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Demography of Jewish Americans: Research Findings, Issues, and Challenges

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Social scientists have long recognized the centrality of population processes for understanding the evolution of the American Jewish community and the changing levels of integration of Jewish Americans. The major features of American Jewish demography are well known, but neither the demographers who have analyzed those patterns nor the social scientists who have used information on population processes have been satisfied with the quality of demographic data or the depth of demographic analyses. This chapter reviews and summarizes what is generally known about the demography of Jewish Americans, with particular attention to the limitations of available research. A concluding section focuses on a series of research suggestions and priorities that emerge from the critical review of what is known about the demography of the American Jewish community.

Demography of American Jews: Scope and Analytic Issues

The analysis of American Jewish demographic patterns involves a number of central themes, some of which are common to a general demographic analysis of total societies while others are unique to the demography of minority groups. It is important to spell out the scope and focus of our review and evaluation. First, a systematic examination of the demography of American Jews involves an analysis of the entire range of population elements and processes. The study of population size, growth, distribution, structure, and composition[1] is integral to demographic analysis regardless of the unit of analysis. This is also true for the population processes of mortality, fertility, and migration. For the Jewish population as for other subgroup analyses, an additional process of "entering" and "exiting" must be examined: in- and out-marriages. The study of losses and gains through intermarriage is a central feature of the demography of

minority groups. Minority populations increase in size through births, immigration, and in-marriages; they decrease in size through deaths, emigration, and out-marriages. Population changes and variations are products of these exiting and entering processes. At the local level, immigration and emigration are of particular significance. Because of the importance of the timing and extent of marriage for reproduction and childbearing, demographic analysis also treats issues of nuptiality and dissolution (divorce and separation).

A second feature of minority group demography is the need to select among a wider range of comparisons for analysis. The population processes of a minority group may be compared to the majority population and/or to other minority/ethnic groups. One of the central analytic questions in the demography of minority groups is whether demographic differences between majority and minority populations are reflections of the particular matrix of socioeconomic characteristics differentiating these populations or whether particular features of the ethnic group influence demographic processes. These features may relate to cultural or structural differences or to the fact of minority group status per se. The centrality of this issue requires that comparisons be made between minority and majority populations, controlling for socioeconomic and related characteristics. A further comparison in the demography of American Jews involves Jews in other countries. Such comparisons clarify the uniqueness of the American Jewish condition or the differences between Jews in situations of a minority and those in a society where Jews are a majority.

Another important type of sociological and demographic analysis associated with the study of minority subpopulations relates to the question of residential clustering. There is a series of complex issues associated with residential segregation and integration of minority groups and the implications of the changing population concentration, dispersal, and density of subgroups within society. For the Jewish population, residential segregation and integration are tied in to the intensity of Jewish identification and related issues of Jewish community organization.

Although minority subgroups tend to be smaller and relatively more homogeneous units of analysis than total societies, there remains sufficient subgroup variation within ethnic groups to allow for detailed investigation. The analysis of variation within the Jewish group provides clues to the direction of change in which the Jewish group as a whole may be moving. The examination of subgroups in the forefront of change (the more educated, the young, or the elite) is one basis for projecting the future direction of the total community. This is particularly important when trend data or longitudinal analyses are lacking.

Finally, the implications of demographic patterns for minority and majority populations may vary. Rates of growth, distribution, composition

and levels of mortality, fertility, and migration may have different consequences for minority populations. Zero population growth has a set of consequences for a total society, for example, that cannot be uniformly applied to every subpopulation. Policies to control, regulate, or channel population growth and processes applied to total nations do not necessarily fit the goals, needs, and aspirations of selected ethnic segments. There are a variety of socio-politico-economic consequences of differential population growth of majority and minority/ethnic populations. Minority populations that are rapidly increasing in size within a society whose rate of demographic growth is stable are as problematic as minority populations that are declining or stable while the total population is expanding rapidly.

The heart of the demographic argument is that there have been and continue to be revolutionary changes, subtle but of profound importance, in the size, growth, composition, and distribution of the American Jewish population and in the demographic processes shaping these patterns. These demographic changes are critical for understanding modern American Jewish life, primarily because they reflect and have implications for the quality of Jewish life in America — and the quality of Jewish life is the key to Jewish survival. Population size is a necessary but not sufficient condition for survival; the immediate Jewish future in America is tied to questions of quantity only indirectly. However, since demographic patterns are consequences and determinants of Jewish life in America, the analysis of American Jewish demography provides a context within which Jewish quality can be evaluated.

The less disputed meaning of demographic patterns and their clearer documentation and trend must be balanced by the fact that some demographic changes are subtle and it is often difficult to appreciate their long-term implications and repercussions. While a decline in financial support for Jewish organizations may be immediately appreciated, declining birth rates, changing marriage patterns, and increasing population age take a longer time to be documented and absorbed as social facts. Of primary importance, the demographic processes that affect population size, composition, and distribution are extraordinarily difficult to reverse unless some of the basic values, attitudes, and social processes change. Jewish demographic processes are integral to the social conditions of American Jewish life, not marginal or independent of social structure. To change, redirect, or channel population trends, the societal context must also be altered. Jewish demographic patterns fit the pattern of American Jewish life and may be viewed as the price paid by American Jews for their level of commitment to Jewish survival. To reverse demographic patterns, some major commitments of American Jewry have to be reordered in priority.

Population structure has an internal set of dynamics as well. Past patterns of immigration and fertility, for example, have an impact on current

and future age structure. The number of births in the 1970s will have effects on marriage and reproduction around the turn of the century and on patterns of aging well into the twenty-first century. Issues of quantitative and qualitative Jewish survival must be considered not only in a national American Jewish context but also in the local Jewish community system where size and quality are more obviously correlated. Within this context, demographic variation and heterogeneity dominate; population size and processes vary among Jewish communities in the United States. Differentiation among them is related to the density of Jewish settlement, the demographic and social composition of local areas, the degree of local population dispersal, generational composition, and the broader socioeconomic opportunities of areas that retain population and encourage immigration or lose population through out-migration.

Sources of Demographic Data on the American Jewish Population

To evaluate the demographic patterns of Jewish Americans, assess research issues, and identify research priorities, a brief review of the sources of demographic data for studying American Jews will be presented. More specific data problems will be reviewed in the discussion of particular demographic processes (for earlier reviews of data on religion see Good, 1959; Landis, 1959; Goldstein, 1971; Engelman, 1947).

Traditional sources of demographic data are largely unavailable for studying the size, growth, distribution, composition, and characteristics of the American Jewish population or for the analysis of the demographic processes of fertility, mortality, and migration. These sources include regular decennial censuses and a continuous system of birth and death registration. In the United States these sources have never included a question on religious preference or affiliation. Indirect and useful data from American censuses may be obtained for the Jewish population through an analysis of those reporting Yiddish as their mother tongue and data on the Russian-born and ethnic populations that reflect segments (and in earlier periods the overwhelming majority) of the American Jewish population. Analysis of these data has been restricted to the selected tabular material published by the Census Bureau. As the proportion of second and third generations in the American Jewish population increases, the value of these indirect data decreases (see particularly Goldberg, 1945–46, 1948, 1962; Rosenthal, 1975).

The utility of annual birth and death records is more limited. In addition to the absence of information by religion, analysis of these data requires detailed information on population size, structure, and distribution obtained from census-type data unavailable for the Jewish population. Birth and death records may be useful in local communities when supplementary

sources of information on Jewish births (from hospital records) and deaths (from funeral directors and/or Jewish cemeteries) are available. This would require problematic individual record-matching. Birth and death records may also be allocated to small subareas (e.g. census tracts) where there is a high proportion of Jewish population concentration. Since an analysis of annual birth and death rates requires two sets of problematic data for American Jews, only limited attempts to exploit these data have been made.

Annual marriage and divorce statistics in the United States do not contain data on religious affiliation (except for the marriage records of Iowa and Indiana). Government statistics on immigration have included information on Jews (Hebrews) for 1881–1943, but except for selected characteristics (numbers, age, sex, previous occupation, and country of origin), details are not available (Lestschinsky, 1960; Hersch, 1949).

To obtain intercensal population estimates and identify continual changes in socioeconomic and labor force characteristics, fertility, geographic mobility, and migration of the American population, the U.S. government carries out a series of annual surveys. The Current Population Survey included a question on religion only once (in 1957) and provided national data on the socioeconomic and geographic characteristics of the Jewish population as well as information on fertility and intermarriage. These data have been fully exploited and represent a unique and important data source in American Jewish demography (Glick, 1960; Goldstein, 1969; Mueller and Lane, 1972; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1958).

A final source of data of limited utility has been the federally sponsored Censuses of Religious Bodies. These were limited to reports from organizations and community institutions rather than individuals. The last such census was conducted in 1936 and, owing to its limited usefulness for government or community planning, has been discontinued (Engelman, 1947).

All official data sources have limitations for in-depth research, even for the American population as a whole, since the amount of socioeconomic data included is minimal. Detailed national sample surveys have been undertaken, particularly on fertility and related patterns. Owing to the small proportion of Jews in the total American population, representative samples include only a small number of Jews for analysis. Not only are details unavailable, but high rates of sampling errors characterize these sources for the study of American Jewish demography (see the review in Goldscheider, 1967, 1971; and detailed discussion below).

Given the limitations of official data sources and general sample surveys for the analysis of Jewish demographic patterns, an increasing number of local Jewish community surveys have been undertaken. These surveys provide basic demographic information on the structure and composition of

the Jewish population and often include questions on fertility and migration. In most cases these surveys have been sponsored by local Jewish Federations and have been useful for planning purposes. Often data details have not been published, and only simple cross-tabulations have been prepared. The major limitations of these Jewish surveys relate to the degree to which scientific sampling criteria are used and whether nonaffiliated segments of the Jewish population are included. These surveys are extremely uneven in quality. Often intercommunity comparisons are problematic as are comparisons to the general American population.

The only national data source for the study of Jewish demographic patterns is the National Jewish Population Study (NJPS) carried out 1970–71. This was the first attempt to design a national sample of American Jews (Lazerwitz, 1973a, 1978; Massarik, 1973; Massarik and Chenkin, 1973). Details from this study have not been published, but it should provide a major data source in the analysis of American Jewish demographic patterns.

In addition to the specific limitations of data sources noted above and those discussed in our review of demographic processes, three general data-related problems should be noted.

First, the data available from local Jewish community surveys have often been prepared for local planning purposes rather than for scientific analysis. The secondary use of these materials for reviews and comparisons among Jewish communities has been limited to these published reports. There is a need to more fully exploit these data for the comparative analysis of Jewish communities and prepare more detailed, comparable data tabulations. More consistent and comparable data collection and preparation should be encouraged in future studies. The lack of full data exploitation is not limited to local Jewish community studies. More systematic detailed analysis is needed of U.S. census materials, particularly past censuses focusing on those reporting Yiddish as their mother tongue and similar data for the 1970 census. Given the limited data available and the high cost and problems associated with collecting new data, efforts should be made to exploit data already collected.

Second, because much of what is known about Jewish demographic patterns is based on local Jewish surveys designed to meet local community needs, selected areas of demographic inquiry have been neglected. Questions regarding emigration, details on selected sectors of the Jewish population (e.g. the young, nonmarried, elites, and the intermarried), or on selected subcommunities (e.g. Hasidic Jews or Israelis) have not been addressed systematically. Often available data have determined the analytic questions social scientists ask rather than the other way around. Some issues may be clarified when the results of the NJPS are published and evaluated. But even these data have limitations for the analysis of Jewish population dynamics.

Third, despite the potential of the NJPS, its value will remain limited if it is not part of a continuing series of studies conducted on a regular basis in coming decades (cf. Goldstein, 1973a). The American Jewish community is constantly changing, reflecting in part changes in American society and in part factors unique to the Jewish community. Already some of the data collected in 1970 are outdated — even before they are published. There has never been a reliable source of continuous systematic data to evaluate the changing demographic patterns of American Jews. Nor have there been longitudinal studies to follow dynamic population processes over the life cycle. Rarely have there been repeat surveys of Jewish communities to systematically analyze data on structural and compositional population changes. As new issues emerge and old issues remain unexplored there will be need for the continuous search for new data sources and ways to exploit those now available.

Analysis of the demography of Jewish Americans is based on a series of bits and pieces from national and local Jewish community studies of varying degrees of quality, for different periods of time, and for limited demographic issues. Population growth and distribution data for Jews are based on cumulative estimates that have an unknown range of error (Schmelz, 1969). General sample surveys include demographic details for analysis and allow comparisons between Jews and other ethnic populations, but the number of Jewish respondents is small. Jewish sample surveys include a larger number of Jewish cases but usually do not include comparative data on non-Jewish population, often details on specific issues (e.g. fertility or migration) are not included, and issues of sample design, particularly full coverage of the Jewish population, remain problematic. Social scientists have attempted to use these data sources in supplementary and complementary ways and have pieced together the advantages of each of these sources to provide a basis for evaluating American Jewish demographic patterns. Relative to other areas of scientific inquiry about modern American Jews, demographic patterns are among the most consistently reported and best documented.

Jewish Population Size and Growth

The absence of reliable national data on Jewish population size and growth, historically and in the contemporary period, prevents a clear assessment of this basic demographic issue. For estimates, we must rely on data put together from various local communities and from estimates and guesses from a variety of sources. These have been published regularly in the *American Jewish Year Book* (see the review by Goldstein, 1971). Only the highlights of these well-known data will be reviewed.

Starting with an estimated Jewish population of 1,200 in 1790, Jewish population growth increased to about 50,000 by 1848 and to slightly less than a quarter of a million before the mass migrations from Eastern Europe. Reflecting high rates of immigration and natural increase, the Jewish population in the United States increased to over one million by the turn of the twentieth century and to over four million by the mid-1920s. Jewish population growth during this period was greater than for the American population as a whole and hence the proportion of Jews to the total U.S. population increased from one-tenth of one percent in 1840 to 3.6 percent in 1927. By 1950, the American Jewish population was estimated at five million — a one hundred-fold increase in a century.

The American Jewish population "explosion" ended in the mid-1930s as the level of Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe declined substantially with quota restrictions a decade earlier and fertility levels of second-generation Jews plummeted to replacement levels during the economic depression. It is likely that the Jewish population of the United States has not yet attained the six-million mark. Estimates of Jewish population size from the NJPS of 1970–71 are around 5,775,000, with a margin of error of almost a quarter of a million on either side.

Since the mid-1930s the Jewish population has grown slowly and during the last decade — taking into account the whole range of demographic processes affecting growth (mortality, fertility, immigration, emigration, and net losses due to out-marriages) — the Jewish population hovers at zero population growth or perhaps slightly below. Because Jewish population growth has been slower than that of American society as a whole, the proportion of Jews in America has declined to less than 2.7 percent according to *American Jewish Year Book* estimates in 1979. This is the lowest proportion since the first decade of the twentieth century.

The decline in the proportion of Jews and the attainment of zero population growth has concerned some American Jewish community leaders. Fears about the vanishing of American Jewry, the political significance of declining numbers, and the absence of vitality and growth in the Jewish community have been repeatedly expressed. The issue of Jewish demographic vitality has called into question broader issues of Jewish survival in modern society. While these broader issues are important to raise and the connections between demographic processes and the quality of American Jewish life are strong, much of the concern seems misplaced. American Jews have never constituted a large segment of the U.S. population nor have their political or economic powers been functions of population size. America has become the world Jewish demographic center as a result of the combined impact of population growth through mass immigration from Eastern Europe between 1880 and the 1920s and the destruction of European Jewry in World War II. It is not likely that this population cen-

trality will be overtaken by any other Jewish community in the world — including Israel — for the rest of this century.

American Jewry is not about to die or vanish either demographically or sociologically. The American Jewish population may be experiencing some small decline in size, but it is changing in composition, characteristics, and distribution. Concerns about quantitative survival nationally are much less real than problems of growth, size, and structure of local Jewish communities. The future of American Jewish life is less tied to the question of its demographic survival than to which subsections or segments of the Jewish community will survive and what will be the quality of Jewish life for most American Jews (for a more elaborate discussion of this issue see Goldscheider, 1978). The demography of American Jews is an integral part of the social, political, cultural, and economic processes of the American Jewish community. This is not only because Jewish demographic processes are reflective of Jewish social life, but demographic processes and structure have implications for Jewish communities and Jewish identification.

Jewish Immigration to the United States

Much has been written about Jewish immigration to the United States and indeed immigration has shaped American Jewish social and demographic history. While the number of Jewish immigrants has been somewhat differently reported in various sources (cf. Hersch, 1949; Lestschinsky, 1960; *American Jewish Year Book*, 1977), there is consensus on the following major themes:

Between 1820 and 1870 an estimated 50,000 German Jews immigrated to America. Their socioeconomic background is difficult to determine from existing data but most probably they came from the commercial classes, since both the proportion of professionals and artisans among German Jewry was small (Lestschinsky, 1960). Their socioeconomic background, social mobility, geographic dispersion, and prior exposure to secularization resulted in rapid integration in American society. By the second generation German Jews had moved further away from traditional Judaism, significant proportions were intermarrying, and rapid assimilation seems to have occurred. Many of the second and subsequent generations of German Jews fully assimilated to American society, although the extent and nature of these changes have not been clearly documented. As German Jews in America faced the growing number of Eastern European migrants, their importance (at least demographically) diminished. For a variety of reasons associated with the attitudes of American society toward the growing number of Jewish immigrants at the turn of the century and their impact on the American Jewish community, Jews of German origin in America slowly changed, and in some ways became more "Jewish" than they had been (Glazer, 1960).

Beginning in the 1870s and increasingly after 1881, a mass migration of Eastern European Jews took place. Between 1881 and 1924 approximately 2.5 million Jews from Eastern Europe immigrated to the United States. Immigration and natural increase enlarged the American Jewish population from less than a quarter of a million in 1880 to over 4 million in the mid-1920s. While mass immigration did not begin until 1881, estimates of Eastern European Jewish immigration suggest that approximately 100,000 Eastern European Jews immigrated to the United States before then — 70,000 during 1871–80 and 30,000 during 1820–70 (Lestschinsky, 1960).

The overwhelming majority of Eastern European Jewish immigrants remained permanently in the United States. Sex ratio data, the proportion of children, and data on families all point in this direction. Direct estimates indicate that of the more than one million Jewish immigrants in 1908–25 only 52,000 emigrated from the United States — about 5 percent. This compares to 40 percent of the Poles and 50 percent of the Russians who were not Jewish who emigrated and to 56 percent of the Italian immigrants who returned to Italy. Even one-sixth of the French and English immigrants returned — three times as high as Jewish return migration (Lestschinsky, 1960, table 5). Jewish immigrants were exceptional in their permanent settlement in America relative to other immigrants.

The mass immigration of Eastern European Jews to America converted the American Jewish community from an insignificant minority too small to establish anything more complex than localized Jewish communal life to a national American subcommunity (Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968). By the end of this mass immigration, the German and Sephardic Jews no longer constituted the dominant Jewish communities in America but were submerged by the overwhelming numbers of East European immigrants.

The demographic dominance of Eastern European Jews has had implications for the internal changes associated with Jewish American integration. The transition from an immigrant subsociety to an Americanized second-, third-, and fourth-generation American ethnic group has been the master theme in the sociology and demography of American Jews. In the 1970s, approximately 80 percent of the Jewish population was native born and half of those were at least third-generation Jews. Generational status is a key axis along which vary the range of demographic and social processes of American Jews and the character of American Jewish communities. Generational changes in residential location, family structure and size, intermarriage, social class (education, occupation, and income), religious identification, and measures of Jewish religiosity and commitment have been analyzed for various Jewish communities. Variations and changes by distance from the immigrant generation provide the most important clues about processes of Jewish American assimilation and acculturation.

While the U.S. immigrant quota legislation ended mass immigration from Eastern Europe in the mid-1920s, Jewish immigration did not cease entirely. Between 1925 and World War II almost a quarter of a million Jews arrived, many of them refugees and escapees from Central Europe. From a demographic and sociostructural point of view these immigrants not only contributed to the population growth of American Jewry but were in occupations quite different from those of immigrant masses from Eastern Europe.

Between 1944 and 1959 about 192,000 Jewish immigrants entered the United States and an additional 129,000 immigrated between 1959 and 1975. Altogether, from World War II to 1975 over 320,000 Jews immigrated to the United States. These immigrants confronted a well-established Jewish community that had already numbered over 4 million by the mid-1920s and had developed communal organizations and social institutions. On the one hand mass Jewish migration and subsequent generational patterns define the character of the American Jewish community. On the other hand the continuous immigration stream after the 1920s cannot be dismissed either demographically or sociologically.

It is not clear what proportion of these recent immigrants follows the generational model of change characteristic of Eastern European immigrants. Some were affected by social changes characteristic of particular periods shaped by the character of the children and grandchildren of Eastern European immigrants. Others may have remained outside the boundaries of these generational changes, particularly the Hasidic, Israeli Americans, and the select number of orthodox German immigrants.

From the mid-1950s until the mid-1970s Jewish immigration to the United States averaged 8,000 annually. This may be a conservative estimate based on immigrants assisted by HIAS and an estimate of assisted to nonassisted immigrants of an earlier period (Goldstein, 1973a). Several tens of thousands of former Israeli residents have settled in the United States in recent decades. Some initially came as students and some have stayed illegally. Many have neither been recorded in official immigration statistics nor have they been assisted by American or international immigration organizations. There has been a significant increase in Soviet Jewish immigration in the last several years. In 1973, for example, only 1,449 Soviet Jews immigrated to America (about 15 percent of the estimated total Jewish immigration to the United States). In 1974, the number of Soviet Jewish immigrants doubled to 3,490 (almost 30 percent of estimated Jewish immigration to America) and increased to 5,250 in 1975 (Edelman, 1977). Data for the last several years are not readily available; it is safe to assume that there has been a significant increase in the number of Soviet Jewish immigrants to the United States as the number leaving the Soviet Union increases and the proportion of those receiving exit visas who immigrate to Israel decreases.

One of the immediate consequences of this recent Jewish immigration — and indeed the immigration of Jews to the United States since the 1960s — has been to change the balance of demographic processes in the American Jewish community. In a crude and preliminary attempt to assess the demographic importance of recent Jewish immigration to the United States, a series of estimates of births, deaths, and net immigration were prepared for the period 1967–69 (see Appendix). These estimates reveal that Jewish immigration to the United States may have more than balanced the negative growth resulting from the excess of deaths over births. Whether net Jewish immigration also compensates for losses due to Jewish out-marriages is difficult to assess until more complete data are available. The significance of recent Jewish immigration for the demography of American Jews has been underestimated. There is a need for specific research to focus on long-term demographic and sociological consequences of both Israeli and Soviet immigration.

Emigration of Jews from America

To complete the picture of the role of migration in shaping Jewish population changes in the United States, we should note not only Jewish immigration to America but Jewish emigration from America. Earlier research on the emigration (or return migration) of Eastern European Jews who came to America reveals the very low proportions of Jewish return migration. This is not surprising given the general integration of Jews in America, their social mobility, the socioeconomic opportunity structure of American society, ideological and normative characteristics of America as the haven for those who have been religiously and politically oppressed, the relative absence of institutional anti-Semitism, and for most Jewish immigrants, the lack of viable alternatives in terms of returning to Eastern or Central Europe.

The only major country representing an alternative to American society has been Israel. Studies of American Jewish immigration to Israel (*aliya*) indicate the very small number of Jews from the United States settling in Israel. Up to the end of the 1950s the numbers of American immigrants to Palestine and Israel were very small — around 200 per year for 1919–48 and 400 per year for 1948–60. Beginning in the 1960s and increasingly between 1967 and 1973 several thousand Jews from the United States immigrated to Israel annually (for details see Goldscheider, 1974). These figures only relate to Americans who arrived in Israel as either immigrants or temporary residents (defined formally after 1969 as "potential immigrants"). Estimates of return migration to the United States indicate that after about three years 30–40 percent return. Since 1971 when the number of American immigrants was at a peak of 7,364 (1,049 immigrants and

6,315 potential immigrants), annual levels have declined. In 1977, 2,571 American Jews immigrated to Israel — 279 immigrants and 2,292 potential immigrants (Israel, *Statistical Abstract*, 1978).

The level of American *aliya* to Israel relative to the population size of American Jewry has been minuscule. However, given the delicate balance of factors affecting American Jewish population growth, even the emigration of small numbers may have demographic significance. Barring unforeseen and unpredictable circumstances, no mass *aliya* of Jewish Americans can be expected to occur in the near future. This is because alongside the near universal American Jewish concern for Israel lies the almost unanimous Jewish commitment to America.

In addition to the question of the number of Jewish emigrants from America to Israel is the selectivity of that immigration. Research has shown that American immigrants to Israel are younger than the American Jewish population as a whole, more likely to have had extensive Jewish education, and are more identified as committed Jews along a variety of dimensions (religious institutional identification, self-definition, Jewish education, ritual observances, and Jewish organizational membership). From the point of view of the American Jewish population this selectivity, however small in number, may dilute selected Jewish communities of the more committed younger American Jews and potential Jewish leadership. On the other hand, American *aliya* might also strengthen and reinforce the interdependence between the American Jewish community and Israeli society. A continuous monitoring of these patterns seems justified in terms of the demographic and sociological interdependence of these two major Jewish communities.

Population Distribution: Regional Patterns

Of greater importance than issues of national Jewish population size and growth are changes in its distribution. The pattern of Jewish immigration and settlement resulted in a high Jewish population concentration in the American Northeast and a sharply reduced level of concentration in the South. In 1930, *American Jewish Year Book* estimates show that 68 percent of the Jewish population was concentrated in the Northeast and 60 percent was in the Middle Atlantic states. Less than 20 percent were in the North Central region and only 4.6 percent were in the West. Particularly affected by immigration and settlement were areas in the South that contained only 7.6 percent of the American Jewish population, a decline of almost 50 percent from 1900.

These patterns began to change as second- and third-generation Jews (and some first-generation Jews as well) moved away from traditional areas of Jewish population concentration. Between 1930 and 1968 the pro-

Table 1.1
Estimates of Regional Distribution of the American Jewish Population, 1968 and 1978

Region	1968 Jewish	1968 Total U.S.	1978 Jewish	1978 Total U.S.
Northeast	64.0	24.2	58.7	22.8
New England	6.8	5.7	6.7	5.7
Middle Atlantic	57.1	18.5	52.0	17.1
North Central	12.5	27.8	12.2	26.8
East North Central	10.2	19.8	9.9	19.0
West North Central	2.3	8.0	2.3	7.8
South	10.3	31.2	15.2	32.3
South Atlantic	8.1	15.0	12.8	15.9
East South Central	0.7	6.6	0.7	6.4
West South Central	1.5	9.6	1.7	10.0
West	13.2	16.8	13.9	18.1
Mountain	0.9	4.0	1.5	4.6
Pacific	12.2	12.8	12.4	13.5
Total United States				
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number (in 1,000s)	5,869	199,861	5,781	216,332

Source: *American Jewish Year Book* estimates, vol. 70 (1969); vol. 79 (1979).

portion of Jews living in the Northeast and North Central regions declined (as did the general American population) and increased sharply in the West and South (Goldstein, 1971).

Recent estimates presented in Table 1.1 show that these regional patterns have continued over the last decade. In 1978, 59 percent of the American Jewish population lived in the Northeast, a decline of 8.3 percent from 1968. This represents a greater decline than for the American population as a whole (5.8 percent for the decade). Smaller declines may be noted for the North Central region. In the Southern states, Jewish population has increased from 10 percent of the total Jewish population to more than 15 percent, an increase of almost 50 percent compared to an increase of only 3.4 percent for the total population. The increasing Jewish concentration in the West has continued but at a much slower pace relative to the earlier period and slower than the American population as a whole. (These data are based on estimates of population prepared by the *American Jewish Year Book* and may understate the amount of changes occurring.)

Regional growth patterns reflect the geographic mobility and interstate migration patterns of American Jews. These patterns may be assumed to characterize younger third- and fourth-generation Jews more than older Jews. Such selective migration has an impact on areas of traditional Jewish concentration not only in terms of reducing population size but in the resultant age composition of these communities. The changing redistribution of the Jewish population by region may also imply migration to areas of lower Jewish population density. Changes in the density of Jewish population and the specific impact of migration are major demographic processes that have not received sufficient research attention.

A recent study of the geographic distribution and change of the American Jewish population (1952–71, by counties) shows some important details on changing Jewish population concentration (Newman and Halvorson, 1979). First, out of over 3,000 counties included in the analysis of the continental United States, Jews are concentrated in only 504. For the rest of the counties, there were either no Jews or less than 100. Jews are far less dispersed than eight Protestant denominations included in the study, despite the fact that several of them are markedly smaller in total numbers. Second, much of the highest Jewish growth during 1952–71 occurred outside of the traditional counties of Jewish population concentration. A total of 77 counties containing Jews were added in that period. A large part of this pattern reflects suburbanization within metropolitan areas and regional declines. Third, in both 1952 and 1971, the Jewish population was far more concentrated than the total population but was becoming more dispersed over time. The extent to which young Jews have recently moved to nonmetropolitan areas of the United States and small towns is largely unknown. Since *American Jewish Year Book* estimates are based on reports from organized Jewish communities, they are not likely to cover these segments of American Jewry.

Jewish Population Density and Migration

The disproportionate concentration of Jews in particular metropolitan areas is a well-known feature of American Jewish demography. The differential impact of population concentration and dispersal on local institutions and organizations has been noted in a variety of studies (Goldstein, 1971). In terms of the vitality of local Jewish communities, migration and population redistribution are of greater significance perhaps than any other single demographic factor. The dispersal of Jews within metropolitan areas and in new communities throughout the United States is of critical importance since there are clear implications of differential Jewish density levels for Jewish survival — demographically and sociologically. Migration and population dispersal have increased among third- and fourth-gen-

eration Jews, particularly those highly educated and in professional and salaried occupations. Changes in the occupational structure of Jews, in the labor market, and the educational level of young Jewish men and women may result in greater future mobility. There are indications that the migration of Jewish Americans is greater than for the total American population and that rates have increased in the last decade among third- and fourth-generation Jews (Goldstein, 1971, 1979b).

The nonrootedness of the young generations and the movement away from centers of Jewish concentration — regionally and within metropolitan areas — are among the major determinants of lower levels of Jewish commitment. To be sure, the willingness to move to areas of low Jewish population density already implies lower levels of Jewish commitment. Nevertheless, areas of low Jewish population density have had in the past important consequences for Jewish identity, Jewish community participation, intermarriage, and lower rates of Jewish continuity. Although the major centers of Jewish concentration are likely to remain and new centers of high Jewish density will emerge, it is likely that significant proportions of fourth-generation Jews will be living in areas of lower Jewish concentration. Their mobility and residential environment imply a weakening of Jewish community ties and a challenge to Jewish continuity in these areas.

Jewish communities and subcommunities are undergoing significant structural changes in age composition because of a combination of selective out-migration and low fertility rates. Neighborhoods of major centers of Jewish concentration have become heavily weighted toward the older segments of the age pyramid as have new retirement centers around the country. These areas have little potential for Jewish population renewal except through selective immigration. Yet it seems less likely that fourth-generation Jews will move to areas of Jewish concentration as they age and retire, given their pattern of residential integration throughout their life cycle. In short, a variety of areas of both low Jewish density and high density with an older population will decline in the next generation and then disappear. Jewish demographic survival is likely to be most pronounced in the large metropolitan centers of Jewish concentration — old and new.

The importance of migration for understanding the Jewish community rests with several important considerations. First, migration has an impact on the size and composition of areas of origin and destination. Second, migration in the recent period seems to be away from areas of heavy Jewish concentration. In turn, the degree of Jewish population dispersal affects the quality and intensity of Jewish identification. Third, the migrant and the repeat migrant tend to be less attached to local Jewish communities and institutions. Finally, migration patterns may affect relationships between members of extended families in a variety of ways. While geographic mobility does not necessarily eliminate extended family ties, it

tends to alter their quality and intensity. These issues are central to an understanding of the demography of American Jews and have not been systematically investigated.

National migration data for the Jewish population are not available from any official source and only preliminary reports have been available to date from the NJPS. Local community studies have provided some insight into the amount of residential mobility within selected metropolitan areas (Goldstein, 1971, 1973a), but these have limited value for gauging out-migration. Indicative of the high rates of mobility, preliminary data from the NJPS found that only 62 percent of the Jewish population aged 20 and over in 1970 were still living in the same city in which they resided in 1965. The rates of mobility are even higher among young Jews: of those 25–39, over half changed their city of residence at least once in 1965–70 and over 20 percent lived in a different state. Even among the elderly aged 65 and over, 30 percent had moved within a five-year period (reported in Goldstein, 1979b).

In one state, data show very high absolute rates of Jewish out-migration and higher rates relative to other religious and ethnic subgroups. Over 70 percent of the Jewish children of couples interviewed in Rhode Island (1967–69) migrated out of the state compared to less than half of the Protestant and about one-third of the Catholic children. Among Jewish fathers with some college education the proportion of children migrating out of the state was even higher. Even controlling for educational level, out-migration is higher among Jews (Kobrin and Goldscheider, 1978). While out-migration from one area implies immigration to other areas, the long-term consequences of such geographic mobility for patterns of social and cultural life — in neighborhoods, communities, states, and regions — requires research attention. While migration may have limited implications for mortality and fertility at the individual level, migration selectivity has important consequences for levels of mortality and fertility of specific areas and, in turn, for population growth and structure.

Jewish Mortality Patterns

Heavy reliance on official death records for the study of mortality trends and differentials and the absence in the United States of any information on religious affiliation on these records have been major barriers to the analysis of Jewish mortality. In the absence of official death statistics, demographers have developed techniques for estimating mortality from sample surveys or censuses. While these techniques have been applied in historical demographic research and in developing countries, no attempt has been made to use them for estimating national mortality rates for Jews. Nor have there been follow-back surveys of the families of deceased

persons to obtain information on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. No national estimates are available to analyze the mortality patterns of Jewish Americans.

Several post–World War II studies of Jewish mortality have used local community data sources to estimate mortality levels and have examined selected demographic variation (primarily age, sex and cause of death) in mortality. These data on Jewish deaths have been based on the records of funeral directors who handle a significant proportion of Jewish deaths and Jewish cemeteries. These records appear to cover most of all Jewish deaths in a community in a given period, although there are few independent checks of coverage. To estimate rates of mortality, these data must be used in conjunction with a base population. Such data are themselves estimates and are often lacking, particularly by age and sex. The small numbers of annual Jewish deaths in any year, even where these are related to local population estimates, preclude detailed analyses of cause of death or socioeconomic characteristics. Whether the patterns of mortality estimated for several select communities are indicative of national levels and whether significant shifts in Jewish American mortality have occurred in the last decade remain open questions.

Despite these limitations, a fairly consistent but general picture of Jewish mortality levels emerges from these community studies. Estimated Jewish mortality levels are low, particularly for infant and child mortality, when compared to the total White population. This appears to characterize males more than females. Age-specific mortality rates and life table measures based on these rates tend to be similar for Jews and the total American population among the older ages and often slightly higher among Jews. It seems reasonable to conclude that mortality differences between Jews and the total American population are small and do not account for population growth differences by religion. (These studies are reviewed in Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968; Goldstein, 1971. See also Gorwitz, 1962; Seidman, et al., 1962; Liberson, 1956; Fauman and Mayer, 1969; Schmelz, 1971.)

While this conclusion applies to the post–World War II period, data for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries show significantly lower Jewish mortality levels than for the general American population. Estimates of infant and early childhood mortality, for example, reveal that for the period beginning in 1885 through 1915, Jewish rates were about 50 percent lower than for the total American population (Billings, 1890; Woodbury, 1926; Liberson, 1956; Schmelz, 1971 who reviews these and comparative Jewish rates for the last 150 years in a variety of countries). This pattern of lower infant and childhood mortality among Jews characterizes recent studies as well, although differences between Jews and the total population have narrowed. There is some evidence (cited by Schmelz,

1971) that the lower infant and childhood mortality among Jews compared to other immigrant Americans or American-born Whites at the turn of the century characterized both high- and low-income categories. The greater care of children by Jewish mothers, the high proportion of breast-feeding, and the low proportion of Jewish mothers who worked in factories have been cited as part of the explanation of low infant mortality during this period. The infant mortality difference between Jews and others has probably narrowed in recent decades.

Since mortality variation and levels are significantly affected by age structure, it is likely that mortality variations among Jewish communities in the United States are largely reflections of the differential age composition of these communities. However, a sufficient number of community comparisons is lacking for any definite conclusions. Other sources of mortality variations among Jews, particularly socioeconomic, residential (urban, suburban, or regional), and by marital status, have not been systematically analyzed. Comparisons between the mortality of Jewish and total White populations have rarely been made controlling for various socioeconomic characteristics. Hence explanations of mortality differences have been problematic. Genetic selection, higher socioeconomic status, or particular Jewish factors have been invoked to account for mortality differences between Jews and non-Jews (Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968).

Given the social and economic characteristics of the American Jewish population and judging by what is known about general differential mortality in the United States, we can infer that there are few major differentials in mortality among Jews except age and sex. This inference seems reasonable for the contemporary period but is not likely to have characterized the Jewish population at the turn of the century when immigration was high and socioeconomic and demographic conditions among Jews were more heterogeneous. Data on sex differentials in mortality among Jews indicate the greater longevity of Jewish women, parallel to patterns of the general American population. This pattern has resulted in a high proportion of widows among the older populations. While Jews may not be exceptional in this regard, the low proportion of males to females among the elderly has a variety of consequences for family structure, household and living arrangements, as well as for Jewish and general community services. The implications of sex differential mortality among Jews for these and related issues have never been studied systematically.

Perhaps because mortality rates among Jews are relatively low and not very different from those of other White Americans, and because deaths are heavily concentrated among the aged — disengaged from major work, family, and community commitments — and contribute little to the population growth differentials between the Jewish and total American populations, mortality issues have never been high in the list of research priorities.

Data constraints have been discouraging even to the most persistent and ingenious demographers. Nevertheless, there remains a series of basic demographic and sociological questions associated with Jewish mortality that merit investigation. These questions cover a wide range of topics from historical trends in national Jewish mortality rates to socioeconomic and demographic differentials in Jewish mortality; from the consequences of mortality for American Jewish social structure to the role, if any, of specific Jewish values and practices associated with death and dying. The whole area of research on the relationship between morbidity and mortality has been neglected.

Over a decade ago, a detailed review of Jewish mortality research in America concluded that "identification as a Jew continues to affect the life chances of individuals" (Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968, p. 151). Then as now, documentation of this generalization is problematic and the analysis of specific reasons underlying Jewish mortality trends and variations must remain speculative until more systematic and comprehensive research is undertaken.

Trends and Differentials in American Jewish Fertility

In contrast to the paucity of data on Jewish mortality patterns, a wide range of data sources and research studies has been available to analyze Jewish fertility patterns in the United States in detail. Although each data source has limitations, taken together the data have been remarkably cumulative and allow for a more comprehensive analysis of trends and differentials in Jewish fertility. Because we know more about Jewish fertility patterns in America, the analytic questions raised have become more sophisticated and the issues more complex. This in turn demands even more systematic and detailed research. The investigation of fertility generally involves more complex theoretical and methodological problems than mortality analysis. While mortality levels in contemporary America remain low with only small annual fluctuations, and mortality differentials have narrowed and declined in importance, such is not the case for fertility. Fertility fluctuations over the last several decades have been substantial and responsive to economic depressions, recessions, war and postwar social changes, and the revolutions in women's role and in sexual norms. Annual birth rates have varied much more than cohort rates or family size. Population growth and structure are much more affected by fertility than mortality. These characteristics of American fertility are no less true for Jews.

While mortality risks are higher for some ages than others and vary by sex, childbearing is biologically circumscribed to fecund women in the reproductive ages and sociologically to married women. Hence population compositional changes (for example in the number of women of reproduc-

tive ages) or changes in marriage patterns (the proportions married or ages at marriage) have important effects on annual birth rates, reproduction, and population replacement, and often on family size as well. Changes in the timing of births and the tempo of childbearing and family formation are also important for an understanding of fertility trends and differentials.

The centrality of fertility for population growth and the relationship between family structure and fertility have made the study of fertility in general, and Jewish fertility in particular, of major analytic concern for sociologists and demographers. An analysis of the demographic vitality of the American Jewish community or changes in the Jewish family has at its core issues associated with fertility variation and change.

To place in perspective the highlights of what we know about Jewish fertility, a brief review of data sources and their limitations is necessary. This provides the basis for assessing major trends and differentials in Jewish fertility and evaluating what types of further research should be carried out. While some of this review duplicates the discussion of data sources on American Jewish demography presented earlier, studies of Jewish fertility have been more extensive and detailed and merit separate treatment.

Data Sources on Jewish Fertility

There are four main categories of data sources for the study of Jewish fertility, nationally and in local communities (see reviews in Goldscheider, 1967; Goldscheider, 1971; Goldstein, 1971, 1973a, 1979a).

Official Government Statistics. Data on religious affiliation or preference have never been included in American decennial censuses. Indirect estimates of Jewish fertility from censuses have been made from mother-tongue data (those declaring Yiddish as mother tongue) or for the Russian-born and Russian-origin population (on the assumption that a substantial proportion are Jews). For earlier periods these data provide a reasonable basis for evaluating national Jewish fertility levels but their utility for the postwar contemporary period is limited (Goldberg, 1948, 1962; Rosenthal, 1975). In the past, analysis of these data has been limited to published data. Recent advances in computer technology and the growing availability of selected census tapes for specific minority groups may allow for a more detailed historical reevaluation of these data. In the 1970 United States Census, mother-tongue data including Yiddish were collected, as were data on fertility. While these data are now available on special computer tapes, they have not been exploited. While providing only a partial picture of national Jewish fertility, they remain useful for comparisons between Jews and others.

The major government statistics relating directly to Jewish fertility are contained in the Current Population Survey of 1957 — a sample survey

covering 35,000 American households and about 1,000 Jewish households. This unique data source inquired about religious preference for the first (and up to now the only) time as well as socioeconomic and fertility patterns. These data have been exploited fully (Goldstein, 1969; Glick, 1960; Rosenthal, 1961). Although fertility levels by religion can be examined with these data, no analysis of fertility differentials or trends is possible. Only one state census has included a question on religion and fertility (the Rhode Island Census of 1905). Only crude data were published (Goldscheider, 1967) but the original records are available and may be useful for some historical-demographic research.

Another major source of official statistics basic to demographic analyses of births and fertility are birth records, but again no data on religious affiliation are collected. A new series of national fertility surveys under the title National Survey of Family Growth has been undertaken by the National Center for Health Statistics beginning in 1973–74. Religious affiliation, along with details on births and socioeconomic background materials, is included. The number of Jews included will be about 125 cases and therefore will be limited (Goldstein, 1978).

A previous set of surveys, also carried out by the National Center for Health Statistics in 1967, 1968, and 1969 included data on the religion of mothers and fathers. These data based on samples of births and follow-back questionnaires provide a unique data source for national estimates of current Jewish birth and reproduction rates in conjunction with selected demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. A thorough analysis of these data along with a discussion of their limitations has been published (Goldstein, 1979a). These data based on current births are limited to a small number of those currently identified as Jews (1167 cases). No population base data by religion are available to compute rates, and major categories of women are omitted (childless couples, mothers of children born out of wedlock, births before 1967). As a view of "period" birth rates and as a supplement to what is known about trends and differentials in Jewish fertility, these data are useful.

General Fertility Surveys. Given the limitations of official statistics for the detailed examination of fertility and fertility-related issues (e.g. timing and tempo of childbearing, contraceptive usage, family planning and fertility norms, preferences, and attitudes), major sample surveys of American fertility have been undertaken. These surveys have included over the last several decades questions on religious affiliation, preferences, and religiosity. Starting from clinical studies in the 1920s to the classic Indianapolis study, the Growth of American Family Studies, the Princeton Studies of the 1950s and 1960s, and the latest national fertility surveys in the 1970s, data on Jewish (compared to Protestant and Catholic) fertility and family planning have been published. These studies have provided rich details on

fertility behavior and attitudes, contraceptive practices, and family planning, and present a comprehensive view of these patterns (trends and variations) for the American population. However, because Jews represent less than 3 percent of the American population, the number of Jewish respondents has always been small — seldom more than one hundred cases. As a result, detailed analyses of these data are restricted. Nevertheless, they represent an important comparative basis for examining Jewish fertility patterns. These studies have been reviewed in several publications (Goldscheider, 1967, 1971; Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968; Goldstein, 1971, 1979a) and provide confirmatory evidence that supplements other official and Jewish community data sources. Other general surveys, based on the total population, have included questions on religion and fertility but again, the small number of cases for Jewish women in the reproductive period precludes detailed analysis. Gallup and NORC polls are therefore of minimum utility for an analysis of Jewish fertility (cf. Goldstein, 1979a on combined NORC data, Table 2).

Jewish Community Surveys. The most detailed and comprehensive data on Jewish fertility trends and differentials have been derived from general sample surveys of Jewish communities. The quality of these data vary enormously in terms of sample design and coverage and in terms of details available on fertility trends and variations among Jews. These data tend to be limited to the Jewish population and comparisons with other ethnic, religious groups have been limited (for an exception see Lazerwitz, 1973b). Nor have details on fertility been included beyond family size patterns, birth intervals, and fertility expectations (for younger women). The most comprehensive use of these surveys has been for an analysis of cohort fertility trends and a variety of socioeconomic and religious differentials (Goldscheider, 1965a, b, c, 1966, 1967, 1971; Goldstein, 1971, 1973b, 1979a). The degree to which patterns analyzed for local communities characterize national trends remains an open question. Details on Jewish fertility from the NJPS have not been analyzed. This latter source should provide valuable evidence on trends and differentials in Jewish fertility at the national level.

Each of these data sources has limitations and analysis based solely on any one of them is problematic. Nevertheless, picking up the various pieces of evidence from these studies, a remarkably consistent picture of Jewish fertility emerges. There continue to be gaps in our knowledge about Jewish fertility trends and differentials that will require new research efforts based on new data sets and reanalyses of data sources now available. The substantive review of American Jewish fertility will focus on four major themes: (1) the trend and level of Jewish fertility; (2) explanations of Jewish/non-Jewish differences in fertility; (3) socioeconomic and religious variations in Jewish fertility; (4) areas of neglected research associated

with Jewish fertility. A related theme on changes in family structure will be reviewed in a separate section.

Levels and Trends in Jewish Fertility

Since the end of the nineteenth century research in the United States has pointed to the unmistakable conclusion that Jews have lower fertility than the American population as a whole or other ethnic groups. The major fertility and community studies available as well as data from official government statistics have consistently confirmed this observation for a wide range of fertility and related measures. Indicators of fertility norms, desires, and expectations, family size, annual birth and reproduction rates, contraceptive knowledge and practices, family planning, and the timing of reproduction all point in the same direction: Jewish couples want, plan, and have small families. Fertility among Jews is low in terms of absolute levels, as well as relative to other ethnic-religious groups in America.

Low Jewish fertility is not a new American pattern. As far as can be discerned from the available data, particularly by marriage cohort, fluctuations around replacement level fertility have characterized Jewish marriage cohorts as early as the mid-1920s. Marriage cohort data in one study (Goldscheider, 1966) reveal that average Jewish family size of those marrying before 1910 was 3.5 children declining to 2 children for the cohorts between 1925 and 1944. Postwar marriage cohorts, as was true for other American couples, experienced an increase in family size to around 2.5 children. The decline and postwar increase are indicated not only by average family size but by specific parity data as well.

The decline in fertility inferred from these cross-sectional data parallel similar inferences from census data on Polish and Russian women who reported Yiddish as their mother tongue in the 1940 U.S. Census (Goldberg, 1948). These data suggest that the decline in fertility for Jews was greater than for the total population. Similarly, the post–World War II increase seems to have been less than that characterizing the White population as a whole.

Similar prewar declines and postwar increases were reported when family size was examined by generational and age-generational groupings. The increase in family size among third-generation Jews may have been followed by a subsequent downturn, particularly for marriage cohorts of the 1960s and 1970s. This would parallel what has happened in the American population in general. Some limited period data on annual births of Jews in 1967–69 point in that direction. It is unclear whether these period rates will reflect eventual family size or whether changes in the timing and tempo of childbearing have pushed these annual rates to unprecedented low levels (cf. Goldstein, 1979a).

Examination of the fertility of married couples may differ from that of the total Jewish population when there are significant proportions of nonmarried or delays in marriage and childbearing. Cohort patterns (births to women who marry or are born during a particular period) may differ from a cross-sectional view of annual birth rates. Both perspectives are necessary for a full examination of fertility levels. The examination of family size changes among different cohorts of women as they pass through their childbearing cycle is essential for a view of completed family size and analysis of the dynamics of family formation. Cohort data of this type have not been available for recent marriage cohorts among Jews.

Another view examines annual birth rates or other period measures that relate to family formation and childbearing at particular periods, irrespective of the ages or cohorts of women giving birth or their previous childbearing experience. Examining births in a given year, for example, related to births occurring to women in a variety of childbearing stages and from various marriage cohorts. Included in an annual rate of fertility are women completing their childbearing as well as those just beginning and those in the middle stages. Average family size among ever-married Jewish women may remain relatively stable while annual Jewish birth rates fluctuate greatly.

Jewish women marrying in the 1920s and 1930s had by the end of their childbearing period around two children. However, births occurring during those years were not only to women marrying during those years but to women who had been married for longer durations — older marriage cohorts whose fertility was higher. Most of those marrying in the 1920s and 1930s were second-generation Jews whose family of orientation was relatively large. The economic depression of the 1930s and the war years were periods of general low fertility in America and were viewed as transitory. In the immediate postwar period of the 1940s and 1950s a "baby boom" occurred among Jews as among the general American population. Although the baby boom reflected in part changes in the timing of childbearing and the making up of postponed births and delayed marriages, the normative experience of this period was childbearing and early family formation. There is some evidence that small increases in Jewish family size characterized the immediate post–World War II cohorts. Yet it was not until the 1960s that both families of orientation and procreation were small in size, almost all Jewish women giving birth during this period were characterized by relatively small families, efficient contraceptive usage, and the planning of the number and spacing of all births.

During the 1960s and 1970s some delayed marriage and nonmarriage began to emerge on the American Jewish scene. These marriage and family formation changes may have been accompanied by changes in the timing of childbearing among married women. If the proportion of married

women declines significantly and delayed childbearing within marriage takes place, a family size of 2-3 children will not necessarily imply *annual* population replacement rates. While the long-run trend in Jewish fertility among married couples is toward the two-child family, annual fertility rates during the 1960s and early 1970s may have been distorted by timing and marriage changes.

Further accentuating this pattern of the changing tempo of childbearing for the Jewish population during this latter period (rather than average family size for ever-married women) is the fact that the number of Jewish women of childbearing age may have been significantly lower in the 1960s. Most Jewish women marrying in the 1960s were born in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The number of Jewish babies born during that period was probably significantly lower than in the previous period or the subsequent post–World War II boom. Hence fewer Jewish women were around to have children. A substantial part of the explanation of very low annual Jewish birth rates in the last decade may lie in these combined changes in the timing of family formation and childbearing and in the number of Jewish persons entering the childbearing period. Nevertheless, replacement levels for those who marry is not synonymous with replacement levels for the population as a whole, particularly if a growing proportion of women do not marry or delay marriage.

Community planning, educational enrollments, and the general presence of children in communities are based not on a cohort view of childbearing but on the number of children born in particular periods. Delayed childbearing through nonmarriage, postponed marriage, and divorce, as well as timing changes within marriage, combined with the changing numbers of persons reaching the childbearing ages must be considered in evaluating changing period rates of reproduction. Add to these processes the general low replacement level fertility of Jews and the ability of Jewish couples to plan total family size and the spacing of all children and the results are clear: an impressive and conspicuous reduction in the number of Jewish children born in the last decade.

When family size is low and marriage patterns, cohort age structure, and the timing of family formation and childbearing are all changing to push marital fertility rates below population replacement, a small minority group cannot sustain losses due to emigration or out-marriage. Small population declines become problems when additional sociodemographic processes exaggerate that decline. For Jews in America, as will be discussed in a subsequent section, rates of intermarriage increased precisely during the 1960s and early 1970s. Young Jews marrying in this latter period were largely third- or fourth-generation Americans, characterized by significantly less Jewish commitment. Even minimum net losses through out-marriage combined with these annual patterns of below replacement

fertility raises the specter of the declining American Jewish population. Research has shown that average family size among Jewish women remains around two children, with little preference for childless or one-child families. Further research must attempt to more systematically document both cohort and period rates of fertility, particularly for younger, recently married Jewish couples.

Explanations of Jewish Fertility

The low absolute and relative levels of Jewish fertility are consistent with the general socioeconomic and residential characteristics of Jews in the United States. The concentration of American Jews in particular statuses and residential locations associated with low fertility supports this observation. The high level of educational attainment among Jews, their concentration in professional and managerial occupations, their high incomes, and the unique urban, metropolitan distribution of Jews have been well documented. These characteristics individually and in combination have been associated with low fertility. Since fertility levels reflect these status and residential categories, the "uniqueness" of Jewish fertility, particularly its low level, reflects the unique socioeconomic and ecological characteristics of the Jewish population.

Jewish fertility levels are integral to the socioeconomic and urban-metropolitan characteristics of the Jewish population. Several pieces of evidence, however, suggest that such an explanation is incomplete. First, Jewish fertility tends to be lower than Protestant and Catholic fertility of similar socioeconomic and residential characteristics. A variety of national and local community studies have shown that fertility differences between Jews and non-Jews remain after the socioeconomic and residential variations have been controlled. Second, the "characteristics" explanation of Jewish fertility would have to assume that Jews in other Western countries have had for the last century the same matrix of characteristics as Jews in the United States or those associated with lower fertility. It would similarly have to be assumed that Jews in the United States for the last century have had these same social and economic characteristics. Empirical evidence shows the very opposite; contemporary Jews do not have the same matrix of characteristics that characterized prior generations. We not only have to explain why Jews are concentrated in particular status and residential categories in order to account for low Jewish fertility, but we must consider other factors particular to the Jewish group — historically and comparatively — to explain the lower Jewish fertility levels compared to non-Jews of similar status and residential characteristics.

There is no clear consensus among social scientists as to what these additional factors might be. Some have argued that social mobility factors are operating (Rosenthal, 1961). Low fertility has been associated with the

rise of Jews into the middle class. Even before attaining middle-class status, it is argued that Jews had a "middle class" "mentality" and psychologically shared middle-class values including small family size. Some have argued that low fertility relates to the changing role and status of Jewish women and their changing self-conception (Sklare, 1971). Others have attempted to relate low fertility to broader patterns of assimilation and acculturation and have argued for a more comprehensive theory related to the changing nature of Jewish social structure and culture. This approach places particular emphasis on the changing role of minority group status and the associated feelings of discrimination and insecurity that may be associated with low fertility. While not neglecting social characteristics, social mobility, and changing roles and statuses of Jewish women, this view suggests that the "uniqueness" of Jewish fertility relates to the particular position of Jews in the social structure.

The combination of minority group status and the interpretation of related values and statuses within that framework helps to account not only for the unique American Jewish patterns but relates as well to other American minority groups (e.g. Japanese- and Chinese-Americans) and to comparative-historical research of Jews (and other minorities). There has never been a systematic test of the role of minority group status in accounting for Jewish fertility levels or alternative theories explaining Jewish fertility. To do so would require research focused on this issue (Goldscheider, 1967, 1971).

Differentials in Jewish Fertility

Given the pattern of low fertility levels and norms among American Jews, it is instructive to ask whether there are any subgroups within the American Jewish population that have larger family size patterns. The issue of differentials in Jewish fertility is hampered by the absence of detailed data from most data sources noted above. The analysis of the NJPS data when published should help clarify some of these differentials.

On the basis of the evidence now available it is reasonable to argue that there are few major differentiators in the fertility of contemporary American Jews. The American Jewish population has become more homogeneous in terms of major socioeconomic characteristics than in the past. In the last several decades there have been processes of diffusion in terms of family planning and overall American norms of small family size such that most segments of the Jewish community have been exposed to and adopted these norms. For the American population as a whole, fertility differentials have converged over the last decade. Traditional variables associated with higher fertility in America — rural residence, poverty, contraceptive ignorance, low education, farm and blue-collar occupations — are nonexistent among Jewish men and women of childbearing age.

Some variations in Jewish fertility in America continue to characterize contemporary Jewish couples. Looking first at the variation by socioeconomic status (education, occupation, and income), available research suggests that the traditional inverse relationship between socioeconomic status and fertility only characterized foreign-born, first-generation American Jews. For second- and third-generation Jewish couples, socioeconomic variations in fertility were unclear with some indication of a positive relationship — higher-status Jews had somewhat larger families than lower-status Jews. There is clear evidence of convergence and greater homogeneity in the fertility patterns of Jewish couples. The contraction of socioeconomic differentials has been viewed as further evidence of the widespread rationality with which the majority of contemporary Jews plan their families, the absence of rapid upward mobility characteristic of earlier generations, and the greater homogeneity of contemporary Jewish social structure. The lack of wide class distinctions among third-generation Jews may account for the absence of striking fertility differences within the Jewish population (Goldscheider, 1967; Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968; Goldstein, 1973b, 1979a).

Traditional Judaism has emphasized large family size and limited the permissibility of mechanical contraception to reasons of health (broadly defined). If judged by the low levels of fertility and efficient use of contraception for family planning among American Jews, these traditional norms have been largely ignored. Until recently, there has been no reason to postulate that the religious elite of the American Jewish community have viewed issues of family size or planning as high priority. Scattered evidence indicates that American Jews are not aware of these norms or prohibitions. Nor is there any clear fertility ideology or theology in Reform or Conservative Judaism that has been clearly conveyed to those identifying with these denominations.

Research carried out in the 1960s suggests that the relationship between religiosity, defined in a variety of ways, and Jewish fertility is complex. For the older foreign-born generation, there seems to be a positive relationship — the higher the religiosity, the larger the family size. This pattern did not characterize younger, American-born generations. Detailed evidence reveals that family size differences among those identifying with various religious divisions within Judaism disappear when socioeconomic status was controlled (cf. Goldscheider, 1965a; Lazerwitz, 1973b; Ritterband and Cohen, 1979). These studies concluded that religious identity and identification have little relationship to Jewish fertility that cannot be accounted for by social class factors. The secular nature of religion for modern Jews implies that Judaism as a religion plays a minor role in determining their fertility.

Studies have not focused on self-segregated religious subcommunities of Jews in selected metropolitan areas of the United States. Impressionistic evidence suggests, for example, that among this segment of committed American Jewry, higher fertility values, ideals, and behavior prevail. In part, these traditional Jewish communities have rejected in a variety of ways the integrationist ideology of the vast majority of American Jews. In their emphasis on traditional roles for women, family and spiritual centrality, and general resistance to acculturation, large-family values and behavior have been retained and supported. These groups have probably contributed a disproportionate share of children to the American Jewish community.

This impressionistic evidence relates to the small but conspicuous Hasidic sects and more fundamentalistic (less modern, integrated) orthodox subcommunities. Growing Jewish public concern with low or declining rates of American Jewish population growth may have an effect for selected committed segments of American Jewry in the direction of somewhat larger family size. An increase in family size among those whose religious orientation has moved toward greater self-segregation and fundamentalism would represent a significant shift in American Jewish fertility patterns. Research on these subcommunities should be carried out to identify the extent and direction of this phenomenon and its implications for understanding future fertility patterns among Jews.

Another source of fertility variation within the American Jewish population, related to the issue of religiosity, is the difference between the family size of couples where the husband and wife are Jewish compared to intermarried couples. Parallel to general findings on intermarriage between Protestants and Catholics, several studies have shown that Jewish intermarriage results in lowered fertility. Intermarried couples have fewer children and higher childless rates than homogenously married Jewish couples (Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968; Goldstein, 1979a). Fertility differences between the intermarried and nonintermarried seem to be narrower among younger couples and may provide some indication of the greater acceptability of intermarried couples within the Jewish community. We shall return to this theme in our review of intermarriage.

One final issue in the analysis of variation in Jewish fertility relates to place of residence. Fertility levels tend to be somewhat higher in suburban than in urban areas and highest in rural areas. Since the number of Jews in rural areas is very small, the issue remains whether suburbanization has an effect on Jewish fertility. Some have speculated on the basis of Protestant-Catholic patterns that there is a convergence in fertility among religious groups in the suburbs (Zimmer and Goldscheider, 1966). Others have argued the case for Jews without empirical evidence (Rosenthal, 1961). Some evidence is available indicating that suburban Jewish family size is

larger than among Jews residing in urban areas and birth intervals are longer as well (Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968).

It is unclear whether the relatively higher fertility of suburban Jews is a reflection of the impact of suburban residence and the equalizing-acculturating effects of the suburbs or whether there is a selective migration to the suburbs of those who want larger families. Some evidence from the Providence study suggests that the majority of suburban residents moved there after their first child was born. The implication is that for many reasons suburban areas are attractive to people with families and this probably accounts for their slightly larger family sizes. More recent detailed research should pursue this relationship further. Data from the NJPS should prove valuable in analyzing this and other differentials reviewed above. However, in order to analyze these patterns fully, a longitudinal research design is necessary.

Neglected Areas of Research in Jewish Fertility

In the review of trends and differentials in Jewish fertility and the issues associated with the explanation of Jewish fertility, we have noted the limitations of previous research. Many of the findings reviewed have been based on inadequate and incomplete evidence or data sources that have serious methodological problems. We also noted the need for research on the fertility of more recently married cohorts and the desirability of longitudinal research designs to identify family formation dynamics.

One area of research that has been neglected relates to the consequences of low Jewish fertility. While assessments of the implications of fertility patterns for Jewish population growth have been made within the limitations of available data, other consequences have not been studied. Three such areas should be investigated. First, what are the consequences of Jewish fertility patterns for the educational attainment of children, occupational career patterns, income, and general socioeconomic status? More generally, what implications does low Jewish fertility have for leisure activities, career patterns for women, and general lifestyles? While socioeconomic and related issues have been viewed as determinants of fertility, almost no research has focused on these patterns as consequences.

A second neglected area of fertility consequences relates to the issue of Jewish identification and religiosity. Some evidence suggests that childless couples are less likely to be formally affiliated with the Jewish community in terms of self-identification, synagogue or temple membership, or in terms of a broad range of Jewish communal organizations. Jewish ritual observances that have become defined as child- or family-oriented are less likely to characterize childless couples (Goldscheider, 1973). It has been suggested that having children and socializing them into the minority subculture often involves parents in roles and decisions which relate them to

the Jewish community and develop or enhance parental Jewish identification (Sklare and Greenblum, 1967). A more thorough investigation of the implications of fertility (not only childless but one- and two-child families) for Jewish identification and affiliation of both parents and children over the life cycle is required. A related issue focuses on the macro level: What are the implications of low fertility for the structure of the Jewish community, for community organizations, and community services?

The research issues involved in examining the consequences of Jewish fertility are complex and new research designs must be developed to cope with these issues. It is analytically important to treat the relationship between social structure and fertility as a two-way process where fertility is both a consequence and a determinant of social patterns at the individual and community levels. The consequences of low Jewish fertility go beyond the demographic issues of population growth and structure. Jewish fertility patterns have indirect effects on Jewish institutions and families through their consequences on population dynamics. They may also have direct consequences on socioeconomic, family, religious, and communal institutional patterns.

Jewish Family Structure

The family functions to maintain group continuity and is one of the basic units of socialization and cultural transmission for the next generation. Demographic and cultural continuities have been primarily located in the family. This is no less true for the Jewish subgroup than for total societies. Because of the interdependence of family and other aspects of society, it is not unexpected that as broader societal changes unfold, family patterns will be altered as well. Several demographic aspects of Jewish family structure will be reviewed below. These include the extent of marriage and nonmarriage, the timing of marriage (particularly age at marriage), the duration of marriage (divorce, separation, and remarriage), and demographic aspects of extended family patterns (particularly household structure). Research on the size of families and mate selection (specifically intermarriage) are reviewed in separate sections of this paper.

Despite the centrality of family patterns for demographic and sociological analysis, few detailed studies are available. Some limited information may be obtained from the 1957 Current Population Survey data and from Jewish community studies and preliminary data published from the NJPS. More recent changes based on impressionistic observations require careful and detailed research focused on Jewish family structure.

American Jews have been until recently remarkably successful in maintaining patterns of family stability and cohesion. The family has remained central in the lives of Jews despite social and geographic mobility and gen-

eral acculturation and integration. The persistence of almost universal but somewhat later ages at marriage, low divorce rates, and nuclear family structure has indeed been exceptional considering the radical social transformations of American Jews in the last century (Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968).

Data from the 1957 CPS survey show the very high proportion of Jewish men and women who ever marry: among those aged 35–44 only 5 percent of Jewish men and 8 percent of Jewish women were single or never married. These findings have been repeatedly observed in various community studies (Goldstein, 1971). Divorce rates seem to be lower for Jews than for the total American population (Goldberg, 1968). Consistent with their higher levels of education, age at marriage tends to be higher among Jews than for the total American population (Goldscheider and Goldstein, 1967; Goldstein, 1971; Kobrin and Goldscheider, 1978).

Marriage cohort data reveal that later age at marriage has characterized Jewish women since at least 1920. Average age at marriage seems to have increased from 19 to 23 years up to World War II cohorts and declined subsequently for cohorts marrying in the 1950s and early 1960s. These patterns follow the general American population, but at higher average ages. Thus while higher education may have been a factor in the delayed marriage of women in the pre–World War II period, other factors (such as the greater separation of marriage from early childbearing due to the use of efficient contraception) must be operating in the post–World War II period. Although data are not available for the analysis of changes in the last decade, it is likely that delayed marriage among selected segments of the Jewish population has occurred. This may be related to greater separation of sexual activity from marriage and revolutionary changes in the role and status of women during this period.

While marriage and family-building patterns emerging primarily from Jewish community studies are fairly consistent, several methodological and theoretical issues remain. First, since available data are cross-sectional and marriage and divorce records do not contain information on religion, the dynamics associated with family changes and family formation must be inferred. More serious are possible biases associated with the sampling design of Jewish community surveys. These surveys have relied heavily on Jewish community master lists. These have been biased toward family units and may not have included younger (or older) single persons. Some scattered evidence pointing to lack of formal Jewish community affiliation among this group would further bias samples focused on the more affiliated. Finally, it is not clear whether marriage patterns (the extent or timing) and divorce levels are exceptional for Jews compared to the total population when the unique socioeconomic and residential characteristics of Jews are controlled. As in the explanation of Jewish fertility, it is not

clear whether specific Jewish values or particular features of Jewish social structure account for these marriage and family patterns or whether they reflect the social characteristics of the Jewish population.

Patterns of household formation and structure, particularly the degree of family extension, have never been studied systematically for Jewish Americans. Community surveys have revealed the small size of Jewish households, mainly reflecting low Jewish fertility. Following the general American pattern, nuclear family structure predominates among Jews (Goldstein, 1971). Recent research on the American population has pointed to changing patterns of household structure, particularly the significant growth of single-person household units (Kobrin, 1976; Kobrin and Goldscheider, 1979). This view examines the proportion of all nuclear households and the household structure of nonnuclear family members. Research focused on the living arrangements of both the older and younger adult ages has pointed to growing proportions who select the alternative of living alone rather than either the nuclear or extended residential arrangement. Preliminary evidence from the NJPS shows that 30 percent of household heads under age 30 live alone or outside the nuclear or extended family pattern (Massarik and Chenkin, 1973).

The review up to this point has emphasized the research available and its limitations up to the 1960s. Recent changes over the last fifteen years that may alter this general picture have not been systematically studied. While there are some clues to these changes from the NJPS for the youngest marriage cohort — particularly the increasing levels of single-person household, delayed marriage, and higher divorce rates — these data may not have fully tapped changes in the last decade (Massarik and Chenkin, 1973).

A variety of indirect indicators suggests that a series of revolutionary family changes are unfolding among selected segments of fourth-generation Jews. For the first time in recent American Jewish history significant proportions of men and women aged 20–35 are not marrying. The increasing proportions of the never married adds to the growing number of nonmarried, divorced, and separated Jewish men and women. These groups represent a new phenomenon in American Jewish life and are a challenge to institutional, organizational, and community structures that have in the past focused almost exclusively on the family as the unit of greatest significance.

The increasing proportion of nonmarriage, delayed marriage, and divorce among Jews has obvious implications for fertility and reproduction patterns, family values, as well as demographic and sociocultural continuity. The implications of these patterns of family and marriage are unmistakable even if they are only temporary responses to social and economic conditions, reflections of peculiar demographic limitations associated with

the availability of Jewish mates in particular locations, statuses, or age categories, or are more deeply related to changes in marriage and family values, women's roles, and sexual behavior characterizing America of the 1970s. If these impressions of changes in nonmarriage and higher divorce rates are accurate, patterns of low fertility and high intermarriage rates will be further exacerbated among Jews. Changes in marriage and family behavior and norms have a direct impact on the timing of marriage, decisions not to marry, processes of separation, divorce, and remarriage, number and timing of births, the relationship of children to their families of orientation and extended family networks, and mate selection.

The sexual revolution, changes in women's roles and, in turn, changes in marriage and family patterns have special significance for Jews because of their tradition of family cohesiveness and unity, endogamy, and universal marriage patterns. Changes in Jewish fertility have been less in the direction of zero and one-child families and more in the direction of almost universal two- to three-child families among those married. However, when fewer Jews are getting married, some are marrying at later ages, and still others deciding to have no children because of career patterns for women, then two- to three-child families are insufficient to attain overall population replacement levels. Changes in marriage and the timing of childbearing may not have the effect of reducing marital fertility in the long run but may reduce current birth rates below replacement levels and place the burden of population replacement on a smaller group of married women.

Jews have tended in the past to be in the forefront of major sociodemographic revolutions. American Jews are located in social statuses and geographic locations most responsive to changes in marriage and the family. The high proportion of Jews with college and graduate-level educations, their disproportionate concentration in select metropolitan centers, and their middle-class backgrounds and values place them in the avant-garde of social change. For Jews, the decline of the family may imply additional strains on Jewish social, cultural, and demographic continuity in America. When added to the empirical results of increasing rates of intermarriage and low levels of fertility, changes in marriage and the family are clearly in the direction away from Jewish demographic vitality in America.

Demographic Aspects of Jewish Intermarriage

Much more so than fertility levels or changes in marriage patterns, intermarriage between Jews and non-Jews has called into question the possibility of quantitative and qualitative survival of a small ethnic-religious minority group in an open society. No other issue symbolizes more clearly the conflict between universalism and particularism, between the American melting pot and sociocultural universalism and pluralism, between as-

similation and ethnic continuity in American society. The unresolved dilemma for American Jewry revolves around traditional values of family cohesion, Jewish continuity and endogamy, on the one hand, and the consistency between out-marriages and the structural-cultural features of American Jewish life, on the other.

Until the 1960s, the Jewish group in America had been accurately described as the classic illustration of voluntary group endogamy. Social scientists hardly had a basis for questioning Jewish group continuity when intermarriage rates were low, Jewish marriage rates high, and family patterns among Jews strong and cohesive. Demographic survival issues were rarely raised when intermarriage was a marginal feature of American Jewish life, even when Jewish fertility patterns fluctuated around replacement levels.

Evidence of increasing levels of Jewish out-marriage began to accumulate in the early 1960s and intermarriage and conversion have become more prominent features of the American Jewish situation. In the 1960s and 1970s the demographic concerns of numerical losses through Jewish intermarriages were heightened since American Jewish population size was relatively small, dispersion more pronounced, growth through immigration small, and natural increase low. Intermarriage rates indicating significant losses among the young pose a particular demographic threat to a small minority reproducing at replacement levels. The concern of the American Jewish community about population reduction through intermarriage was not directed to macrodemographic issues that have rarely been fully understood or well documented statistically. Rather Jewish intermarriage has come to symbolize significant shifts in Jewish family life and group continuity.

Jewish intermarriage in contemporary American society does not appear to be the result of a specific desire to assimilate or a consequence of particular intermarriage norms. It is the direct result of the structure of American Jewish life and general values shared by American Jews. It is the structural integration of American Jews that results in higher rates of intermarriage among the fourth generation. These structural features include greater residential integration of Jewish and non-Jewish neighborhoods, social interaction between Jews and non-Jews, and public school and college attendance where Jews are a minority in a middle-class environment. A set of ideological commitments and value patterns reinforces these structural features. Conducive to high rates of intermarriage are egalitarian beliefs, emphasis on liberalism, faith in minority group integration, rejection of ethnocentrism, and commitment to universalism (Sklare, 1971). These structural features and cultural values have come to characterize the Jewish ethnic group in America.

Intermarriage (and its sociodemographic consequences) can no longer be treated as marginal when it is the result of a deep-rooted sociopolitical ideology and value structure and a function of lifestyle, residential pattern, and educational and occupational structure. It cannot be ignored within the Jewish community when few Jewish families have not experienced intermarriage directly or through friends and neighbors. The intermarriage issue has become central to the internal struggles of American Jewry. For those who view intermarriage as a threat to Jewish demographic continuity in America, the ultimate choice appears to be between changing the social structure and value orientations of the American Jewish community or to accommodate and accept the intermarried. There are no indications that the first alternative has been or will be selected by the majority of American Jews.

Data sources on Jewish intermarriage have been limited for comprehensive demographic analysis. Although some data on religion are available on the marriage records of two states (Iowa and Indiana) and from the 1957 Current Population Survey, these have limited value for any extensive analysis of Jewish intermarriage rates (Rosenthal, 1963, 1975; Glick, 1960; Goldstein, 1973b).[2] The major source for an analysis of trends and differentials in intermarriage are Jewish community surveys. While allowing for the inclusion of details on the background characteristics of intermarried couples, these surveys have limitations in terms of full coverage of marginal Jewish households and the nonaffiliated.

A brief overview of findings on changes and variations in Jewish intermarriage in the United States reveals the following patterns. Jewish endogamy is high and intermarriage rates are low relative to large American ethnic-religious groups. However, given the specific demographic characteristics of American Jewry, the level of intermarriage probably represents a diminution in the size of the American Jewish population. No evaluation of the demography of American Jews can ignore the centrality of Jewish intermarriage in absolute and relative Jewish population changes.

The general pattern of low rates of intermarriage based on a cross-section of the Jewish community obscures the effects of age and generation and confuses cumulative and current rates. The separation of period and cohort perspectives is no less required in the analysis of intermarriage than in fertility studies. An examination of intermarriage rates by age and generation as well as general levels of intermarriage between different periods reveals a pattern of increase in Jewish intermarriage. Some scattered evidence and impressions suggest that disproportionate shifts in the rate of intermarriage have occurred in the 1960s and 1970s among young Jews of third and fourth generations.

Systematic evaluation of the quantitative significance of changing intermarriage trends is incomplete since the level of conversion to Judaism is

not well documented. Nor do we know the eventual Jewish commitment by children of intermarried couples. The general impression from selected community studies including the NJPS is that the level of conversion to Judaism has increased, and some significant proportion of the children of intermarried couples are being raised as Jews. Although it is impossible to be precise, there is no question that current rates of Jewish intermarriage affect the size of the American Jewish population and have longer-term demographic significance for the size of generations yet unborn. It is also clear that not all Jewish intermarriages imply the loss to the Jewish community of the Jewish partner, the non-Jewish spouse, or the couple's children. On the contrary, for some select proportion of intermarried couples, the Jewish community gains rather than loses members through conversion and the Jewish socialization of the children of intermarried couples. Some data show a tendency among those who intermarry and remain within the Jewish community to be more religious and committed as compared to Jews endogamously married.

In addition to the question of changing intermarriage rates and their demographic implications are issues relating to differential levels of intermarriage among American Jewish communities and subgroups within the Jewish community. The level of Jewish intermarriage varies considerably between communities and reflects in part social compositional variations. Communities and subcommunities (suburbs, for example) vary in the rate of intermarriage simply because of variation in the size of the Jewish population and in generational and socioeconomic characteristics as well as related factors such as religiosity. It is not clear whether communities with higher intermarriage rates foreshadow what will come to characterize the American Jewish population in the future or whether because of their size or composition these communities are exceptional. The size of the Jewish community and the implied density of Jewish residential patterns appear to be important factors in intermarriage rates.

There are some indications emerging from the literature that sociological differences between the intermarried and nonintermarried have diminished among recent cohorts. Analysis of changing patterns of age at marriage, fertility, socioeconomic status, and sex differentials suggests some convergence of the intermarried and nonintermarried in these characteristics. These tentative findings fit in with the notion that intermarriage is no longer a marginal or deviant phenomenon in American Jewish life. There appears to be much less selectivity in intermarriage among contemporary Jews and the intermarried may become in terms of their characteristics and subsequent behavior not significantly different from those in endogamous marriages. The social background characteristics of Jewish and non-Jewish partners to the intermarriage tend to be similar among recently intermarried couples as compared to intermarried couples of previous generations.

Two social characteristics are related to intermarriage: Jewish residential segregation and Jewish education. An empirical relationship has been reported in a variety of studies between the character of residential neighborhoods and intermarriage rates. Jews living in areas of greater Jewish population concentration are more likely to be endogamous than Jews living in areas of low Jewish population densities. This may reflect the fact that contact and interaction between Jews and non-Jews are integral processes determining levels of intermarriage. The more extensive and significant the interaction between Jews and non-Jews in school, neighborhoods, organizations, social and business activities, the greater the likelihood of intermarriage. It is not clear whether residence in areas of low Jewish population density is a determinant of high intermarriage rates or a consequence of selective migration patterns of intermarried couples.

A key finding of previous research has been that extensive and intensive Jewish education is generally correlated with endogamy. Again, the implications are less clear than a superficial examination might suggest. It is not obvious, for example, what is the relationship between Jewish education and residential segregation or that between Jewish education and a variety of dimensions of Jewish identity and commitment. Nor does this finding specify the amount or type of Jewish education that clearly results in endogamy. However, the finding at the most simple level indicates at a minimum that commitment to Jewish survival either through Jewish education or through processes reflected in Jewish education are conducive to Jewish endogamy and continuity. Jewish intermarriage rates therefore tend to be highest among those who stand at the least committed end of the Jewish continuum.

Data on the relationship between educational attainment and occupational status and intermarriage levels do not show clear patterns. Results from one community lead to the conclusion that Jewish intermarriage rates do not vary in a consistent way with current class position (Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968). The same study noted that marriage instability is very much associated with intermarriage. It is nevertheless clear that a fuller examination of variation in intermarriage requires a dynamic, longitudinal research design to unravel the determinants and consequences over the life cycle. Such studies have never been undertaken (cf. the research by Sherrow reported in Schwartz, 1970).

A final point requires reemphasis: it is not the level of Jewish intermarriage per se that challenges the sociodemographic survival of Jews in America. Nor are the patterns of Jewish reproduction, migration, family, or age structure exceptional in their individual and separate levels and trends. Rather it is the specific demographic context within which intermarriage rates operate in America that is of paramount significance. The combination of low fertility, geographic dispersion, minimum potential

sources of population renewal through immigration or further mortality reduction, declines in family cohesion, *and* relatively high intermarriage rates have resulted in issues associated with the demographic vitality of Jewish Americans. Given the limitations of available research on all the demographic factors related to Jewish population growth, it is not possible to assign relative weights to individual factors or fully assess the level of Jewish population growth (stability or decline).

Research Challenges and Priorities: Data Collection, Documentation, and Types of Analysis

The critical review of research on the demography of Jewish Americans reveals a reasonably solid foundation upon which to build future cumulative studies. While empirical evidence supporting specific generalizations on particular topics may be less than satisfactory from a methodological point of view, a considerable amount of research has been carried out on major aspects of American Jewish demography. Future research must build upon what is known and hypothesized rather than proceeding in a research vacuum. Undoubtedly, careful and systematic research will qualify and refine existing findings on American Jewish demography, correct previous errors, and contribute new insights and generalizations. Future research on the demography of American Jews must explore new unresearched topics suggested by previous studies and apply different methodological strategies in addressing particular analytic issues. There is also continuing need for reorganizing existing data sources, providing documentation of previously researched issues, and evaluating more systematically data now available.

The overview of past research presented here has pointed to the variety of substantive issues and research topics included in the demography of American Jews. For each of these topics there are a variety of data sources, many of them limited and unsatisfactory for an in-depth examination of major analytic issues. Therefore research challenges for future studies are also pluralistic: no single research design or methodological strategy can encompass the broad range of topics that require research attention in the future. In considering the types of research that should be pursued and the priorities associated with particular topics and activities, we begin with the premise that there are diverse methodological approaches for studying the range of demographic topics for the heterogeneous subgroups that encompass the American Jewish population.

Before considering specific demographic research activities of the proposed center of modern Jewish studies and discussing research priorities that emerge from our review of the demography of American Jews, two caveats must be considered. First, we shall avoid proposing an ideal, com-

prehensive survey design for an all-encompassing study of American Jewish demographic processes. Such a multipurpose design is neither desirable nor feasible at this stage, and there are other research activities of greater value. It is premature to consider grand research projects before exploring more modest but fruitful alternative research strategies. In-depth research on specific demographic topics using appropriate research designs is required rather than some overall project attempting to obtain information on a broad range of topics that inevitably fall short — for both methodological and design reasons. Sampling problems and financial issues must also be considered. Although any sample survey carried out by a new research center would incorporate selected demographic data, surveys designed to investigate demographic issues should focus on particular topics and research these in depth.

There is a need to specify research priorities among the variety of demographic issues. Some priorities emerge from the review of what we know about American Jewish demographic processes. There are also subjective elements involved in selecting among research priorities. The suggested research topics that will be outlined below seem to me to have the greatest priority. It is possible that a demographer with specific interests, as for example in model building, demographic history, or morbidity and epidemiology, would assign different priorities to future research topics. Four major activities are suggested for the proposed new center. These include: (1) documentation and organization of existing materials; (2) coordination and consultation; (3) initiation of research on continuous demographic changes; and (4) research on specific issues — evaluative and substantive.

Documentation

The first set of proposed activities relates to the organization and exploitation of existing research materials. This includes two specific tasks. First, the proposed center should obtain and organize all materials published on the demography of American Jews. This documentation should include all publications in the general literature pertaining to the Jewish group in America as well as the various Jewish community studies that have been carried out. This documentation function is essential for both teaching purposes and research. Second, there is a need to obtain unpublished data from various Jewish and general sources. Ideally, the original data files — cards, computer tapes — should be available for more detailed and uniform tabulations for intercommunity and historical comparisons. There is a wealth of data from Jewish community studies that has not been fully analyzed and has not been sufficiently organized for detailed comparisons. In addition to specific community studies the basic data file of the NJPS should be obtained. Most demographic comparisons have been limited to published materials and as a result are less than comprehensive.

Despite the limitations of general surveys for the analysis of Jewish demographic processes, some of these data — published and unpublished — are extremely valuable. The original data sets of the major fertility studies are readily available and should be on file at the proposed center. Gallup and Roper polls that contain information on Jews as well as the birth data obtained in the National Center for Health Statistics studies are additional data sources. Special U.S. census tapes may be ordered for specific subpopulations — those reporting Yiddish as their mother tongue, or the Israeli-born — that provide data on subsections of the American Jewish population. A systematic inventory of ongoing demographic projects should be made to uncover whether useful data on the Jews are included. Historical data from previous censuses should be obtained where possible. In short, one of the major functions of the proposed center should be the organization of existing materials and the exploitation of unpublished data sets. The center should include a comprehensive and continuous Jewish data bank as an integral part of its activities.

Coordination and Consultation

The proposed center should also serve for the coordination of future Jewish community studies and as a consultant to sample surveys of local Jewish areas. There is an urgent need to improve the quality of these surveys and tackle the complex methodological issues of sampling and coverage. This should be centrally coordinated to insure the highest-quality data collection under local sponsorship. Only through such coordination and consultation can minimum standards of quality and comparison be maintained. Although most of these surveys are carried out to meet local needs, the utility of these data could be improved with centralized consultation. Beyond consultation on methodological and design issues, standard tabulation formats might be organized to facilitate data analysis. The center should be the data depository of all future surveys.

Related to coordination of studies initiated in local areas, the center might become involved in initiating, jointly with local Jewish community agencies, research projects involving the collection of demographic data. This is particularly needed in areas where Jewish community studies have not been undertaken, in newer Jewish communities where recent population growth has been substantial, and in communities where surveys have been undertaken in the past but are now dated.

While this paper has focused exclusively on the demography of American Jews, some consideration might be given to broadening the focus to other countries. Rich data sources are available on the demography of Canadian Jewry, for example. The similarity of conditions in Canada and the United States argues strongly for the exploitation of official demographic data from Canada. Cooperation with Statistics Canada should be encour-

aged. Since the Institute of Contemporary Jewry at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem has a unit for the documentation of Jewish statistics and demography around the world, it would be unnecessary for the proposed center to duplicate their activities. There is a need to establish channels of communication and cooperation so that duplication is avoided.

Cooperation with the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel should also be encouraged. Data are available on American Jews settling or visiting Israel. Census data sources and special studies of immigrant adjustment in Israel have contained data on American Jews. While the proposed center should not attempt to focus on the comparative demography of world Jewry, comparative materials on Jews in other countries — similar and different from American Jews — should be included in the center's activities. These comparative materials should be valuable in isolating the particularly American aspects of American Jewry as well as the commonalities of the Jewish demographic experience in a variety of national contexts.

Research on Continuous Demographic Changes

The research reviewed here has almost invariably been cross-sectional in design. To my knowledge, there has never been a study designed for an analysis of continuous demographic (or broader sociological) changes among American Jews that has been longitudinal in design. There are methodological and analytic limitations to cross-sectional studies, although these should be encouraged wherever possible. The dynamics of Jewish demographic change have been inferred from cross-sectional studies over a period of time (usually from different communities). We have reached the point in our studies of Jewish demographic changes where methodological and analytic issues require a new research emphasis. This demands a research design to tap the dynamics of changes as they unfold rather than retrospectively.

It was argued earlier that a grand survey design for uncovering demographic processes would not be proposed here. Nevertheless, the proposed center should consider the range of possibilities of longitudinal research that may find financial support outside the center. Such projects might be initiated with minimal funds to demonstrate feasibility and subsequently turn to government sources and private foundations for more substantial grants. Such projects might include repeat interviewing among a select subsample of the NJPS or the selection of a particular community (or communities) where pilot projects may be initiated. The specific focus of the pilot project will be determined by the sample design and substantive priorities discussed below. The objective would be to obtain information on early family formation stages and follow-up processes of fertility and migration. The goal would be to analyze these family-fertility-migration pro-

cesses over time, and in relationship to measures of Jewish identification and commitment at macro and micro levels, rather than an analysis of population structure and composition for a specific community. Even a modest attempt in this direction should prove valuable. The involvement of students in the analysis of longitudinal changes should be a major research experience that would include all the various research issues and stages — research design, sampling problems, questionnaire construction, and data analyses. An ongoing project should allow for the inclusion of questions that may be related to changing demographic processes but not focused solely on demographic issues per se. Thus for both research and teaching purposes an ongoing longitudinal study of the Jews would be of enormous value.

Topics and Issues: Evaluative and Substantive

In the context of our review of previous research on the variety of major demographic processes we have noted specific research issues that require further investigation as well as neglected issues. It is unnecessary to repeat in this section the details of those suggestions or to list them all. Rather, several major themes in American Jewish demography appear to be of greater research priority. These are subdivided into two categories: those with higher and those with lower priority. Before turning to these topics, it is important to note the need for research designed to evaluate data sources now available.

Evaluation Research. One theme repeated throughout this chapter has been the methodological problems associated with the various data sources available for studying American Jewish demography. The heavy reliance on data collected for purposes other than scientific analysis requires caution in interpretation and analysis. The cumulative nature of much of the research available may support particular empirical generalizations and hypotheses. Cumulative findings based on limited data of poor quality may also reflect similar methodological biases and cumulative error.

Great reliance has been placed on *American Jewish Year Book* estimates of population size and distribution. These estimates have rarely been systematically challenged or evaluated and when they have, serious biases have been uncovered (Schmelz, 1969). All too rarely have Jewish community studies been evaluated in detail to include sampling error estimates, coverage biases, and related methodological issues. While the NJPS remains the best potential source for examining selected aspects of Jewish demography at the national level, no comprehensive methodological evaluation is available of this study. The heavy dependence on Jewish community studies for understanding Jewish demographic processes requires that evaluation research be carried out. It is likely that Jewish-sponsored research will remain the major source of demographic

information on the Jews in the future as in the past. Given this situation and the uneven quality of these data so often noted in the literature, it is necessary to design studies to allow for the comprehensive methodological evaluation of this data source.

High-Priority Research Topics. Whether the research design is longitudinal or cross-sectional and whether the study area is local, comparative, or national, the following topics in the demography of American Jews should receive the highest research priority. Studies of family structure, formation, marriage, and fertility among recent cohorts should be carried out. No evidence is available on changes in the 1970s on these fundamental topics. The focus should be on young persons — married and unmarried — and should include attitudinal and behavioral data associated with these processes. Preferably these data should be collected as part of a longitudinal design to evaluate changes in these family and childbearing processes as they unfold. Such a study should begin ideally with a cohort of unmarried young persons and follow them over time to study processes of mate selection, child spacing, marriage attitudes, decisions to and timing of marrying, living arrangements, and marriage stability. Other topics listed below could be incorporated into such a study.

Since by their very design, longitudinal studies take time to uncover the processes of change, special studies ought to be encouraged on related topics of critical importance. These include divorce and remarriage patterns and reproductive behavior and attitudes among persons marrying in the last decade or so. A related area should focus on the changing status and role of Jewish men and women regarding marriage and reproduction as well as other areas of Jewish community life.

Another area of investigation relates to household structure and living arrangements of both younger and older segments of the American Jewish population. Research on social processes associated with living alone (or in nonnuclear and nonextended family units) should be designed. If American Jews follow the general pattern emerging in the United States (and there is no reason to assume that they do not), changes in household structure have been substantial in the last decades. These changes have not been investigated among Jews and may be of demographic and sociological importance at the individual and community levels. As the structure of the Jewish population becomes more heavily concentrated in the older ages, special studies of this group — particularly family and Jewish institutional issues — should be designed.

One of the most neglected topics in the demography of American Jews has been that of migration patterns and population dispersal. Because of the educational and occupational concentration of Jews, the changing structure of occupational opportunities, and changing levels of Jewish commitment, younger Jews may be migrating more than previous genera-

tions. These migration patterns involve more than just the process of mobility. They include moving away from traditional areas of Jewish population concentration. If Jews follow recent patterns of the American population as a whole, migration may imply moving to nonmetropolitan areas and small towns. The relationship between Jewish population density and commitment to Jewish communities (and Jewish identification) make this a central topic in evaluating the demography and sociology of American Jews. Since migration lessens ties to local community institutions and the integration of migrants in local communities requires time, the issue remains whether Jewish commitments of migrants are transferred to a more national level of identification or with international issues (such as Israel or a sense of peoplehood), or whether in the absence of local community integration, Jewish commitments decline generally. Population dispersal, residential integration, and migration patterns are complex research topics at both local and national levels and remain one of the critical research challenges of the highest priority.

The importance of intermarriage for the demographic future of the American Jewish population cannot be overstressed. Despite the centrality of the issue and the voluminous scientific, ideological, and popular literature that has dealt with it, fundamental research remains to be done. Research on Jewish intermarriage has been cross-sectional and retrospective in design. Hence we have not been able to fully analyze selection and change in Jewish intermarriage nor the dynamics associated with normative and structural shifts within the American Jewish community. Except for small, unrepresentative samples of limited utility, no social science research has focused systematically and comprehensively on the determinants and consequences of Jewish intermarriage.

Studies of Jewish intermarriage and its implications for the retention of Jewish identity (for Jewish and non-Jewish partners as well as for the children of intermarried couples) need to be carried out. Again, the preferable design should be longitudinal and prospective rather than cross-sectional and retrospective. Detailed research on the selectivity of intermarriage by socioeconomic background, religious commitment, Jewish education, residential patterns as well as dating and interaction between Jews and non-Jews should be systematically carried out.

One of the interesting related areas of investigation from a demographic point of view is the relationship between the availability of mates and marriage choices. One factor involved in lower rates of intermarriage in communities with large Jewish populations may be the larger "marriage market" of Jewish men and women. Overall population size and particularly the size of various cohorts of unmarried men and women set structural limits to endogamy. The choice of those faced with a "Jewish marriage squeeze" ranges from migration to another community where

Jewish marriage markets are larger, marriage out of the Jewish community, or nonmarriage (or delayed marriage).

Fluctuations in availability of Jewish mates at the local level may be affected by patterns of migration and indirectly by past patterns of childbearing (cohort and period fertility fluctuations). While we do not have any direct research on this issue, it seems reasonable to speculate that migration selectivity and period fertility fluctuations among Jews have had a structural impact on Jewish marriage markets in some communities. In turn, these structural demographic changes have had repercussions on intermarriage, patterns of nonmarriage, and changes in marriage timing.

Studies of the impact of intermarriage on present and future Jewish population need to be designed. Similarly, the structural demographic antecedents to intermarriage, particularly the role of marriage markets and squeezes need to be specified and analyzed. Intermarriage is one of the master themes in American Jewish life and has been described as the "quintessential dilemma" for American Jewry. Research on this issue is of highest priority.

National data on Jews do not allow for the systematic analysis of Jewish heterogeneity in terms of communities and specific subgroups. Local Jewish community studies are designed for overall planning purposes and for the description of the total population in these areas. Specific research is needed on particular subgroups and subcommunities to evaluate the range of Jewish heterogeneity. Demographic studies of segregated Jewish communities — such as Hasidic and segregated orthodox communities — are necessary. Since these Jewish communities are densely settled and relatively more organized, they are easier to study, although their social closure often limits research access. At the other end of the Jewish commitment continuum are Jewish subgroups residentially and socially integrated, where the levels of Jewish identification and continuity are low. As a supplement to national and local Jewish population studies, there is a need to select several major Jewish subgroup types and collect data on Jewish demographic processes. The research objective would not be to describe the population structure of total Jewish communities, but to select for analytic comparisons the range of subgroups within the Jewish community. This focused research strategy may be particularly useful given the more general sampling problems associated with covering the various segments of the Jewish community. Even when local Jewish community studies have made efforts to incorporate nonaffiliated and marginal subgroups, their numbers have been too small for detailed analysis. Research focused on specific Jewish subpopulations to maximize the comparative analysis of Jewish heterogeneity is a viable alternative to supplement in detail what is known about Jewish American demographic processes.

There are other Jewish subgroups that should be the focus of special analytic demographic studies. These include Jewish community leaders, religious personnel (rabbis, teachers in religious schools), academics, and members of particular occupational categories (e.g., physicians, lawyers). The study of the demographic patterns of the Jewish elite, however defined for research purposes, would include behavioral and attitudinal dimensions associated with reproduction, marriage, migration, and intermarriage. From a sampling point of view these subgroups would be more readily available and less problematic. Again, while not representing the broader cross-section of the Jewish community, they may represent significant patterns of variation and change, serving as a demographic barometer of the future of the American Jewish population. In part, the Jewish elite and influentials, directly and indirectly, by action or inaction, through personal behavior and attitude, shape the overall normative climate of the Jewish community's response to issues associated with key demographic processes.

The final topic of high research priority relates to recent Jewish immigration. If estimates over the last decade are accurate, well over 100,000 Jewish immigrants have settled in the United States. These have mainly come from the Soviet Union and Israel. Research on all aspects of immigration, settlement, and integration (or nonintegration) within the larger Jewish community is necessary. This should include more accurate data on the volume of immigration and selective characteristics of immigrants as well as their reproduction, migration, and marriage patterns.

Low-Priority Research Topics. Several areas of demographic research, focusing on specific demographic processes and requiring particular analytic techniques, will be included in this section. The lower priority assigned to these proposed projects is based either on the availability of previous research providing an approximation of the patterns, or the judgement that the issue is of less analytic importance for the demography of American Jews. Some research suggestions made in the review of specific demographic processes have not been included in this section. Other research suggestions unfeasible in the immediate future, although highly desirable — e.g. Jewish population growth rates for local areas, more reliable Jewish population distribution estimates — are also not included.

These topics of lower priority will be listed without elaboration. They are as follows: (1) Family planning practices among younger Jewish couples including contraception, abortion, sterilization, and sexual attitudes and behavior. (2) Health-related issues, particularly among the elderly, and their relationship to mortality variation and change. (3) Use of ecological techniques to obtain data on mortality (and birth) levels in selected areas of high Jewish population density, historically and for the contemporary period. (4) Jewish population projections for local areas and regions. (5) Studies of population attitudes and issues related to the feasibility of Jew-

ish population policies. (6) Historical work on Jewish immigration selectivity and the marriage patterns of Jewish immigrants from Eastern and Western Europe. (7) Comparative demography of specific ethnic communities within the Jewish population (e.g. Jews of Sephardic origin, descendants of German Jews, Holocaust survivors and their children, Israeli-Americans).

The list of suggested research topics on the demography of American Jews represents a major challenge. Combined with proposals for a documentation unit, a continuous Jewish data bank, consultation and coordination functions, and the initiation of some longitudinal studies on the social demography of American Jews, these research priorities are of major importance in designing a center that will meet research and teaching goals of the highest standards.

Demographic studies and research are central in understanding the American Jewish community. They are too important to be left to the sole purview of the demographer. Demographic research gains enormously by the theory and analysis of other social scientists. In the past some demographic research has been carried out by sociologists who at times failed to appreciate elementary demographic techniques. Often research on demographic issues has been relegated to the statistical demographer who has failed to incorporate demographic data within a broader social scientific perspective. There is a need to involve sociologists, political scientists, historians, and psychologists in the analysis of demographic data on American Jews. The proposed facility should serve as a center of interdisciplinary research and training encouraging scholars and students to exchange ideas and research on the wide range of issues associated with the demography of Jewish Americans.

Appendix

An Illustrative Exercise of the Balance of Factors Influencing the Jewish Population Equation in America, 1967–69

To illustrate the relative importance of recent immigration in the population growth equation of the American Jewish community, a simple demographic exercise was prepared. The only estimates of the number of annual births among Jews nationally is from the national natality survey described earlier. These estimates for 1967–69 indicate an annual average of 55,162 Jewish births (Goldstein, 1979). Accepting the Jewish population size medium estimate from the NJPS of 5,775,000 and the crude death rate for the Providence Jewish community (1962–64) of 10.1 (Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968) as an estimate of national Jewish death rates yields an estimated number of 58,328 annual Jewish deaths. From

these estimates the excess of deaths over births annually is 3,166. Estimated Jewish immigration to the United States was 24,800 for 1967–69, averaging 8,267 annually (Diamond, 1977). Some estimate of Jewish emigration from the United States is provided by figures of the number of Jews arriving as immigrants and potential immigrants in Israel during 1967–69 (Goldscheider, 1974). A total of 2,268 American Jews arrived in Israel as "immigrants" and an additional 13,735 arrived as "potential immigrants" (1967–69). Not all American Jews who arrived remained in Israel. In a special longitudinal study of immigration to Israel, the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics noted that after three years in Israel 16 percent of the North American immigrants arriving during 1969–70 left Israel and 34 percent of the potential immigrants returned (Israeli CBS, 1975, p. 56). Applying these proportions to the number of American Jews immigrating to Israel in 1967–69 indicates an estimate of 10,970 American Jews remaining in Israel after three years or an average annual net emigration from the United States of 3,657.

Putting all these estimates together suggests that for 1967–69 with a base Jewish population of 5,775,000, we add 165,486 births, subtract 174,984 deaths, add 24,800 immigrants, and subtract 10,970 emigrants. This results in a net estimated *loss* due to the excess of deaths over births of 9,498 for the three-year period, but a net estimated *gain* of 13,830 from the balance of immigration and emigration. This is a net growth of 4,332 Jewish Americans for the three-year period. This comes very close to zero population growth. The important point is that net Jewish immigration compensates demographically for losses due to the excess of births over deaths and pushes American Jewish population growth from decline (negative growth) to about zero growth.

This is just an illustrative exercise. There are reasons to argue, as discussed in this chapter, that the estimated annual Jewish birth rates in 1967–69 may have been low due to compositional and timing factors rather than family size per se. There is no way to determine whether the crude death rate for Providence is an accurate reflection of rates for the total Jewish population in the United States. And the immigration figures may be underestimates while the number of American Jews remaining in Israel is probably an overestimate. This demographic exercise suggests that the demographic role of Jewish immigration to the United States has been underestimated. If that immigration increases and Jewish emigration decreases (as has been the case in the last number of years), net Jewish immigration will be an increasingly significant part of the American Jewish demographic picture.

Net Jewish immigration to the United States does not change the number of Jews in the world, since one community's gain is another community's loss. There is reason to hypothesize that the probability of remaining

Jewish is somewhat higher in America than in the Soviet Union (one source of recent immigration). This requires careful monitoring. There are a series of demographic consequences to zero population growth, particularly in terms of aging and population structure and dynamics, that require further analysis. Without further evidence on the age structure of immigrants and their reproductive patterns, it is difficult to estimate these structural changes and their future implications.

Lack of adequate data on demographic losses due to intermarriage prevents any attempt to include that factor in calculations of annual population gains and losses. A crude and very limited attempt will be made to indicate that losses due to Jewish out-marriage are of much less demographic significance than has been commonly suggested. Data are not available to estimate crude annual marriage rates among Jews. For the purpose of illustration let us assume that the crude marriage rate for the American population in 1969 can be applied to the Jewish American population. In 1969 the rate of marriage was 10.6 per 1,000 for the American population and would imply 61,215 Jewish marriages assuming the Jewish population was 5,775,000 (given the structure of the American Jewish population, this is probably an overestimate). For the sake of argument we can estimate that 20 percent of these marriages involved a non-Jewish spouse or 12,242 marriages. These marriages involved 6,121 Jews who married non-Jews in 1969. Of these 6,121 Jews who married out, let us assume that half retained their Jewish identity. This would imply that 3,060 Jews could be considered a demographic loss to the American Jewish community. If we further assume that in half of the intermarriages the non-Jewish spouse identifies with the Jewish community either through formal conversion or through self-identification, the annual demographic loss through intermarriage would be of about 1,500 Jews. That figure is balanced by the net annual gain through other demographic processes estimated for 1969 at 1,444. These estimates are built on a series of very problematic assumptions, any one of which might be seriously in error. I would guess that the net loss to the American Jewish community due to intermarriage is higher than these data show. However, placing intermarriage in the annual population growth equation does not seriously alter the conclusion that American Jewish population growth is about zero, but not much lower. Population projections that do not take into account the range of demographic factors that influence growth and are based on naive straight-line extrapolations from the past lead to serious miscalculations and absurd conclusions. Dire predictions about the virtual extinction of the American Jewish population over the next century (and speculation about the vanishing American Jew) — a projection of a Jewish population size of 10,420 by the year 2076 — are seriously misleading and demographic nonsense (Bergman, 1977; Lieberman and Weinfeld, 1978).

Notes

1. Although population composition, particularly by education, occupation, and income, is often included by demographers, there is no theoretical justification for treating these as demographic variables beyond their availability in census materials (Goldscheider, 1971). Hence these will not be included in the present review. For a review of the socioeconomic composition of the American Jewish population see Goldstein (1971).
2. Since so much has been written about the 1957 study, it should be noted that less than 75 Jewish intermarried couples nationally were included in the sample. The number of cases in Iowa was less than 45 cases a year (1953–59), and less than 100 cases a year in Indiana (1960–63). A total of around 400 Jewish intermarriages of all ages and generations were included in the NJPS.

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