1979-85. Especially low birthrates were revealed for New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago; Miami, Philadelphia, and greater Washington also ranked in the lower part of the range displayed in Table 2. Recent findings for Boston are similar.<sup>15</sup> If the local data in Table 2 are weighted according to the size of each Jewish community, it emerges that around 1980 the "effectively Jewish" birthrate in the United States was approximately 10 per 1,000. By comparison, the birthrate of total whites in the United States amounted then to 15 per 1,000.

c. Comparing the prevalent Jewish birthrates around 1980 with the analogous figure of 9 per 1,000 from NJPS, one is led to conclude that no major change in U.S. Jewish birthrates took place between 1970 and the early 1980s.<sup>16</sup> Jewish fertility was greater at the time of NJPS, but Jewish age structure became

**Table 2****Percentages of Children, Birthrates, and Child-Adult Ratios:  
Selected Jewish Communities in United States, 1970-1985**

Community	Year	% of Jewish population in age group			Birth-rate <sup>a</sup>	Child-adult ratio <sup>b</sup>
		0-4	5-9	10-14		
Total (NJPS)	1970-1	4.6	6.7	10.0	9.2	250
	<b>1971-75</b>					
Chicago <sup>c</sup>	1971	5.8	7.5	7.9	11.6	290
Minneapolis	1971	6.8	7.2	8.9	13.6	362
Dallas	1971-2	5.4	6.5	10.3	10.8	274
Houston	1975	6.4	9.1	9.4	12.8	282
Baltimore <sup>c</sup>	1975	4.8	6.2	7.0	9.6	239
	<b>1976-80</b>					
Pittsburgh	1976	2.6	5.1	7.0	5.2	164
Kansas City	1976	4.0	6.0	5.0	8.0	200
Vineland, N.J.	1976	3.9	6.7	7.8	7.8	214
Memphis	1977	4.5	14.7	—	9.0	243
Los Angeles	1979	4.3	5.5	6.3	8.6	159
San Diego <sup>c</sup>	1979	6.3	7.7	8.3	12.6	..
Rochester	1980	3.2	3.8	7.4	6.4	178
Cleveland	1980	4.6	5.4	7.2	9.2	218
Oklahoma City <sup>c</sup>	1980	5.1	8.0	9.1	10.2	..
	<b>1981-85</b>					
Minneapolis	1981	5.8	5.7	8.1	11.6	291
St. Paul	1981	5.6	3.9	5.4	11.2	299
Denver	1981	6.4	5.6	5.8	12.8	195
Chicago <sup>c</sup>	1981	4.2	6.1	6.7	8.4	168
New York	1981	4.2	5.2	6.4	8.4	184
Sarasota, Fl. <sup>c</sup>	1981	1.5	1.9	2.9	3.0	227
Nashville	1982	6.4	7.3	6.7	12.8	303
San Francisco	1982	5.4	4.3	6.9	10.8	181
St. Louis <sup>c</sup>	1982	4.8	5.0	6.5	9.6	224
Miami	1982	4.7	4.1	6.2	9.4	353
Phoenix	1983	6.7	6.6	7.1	13.4	263
Milwaukee	1983	5.4	5.5	6.8	10.8	255
Washington <sup>c</sup>	1983	5.0	6.6	7.1	10.0	178
Philadelphia	1983-4	5.0	5.8	6.3	10.0	203
Atlanta	1984	7.7	4.3	7.4	15.4	266
Richmond, Va.	1984	8.0	7.2	5.5	16.0	297
Pittsburgh	1984	4.7	4.8	6.1	9.4	288
Baltimore	1985	6.1	5.7	5.9	12.2	310
Kansas City	1985	5.0	6.1	6.2	10.0	244
Boston	1985	7.3	4.4	4.8	14.6	218

(a) Per 1,000 Jewish population.

(b) Ratio of children aged 0-4 per 1,000 adults aged 20-34.

(c) Our adjustment of originally different age groupings.

Source: Reports available at Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

more favorable for natality later, when large baby-boom cohorts reached reproductive age. These changes in natality conditions tended to offset one another.

d. Since the large cohorts of women born during the baby boom were at the peak ages of fertility around 1980, an increase in the birthrate was to be expected as a temporary "echo effect." Indeed, Table 2 shows a lessened reduction, and even instances of rise, in the proportion of children aged 0-4 -- and thus also in the birthrate -- according to surveys conducted in the 1980s. The noteworthy fact is how weak these tendencies actually are, considering the great increase of potentially reproductive women due to the large baby-boom cohorts. This in turn attests to the prevalence of very low fertility.

### **Recent Fertility of the Jews**

Aging (see below) partly accounts for the lower birthrates of Jews compared to total whites in the United States. But the fertility of Jews has also been lower than that of total whites in the recent period as it was in the past.

The fact of low recent fertility among Jews, although it has not been accurately measured, can be documented from numerous local community surveys whose age data permit computation of "child-adult ratios." The last column of Table 2 presents the ratios of the number of children aged 0-4 years to the number of adults aged 20-34 for the communities surveyed; by thus relating the number of young children to the number of adults in what are women's most reproductive ages, a rough indicator of fertility is obtained.<sup>17</sup> The following figures can serve as yardsticks for assessing the fertility levels reflected by the child-adult ratios in Table 2: In the United States, the ratio corresponding to minimal population replacement among total whites was approximately 340 for 1970 and 1980.<sup>18</sup> The actual ratios among total whites decreased from approximately 400 in 1970 to 270 in 1980,<sup>19</sup> reflecting the striking fertility drop to subreplacement levels. Thus Table 2 shows that Jewish child-adult ratios fell short of replacement requirements not only at the time of the country-wide NJPS but also according to 32 of the 33 subsequent local surveys listed (a marginal and curious exception is presented by the very aged Jewish community of

Miami); in most instances, including New York, Los Angeles, and other principal concentrations of Jewish population (except Miami), the Jewish ratios ranged far below the replacement level. Further, the ratios for Jews in most of the communities listed, including the large ones (except Miami), fell short of contemporary ratios for total U.S. whites, whose period fertility has been below replacement since the early 1970s. All this contradicts the revisionists' contention that the fertility of U.S. Jews is now at about replacement level<sup>20</sup> and thus "a nonexistent issue."<sup>21</sup>

Besides the NJPS, fertility data for Jews are available from the three cycles of the U.S. National Survey of Family Growth (conducted by the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics in 1973, 1976, and 1982) as well as from the Canadian population censuses of 1971 and 1981. Among these sources, the later ones clearly show reduced fertility at lower reproductive ages. On the other hand, women aged around 40 represented up to the early 1980s cohorts that had experienced the high reproduction of the baby boom or the immediately following period; their comparatively substantial fertility reflected a past period of greater fertility, *not* current conditions of low fertility. This was true of the fertility figures of married Jewish women aged 35-44 derived from two local surveys; 2.1 for New York (1981)<sup>22</sup> and 2.5 for Philadelphia (1983-84).<sup>23</sup> The corresponding figures for all Jewish women there, including the unmarried, must have been lower.

The conceptual distinction between (near-) completed cohort fertility and TFR led to striking disparities in the fertility levels measured by the two approaches during the transition between "baby boom" and "baby bust," when middle-aged women still represented the former period but young women represented the latter. Among U.S. white women in 1981 the average number of children borne by those aged 40-44 was 2.76, while TFR amounted to only 1.73. Similarly, Jewish women in Canada who were 40-44 in 1981 had borne 2.24 children, whereas the average TFR among the Jews of that country amounted to only about 1.6 during the whole intercensal interval 1971-81 and was probably below 1.5 toward its end.<sup>24</sup>

By now low period fertility of Jewish women has lasted so long in the United States that it must approximate the completed fertility of the younger cohorts. Moreover, the distinction

between the fertility of married and of all Jewish women is essential; as marriage propensities decline, the gap between the two widens. As explained above, TFR measures the period fertility of all women, including the unmarried.

Questions about the present level of the Jewish period fertility in the United States had really best be put off pending comprehensive data collection and solid analysis. Failing this, for the time being one can very roughly estimate that TFR is somewhat below 1.5, compared to 1.7 for total whites.

It has been claimed that a fertility rise among Jewish women in their 30s makes up for low fertility at earlier ages and will eventually permit virtual attainment of replacement fertility.<sup>25</sup> There is indeed recent evidence of some increases in the specific birthrates of women in their early 30s -- or of smaller decreases than at other ages -- among both total U.S. whites and Canadian Jews, probably due to postponement of first marriages. But inspection of the data shows that this is actually a minor phenomenon that does not invalidate the basic finding of the great fertility decline to subreplacement levels.

The Canadian census of 1981 solidly demonstrated that ever-married Canadian Jewish women had averaged as few as 1.63 children up to age 30-34; the corresponding figure for all Canadian Jewish women at that age was only 1.44. On the basis of previous empirical evidence,<sup>26</sup> it seems likely that the ever-married might add about a tenth of a child by the end of their reproductive life spans, which would raise the performance of that entire cohort to, say, 1.6. The 30-34-year-old never-married amounted to 12 percent of the cohort in 1981. To boost the average of the entire cohort from 1.6 to 2.1 children, as required for replacement, each of the 30-34-year-old never-married would have to produce nearly 6 children on average, which reduces this particular line of argument to an absurdity.

Analysis of the available U.S. and Canadian data reveals that the low Jewish fertility was largely due to the later start of reproduction, which in turn was apparently due to later marriage by Jews of both sexes. The tendency to postpone first marriage and thus reproduction is well established for the general populations of the United States and Canada; it is empirically documented for Canadian Jews and assumed by Goldscheider himself to extend to U.S. Jews as well. The evidence makes clear, however, that

the delayed fertility does not by any means compensate for the great reduction in early fertility.<sup>27</sup> Therefore it will not lead to an increase but to a net decrease of Jewish fertility. The remarkable spread of surgical sterilization of both males and females in North America for contraceptive purposes, especially among couples where the wife is above 30, further affects future fertility.

### Fertility Expectations

The drop of fertility in developed countries over the last few decades has been dramatic, affecting economic and social conditions and actual or prospective demand for many public services. Therefore, it has become customary to try to anticipate future fertility by studying the childbearing expectations of younger women through interview surveys. A considerable body of information regarding the relationship between expectations and actual performance has accumulated. In the United States, critical evaluation of these data<sup>28</sup> points to the predictive validity of the expectations of women who are married, have already had one child at the time of the survey, and whose marriages continue uninterrupted. If, however, one or more of these conditions are not met, serious discounts must be made in the declared expectations; in particular, there is very little predictive value in the expectations of never-married young women or men, let alone teenagers.

The periodic Fertility Surveys conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census indicate, for total white women including the unmarried:<sup>29</sup>

a. At ages 30-34, a drop in expectations occurred from 2.39 children in 1976 to subreplacement levels since 1981 and 1.98 by 1985. Even at ages 18-24, when many of the interviewed women had not yet married, declared expectations ranged between only 2.0 and 2.1 children throughout the years 1976-85.

b. Among all white women aged 18-34 in 1985, fertility expectations declined with rising educational attainment -- down to 1.77 for those with five or more years of college, 18 percent of whom expected to remain childless. Expectations were also lower for women in the labor force than for those not in it. The point here is that highly educated and employed women are

an important and growing segment of U.S. Jewry, whose reproductive future they will influence.

If these reports are combined with the basic finding that the actual TFR of white U.S. women has been about 1.7 since 1973, they go far to disprove Goldscheider's claim of replacement fertility for all American Jews based on the expectations of Jewish women in a single local survey -- that of Boston in 1975. That survey indicated an average of 2.2 children expected by currently married women in the wide age range 18-45.<sup>30</sup> Even so, this fertility expectation of Jewish women was lower than those of all other religio-ethnic groups compared in the Boston study. Moreover, Goldscheider's own published data reveal that both the youngest age category of married Jewish women in Boston (18-29 years) and the latest marriage cohort (married 1966-75) expected no more than 1.9 children on the average. This was both below replacement and considerably lower than the fertility expectation of any corresponding age category/marriage cohort in that survey. Since, moreover, the figure 1.9 related to already married women, it is too high as a predictor of the eventual completed fertility of all Jewish women in Boston who were 18-29 years old at the time of the survey, including the unmarried. Consequently, the eventual attainment of replacement fertility by these women seems unlikely on the strength of Goldscheider's own data. Some other reports of fertility expectations at about replacement level from local community surveys, which have been cited as predicting Jewish reproduction,<sup>31</sup> are similarly unconvincing because they disregard the methodological reservations already stated.

A study of family-size expectations of very young American Jewish adults was based on data obtained from a national sample of the high-school class of 1972, whose members -- girls and boys -- were interviewed in 1973 and again in 1979. From the data on about 400 Jewish youngsters in the sample, it has been suggested that their "cohort fertility patterns ... will be sufficient for population replacement."<sup>32</sup> But reliance on the fertility expectations of very young respondents has proved imprudent. Moreover, according to the survey itself, not only did the expectations of the Jewish youngsters change considerably from 1973 to 1979 (i.e., between the ages of 18 and 24 approximately), but the average expectations actually declined. A closer look reveals



that already at the later age these were in both sexes somewhat below replacement level.<sup>33</sup>

From NJPS (1970-71) to the third cycle of the National Survey of Family Growth (1982), one finds reduced average fertility expected by: (a) Jewish women who had arrived at the same age in each of the surveys; and (b) a particular cohort of Jewish women that can be identified, at different ages, in both surveys. Completed cohort fertility, including never-married women, will clearly be below replacement level.

### **Future Fertility and Birthrates**

The present fertility situation in the United States and other developed countries is unprecedented. Women of reproductive age today are the first to use highly efficient methods of contraception on a large scale. The brevity of this experience and our consequent lack of perspective make predictions difficult. Two schools of thought have emerged among demographers. One, a growing majority, holds that low fertility has come to stay, though some ups and downs may of course occur. The other foresees a cyclical pattern due to different opportunities in the labor market for large or small cohorts that were born respectively during booms or slumps of natality and may reproduce in opposition to the tendencies of their parents. This is essentially an economic approach that disregards sociopsychological and educational factors. But as the current low fertility and the related changes in marriage patterns (see below) persist, the first-mentioned view -- which assumes continuation of these trends in the foreseeable future -- is gaining credence.

In the United States, the Bureau of the Census has revised downward to 1.9 the future average fertility for total whites in the middle series of its recent population projections, explaining that higher assumptions seem unrealistic. Thus the Bureau assumes the continuation of below-replacement fertility, foreseeing the eventual cessation of natural increase and indeed -- at moderate immigration -- of population growth altogether. The Bureau's "low" series posits a gradual further decline of TFR to 1.6 in the year 2010; its "high" series a TFR of 2.3 in 2025.<sup>34</sup>

All the accumulated empirical evidence shows that the fertility of Jews has been consistently and significantly below

that of total whites in the United States. Hence, if the Bureau of the Census holds that fertility for total whites is likely to continue below the replacement level of 2.1, that for Jews should be even lower. Even if total whites were to attain a TFR of 2.3 in the next century, according to the Bureau's high projection, and the upswing were to carry Jews along, the Jewish TFR might still remain below replacement level because of the fertility differentials that have prevailed so far between the two groups.

The size of a population is directly influenced by its birthrate (the combination of fertility and age composition). The age structures of both total whites and Jews have recently been favorable for natality because of large baby-boom cohorts in the ages at which women are most reproductive. This situation, however, is changing as successively smaller birth cohorts occupy that age range. The inevitable result will be a marked reduction of births in the next few decades. These dynamics are illustrated by the projections of the Bureau of the Census concerning total U.S. whites, which anticipate a considerable decline in the absolute number and rate of births not only at constant but even at moderately rising fertility.

A substantial drop in the absolute and relative frequency of births must be anticipated for U.S. Jews as well. Their birthrate will be particularly depressed by their greater aging. Whereas the course of fertility will depend on future attitudes and societal "fashions," the age structure of a population is virtually predetermined several decades earlier when large or small cohorts of prospective parents are themselves born. The smaller cohorts born in the United States during the 1960s and the 1970s, among Jews as among total whites, will tend to reduce births in coming decades.

The revisionists<sup>35</sup> disregard the evidence of some 30 community surveys that the birthrate and fertility of U.S. Jews are very low indeed. They also disregard the continued prevalence of subreplacement fertility among total U.S. whites and its implication for the assessment of Jewish fertility in view of the abundant evidence that Jewish fertility is consistently lower than that of total whites. They have not even attempted to explain why this empirical ranking should suddenly be reversed, with Jews attaining replacement levels of fertility while total whites do not. Instead, the revisionists have chosen to focus on the

(near-) completed fertility of middle-aged Jewish women, which reflects the higher levels of earlier times but not current levels; or on the fertility expected by groups of Jews that include young and never-married individuals whose expectations must be discounted.

## NUPTIALITY

Up to NJPS (1970-71), the average age at first marriage for U.S. Jews was somewhat higher than that for total whites, but the proportions of ever-married persons of both sexes above age 30 were also higher. That is, despite some delay in marrying, a greater proportion of Jews than of total whites eventually married. Mean age at first marriage decreased in both groups after World War II. Furthermore, between the ages of 30 and 44, Jews not only had smaller percentages of never-marrieds but also of unmarried persons altogether, since among them divorce was less frequent and remarriage (whether after divorce or widowhood) more frequent.

Since about 1970 the marriage patterns of the U.S. white population have changed: age at first marriage and the proportions of never-marrieds have risen for both sexes, and divorce has also increased. All this, among other factors, is related to an enhanced pursuit of "individuation," greater labor-force participation and economic independence for women, increased sexual freedom and efficiency in contraception, cohabitation without formal marriage, etc. Similar trends prevail in Canada.

Undoubtedly these changing mores have influenced American Jews, but documentation is deficient. There are no statistics of current marriages (i.e., of weddings) for Jews in the United States, and local community surveys provide little relevant information. Even such basic data as the Jewish population's distribution by sex, age, and marital status are lacking from most published surveys.

The fragmentary information indicates increased proportions of never-marrieds among younger U.S. Jews. This is confirmed for Canadian Jews by Canadian census data. The significance of this trend becomes clear when one considers that conditions in the "marriage market" were favorable during most of the 1970s

and early 1980s due to balanced and plentiful supplies of candidates of both sexes. Previously, there had been prolonged "squeezes" (i.e., surpluses of marriageable people of one sex), first of men in the 1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s, then of women from the mid-1960s to the beginning of the 1970s, because (a) men tend to marry later than women, so grooms belong to earlier and brides to later cohorts, and (b) the cohorts born during the Great Depression were of decreasing size while subsequent cohorts (people born in the postwar baby boom) were large.<sup>36</sup> The rise in the proportion of never-marrieds around 1980 despite the improved demographic chances for marriage support the idea that a profound and probably enduring change is taking place.

Analysis of the Canadian census data for Jews shows specifically that the frequency of first marriages at comparatively late ages remained constant among Jewish men and increased only slightly among Jewish women. Consequently, belated marriages do not compensate for the conspicuous decreases in younger marriages, contrary to the revisionists' claim to this effect.<sup>37</sup>

The recent data on Jews in the United States and Canada also show a rapid increase in the proportion of divorced individuals and of one-parent households. Because of the relatively fewer and later first marriages as well as increased divorces, the proportions of currently unmarried persons at reproductive ages are on the rise in both sexes. All these changes have adverse implications for the fertility of the Jews as for that of the total population.

## OUT-MARRIAGES AND MIXED MARRIAGES

### Determinants and Definitions

For a subpopulation like the Jews, not only the incidence of marriage but also mate selection within or without this subpopulation is of demographic relevance. Since the 1960s there has been a steep increase in out-marriages (i.e., both mixed and conversionary marriages) of Jews in North America. This is part of the wider process of the integration of Jews into the general society, associated with the rise in the generation status of the Jews and in the receptivity of the society. It is also connected with the reduced religiosity of the Jews and their readier acceptance

of out-marriages on the familial and communal levels, as well as with the not-uncommon desirability of individual Jews (those who are well educated, affluent, etc.) as marriage partners. It accords with comprehensive tendencies of interethnic and interdenominational integration of the U.S. white population.

Besides the wider societal determinants, some more specifically demographic ones are operating for an increase in Jewish out-marriage:

a. Once religious and social barriers to out-marriage have become weakened, the dispersion and small size of many Jewish populations in towns or suburbs reduce the opportunity of finding acceptable marriage partners within the group.

b. The intensive migrations and geographical redistribution of Jews away from their centers of concentration in the northeast United States have in fact produced small groups of Jews in localities where none resided before, or groups of new arrivals lacking social connections with Jews already resident there. A special case in point are the boarding universities, with their interreligious and interethnic atmosphere, which attract a great many young Jews of marriageable age.

c. "Marriage squeezes," due to sex imbalances at the prime ages of marrying for young men and women, constitute an incentive to exogamy for members of a minority group like the Jews.

The term "endogamy" or "in-marriage" is applied to unions of two Jewish partners. Currently endogamous marriages comprise those where both spouses have been Jewish from birth as well as those where the originally non-Jewish spouse converted. The term "exogamy" or "out-marriage" is applied to unions where one partner was not born a Jew.<sup>38</sup> Out-marriages can be divided into those that are "mixed" -- that is, nonconversionary or currently exogamous -- and those that are conversionary. "Conversion" in this context preserves a familiar terminology; in actual fact, self-identification is usually meant, not necessarily a formal conversion (whose validity may be contested by various branches of Judaism).

Reasoned consideration of Jewish out-marriage is bedeviled by definitional and measurement problems. Markedly different results are obtained if one computes the proportion of out-married individuals among the Jewish married population or the proportion of couples with one partner who was not born Jewish among all

couples with at least one Jewish partner; if one counts only currently exogamous couples ("mixed marriages") or also those that have been made religiously endogamous through a partner's conversion to Judaism before or after the wedding; if one counts total exogamous Jewish individuals or couples, including those who married in the past when the frequency of out-marriage was much smaller, or only those who married recently when out-marriage had become far more common. Table 3, using NJPS data, demonstrates the remarkable differences resulting from these various alternatives (there are even more possibilities if one takes into account the sex of the Jewish individuals involved). Inattention to these definitional differences is widespread and leads to spurious comparisons between figures that are really incomparable.

**Table 3**  
**Measuring Out-Marriage of Individuals and Couples, NJPS Data, 1970-71**

Type of marriage	Out-married Jewish individuals as a percent of all married Jews	Out-married couples as a percent of all couples with at least one Jewish spouse
All out-marriages (mixed and conversionary)		
Total	8.1	15.0
Recent (1965-71)	29.2	45.1
Mixed marriages (non-conversionary only)		
Total	6.8	12.5
Recent (1965-71)	22.5	34.8

Moreover, it is to be feared that all Jewish-organized collections of data concerning out-marriage -- including local community surveys -- have led to biased results that underestimate the frequency of the phenomenon and overestimate the Jewishness of the out-married households. For various reasons -- the psychological resistance of the persons concerned and/or excessive costs -- the surveys fail to adequately encompass out-marriages of ex-Jews, of very alienated Jews, or of Jews who live in typically non-Jewish surroundings.

Despite the salience of the topic, recent sources on the extent of Jewish out-marriage in the United States are quite

fragmentary, and documentation of the demographic consequences of out-marriage is even worse.

### **Known Extent of Mixed Marriages**

The predominant pattern of Jewish out-marriage in the United States and Canada is mixed -- that is, nonconversionary -- marriage (see below). Therefore Table 4 presents an overview of recent data on mixed marriages, both couple and individual rates, distributing the latter according to period of wedding or, failing this information, according to the age of the Jewish spouse at the time of the respective survey (which can serve as an indirect indicator of wedding period). It is seen that great variation exists in the local data. Regarding recent marriages, New York, with its unique potential for Jewish endogamy, reported the lowest level of Jews contracting mixed marriages -- 11 percent. The figures were much higher in the west and south, rising to 61 percent in Denver.

By aggregating the available survey figures, weighted for the size of the respective Jewish populations, and allocating figures for the missing Jewish communities according to those of geographically and typologically similar ones for which reports exist, one can roughly estimate that Jews contracting mixed marriages constituted nearly 30 percent of all recently married Jews in the United States.<sup>39</sup> The corresponding percentage for the whole of Canada is about 25 percent (although the figures from the official marriage statistics, quoted in Table 4, are somewhat higher since they omit the province of Quebec, where mixed marriage used to be below the country average). A mixed-marriage rate of 25 percent for Jewish individuals means that of all couples with at least one Jewish partner approximately 40 percent are mixed, and the inferred U.S. rate of 30 percent for individuals means that 45 percent of all couples with at least one Jewish partner are mixed. The corresponding out-marriage rates, including conversionary marriages, are even greater. Until NJPS, Jewish men out-married more frequently than Jewish women, but the latter have been catching up in recent years.

If Jews, who in most parts of the United States constitute a tiny minority, were to choose their spouses at random, hardly any endogamous Jewish couples would be formed at all. In fact,

a strong tendency for in-marriage still persists among American Jews. Nevertheless, present levels of out-marriage, their rising trend, and especially their consequences are reasons for concern.

### Consequences of Out-Marriages

The demographic consequences of out-marriage are both direct and indirect. The direct consequence is additions or losses to the Jewish population, either in the first generation (i.e., among the out-marrying Jews themselves) or in subsequent generations. The indirect consequence is the diminished Jewishness of the respective households, which may eventually produce the direct consequence just defined.

Additions to the Jewish population are accomplished by formal conversion or informal accession of the non-Jewish-born spouse. Losses -- through formal or informal secession of the Jewish-born spouse -- as well as instances of advanced alienation are insufficiently measured in Jewish-sponsored surveys, even in so well-designed and major a project as NJPS.<sup>40</sup> In U.S. Jewish population surveys, as in the official censuses of other countries, the practice is to accept the declaration of the respondent: a Jew is anyone (self-) reported to be Jewish at the time of enumeration.<sup>41</sup>

Among U.S. Jews today, conversionary marriages constitute only a minority of out-marriages. Conversions to Judaism for marital reasons occur more often among women than among men; this lower frequency of male conversions is disadvantageous for the Jewish population. According to NJPS, in only 16 percent of out-marriages did the originally non-Jewish spouse convert to Judaism (formally or informally) -- 22 percent of all the originally non-Jewish wives but only 3 percent of the originally non-Jewish husbands. The rapid increase of Jewish out-marriage in the second half of the 1960s was not accompanied by an increase in the proportion of originally non-Jewish spouses converting, according to the NJPS. More recent community surveys have consistently confirmed that only a minority of the spouses of out-married Jews were reported as Jewish. In 1981 in New York, where the proportion of out-marriages ranked at the low end of the U.S. range (cf. Table 4), less than a quarter of the non-Jewish-born spouses had converted to Judaism.<sup>42</sup> Most of the recent surveys



**Table 4****Percentage of Jews with Currently Non-Jewish Spouse, by Year of Marriage/Age: United States and Canada, 1957-1986**

Community	Year	Couples, total <sup>a</sup>	Individuals, by year of marriage							
			Total <sup>a</sup>	1980-84	1975-79	1970-74	1965-69	1960-64	1955-59	1950-54
<b>Canada</b>	1981	18 <sup>b</sup>	10 <sup>b</sup>	28 <sup>c</sup>	25 <sup>c</sup>	19 <sup>c</sup>	12 <sup>c</sup>	9 <sup>c</sup>	8 <sup>c</sup>	6 <sup>c</sup>
<b>United States</b>										
Total (CPS)	1957	7.6	4							
Total (NJPS)	1970-1	12.5	7			22.5	10	5	4	
Seattle	1978	44	28							
Oklahoma City	1980	15	8							
Rochester	1980	11	6							
New York	1981	10	6		11	9				
St. Louis	1981	13	7	25 <sup>d</sup>	19 <sup>d</sup>		6 <sup>d</sup>			
Minneapolis	1981	18	10							
St. Paul	1981	11	6							
Atlanta	1984	20	12							
Boston <sup>d</sup>	1985	.	.	29	29	20	27	10	5	0
Kansas City	1985	31	21	46		26		11		
Metro West, N.J.	1986	12	7							

Community	Year	Couples, total <sup>a</sup>	Total <sup>a</sup>	Individuals, by age			
				18-29	30-39	40-49	50-59
Boston	1965	7	4	11	4	4	2
	1975	11	6	13	10	12	2
Kansas City	1976						
Respondents		7	4	6 <sup>f</sup>	3 <sup>f</sup>	2 <sup>f</sup>	
Children <sup>e</sup>		31	18	27 <sup>f</sup>	10 <sup>f</sup>	13 <sup>f</sup>	
Los Angeles	1967	10	5				
	1979	19	12	33	13	7	8
Cleveland	1980	18	11	24	19	14	5
Chicago	1981	17	9	16	18	8	4
Denver	1981	30	18	61	32	8	7
Miami <sup>d</sup>	1982	10	5	22 <sup>g</sup>		13 <sup>g</sup>	8 <sup>g</sup>
Milwaukee	1983	19	11	28	20	9	6
Phoenix	1983	24	14	40	17	14	7
Washington, D.C.	1983	25	15	28 <sup>h</sup>	21 <sup>h</sup>	14 <sup>h</sup>	10 <sup>h</sup>
Philadelphia	1983-4	22	12	34	23	13	8
Pittsburgh	1984						
Respondents		10	5				
Children <sup>i</sup>		26	15	29	20	6	4
Richmond	1984	33	20	44	29	21	6
Baltimore <sup>d</sup>	1985	22	12	24	23	12	6

**Notes to Table 4**

(a) If only the individual rate or only the couple rate was published, we computed the other as well.

(b) 1981 census (whole country).

(c) Official vital statistics. Quebec province not included.

(d) Including persons converted to Judaism.

(e) Regardless of place of residence.

(f) The ages are respectively 18-34, 35-44, 45 and over.

(g) The ages are respectively 18-34, 35-49, 50-64.

(h) The ages are respectively 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54.

(i) Pittsburgh residents.

Source: Reports available at Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

point to even lower conversion rates at higher levels of Jewish out-marriage. Silberman entitled the demographic chapter of *A Certain People* "Jews by Choice," since it mostly describes instances of originally non-Jewish women who married Jewish husbands and became Jews themselves. This is, however, a cheerfully one-sided picture. It disregards the usual form of out-marriage, namely, couples who continue to be mixed; instances of alienation or secession of Jews due to out-marriage; and the rarity of originally non-Jewish husbands becoming Jews.

For the second generation, the direct demographic consequence of out-marriage manifests itself in two ways:

a. Analysis of NJPS data pointed to lower-than-average fertility of out-married as compared to endogamous Jewish couples. This finding is replicated in other Diaspora countries,<sup>43</sup> but no other sufficiently detailed data source for U.S. Jews has become available since NJPS. At any rate, such a pattern is intrinsically plausible, because the same sections of the Jewish population may have -- for interrelated reasons -- enhanced tendencies both to out-marriage and to particularly low marital fertility, and also because the upbringing of children in mixed households poses specific problems.

b. Most conversionary couples may be expected to rear the children in their joint religion. But what about children of mixed couples, which predominate among the out-marrieds? Were it not for predilective decisions by the parents, half of the children of mixed couples ought to be Jews. In fact, NJPS and later studies have shown that a majority of the children are brought up as Jews when their Jewish mother has a non-Jewish husband, while the opposite obtains in the reverse situation. According to NJPS, 86 percent of the children of mixed couples with Jewish wives but only 17 percent<sup>44</sup> of those of mixed couples with Jewish husbands were identified as Jews by their parents. The corresponding proportions in New York in 1981 were 73 percent and 35 percent. According to NJPS, 44 percent of total children of mixed couples but as few as 15 percent of the 0-4-year-old children of mixed couples married during 1965-71 were Jews; accordingly, only 75 percent of all the 0-4-year-old children in total Jewish households, including the mixed ones, were themselves Jews at that time (1970-71). In New York in 1981, the proportion of Jews among total children of mixed couples amounted

to 53 percent due to the increased frequency in mixed marriage of Jewish women, most of whom bring up their children as Jews, and probably also due to the environmental influence of the large Jewish population in that city. In Chicago (1981) only 40 percent and in Kansas City (1985) only 38 percent of total children of mixed couples were identified as Jews. The corresponding figures in Philadelphia (1983-84), according to sex of the Jewish parent, were: mother Jewish, 40 percent; father Jewish, 22 percent. A study of <sup>45</sup>children of out-married couples found only a quarter to be Jews.

Mixed households, where each spouse maintains his or her original religion, are likely to observe, to some extent, the religious practices of both spouses. Local community surveys find in mixed households not only children who are reported as belonging to a non-Jewish (mostly Christian) denomination but also children having no religion or having more than one. Even those identified as Jews are likely to have some affinity to the religion of the non-Jewish parent as well.

A study in Philadelphia covering three generations found that mixed marriages in one generation entailed greater percentages of mixed marriages and increasingly <sup>46</sup>smaller percentages of Jewish children in the following generations. If both parents of the Jewish respondent whose marriage was mixed had been Jews, 37 percent of the grandchildren were Jews; if the grandparents had been a mixed couple, none of the grandchildren were found to be Jewish in this particular study.

The Jewish out-marriage situation in the United States is thus very complex, fluid and -- in its rapidly expanding dimensions -- novel. It is characterized by strong local variations, though most survey results point to losses and not to gains for the Jewish communities studied. On the whole, out-marriage seems to operate toward a long-term reduction of the Jewish population (concerning the identificational balance in general, see below). For many Jews who out-marry and for their children, the prevalent process is not a one-time severance from Jewishness but rather a chain of events, each of which raises the likelihood that the following ones will adversely affect the size or cohesion of the Jewish population. All this is taking place alongside an overall decline of Jewishness in the endogamously Jewish homes. Traditional Judaism, as a result of age-long Jewish minority status, developed

a cautious attitude toward conversion of non-Jews. One might imagine a more encouraging attitude that could result in demographic accessions -- but these might also lead to intensified tensions within the U.S. Jewish community if many conversions were contested among the various branches of organized Judaism.

Together with the population of Jews, an "enlarged Jewish population" exists now in the United States, comprising the Jews plus their non-Jewish household members. In 1970-71, 430,000 of the latter were counted by NJPS, and their absolute and relative numbers must have considerably increased in the meantime. There is an even much larger and likewise growing section of non-Jewish Americans who have Jewish relatives. The paradox is that, while the enlarged Jewish population expands, the number of actual Jews can diminish. It is our understanding of the situation that this will actually happen. To be sure about it and to obtain more insights into the complex sociodemographic dynamics involved, the collection of adequate country-wide data is imperative.

## AGING OF THE POPULATION

The aging of a population is primarily a consequence of low fertility. No wonder, therefore, that Jews, with their prolonged lower-than-average fertility, exhibit more pronounced aging than total U.S. whites. NJPS showed for the whole country, and subsequent community surveys have shown locally with very few exceptions, that the proportion of elderly (i.e., persons aged 65 and over) among the Jews exceeds the corresponding proportion in the total population. For the United States as a whole, the percentages of elderly were: around 1970, 12 percent for Jews (according to NJPS) compared to 10 percent for total whites; in 1985, an estimated <sup>47</sup>17 percent for Jews compared to 13 percent for total whites.

The large proportion of Jews in late middle age found by NJPS made the intensification of aging almost inevitable. That factor has been reinforced by the very low Jewish birthrates of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Intensified aging was empirically observed in most instances <sup>48</sup>where successive surveys were conducted in the same community.

The proportion of the elderly in the Jewish population

varies widely among communities. Old-established communities may be affected by greater aging than those whose populations are largely composed of newcomers attracted by expanding job opportunities. In contrast, the migration of elderly Jews from northern localities, where they spent most of their lives, to Sunbelt cities raises the percentages of elderly in the latter.

The proportion of Jewish elderly will remain around 17 percent beyond the end of the century as small cohorts born during the 1930s and in the early 1940s enter the 65-plus age range. Projections based on varied assumptions (see below) show that the influence exercised by the present age structure of the Jewish population is so overriding that a moderate increase in Jewish fertility cannot much alter the proportion of elderly. When the large cohorts born during the baby boom reach the 65-plus age range in the second decade of the next century, the proportion of elderly will receive a powerful boost.<sup>49</sup> Even before the end of this century, the elderly themselves will age: the proportion of the very old (aged 75 or more) will rise both among all the elderly and in the U.S. Jewish population as a whole. Among other consequences, this will inevitably raise the Jewish death rate. Greater aging is foreseen also for total U.S. whites,<sup>50</sup> but at a lower level than for Jews.

The effects of pronounced aging of a population are manifold and profound. Because it reflects reduced proportions of persons in the reproductive ages and relatively many old people, aging tends to reduce population increase and eventually population size. At given levels of fertility, aging lowers the birthrate because of the reduced proportion of people in the reproductive ages; at given life expectancies, it raises the death rate because of the increased frequency of elderly. Moreover, the smaller proportion of young adults may reduce the opportunities for endogamously Jewish marriages and thus, other things being equal, increase the probability of out-marriages. The size and composition of Jewish households are influenced by aging, a trend toward one-person households being one result. In the economic sphere, pronounced aging affects the ratio of retired to working persons and the composition of the Jewish labor force. Aging is likely to have an impact also on most other life spheres: dwelling and consumption patterns, leisure pursuits, health status, service needs (more demand for geriatric assistance, including institutional-

ization, less demand for schooling), etc. Accentuated aging may affect the whole tenor of Jewish life in the United States on the individual, familial, and communal levels, and possibly the position of the Jewish group in the general society.

The revisionist writers have virtually ignored the effects of the present and future aging of the U.S. Jewish population. This applies both to the influence of aging on natural increase and to the widely ramified economic, social, and communal implications of aging.

## **OTHER DEMOGRAPHIC DYNAMICS**

### **Mortality**

No comprehensive data on mortality are available for U.S. Jews, but for overall assessments of their demographic situation and trends it can be assumed that their mortality is very low, like that of whites in general.

### **Immigration**

U.S. Jewry has had a favorable balance of migration vis-a-vis all the other regions of the Jewish world, including Israel, but the extent of this balance has varied considerably. There was a spurt of immigration in the second half of the 1970s due especially to the arrival of Soviet Jews, whose exit has been virtually barred in more recent years. In longer-term consideration, it should be realized that moderate migratory increments are no more than a palliative whose effect will fade away unless the absorbing population can replace itself on its own.

### **Internal Migration**

There has been a marked tendency for Jews to move away from their large concentrations in the northeast to the west and south. This scattering can have different consequences from the Jewish point of view: it may reduce Jewish cohesion, especially when Jews move to localities where no Jewish community existed before; but sometimes it may reinvigorate existing communities

that stagnated.<sup>51</sup> On the whole, it probably increases exposure to assimilation, and therefore may become an important determinant of the demographic future of American Jewry.

### Accessions and Secessions

While community surveys furnish some information on accessions, especially through conversionary marriages, they are, as mentioned above, rather unsuccessful in including alienated Jews, ex-Jews, or non-Jews of Jewish descent (if either of the latter categories is targeted for inclusion). An exception are some of the children reported in such surveys: a large proportion of children of mixed couples are not Jews, and if these amount to more than 50 percent, a loss is incurred by the Jewish population; in addition, a small proportion of even the children of Jewish couples are reported by their own parents to be not Jews.<sup>52</sup>

For a realistic assessment of the balance of accessions and secessions in the Jewish population, one needs information either on (a) current religious identification of relatives of those Jews who were reported in Jewish-sponsored surveys or, better still, on (b) changes of religious identification among samples of the total population. The General Social Surveys, conducted since 1972 by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago, have collected data of the latter type. According to this source, Jews have the lowest ratio of conversions to "disaffiliations" and the relatively greatest net loss among 14 religious groups in the United States, including the "no religion" category.<sup>53</sup> But obviously, the matter requires further investigation.

### Population Balance

We have inferred above from the percentages of children in many recent community surveys (cf. Table 2) that the "effectively Jewish" birthrate of U.S. Jewry is about 10 per 1,000.<sup>54</sup> Its death rate must exceed that of total whites, which has of late been close to 9 per 1,000, because of the Jews' greater aging. In fact, application of the age-sex-specific mortality rates of total whites to our estimates of the U.S. Jewish population, by age and sex, suggests a death rate of 12 per 1,000 for Jews during 1981-85. Thus it is not impossible that a slightly negative

natural increase has just set in among U.S. Jewry. Moreover, it is evident that, barring an unexpected sudden fertility increase, this negative tendency will soon intensify -- generally because of further aging of the Jewish population, and in particular because the Jewish birthrate will diminish when smaller cohorts occupy the prime reproductive ages.

In the absence of solid data on the respective balances of immigration versus emigration and of accessions versus secessions among U.S. Jewry, one is reduced to conjectures. It does not seem unlikely that net assimilatory losses, even if very moderately assessed, may approximate the positive migration balance at its present low level.

The conclusions from all this interplay of components are: First, the population balance of U.S. Jews is to be estimated at close to zero at present. Second, changes in a component which are small by themselves can now tilt the balance in either a positive or a negative direction. Third, this balance is likely to become clearly negative in the future, as indicated by demographic projections.

## **POPULATION SIZE AND PROJECTIONS**

### **Size of the U.S. Jewish Population**

The size of the U.S. Jewish population is imperfectly known. Determining the size of any population involves two elements: definition and measurement. As mentioned above, Jewish community surveys (like official censuses) accept the self-definitions of the people surveyed. A Jew is essentially a person who is reported -- by the respondent for a particular household -- to be Jewish at that time,<sup>55</sup> even if this description does not conform with rulings of halakhah.<sup>56</sup> As for measurement, at least three types of data exist: results of sample surveys, which for cost reasons deal with only relatively small samples and consequently have large margins of error; updating estimates based ultimately on survey results; and other estimates arrived at in a variety of ways and of varied quality. With the exception of NJPS, U.S. Jewish surveys have been only local and nonsynchronous, and consequently not representative of total American Jewry.



Two estimates of the size of the U.S. Jewish population were derived from NJPS data by different experts:

a. Fred Massarik and Alvin Chenkin published a figure of 5.8 million residing in "Jewish households." This included 430,000 non-Jewish persons in such households, but excluded up to 50,000 Jewish residents of institutions.<sup>57</sup> Consequently, the number of Jews amounted to about 5.420 million according to this version.

b. Bernard Lazerwitz published three estimates for the number of Jews in private households: low, 5.555 million; medium, 5.779 million; high,<sup>58</sup> 6.002 million. Here again institutionalized Jews must be added.

The updating estimates in the annual article "Jewish Population in the United States" in the *American Jewish Year Book (AJYB)*, after incorporating NJPS results, according to Massarik's version, fluctuated around 5.8 million until 1985; the figure for 1985 was 5.835 million. The article explained, however, that these totals actually included non-Jewish household members, who were originally estimated at 430,000 and eventually at between 6 and 7 percent. Thus "the numbers of individuals in 'Jewish households' who identify themselves as Jewish in 1985 would be approximately 5.425 million."<sup>59</sup>

Taking into account both versions of the NJPS results as well as other sources and considerations, we proposed using the round figure of 5.6 million as a provisional estimate of the number of U.S. Jews -- excluding non-Jewish household members -- in 1970-71.<sup>60</sup> Since no serious attempt at improving on that figure was made in the United States, despite our recommendation, we continued to use it for 1975, on the assumption that the net balance of Jewish population changes had been negligible. We raised the estimate to 5.690 million in 1980, and to 5.705 million in 1982, because of increased immigration, especially of Soviet Jews; but we kept it at the latter level for 1984 because of the decline of Jewish immigration.<sup>61</sup>

Three further aspects deserve to be noted:

a. It is probable that all the mentioned figures include not a few persons who are actually far removed from Jewish religion and culture.

b. Our estimates of 5.6-5.7 million Jews in the United States in the 1970s and early 1980s were actually *higher* than those of about 5.4 million featured in the *AJYB* until 1985.

This should dispel any suspicion that we are inveterate pessimists.

c. The *AJYB* article on "Jewish Population in the United States, 1986" was prepared by a new team who had studied the subject afresh, revising the long list of local estimates that together provide the basis for the country-wide total. They came up with a figure of 5.814 million for 1986, but warned: "While every effort has been made to exclude non-Jews from the figures, this has not always been feasible. We calculate that non-Jews *not* excluded comprise under 2 percent of the national Jewish population."<sup>62</sup> Deducing "under 2 percent" from 5.814 million, one arrives at approximately 5.7 million; so this new estimate -- notwithstanding appearances -- actually agrees with ours.<sup>63</sup>

### Demographic Projections

Demographic projections are not, of course, prophecies. They merely indicate the consequences, in quantitative terms, if a given population evolves according to certain assumptions. The more realistic the assumptions, the greater the chance that the projection will approximate the actual evolution. Alternative projections make it possible to compare the results of different scenarios and thus convey an impression of the plausible range of variability.

We present here several demographic projections for U.S. Jewry, exploring different possible courses of evolution over the 15, 25, and 35 years beginning with 1985.<sup>64</sup> We start from a population of 5.7 million in 1985, initially disregarding external migrations so as to deal specifically with internal evolution of the U.S. Jewish community.

We shall assume two fertility levels and combine each with three assumptions of net assimilatory losses (including a nil assumption). This will give six versions of internal evolution. Mortality is uniformly low in all these versions, similar to that assumed (specific for age and sex) in recent official projections for total U.S. whites.

Assumptions for fertility: We have above expressed the opinion that the "effectively Jewish" TFR is now below 1.5 children per Jewish woman, but we shall start here with the somewhat higher round figure of 1.5. Two courses of future fertility are

illustrated: *low*, continuation of TFR at the level of 1.5 children; *rising*, a gradual increase to 2.1 children by the year 2000 and then continuation on this level. Thus rising fertility would lead up to replacement level -- in accordance with the revisionists' claim -- though this actually appears as a bold upper limit since recent official projections for total whites have assumed for the span 2000-2020 only 1.9 children in their middle version or 2.2-2.3 children in the high version, and Jews have had lower fertility than total whites.

Assumptions for net assimilatory losses: *nil*; *moderate*, only 0.2 percent per year (or 7 percent over 35 years) in the ages above early childhood, but cumulatively 0.5 percent per year (or 17.5 percent at the end of 35 years) among the newborn, because of assumed expansion of out-marriages;<sup>65</sup> *large*, double the moderate assumptions. The nil assumption has been included for illustrative purposes, though it does not appear realistic at present; a fortiori, no assumption of net assimilatory gains is used.

Table 5 presents the projection results. According to five of the six versions of internal evolution, a clear decrease of the U.S. Jewish population will occur during the projection period. Only if fertility were to rise very markedly, and net assimilatory losses could be avoided, would it be possible for the present number of Jews to maintain itself until 2020 through internal evolution alone. Hypothetically the same result might be attained at continuing low fertility if the number of Jews -- as distinct from their non-Jewish household members -- were to swell substantially through net assimilatory gains. It must be noted, however, that even under the most optimistic assumption presented in Table 5, a reduction of population size would set in soon after the year 2020 because of increased aging. Under the other assumptions, an acceleration of population decrease would then take place.

These findings must be viewed in a larger context. The U.S. white population in general is expected to start declining in the first half of the next century unless its fertility rises considerably and/or it is reinforced by large immigration. According to the low series of the official projections -- assuming a TFR of 1.6 -- an ever-intensifying excess of deaths over births would prevail from the year 2006 onward; according to the middle series -- TFR of 1.9 -- this would happen beginning with 2026.<sup>66</sup>

It seems likely that only a substantial upswing in U.S. fertility generally, which might carry along Jews as well, could change existing trends among them, although even then Jews would be handicapped by their greater aging and, being a minority group, by their exposure to assimilatory risks.

**Table 5**  
**Alternative Projections of U.S. Jewry, 1985-2010**  
**(1985 population = 5.7 million)**

Assumptions <sup>a</sup>		Jews (millions)		
Net assimilatory losses	Fertility	2000	2010	2020
		Internal evolution <sup>b</sup>		
Nil	Rising	5.6	5.6	5.6
Nil	Low	5.4	5.1	4.9
Moderate	Rising	5.3	5.1	4.8
Moderate	Low	5.1	4.7	4.3
Large	Rising	5.1	4.6	4.1
Large	Low	4.9	4.3	3.7
			Migration balance of + 15,000 annually	
Moderate	Low	5.4	5.1	4.7

(a) Explanations in text.

(b) I.e., regardless of external migration balance.

International migrations in general and those of Jews in particular are notoriously difficult to foresee. With a positive migratory balance averaging 10-15,000 annually, U.S. Jewry would receive cumulative reinforcements of between 350,000 and 525,000 persons during the 35-year projection period. This would mitigate but not radically change the picture suggested by the projections of internal demographic evolution.

Assuming what seems the most likely course of internal evolution -- continued low fertility and moderate assimilatory losses -- as well as a cumulative migratory balance of even 525,000 up to 2020,<sup>67</sup> the number of Jews would decline from 5.7 million in 1985 to 5.4 million in 2000, 5.1 million in 2010, and

4.7 million by 2020. The proportion of elderly (65 and over) would rise from 17 percent to approximately 23 percent of the Jewish population, compared to a drop from 18 percent to 11 percent in the proportion of children aged 0-14 years.

If immigration should prove larger, U.S. Jewish population figures would be correspondingly larger than those shown in Table 5.<sup>68</sup> However, even a considerably larger immigration would not prevent an eventual decrease of U.S. Jewry if the immigrants' demographic behavior resembled that assumed for native-born U.S. Jews. Any migratory reinforcements will be whittled away sooner or later unless U.S. Jewry succeeds in maintaining its size through higher reproduction and lower assimilatory erosion.<sup>69</sup>

While the demographic evolution of U.S. Jewry will not proceed exactly according to any of these projections -- which are based on simplistic assumptions, as is usual in projection making -- the prospect of a population decline even within the next few decades that emerges from the various scenarios is unmistakable. In consequence, the assertion that "predictions about the drastic numerical decline of the American Jewish population in the next generation is demographic nonsense"<sup>70</sup> must be received with reserve. Moreover, the evolutionary prospects of a population must not be viewed in the narrow dimensions of a few decades, certainly not if a major section of the Jewish people, with its remarkable continuity, is involved.<sup>71</sup> It is precisely the longer-term risks inherent in the present demographic trends of U.S. Jewry that give cause for concern.

It is possible that the undesirable consequences of the trends identified here can be averted by conscious demographic policies. It is also possible that demographic trends in the U.S. population as a whole may change, affecting Jewish demographic trends as well. We would be only too pleased if new developments canceled or mitigated the consequences we foresee of currently operating demographic trends.

## CONCLUSIONS

The recent socioeconomic progress and success of American Jewry are extremely gratifying. From the wider Jewish point of

view they come, together with the rise of the State of Israel, after the abysmal tragedy of the Holocaust and are thus further evidence of the remarkable resilience that has characterized the Jewish people in its long history. Yet socioeconomic success cannot be a proof, or guarantee, of the intrinsic soundness of American Jewry's demographic situation. The United States and the other highly developed nations, despite their ascendancy in the world, face reductions in population size, intensification of aging, etc. if present demographic trends continue and barring large movements of immigration. Neither can the demographic problems of U.S. Jewry be glossed over by reference to the intensive Jewish activities that are going on. Central European Jewry had prolific Jewish activities in the mid-1920s and yet had an excess of deaths over "effectively Jewish" births. Nor are some newly developed modes of Jewish cohesion in the United States -- e.g., wide concern for Israel, increased knowledge of Hebrew, the *havuroth* movement -- directly relevant for the demographic assessment.

This is not a debate about the demographic survival -- in the word's crude sense -- of U.S. Jewry. With approximately 5,700,000 souls, impressive talent and abundant potentialities, U.S. Jewry has great reserves and staying power. What is indeed at stake are the future size, composition, and cohesion of U.S. Jewry. Attention to demographic issues should not be decried as an excessive insistence on "mere numbers" to the disregard of the quality of life. The present demographic trends make, among other adverse effects, for unprecedented aging in the United States and other highly developed nations and thus conjure up quality problems of profound significance. While these nations are generally in a demographic predicament, Diaspora Jews are even more so: they have particularly low fertility; as minority groups they are at risk of assimilatory attrition; and they are branches of an ancient but rather small people that, not long ago, lost a third of its substance in the Holocaust.

With curious inconsistency, the revisionists deprecate pessimism with regard to American Jewish demography, on the one hand, but sometimes evince indifference to a future diminution of the Jewish population, on the other. This is exemplified by the following quotations: "Will American Jews ... continue to survive as Jews? They have, and selected segments will in the future";<sup>72</sup>

"Once the safety of individual Jews has been assured, the continuing communal emphasis on Jewish survival becomes stale."<sup>73</sup> This seems tantamount to mentally writing off anticipated numerical losses.

The present controversy about the demographic situation and trends of U.S. Jewry need never have occurred if the revisionists had paid attention to the well-documented demographic realities of total U.S. whites and drawn reasonable analogies for the Jewish subpopulation. Instead, the lacunae of specific information on Jews have been used as an opportunity to put forward unfounded claims, formulated in sweeping terms and with internal contradictions -- although the fragmentary data that do exist go far to disprove revisionist contentions. There is indeed great need for the collection of solid demographic-statistical information, if so intellectually alert a group as U.S. Jews wish to apply to their own situation and problems the same "facts and figures" approach they apply to other matters.

Not long ago, the Zero Population Growth movement enjoyed a great deal of appeal in the United States and many Jews were among its advocates. Actually, if people engage in strongly reducing reproduction, it is easy to overshoot the mark and slide into negative population growth. In the last few years a countertendency has made itself felt. There is growing concern among both scholars and politicians about the long-term effects of present demographic trends in the developed countries. Books with the following suggestive titles have been published (the two last-named officially): *The Empty Cradles of Marianne: The Future of the French Population* (1981); *Fertility in Canada: From Baby-boom to Baby-Bust* (1984); *Will the Swiss Disappear? The Population of Switzerland: Problems, Prospects, Policies* (1985).<sup>74</sup> Search for demographic policies is in the air, and an increasing number of governments are adopting this course.

Demographic policies are difficult to devise and put into effect in liberal countries, and their success cannot be taken for granted. If this is so for national administrations, the situation is much more complicated for a group like the American Jews, all of whose activities cannot be other than voluntary. At any rate, American Jews have a right and a duty to know where they are heading demographically. It may even be that dissemination of realistic information about the demographic trends and

their implications is the most widely effective measure of applied population policy that can be thought of for American Jewry at large -- as distinct from any more specific measures that will probably be, at best, local or sectorial.

Our plea, from both the intellectual and the Jewish points of view, is for awareness of the demographic facts and trends. This is not a matter of pessimists versus optimists, as has been alleged. It is a call for realism based on sound empirical information and against a disregard of the demographic facts that is conducive to complacency.

## NOTES

Judith Even and Arin Poller ably assisted in this study.

1. Sidney Goldstein, "Jewish Fertility in Contemporary America," in Paul Ritterband, ed., *Modern Fertility* (Leiden: Brill, 1981), pp. 160-208; idem, "Jews in the United States: Perspectives from Demography," *American Jewish Year Book 1981* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1981), pp. 3-59; idem, "Jewish Demography: The Research Challenges," in Jerry A. Winter and Lester I. Levin, eds., *Advancing the State of the Art: Colloquium on Jewish Population Studies* (New York: Council of Jewish Federations, 1984), 1:7-15; idem, "American Jewish Demography: Inconsistencies that Challenge," paper presented at the 9th World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1985; idem, "Population Trends in American Jewry," *Judaism* 36 (1987): 135-146; idem, "Demography of American Jewry: Implications for a National Community," paper presented to the Sidney Hollander Memorial Colloquium on the Emergence of a Continental Jewish Community -- Implications for Federations, Parsippany, N.J., 1987; idem, "The Demographics of American Jewry," paper presented at the Symposium on World Jewish Population, Jerusalem, 1987.

2. Sergio DellaPergola, "Patterns of American Jewish Fertility," *Demography* 17 (1980): 261-273; U.O. Schmelz and Sergio Della Pergola, "The Demographic Consequences of U.S. Jewish Population Trends," *American Jewish Year Book 1983* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1983), pp. 141-187; idem, "Some Basic Trends in the Demography of the U.S. Jews: A Re-examination," paper



presented at the Conference on New Perspectives in American Jewish Sociology, New York, 1986; Sergio DellaPergola and U.O. Schmelz, "Demographic Transformations of American Jewry: Marriage and Mixed Marriage," *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, vol. 5 (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, in press). For demographic trends among Jews worldwide, see Roberto Bachi, *Population Trends of World Jewry* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1976); U.O. Schmelz, "Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors," *American Jewish Year Book 1981*, pp. 61-117; idem, *World Jewish Population: Regional Estimates and Projections* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1981); idem, *Aging of World Jewry* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1984); idem, *World Jewish Population in the 1980s: A Short Outline* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1987).

3. Calvin Goldscheider and Alan S. Zuckerman, *The Transformation of the Jews* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Steven M. Cohen and Leonard M. Fein, "From Integration to Survival: American Jewish Anxieties in Transition," *Annals AAPSS* 480 (1985): 75-88; Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change: Emerging Patterns in America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985); idem, *The American Jewish Community: Social Science Research and Policy Implications* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1986); Calvin Goldscheider and Frances K. Goldscheider, "Family Size Expectations of Young American Jewish Adults," paper presented at 9th World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, 1985.

4. Charles E. Silberman, *A Certain People: American Jews and Their Lives Today* (New York: Summit Books, 1985); Marshall Sklare, *Symposium on Charles Silberman's "A Certain People,"* mimeo (Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University, 1986).

5. Except for a single isolated instance: the survey of March 1957, when a question on religion was asked.

6. Retrospective information on a cohort's completed fertility provides a definitive answer about its reproductive achievement, but it requires waiting until the respective women reach, or at least approach, the end of their fertile life span. TFR can be currently computed if there is adequate data, but it is a less conclusive indicator since it combines the short-term behaviors of different cohorts and can be influenced by shifts in the age-specific birthrates.

7. DellaPergola, "Patterns of American Jewish Fertility"; Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences."
8. Schmelz, "Jewish Survival." This is an upwardly corrected estimate; see also Goldstein, "Jewish Fertility."
9. In considering the births of Diaspora Jews in our time, one must distinguish between the full number of newborns with at least one Jewish parent and the "effectively Jewish" newborns; the latter exclude those children, mostly offspring of mixed marriages, who by their parents' decision are not Jews. Similarly, the fertility per se of Jewish women is to be distinguished from the "effectively Jewish" fertility that accounts for those children who are themselves Jewish.
10. These figures relate to all Jewish women in the respective birth cohorts, including the unmarried; the corresponding figures for the (ever-) married were somewhat greater.
11. The comparatively youthful age composition of total U.S. whites explains why they have a birthrate which, at the prevailing very low mortality, still results in a modest natural increase, although current fertility per se is insufficient for demographic replacement in the long run.
12. In some instances the child percentages had to be adapted from the differently categorized age classifications that were published. Other recent surveys did not furnish this information at all because only excessively wide age categories were published.
13. Cf. note 9.
14. Several of the local surveys listed in Table 2 comprised indistinguishably some non-Jewish children among the "Jewish" population whose age structure was reported. This imparted an upward bias to these birthrates.
15. The 1985 survey of Greater Boston Jewry indicated 12 percent of children "under 11" compared to 13 percent in 1975 and 17 percent in 1965. Also current fertility, as indicated in Table 4 by the child-adult ratio, was very low around 1985. The relatively large proportion of 0-4-year-old children merely reflected a considerable influx of younger adults during 1975-85, when Boston's Jewish population recorded a marked increase.

16. There may, however, have been some temporary sagging of Jewish birthrates in the mid-1970s as there was among total whites (cf. Table 1).

17. Because the published reports of some of the Jewish community surveys failed to indicate age distribution by sex, the ratios presented here were computed without regard to the sex of the adults, unlike the more pertinent "child-woman ratios" familiar to demographers.

18. Computed from the "stationary population" of the official life tables for U.S. whites in 1967-71 and 1982.

19. According to the U.S. population censuses of those years.

20. Steven M. Cohen and Calvin Goldscheider, "Jews More or Less," *Moment* 9 (September 1984): 41-46; Goldscheider, *American Jewish Community*.

21. Calvin Goldscheider, "Letters: Jews More or Less," *Moment* 9 (December 1984): 4-5.

22. It is not clear whether the fertility data from the 1981 New York survey will be published.

23. William L. Yancey and Ira Goldstein, *The Jewish Population of the Greater Philadelphia Area* (Philadelphia: Federation of Jewish Agencies of Greater Philadelphia, 1984).

24. Computed from cohort-specific child increments between these two censuses.

25. Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change* and *American Jewish Community*.

26. Particularly NJPS and the Canadian census.

27. See preceding note.

28. Nathan Keyfitz, "Can Knowledge Improve Forecasts?," *Population and Development Review* 8 (1982): 729-751; Martin O'Connell and Carolyn C. Rogers, "Assessing Cohort Birth Expectation Data from the Current Population Survey 1971-1981," *Demography* 20 (1983): 369-384.

29. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Fertility of American Women*:

June 1985, Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 406 (Washington: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1986).

30. Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change*. Goldscheider published from that survey only data on expected but not on attained fertility.

31. Silberman, *A Certain People*.

32. Goldscheider and Goldscheider, "Family Size Expectations."

33. This is evident from the proportions of actual numbers of children (0, 1, 2, etc.) expected by the interviewees.

34. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Projections of the Population of the United States, by Age, Sex, and Race: 1983-2080*, Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 952 (Washington: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1984).

35. Goldscheider, *American Jewish Community*; Silberman, *A Certain People*.

36. A renewed squeeze for men is taking place in the late 1980s due to the arrival of the decreasing post-baby-boom cohorts in the marriageable-age range. The earlier cohorts of prospective grooms are larger than the later cohorts of prospective brides.

37. Goldscheider, *Jewish Continuity and Change* and *American Jewish Community*; Steven M. Cohen, "Vitality and Resilience of the American Jewish Family," in Steven M. Cohen and Paula E. Hyman, eds., *The Jewish Family: Myths and Reality* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986).

38. Sociologists use the terms "homogamy" and "heterogamy."

39. Silberman, in *A Certain People*, makes a similar attempt, arriving at an estimate that ranges between 22 and 27 percent. However, he did not sufficiently distinguish between different types of data (according to the distinction made by us in Table 3) and several new local studies have produced figures higher than expected according to Silberman's typology.

40. See Fred Massarik, "National Jewish Population Study: A New U.S. Estimate," *American Jewish Year Book 1975* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1975), pp. 296-304, and Bernard

Lazerwitz, "An Estimate of a Rare Population Group: The U.S. Jewish Population," *Demography* 15 (1978): 389-394.

41. Additional questions can elicit information whether the person was Jewish at birth or when he or she first met the current spouse, as well as about the person's parents, and these matters may form the subject of sociodemographic analysis.

42. Steven M. Cohen and Paul Ritterband, *Intermarriage: Rates, Background, and Consequences for Jewish Identification*, mimeo (New York, 1985).

43. Sergio DellaPergola, "L'effet des mariages mixtes sur la natalité dans une sous-population: Quelques problèmes et résultats concernant la diaspora juive," in *Démographie et destin des sous-populations* (Paris: Association Internationale des Démographes de Langue Française, 1983), pp. 223-236.

44. Not 27 percent as misprinted in Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences."

45. Egon Mayer, *Children of Intermarriage: A Study in Patterns of Identification and Family Life* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1983).

46. Yancey and Goldstein, *Jewish Population of the Greater Philadelphia Area*.

47. Schmelz, *Aging of World Jewry*.

48. I.e., in Chicago, Rochester, Pittsburgh, and Minneapolis.

49. Schmelz, *Aging of World Jewry*.

50. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Projections of the Population*.

51. Sidney Goldstein, "Population Movement and Redistribution among American Jews," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. DellaPergola, eds., *Papers in Jewish Demography 1981* (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1983), pp. 315-341; idem, "Demography of American Jewry"; idem, "The Demographics of American Jewry."

52. According to the NJPS, 6 percent of the children of conversionary marriages (husband Jewish, wife converted to Judaism) were not Jews; according to the Chicago survey of 1981, 6 percent of the children of conversionary marriages and 3 percent of children

with two Jewish-born parents were not Jews.

53. Tom W. Smith, "America's Religious Mosaic," *American Demographics*, June 1984, pp. 19-23.

54. This estimate corrects downward that previously made by us; see Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences."

55. The wording of the question may purposely omit the term "religion" (e.g., in the formulation "Is he/she Jewish, Protestant, Catholic ...?") so as to include individuals who consider themselves to be Jews on other than religious grounds. See also note 41.

56. E.g., children of a Jewish father and a non-Jewish-born mother who was unconverted or whose conversion may be contestable.

57. Massarik, "National Jewish Population Study."

58. All the figures from the NJPS, according to both versions, have considerable sample errors.

59. Alvin Chenkin, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1985," *American Jewish Year Book 1986* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1986), pp. 219-230.

60. Schmelz, *World Jewish Population*.

61. U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population," *American Jewish Year Book 1982* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1982), pp. 277-290; idem, "World Jewish Population, 1982," *American Jewish Year Book 1984* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1984), pp. 247-258; idem, "World Jewish Population, 1984," *American Jewish Year Book 1986* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1986), pp. 350-364.

62. Barry A. Kosmin, Paul Ritterband, and Jeffrey Scheckner, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1986," *American Jewish Year Book 1987* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1987), pp. 164-191.

63. U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population, 1986," *American Jewish Year Book 1988* (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1988).

64. These projections are essentially compatible with those presented

by us earlier (Schmelz, *World Jewish Population and Aging of World Jewry*; Schmelz and DellaPergola, "Demographic Consequences"), but the presentation is different: internal evolution is separated from migratory reinforcement. They are updated to start with 1985 and extend to later years; there are some modifications in details. The message is the same as before, but even more emphatic.

65. This corresponds to the following reductions of assumed fertility to the "effectively Jewish" level: *low* fertility and *moderate* assimilatory losses, TFRs of 1.39 in 2000, 1.31 in 2010, and 1.24 in 2020; *rising* fertility and *large* assimilatory losses, 1.78, 1.58, and 1.38, respectively. The revisionists do not take into account the possibility of lower "effectively Jewish" fertility because of increased out-marriage.

66. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Projections of the Population*.

67. Subsequent evolution in the United States will reduce the original number of immigrants, if their demographic behavior is similar to that of U.S. Jews.

68. The reader can easily combine, in an approximate manner, different migration estimates with any of the versions of internal evolution in Table 5.

69. This point is exemplified by the official U.S. projections, where a decline in population size sets in soon after the above-mentioned excess of deaths over births begins despite the assumed continuation of a positive but moderate migration balance.

70. Goldscheider, *American Jewish Community*.

71. The U.S. Bureau of the Census publishes population projections extending 100 years.

72. Goldscheider and Zuckerman, *Transformation of the Jews*, p. 188.

73. Cohen and Fein, "From Integration to Survival," p. 88.

74. J.N. Biraben and J. Dupaquier, *Les berceaux vides de Marianne: L'avenir de la population française* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1981); A. Romaniuc, *Fertility in Canada: From Baby-Boom to*

*Baby-Bust* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1984); Commission Politiques de Population, *Les Suisses vont-ils disparaître? La population de la Suisse: problèmes, perspectives, politiques* (Berne: Editions Paul Haupt, 1985).