

# Secular Pay-Offs to Religious Origins: Gender Differences Among American Jews

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*This paper uses the 2000-2001 National Jewish Population Study to explore potential independent connections between a variety of childhood and adolescent Jewish antecedents and subsequent 'success' in the secular adult world. The research focuses on how childhood denominational affiliation, Jewish education and friendship networks, and a variety of other factors may be independently linked with subsequent educational completion, employment, earnings, and household economic success. The focus is on explaining gender differentials in these over-time connections and in testing hypotheses suggestive of greater adult success for men and women who followed 'moderate' behavioral religious pathways in childhood and adolescence and/or have moderate contemporary religious connections as adults. Findings in several instances support the notion that 'moderate' orientations result in greater secular success, although some interesting and important gender differentials did emerge.*

## INTRODUCTION

There is a substantial body of literature across several disciplines that explores the many connections between early social and human capital transference and subsequent success in adult spheres of life, such as higher education, employment, earnings, family income, and non-economic outcomes like child-bearing (see Portes 1998 for a review of this literature). For the most part, this research has focused on predominantly secular developmental processes, such as family interaction, parental human-capital accumulation, and educational experiences from childhood through early adulthood. Although many of these secu-

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lar factors are linked with religiosity, to a considerable degree potential linkages between religious dimensions and subsequent adult 'success' in the secular world have been largely neglected.

In this research we attempt to sort out the childhood/adolescent secular from non-secular influences on educational, employment and economic 'success' for Jewish men and women in early/mid-adulthood. Using the recently released NJPS2000, we focus on a religious subpopulation that has successfully maintained a unique cultural identity simultaneous to their successful assimilation within the social and economic mainstream. Given that the American Jewish population is, on average, more highly educated (NJPS2000), employed in more prestigious jobs, and nets a higher household income than the overall U.S. population (United Jewish Communities, 2003a), the usefulness of this data source for elucidating distinctions in religious versus non-religious factors impacting secular outcomes is apparent. A major objective is to explore gender distinctions in the connections between religious and secular background factors and contemporary adult secular outcomes.

## THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

### *Human and Social Forms of Capital: Connections Between Religious and Secular Childhood and Adolescent Priors*

Research regarding the familial exchange and investment of human and social forms of capital is an interdisciplinary topic of interest for many researchers exploring behavioral, social and cognitive outcomes. Intergenerational exchanges of *religious* human and social capital, in particular, may arguably encourage a certain degree of non-secular values and beliefs that potentially influence long-term personal, educational, and professional goals and outcomes within the overarching secular arena. In a recent article comparing different religious sub-populations within the United States and their early adult asset accumulation, Keister (2003) found that Jews accumulated significantly more wealth than their non-Jewish counterparts and that this was particularly evident when the comparison was made with conservative Protestants. It is suggested that the religious linkage is somewhat more complex than these prior findings indicate. The American Jewish population is a diverse subgroup. To include all denominations (Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and the non-affiliated) within one category overshadows important differences between divergent facets of the religion. Hartman and Hartman (1996) utilized the 1990 National Jewish Population Study to explore gender differences in the effect of non-secular on secular outcomes, using a somewhat different methodological approach and a different available set of inputs for a much wider aged sample than we utilize for 2000, making precise comparisons difficult. Using a somewhat different methodology, we use the 2000 data to consider similar issues as Hartman and Hartman, but with a greater focus on utilizing childhood and adolescent data. Both

Hartman and Hartman's results and the results we will present highlight the reality that the impact of religion on secular realms of life is not dichotomous, but rather varies along denominational continuums as well as level of adherence to one's own religious practices and beliefs regardless of the more generic type of religious affiliation, although our results do not always coincide. Just as is true for other religious groups in this country, there may often be more variability in attitudes and values *within* Judaism than there is *between* Judaism and other religions. So although the accumulation of social (Coleman 1988; Sherkat & Ellison 1999; Portes 1998) and human (Iannaccone 1990) capital throughout the life course has been well documented within the literature, our intention is to shed light on whether and how varying degrees of these *non-secular* precursors, within a heterogeneous religious group, influence one's successful or unsuccessful attainment of secular goals.

Religious milieus, also referred to as 'free spaces' (Warner 1997), afford members an opportunity to develop ethnic and cultural sustenance and greater intra-group cohesiveness within the larger, secular society by creating a safe environment in which to exchange these forms of capital and potentially strengthen otherwise disadvantaged and/or marginalized populations. As one example, research on the African American community documents the important role of religion in providing social networks, social services, political advocacy, and community ties (Pattillo-McCoy 1998; Lincoln & Mamiya 1990). In important respects, similar connections exist within Judaism (Keysar et al. 2000; Gurock 1998; Schnall & Gelman 1998). Indeed, the value of this social capital exchange is by no means limited to conventional religious groups, and may arguably be even more beneficial for spiritual groups who are marginalized because of their *less* orthodox beliefs. For instance, a number of contemporary marginalized sub-populations such as the Metropolitan Community Church for gays and lesbians (Warner 1995) and various pagan and Wiccan feminist spirituality groups (Griffin 1995) have similarly benefited from this exchange of social capital within their own 'free space'.

We believe that by looking at a secularly successful yet arguably non-mainstream religious subpopulation within a largely Christian culture we are eliminating extraneous factors that might otherwise confound findings if we were to consider all religious groups more generally. For instance, some significant component of the above-average educational attainment and occupational success of the Jewish population is certainly reflective of norms and values that may, at least in part, be the result of their specific religious upbringing. When secular and non-secular inputs are considered in tandem, do educational, employment and earnings achievement independently reflect both secular predictors as well as one's level of religiosity? To complicate this issue further, there is some suggestion that white individuals with ethnic connections that are highly educated and socio-economically successful may in some instances be more invested in ensuring their ethnic legacy is carried on through subsequent generations than are their less successful counterparts (Alba cited in Fishman 2004: 96). We assess these sce-

narios by considering the extent that religious traditionalism (i.e. Jewish education, denomination, and so on) during childhood and adolescence and parental education independently link with variations in our secular outcomes of interest. Research suggests that being raised in a more traditionally religious household is associated with remaining actively religious in adulthood and dedicating more time and money to religious organizations (Skerkat & Ellison 1995; Rimor and Katz 1993). Our research will clarify whether the same holds true for secular outcomes, such that one's religious upbringing independently impacts educational, employment, and economic outcomes in adulthood.

Invariably, these religious commitments will compete with other secular domains, but the pathways through which religion may enhance/hinder one's accumulation of human and social capital varies. For instance, having Jewish religious education several times per week in addition to secular schooling during childhood may positively impact lifelong educational and occupational trajectories via widened social circles and elevated levels of social capital. This hypothesis aligns with Burt's (1992) assertion that social capital is enhanced by the development of more diversified and less tightly knit social ties or 'structural holes', because a social network that is too dense may ultimately decrease opportunities for mobility by limiting the opportunity or desire for new contacts. In contrast, if one's education is attained primarily through *either* non-secular (i.e. Jewish day school or Yeshiva) *or* secular (i.e. public or private) institutions only, his/her social capital may be negatively impacted by a more limited, less diverse social circle (when compared to those with exposure to both). Arguably, and partially testable with our data, this notion of 'moderation' may apply to a number of childhood/adolescent secular or religious domains that we incorporate into our analysis.

Relatively recent findings indicate that the accumulation of religious human and social capital among adolescents with high levels of religious involvement is related to higher educational expectations and better math and reading skills (Regnerus 2000). Similarly, Ellison and Muller (1996) found that religious involvement among high school students was linked with devoting more time to schoolwork, a lesser likelihood of cutting class, and a greater propensity to graduate. Bryk et al. (1993) found that religious involvement was associated with a greater propensity to shy away from oppositional youth cultures among urban African Americans and the same has been found among immigrant subpopulations (Bankston & Zhou 1996). Smith (2003a) also suggests that exposure to religion in adolescence fosters an elevated level of comfort in more diversified social circles. These findings are indicative of a synergism between the secular and non-secular domains. However, how this translates into later-life experiences is less clear.

The literature on religious human capital—having an awareness and understanding of dogma, practices, traditions, and so forth—highlights the important linkage between one's religious upbringing and later-life production of religious goods: higher levels of religious participation during childhood and adolescence results in higher levels of religious human capital during adulthood (Iannaccone

1990). For instance, learning the history and language (Hebrew) of Judaism at young ages likely enhances one's accumulation of religious human capital, but whether this occurs in lieu of, or in addition to, other mainstream forms of human capital is uncertain. Given that large proportions of the Jewish community also stress secular forms of human capital (such as education and employment), in some instances efforts have been made to lessen the amount of time necessary to acquire Jewish forms of human capital, such as greater reliance on English versus Hebrew in prayer services, and inclusion of English translations in prayer books for those who are less familiar with the Hebrew alphabet (Chiswick 2002). For this reason we incorporate an explanatory variable that directly taps knowledge of Hebrew at a very basic level. This, of course, is intimately linked with the notion that secular effects cannot be completely separated from the religious, but by limiting our sample to only Jewish Americans we are better able to disentangle the independent and interdependent nature of these two cultural domains.

### *Gender Issues*

In the broadest sense, we attempt to disentangle the independent and potentially competing influence of many secular and religious antecedents as predictors of post-secondary schooling, employment, and income-linked outcomes in early and mid-adulthood. We delineate these secular and non-secular connections by exploring differences between men and women. This is an essential distinction based upon our awareness of gender differences in upbringing as well as current circumstances that may, at least for some segments of the Jewish population, follow distinctively divergent non-secular and secular pathways.

Although all contemporary Jewish denominational groups are more gender-egalitarian than had been true in the past, differences persist in how members view the primary roles of women and in how women are involved in synagogue and religion-linked activities (for some evidence of the complexity of this issue, see Fishman 1993; and Hartman and Hartman 1996, Chapter 6). To some extent this carries over to the secular attitudinal and behavioral domains, which translate into gender-role expectations within the household and subsequent denominational differences in childbearing patterns.

The gender differentials examined in this research are intimately linked with the lower fertility for many Jewish subgroups who are motivated at least in part by a desire to ensure that their own children have the same, if not greater, educational opportunities than they had while growing up (Chiswick 1988; 1997; Hartman and Hartman 1996; Hurst and Mott 2004; Keister 2003). The denominational differences are intimately linked with marriage, divorce, employment and income-related issues and how they vary between men and women along the religion's continuum of traditionalism, a continuum strongly linked with denomination.

Orthodox and more traditional women marry earlier, are less likely to divorce, are inculcated with a value system that encourages greater childbearing,

and more likely to adopt values consistent with placing a higher priority on in-home familial activities (Fishman 1999a). Based upon analyses of the 1990 NJSP, Hartman and Hartman (1996) found that the extent to which religious involvement impacted educational achievement did not vary by gender; however, gender variations did surface when examining religious involvement relative to labor force participation such that high levels of "Jewishness" positively impacted labor force participation for men but had no effect for women. The causality is complex, and these contemporary religious variations may be somewhat less pronounced than in earlier decades (Fishman 1999a) – this level of complexity and variation is perhaps even greater between Jewish denominational groups than among some other religious subgroups (Groeneman 1985). From the perspective of our secular outcomes, the emphasis is on temporal interpretations ordered from earlier religious involvement (which may well be different from current religious attitudes or behaviors) to later secular behaviors or attributes, in some instances mediated by intervening secular behaviors such as education or childbearing.

## THE DATA AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

The data set utilized is the 2000-2001 National Jewish Population Survey. Our research sample includes 378 men and 430 women between the ages of 25 and 39 who either reported that their only religion was Jewish/Judaism or they were Jewish and/or some other religion but still considered themselves definitely/partially Jewish. More detail on the data set can be found in Kotler-Berkowitz's Introduction to the NJPS in this issue. A wealth of both secular and non-secular information is available for each respondent, such as employment status, educational attainment, family background, parental education, religious/ethnic origins, and a multitude of attitudes and practices pertinent to Judaism (see Appendix for variables used in this analysis). Using this extensive battery of information one can to some extent disentangle the significance of secular and non-secular antecedents as predictors of educational attainment, employment, earnings and household income.

### *Outcomes and Inputs*

*Outcomes.* In the following multivariate analyses five outcomes are considered: college degree receipt, graduate schooling or more, employment status, personal earnings, and pre-tax household income for 1999. The education and employment variables are coded as dummy variables (1=college degree or more, 0=less than college degree; 1=has attended graduate school, 0=has not attended graduate school; 1=employed, 0=not employed), and the earnings and income values were recoded into 60 possible discrete categories from "low" to "high". The earnings and household income categories represent recodes of categorical income codes and are detailed in the Appendix as are all the variables included in these analyses.

*Key explanatory inputs and controls.* The key secular antecedent input is parental education. From a secular perspective, we also selectively include a “child ever born” variable in the female employment and income equations as the earlier variables may partially impact on the outcomes to the extent that they may have direct independent connections with childbearing that in turn may have independent linkages with earlier non-secular variables of interest. For similar reasons, we also include measures of current marital status in the earnings and income equations. Essentially, these demographic antecedents are included as controls, so that the religious antecedents can more effectively capture their true independent meaning. To some extent, we highlight how the inclusion and exclusion of the fertility input may impact on the magnitude of the denominational coefficients.

The religious inputs considered in this analysis include childhood denominational attachment, Hebrew schooling, Jewish camp attendance/employment until early adulthood, time spent in Israel, and current personal religiosity. The last individual input noted above is our best summary measure of a respondent’s recent feelings about personal religious attachment. While the issue of causality between the various secular outcomes and contemporary religiosity is certainly of concern, this represents our best available proxy for prior personal religiosity. While behaviors can often be measured reasonably well retrospectively, personal attitudes or beliefs are much more difficult to measure after the fact, which is the reason it was not asked in this survey. It is suggested that Jewish behaviors may represent fundamentally different concepts than personal beliefs about religion or God. As such, their linkages with our secular outcomes may fundamentally differ.

### *Sample Characteristics*

From an employment and earnings perspective, this cohort encompasses a lifecycle range between the ages of 25 and 39—from post-education for most respondents into mid-career. Given that a substantial proportion of the sample is currently married, it is also analytically important to explore the secular and non-secular antecedents to *family* economic success.

*Secular attributes.* A large majority of our respondents have attained a college degree or more and approximately one-third have attended graduate school or received a graduate degree. The majority grew up in highly educated households, as nearly 70 percent were raised by at least one parent who had a college degree or higher. For both genders, these estimates highlight a population that is educated well beyond average national levels.

Akin to these gender similarities in education, household income estimates appear consistent for male and female respondents (approximately \$60,000 for men and \$57,000 for women). Consequently, given the seemingly similar education and income distributions of Jewish men and women, it is of particular interest to consider whether the same or different secular and non-secular factors predict these parallel educational and economic propensities.

*Non-Secular Attributes.* Shifting to the religious domain, Jewish men and women had similar propensities to attend religious schools during childhood. Also, slightly less than one-third of all Jews had mostly Jewish friends during childhood. Despite these similarities in religious schooling and friendship networks, men (68%) are significantly more likely to be able to read Hebrew as adults than are their female (58%) counterparts.

Two-thirds of Jewish men and women report having attended or worked at a Jewish camp prior to age 25, and over one-third have visited or lived in Israel. Less than 20 percent consider themselves personally "very religious". Approximately 10 percent of Jewish men and women were raised Orthodox, while slightly higher proportions of women reported Conservative origins and men were more likely to be raised Reform.

## ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK

Obviously, our analyses are limited and constrained by what data is available in the NJPS2000. Our overall modus operandi is to first explore selected analyses that include all possible secular and non-secular inputs that, based upon the literature, may be theoretically relevant predictors of at least some of our outcomes. Based upon face validity and examination of a variety of correlation matrices, we also created two indices that we believe approximately tap conceptually broader notions relating to extensiveness of childhood/adolescent Jewish socialization (Socialization Index), and childhood networking along Jewish-non-Jewish dimensions (Network Index). They are fully defined in the Appendix. In several instances, including equations utilizing both approaches enhanced interpretations.

Having parallel equations permits interpretive clarifications beyond what is possible using only the individual variables or only the composite indices. We additionally coded some individual variables in a fashion that allows comparison between levels that are high, medium and low which permits some clarification of whether or not there is a positive or negative independent association between individual items and various outcomes. It also permits us to explore issues of non-linearity by directly testing the 'moderation' hypothesis that middle ground responses on several secular and non-secular inputs show maximal positive connections with success on all or some of the outcomes after controlling for the many other explanatory factors..

We detail full equations for the college degree and household income outcomes and selected summaries of results for all outcomes from the multivariate regressions. Our primary focus is on exploring possible generalizations for both men and women using estimates from both forms of equations.

As we examine the linkages between formal childhood *denominational* affiliation and our various outcomes, it is useful to emphasize that these connections persist independent of all the other religious and secular inputs. From our perspective, childhood denomination within this multivariate context is a useful



TABLE 1

Estimating the Secular and Religious Determinants of Receiving a College Degree for Men and Women (logit coefficients)

	Male		Female	
	1	2	1	2
<b>Religious Inputs</b>				
Low Jewish Education	-0.60 <sup>c</sup>	-	-0.38	-
High Jewish Education	-0.26	-	0.19	-
No Knowledge of Hebrew	-0.09	-0.22	0.21	0.11
Attended or Worked Jewish Camp	-0.50	-	0.33	-
Few Jewish Friends, Childhood	-0.11	-	-0.64	-
Most Jewish Friends, Childhood	0.35	-	-0.59	-
Visited or Lived in Israel	0.14	-	0.52	-
High Personal Religiosity	-0.08	-0.15	-1.34 <sup>a</sup>	-1.25 <sup>a</sup>
Low Personal Religiosity	-0.03	0.03	-0.18	-0.07
<i>Childhood Denomination</i>				
Conservative	1.59 <sup>a</sup>	1.74 <sup>a</sup>	0.85	0.89 <sup>c</sup>
Reform	1.83 <sup>a</sup>	1.96 <sup>a</sup>	1.30 <sup>b</sup>	1.29 <sup>b</sup>
Not Affiliated	1.73 <sup>a</sup>	1.82 <sup>a</sup>	1.50 <sup>b</sup>	1.39 <sup>b</sup>
Not Raised Jewish	1.49 <sup>b</sup>	1.53 <sup>b</sup>	0.91	0.80
Network Index	-	0.25 <sup>b</sup>	-	0.14
Socialization Index	-	-0.22	-	0.38 <sup>c</sup>
<b>Non-Religious Inputs</b>				
Age	-0.02	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01 <sup>c</sup>
Mom & Dad College Degree	1.64 <sup>a</sup>	1.64 <sup>a</sup>	1.86 <sup>a</sup>	1.86 <sup>a</sup>
Mom Only College Degree	0.10	0.10	0.39	0.38
Dad Only College Degree	1.01 <sup>a</sup>	0.98 <sup>a</sup>	0.74 <sup>b</sup>	0.75 <sup>b</sup>
N	376	376	428	428
R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.15	0.19	0.18

NOTE: See Appendix Table A for full variable definitions

NOTE: Omitted categories include: moderate Jewish education; unable to speak or read Hebrew; did not attend or work at a Jewish camp prior to age 25; have never visited or lived in Israel; considers oneself somewhat personally religious; childhood denomination was Orthodox and neither mom nor dad received a college degree.

a = significant at p<.01

b = significant at p<.05

c = significant at p<.10

proxy for selected ritual observances and practices, such as synagogue membership, traditions, values, and gendered expectations that distinguish one group from another. Also, when interpreting and understanding any potential gender-related findings, it is useful to recall that most respondents were born between

the years 1960 and 1974. Consequently, formative notions about the role of women within our society may have been more traditional for some denominational groups of this generation than others (Fishman, 1999b). To a large extent, Orthodox values define the familial and non-familial roles for women somewhat more traditionally than do other denominational groups, although within Orthodoxy there is still considerable variability. Given this anticipated more traditional Orthodox orientation, we chose to make Orthodoxy the omitted reference group for making comparisons with the other denominations as well as for those respondents who claim no denominational connection. Conservative Jewry among this sample has similar variability, because although members of this denomination are largely egalitarian in the roles that women fill within the synagogue structure and essentially egalitarian in the roles that women play in the larger society, they were more traditional when this cohort transitioned through childhood and adolescence a few decades ago (Fishman, 1999b). Our discussion of the independent denomination and secular outcomes is based on this premise.

## RESULTS

Our analysis follows a lifecycle perspective, progressing from educational attainment to current employment status, earnings, and household income. The first equation in Table 1 includes all predictors of college degree receipt. The parallel equations, as detailed above, explore whether or not the indices usefully compliment the results from the full equations.

From a secular perspective, Table 1 illustrates that if both of the respondent's parents have a college degree he/she is more prone to follow a similar educational trajectory. If only the father has a college degree, an evident but less pronounced connection persists; however, no such significant pattern exists for maternal college completion. In general, these patterns hold regardless of what inputs are included in the equations and for all outcomes.

Shifting to the religious dimension, Equation 1 in Table 1 demonstrates that college completion is more likely among men who were raised non-Orthodox. This group of men includes those who were raised Conservative, Reform, "just Jewish", or even outside of the religion.

None of the latter denomination coefficients differ from each other, but they all differ from the Orthodox. In Equation 2 we attempt to capture the generalized impact of social networking and socialization processes by including these indices in place of their individual components (as detailed in the Appendix). For Jewish men, all religious antecedents other than childhood denomination as well as the contemporary religiosity variables essentially remain non-significant as predictors of college degree receipt. (One modest exception will be noted when we discuss the "moderation" hypothesis, below.) The slight increase in the male denomination coefficients in equation 2 reflects the likelihood that, to a modest extent, the denomination coefficients are absorbing other childhood "religious effects."

For women, the denomination connection (in the female equation 1 of Table 1) is less pronounced but generally consistent with the male pattern. However, one gender distinction worth noting is that having a Conservative denominational origin is *not* significantly different from the Orthodox reference group for women, which may be reflective of the likelihood that gender-role orientations for those growing up in the 1960s and 1970s within the Conservative population did not differ from the Orthodox to the extent that they may for younger generations of women in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century.

However, the religious effect for women, as may be seen in column one, is only slightly more pronounced than for men. Aside from childhood denomination, having a high level of personal religiosity is linked with less college. This also requires some qualification as will be noted in the "moderation" section. When we shift to an examination of Equation 2, a more cogent story appears. We find that college graduation is significantly and positively connected with our socialization index and continues to be strongly and inversely linked with a high level of personal religiosity. That these items are only predictive for women is worthy of attention. In various ways, these two significant connections are consistent with expectations, although a total explanation is not possible because of data constraints. The significant impact of high religiosity for women but not men may in part be an artifact of when this question was asked. Since it reflects a contemporary response, it may be that to some extent the causal linkage between college completion and contemporary religiosity may be complex, as completing college *may alter* views about personal religious beliefs perhaps more for women than for men. That this measure is insignificant for men may suggest a fundamentally different connection between college completion and religiosity for this generation of women, who may for religion-connected reasons still internalize a vestige of earlier religious-gender connected values. Recall that these women, who are now 25 to 39 years of age, were born during a time period (1960-1975) when religious value systems were generally more traditional across all affiliations. One might speculate that the next generation of women might evidence very different attitude-behavior connections.

The socialization connection, which is significant only for women, is perhaps somewhat more difficult to interpret. It may well be that the social connections made in Jewish camps and the Israel connection jointly either select out youth with more liberal orientations or provide a more liberal socializing environment. Given that this connection is only evidenced for women is suggestive of more than just economic factors at play.

#### *Independent Childhood Denominational Effects*

Table 2 includes coefficients predicting all outcomes for the independent connection between childhood denomination and a variety of secular outcomes separately for men and women. The input variables for the college degree receipt and graduate school attendance outcomes are the same as those included in Equation 2 from Table 1. In the analyses examining employment status, earnings,

TABLE 2

Independent Linkages between Childhood Denomination and Selected Outcomes\*

	Conservative		Reform		"Other"		Not Raised Jewish	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
College Degree (=1)	1.74 <sup>a</sup>	0.89 <sup>c</sup>	1.96 <sup>a</sup>	1.29 <sup>b</sup>	1.82 <sup>a</sup>	1.39 <sup>b</sup>	1.53 <sup>b</sup>	0.80
Graduate Attendance (=1)	0.89 <sup>c</sup>	0.50	0.90 <sup>c</sup>	0.57	0.46	0.86	0.79	0.54
Employed at Survey Point (=1)	-1.42	0.92 <sup>c</sup>	-1.55	0.74	-1.41	0.82	-1.85	0.48
Earnings	-0.34 <sup>a</sup>	0.08	-0.35 <sup>a</sup>	0.05	-0.76 <sup>a</sup>	0.05	-0.41 <sup>a</sup>	-0.11
H.H. Income	-0.04	0.45 <sup>a</sup>	0.02	0.43 <sup>a</sup>	-0.20 <sup>a</sup>	0.25	-0.09	0.64 <sup>a</sup>

\* Orthodox is the denomination for the omitted regression category.

The College and Employment outcomes are from logit equations and are standard logit coefficients. The income/earnings outcomes equations are Poisson coefficients.

Note: See equations in Table 1 for variables included in the education outcome equations. The employment equation is limited to employed respondents and also includes a college completion variable. The earnings equation additionally includes a current marital status variable and all the variables for the household income equation are specified in Table 5. For all the employment/income equations, a variable defining children ever born status is also included. Refer to Appendix for all variable definitions.

a = significant at  $p < .01$

b = significant at  $p < .05$

c = significant at  $p < .10$

and household income, a few additional secular variables are included in the equations (more detailed information can be found in the footnote for Table 2). In particular, these equations for women include an explanatory variable for motherhood as of the survey date, under the assumption that earlier religious variables may to some extent affect the economic outcomes indirectly through their intervening impact on fertility. Including this intervention does not alter the childhood denomination-outcome connections in any major way (not shown). In all equations, respondents who were raised Orthodox are the omitted reference group when interpreting the relevance of denominational background as an independent predictor.

In general, this table summarizes the extent to which childhood denomination is a meaningful independent predictor of variations in outcomes for men and women. As the college degree receipt equation indicates, almost without exception and across both genders, the Orthodox (the omitted reference group) are below average in their propensity to finish college. In general, the male coefficients for the various denominational groups are somewhat larger than those of their female counterparts (although not significantly so), suggesting a slightly smaller hindrance of Orthodoxy on college completion for women of this generation. With respect to graduate school attendance, the denominational coefficients suggest that Orthodoxy does not significantly predict lesser graduate schooling for women. However, men who have been raised Orthodox are modestly less likely than their Conservative or Reform counterparts to have at least attended graduate school.

Our findings for current employment and earnings are from some perspectives consistent with disparate gender role expectations. For women, greater levels of contemporary employment are systematically positive for all denominational groups in comparison with the behaviors of Orthodox-raised women whereas the male coefficients tend towards being significant in the other direction. Additionally, those Orthodox women who are working are quite likely to be employed as religious workers (9 percent) or teachers (22 percent)(not shown). It may be that this partly reflects the need for more Orthodox women in contrast with men to follow career paths that allow greater scheduling flexibility for them to meet their religious obligations relating to ritual activities, or observance of the Sabbath and other holidays. Additionally, given the more flexible employment scheduling Orthodox women have for meeting their religious obligations, they are better able to fit family and child obligations into their daily routines.

To a considerable degree, the current earnings equation parallels that for employment in that men who are raised Orthodox systematically report *higher* earnings than all other male denominational groups. There is no similar variation in earnings among their female counterparts.

The final equation in Table 2 similarly highlights a pattern for household income paralleling that for employment and earnings. It may be noted that women raised non-Orthodox systematically live in household units that have higher household incomes independent of all the other background and contemporaneous factors included in our multivariate analyses. This is not true for men, where specific denomination raised is independent of household income. This may be related to the greater likelihood that women raised Orthodox are substantially less likely than their non-Orthodox counterparts to be employed – only 60 percent compared with approximately 90 percent for those raised in other denominations. Also, women who were raised Orthodox have a greater likelihood than men raised Orthodox to maintain their Orthodoxy into adulthood—70 percent compared with only 53 percent—which could certainly contribute to the gender differential in the connection between denomination raised and current house-

hold income. These figures may also highlight differences in gender-role socialization during childhood and adolescence, resulting in more traditional propensities to stay at home and dedicate time to family-centered activities as opposed to entering the work force, thereby restricting the household's net income.

#### *A Note on the Influence of Fertility*

While an exploration of the determinants and consequences of fertility is beyond the scope of this research, its influence on the economic outcomes that may arguably be considered inexorably connected with childbearing warrants a note. For this reason, we examined female economic outcome equations with and without a child ever born variable included. The inclusion of a child variable in the earnings and household income equation does not alter in any way the independent connections between childhood denomination and these outcomes (not shown).

The addition of the child variable does, however, reduce the size and significance of the connection between childhood denomination and current employment. While not included in the text, this is completely consistent with the fact that there is no significant independent connection between the earnings/income outcomes and childbearing while a very strong independent connection between current employment and children ever born exists. This is consistent with the reality that mothers in this age group typically have young children which may be linked with lesser employment in a cross-sectional context, albeit not necessarily lower earnings, if they are employed.<sup>1</sup>

#### *"Moderation" in Religious Orientation and Secular 'Success': Testing the Thesis*

To help clarify whether less extreme affiliations and more diversified social networks can be beneficial to secular success, the input variables presented in Table 3 differentiate between the impact of high, moderate, and low levels of selected non-secular explanatory factors on secular outcomes. This is not to suggest that connections between these factors and background or current denominational attachment do not exist. Rather, our analytical approach is consistent with the view that across all denominational groups, or indeed for all Jewish respondents, there are significant cultural, personal, or historical reasons for having *personal* connections with Judaism that can be independent of denominational connections, and these connections can translate into personal or social motivations that impact adult secular outcomes independent of more formal denominational links. Indeed, these

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<sup>1</sup> When examining denominational differences, we do find that employment coefficients are similar across all but one denomination for women who had children. In contrast, Orthodox women who were childless were significantly less likely to be employed than their non-Orthodox childless counterparts. These findings are suggestive of a potential mediating effect of children between denomination and female employment status. Although we do not find the mediating influence of children to be as pronounced as Hartman and Hartman (1996) did in their analysis of the NJPS 1990, this may be due to overall sample differences and the age restriction of our respondents.

TABLE 3

Independent Linkages between Selected "High-Low"  
Variable Categories and Selected Outcomes\*

	College Degree		Graduate Attendance		Employed		Earnings		H.H Income	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Low Jewish Ed.	-0.60 <sup>c</sup>	-0.38	-0.32	-0.05	0.15	-0.13	-0.06	0.01	-0.18 <sup>a</sup>	0.13 <sup>b</sup>
High Jewish Ed.	-0.26	0.19	-0.31	0.37	0.50	-0.35	0.19 <sup>b</sup>	0.10	0.28 <sup>a</sup>	-0.24 <sup>a</sup>
Few Jewish Childhood Friends	-0.11	-0.04	0.23	0.13	0.79 <sup>c</sup>	-0.80 <sup>c</sup>	-0.14 <sup>b</sup>	0.14	-0.05	-0.28 <sup>a</sup>
Most Jewish Childhood Friends	0.35	-0.59	0.69 <sup>c</sup>	0.26	0.38	-1.20 <sup>b</sup>	-0.03	0.14	0.14 <sup>b</sup>	-0.05
High Personal Religiosity	-0.08	-1.34 <sup>a</sup>	0.12	-0.72 <sup>b</sup>	0.25	0.04	-0.42 <sup>a</sup>	-0.08	-0.17 <sup>a</sup>	-0.13 <sup>b</sup>
Low Personal Religiosity	-0.03	-0.18	0.14	-0.25	0.26	-0.24	-0.27 <sup>a</sup>	-0.00	-0.20 <sup>a</sup>	-0.12 <sup>a</sup>

\* See Table 1 and Appendix for relevant notes regarding omitted categories and Table 2 for additional notes regarding employment/earnings equations. The college and employment coefficients are Poisson estimates. The earnings equations Poisson estimates limited to employed respondents.

- a = significant at p<.01
- b = significant at p<.05
- c = significant at p<.10

contemporary and antecedent proxies have the potential to significantly impact adult economic success. Once again, we acknowledge that the direction of causality between the outcomes and contemporary religiosity remains somewhat ambiguous, but the contemporary personal religiosity variable represents the only available proxy for temporally prior personal religiosity.

As a corollary to this thesis, and as suggested earlier, the connections between religious factors and subsequent secular 'success' are not always transparent, and are in some instances demonstrably nonlinear. Adult adjustment in a secular world may at times be linked with childhood through moderate religious involvement and religious-linked social networking and perhaps further reinforced by more generalized personal orientations toward moderate or "middle of the road" behaviors and attitudes (Burt 1992). While the results in Table 3 are not always consistent, they demonstrate partial support for some of our speculations and suggest avenues for future research.

TABLE 4

Independent Linkages between Religion Indices, Contemporary Religiosity, and Selected Outcomes\*

	Network		Social		Very Religious		Not Very Religious	
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
College Degree (=1)	0.25 <sup>c</sup>	0.14	-0.22	0.38 <sup>c</sup>	-0.08	-1.34 <sup>a</sup>	-0.03	-0.18
Graduate Attendance (=1)	0.15	0.10	-0.10	0.09	0.12	-0.72 <sup>b</sup>	0.14	-0.25
Employed Survey Point	-0.12	-0.15	-0.52 <sup>c</sup>	-0.18	0.25	0.04	0.26	-0.24
Earnings	0.08 <sup>a</sup>	0.01	-0.13 <sup>a</sup>	-0.04	-0.42 <sup>a</sup>	-0.08	-0.25 <sup>a</sup>	-0.00
H.H. Income	0.13 <sup>a</sup>	0.05 <sup>a</sup>	-0.03	0.02	-0.17 <sup>a</sup>	-0.12 <sup>b</sup>	-0.20 <sup>a</sup>	-0.12 <sup>b</sup>

The college and employment coefficient are Logit estimates and the income equations are produce Poisson estimates. See equations 2 in Tables 1 and 5 for complete equation variable listings and Appendix for all variable definitions.

"Social" Inputs = Jewish Camp; Have Ever Lived in or Visited Israel

"Network" Inputs = Yrs of Jew Educ; Jew Friendship Networks in Childhood & Adolescence

a = significant at  $p < .01$

b = significant at  $p < .05$

c = significant at  $p < .10$

Educational completion shows limited connection with the items highlighted in Table 3. For women, a moderate level (compared with high and low) of personal religiosity and to a lesser extent, childhood friendship networks, are linked with higher subsequent educational attainment. In both instances, the only positive connection is with the omitted middle 'moderate' category. Additionally, women with a moderate childhood Jewish social network (i.e. not few or many childhood Jewish friends) have significantly higher levels of contemporary employment. There is also evidence that moderate religiosity is linked with higher household income.

For men, a moderate level of childhood Jewish education (when compared to high or low levels) evidences a positive connection with educational attainment and graduate school attendance, a modest positive connection with earnings and strong positive connections between moderate friendship networks, religiosity, and household income. Thus, while not overwhelming, there is evidence of con-



nections between moderate current or earlier religious-linked behaviors and outcomes where social interactions or networking that might broaden an individual's social or employment world could potentially have a "payoff."

Table 4 synthesizes some of the non-secular individual items into two abbreviated indices that may approximately represent childhood/adolescent networking ('Network' includes years of Jewish education and extensiveness of Jewish friendship networks), and earlier more extensive Jewish linked social interactions ('Social' typically included childhood/adolescent Jewish camp attendance or trip(s) to Israel). While not indexed, we also include high, moderate and low personal religiosity for comparative purposes, as perhaps our best measure of personalized feelings towards religion.

Table 4 presents coefficients from multivariate analyses that include these indices as well as all the additional variables in equations 2 of Table 1 and the additional items included in the note to Table 2, as appropriate. For women, stronger early Jewish networking is linked only with greater household income, and earlier social linkages are associated with a greater likelihood of college completion. In contrast, high personal religiosity is linked with less education and less household income (although, as demonstrated in table 3, this last effect is really an "inverted U" relationship). These results are generally supportive of the notion that earlier religious socialization can translate into more subsequent secular "success" via the education route, whereas high personal religiosity has the opposite effect as evidenced by the inverse connections between high religiosity, educational attainment and household income. Childhood socialization can clearly have fundamentally different predictive value than personal religiosity values. It should be reiterated that these significant economic connections are independent of earlier denominational connections and educational attainment (of the respondent and his/her parents).

For men, having a Jewish networking history is linked with current higher earnings, and household income (as was also true for women). Thus, there is an important commonality here between men and women. However for men, there is an even stronger inverse personal religiosity-household income connection, and a greater personal religiosity connection with lesser personal earnings than was true for women—but subject to an important caveat—that these connections, as shown in Table 3, are really U shaped, and quite consistent with the "moderation" hypothesis. One theme that remains evident is that earlier (childhood) denominational connections that may well be linked with social and networking behavioral paths have fundamental meanings in terms of subsequent secular behaviors and more so than do more contemporary personal feelings about religion (Table 2).

Additionally, for men, having early Jewish social linkages was linked with less employment and lower earnings whereas the same index was of little value for explaining female outcomes.

TABLE 5

Estimating the Secular and Religious Determinants of Household  
Income for Men and Women (Poisson estimates)

	Male		Female	
	1	2	1	2
<b>Religious Inputs</b>				
Less Jewish Education	-0.18 <sup>a</sup>	-	0.13 <sup>b</sup>	-
More Jewish Education	0.28 <sup>a</sup>	-	-0.24 <sup>a</sup>	-
No Knowledge of Hebrew	0.03	0.01	-0.08	-0.04
Attended Jewish Camp	-0.05	-	-0.08 <sup>c</sup>	-
Few Jewish Friends, Childhood	0.14 <sup>b</sup>	-	-0.28 <sup>a</sup>	-
Most Jewish Friends, Childhood	0.28 <sup>a</sup>	-	-0.05	-
Visited Israel	0.03	-	0.11 <sup>b</sup>	-
High Personal Religiosity	-0.16 <sup>a</sup>	-0.17 <sup>a</sup>	-0.12 <sup>b</sup>	-0.13 <sup>b</sup>
Low Personal Religiosity	-0.20 <sup>a</sup>	-0.20 <sup>a</sup>	-0.10 <sup>b</sup>	-0.12 <sup>a</sup>
Conservative	0.00	-0.04	0.29 <sup>a</sup>	0.45 <sup>a</sup>
Reform	0.10	0.02	0.24 <sup>b</sup>	0.43 <sup>a</sup>
Other	-0.16 <sup>c</sup>	-0.20 <sup>b</sup>	-0.03	0.25 <sup>b</sup>
Not Raised Jewish	-0.04	-0.09	0.36 <sup>a</sup>	0.63 <sup>a</sup>
Network Index	-	0.13 <sup>a</sup>	-	0.05 <sup>a</sup>
Socialization Index	-	-0.03	-	0.02
<b>Non-Religious Inputs</b>				
Age	0.05 <sup>a</sup>	0.05 <sup>a</sup>	0.03 <sup>a</sup>	0.04 <sup>a</sup>
Mom & Dad College Degree	0.31 <sup>a</sup>	0.33 <sup>a</sup>	0.18 <sup>a</sup>	0.21 <sup>a</sup>
Mom Only College Degree	0.31 <sup>a</sup>	0.31 <sup>a</sup>	0.04	0.08
Dad Only College Degree	0.22 <sup>a</sup>	0.21 <sup>a</sup>	0.23 <sup>a</sup>	0.22 <sup>a</sup>
Attained College Degree	0.28 <sup>a</sup>	0.28 <sup>a</sup>	0.32 <sup>a</sup>	0.32 <sup>a</sup>
Partner/Spouse Pres	-0.11 <sup>c</sup>	-0.09	-0.55 <sup>a</sup>	-0.63 <sup>a</sup>
Employed	1.01 <sup>a</sup>	1.03 <sup>a</sup>	0.09 <sup>c</sup>	0.09 <sup>c</sup>
Spouse Employed	0.18 <sup>a</sup>	0.17 <sup>a</sup>	1.05 <sup>a</sup>	1.14 <sup>a</sup>
Children Ever Born	-	-	0.04	0.05
Constant	-0.60	-1.02 <sup>a</sup>	0.33	-0.29
N	305	305	318	318
R <sup>2</sup>	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.15

Note: See Appendix for full variable definitions

a = significance at p<.01

b = significance at p<.05

c = significance at p<.10

*Explaining Household Income*

This final analytical section permits a more “gestalt” exploration of how the secular and non-secular concurrently contribute to the economic success of Jewish family units. In this regard, it is useful to recall that we are examining household units for respondents who were between the ages of 25 and 39 years at the time of interview. Thus, many of these families are in their formative years. If they have children, they are mostly young, and economic, particular employment outcomes, may be affected by the age of the youngest child, as this is the most important determinant of short-term female employment. We have already indicated the presence of children has a depressing effect on female employment, and that the presence of children mediates the effect of childhood denominational attachment on female employment. In contrast, the connections with child presence-absence do not moderate any denomination connection to income outcomes.

According to Table 5, a wide range of secular and non-secular inputs contribute to family economic success for men. Secular human capital during childhood, as represented by parental education, is a major predictor of economic ‘success’ for the next generation. Not surprisingly, respondent college completion is also an important predictor. In contrast, living with a partner/spouse has a negative effect, even after controlling for children (of female respondents) in the home. Despite this finding, both respondent and partner employment contribute to higher household income *if they are employed*.

Shifting to the non-secular for men, while denomination per se matters little, it may be seen that a higher level of childhood Jewish education is linked with greater family income, perhaps reflecting network considerations as well as superior pedagogically acquired skills. The network consideration is also supported by a strong positive connection between income and having had an extensive Jewish friendship network (Equation 2). It could also be that more educated Jewish men have more Jewish education and come from families with higher incomes (not available in data set) who could afford both Jewish education and secular college education. In contrast, as noted earlier, a moderate perspective on (personal) religiosity is linked with higher incomes, whereas both extremes have the opposite relationship to income. In summary, Equation 2 synthesizes the importance of the secular and non-secular—education and religious networking as well as a traditional orientation — for higher household earnings. This mix of human and social capital suggests that both skill acquisition and personal traits that can impact on partner selection may be relevant to this household story. That is, there is a general literature that indicates that better educated individuals, from higher income families tend to marry each other, with both thus contributing to better-educated, higher income family units (e.g. Mare 1991; Qian 1998).

Comparison with the female equations suggests that despite certain gender commonalities there are also important gender differences. In general, the parental education dimension is very important as a predictor of household

income although it may be useful to note that having only a mother with a college degree is of importance for men but not for women. This may be a reflection of a greater emphasis on enhancing the human capital skills of men in comparison with women, independent of other factors in Jewish households.

By itself, having a partner/husband present is detrimental for women, presumably for the same reasons as was true for men. However, not surprisingly, spouse/partner employment has a much stronger positive effect on husband household income than the mirror image of wife/partner. An employed female respondent does not enhance household income as substantially as it does for men.

We now shift to the religious dimension. While denomination had no relevance for predicting household income for male respondents, a non-Orthodox background—be it Conservative, Reform, or not having been raised Jewish—is linked with higher household income for women. Additionally, a limited level of childhood Jewish education, having a moderate number of childhood Jewish friends, and having visited or lived in Israel, are connected with higher household income for women. Much of the above is consistent with our hypothesis that a ‘middle ground’ of Jewish affiliation and background for women is associated with the greatest likelihood of subsequent household economic success.

For women, the two indices in Equation 2 are positively linked with greater household income such that stronger childhood Jewish networking and socialization are positively linked with subsequent family economic success. This may well reflect a mixture of prior Jewish social capital impacting positively on the pursuance of select employment and potentially wealthier Jewish or non-Jewish partners.

## A SYNTHESIS

While we had several objectives in this research, each was guided by one overarching question: to what extent do religious origins have long-term secular ‘payoffs,’ be they positive or negative in nature, for a contemporary nationally representative sample of younger adult Jewish men and women? Our results are suggestive of a reality that there are dimensions of religious upbringing that clearly have a significant independent impact on adult educational and economic outcomes; and the extent to which one adopts and/or is exposed to a moderate level of both the secular and non-secular is sometimes a determinant of whether this impact is positive or negative.

While our more robust generalizations are probably most applicable to the U.S. Jewish population, we also believe some of these findings enhance our understanding of religious-secular connections for other religious populations. However, when making generalizations to other groups or religious sects, researchers must be mindful of certain demographic characteristics unique to the Jewish population. It is useful to recall that the overall Jewish population has historically been (and continues to be) more highly educated than their non-Jewish U.S. counterparts, they reside in predominantly urban neighborhoods, and,

although the majority are extremely integrated within mainstream society, a non-trivial Orthodox subset adheres to extremely traditional values and rituals that inhibit full assimilation and integration. To some extent, our multivariate approach addresses this issue; however, to the extent that our quantitative inputs do not sufficiently capture these dimensions within the religion and basic attitudinal or behavioral priors are not tapped by our inputs, attempted generalizations may be subject to misinterpretation.

The emphasis in most of this paper was on the effect of religious upbringing and *not* contemporary religious attitudes or behavior. To do otherwise might introduce substantial circularity into any interpretations of the connections between adult secular outcomes and religious attitudes or behaviors from earlier in life. From a Jewish perspective, our objectives were several. We had an overarching interest in exploring the extent to which various aspects of religious background might alter adult secular outcomes, how this might reflect variations in religious upbringing, and in particular whether these causal links vary by gender. From a religiosity perspective, we were interested in the extent to which a more or less traditional and/or conservative background is positively or negatively associated with secular adult 'success' or 'failure'; or, is a more moderate, middle-of-the-road upbringing preferable?

Given the somewhat stronger continuity between childhood religious orientation and adult religious connections for Jewish women compared to men, as evidenced by a greater likelihood of having a childhood traditional upbringing extend into adulthood, one might anticipate stronger, more lasting non-secular and secular ties for women than for men.

Additionally, when these respondents were going through their childhood-early adolescent formative years, attitudes and behaviors relating to what were 'appropriate' roles for women in comparison with men, both within the formal religious world as well as within the larger society, were significantly more traditional for certain segments of Jewish society. Since that time, the shift towards greater equalitarianism in gender roles within our larger society has probably had more impact on denominational groups that had in past decades evidenced greater gender disparities in attitudes and behaviors, the Orthodox, and to some extent the Conservatives. All of the above are consistent with our hypothesis that there are likely stronger and/or possibly different links between childhood religion and religiosity and current secular behaviors for women than for men.

Our synthesized findings suggest moderate support for both of the above theses relating to stronger female connections and the importance of moderate perspectives as determinants of adult secular behaviors and attributes. Our results for Jewish women are supportive of the following generalizations: childhood non-Orthodoxy and our socialization index are linked with greater college completion. In contrast, having strong personal religious values is strongly connected with lesser college completion, although this last suggestion should be interpreted more cautiously, because of the less satisfactory temporal placement of this personal religiosity "input."

Whereas Orthodox origins are strongly linked with less current employment for women compared with the other denominations, we find strong positive connections between *moderate* Jewish childhood friendship networks and employment; and, while earnings do not appear to be connected with any antecedents of significance, household income is. Specifically, higher household income is linked with high values on the network index, having visited Israel earlier in life, and a moderate score on the personal religiosity measure. Overall, it is perhaps fair to generalize that female secular success, while not entirely consistent, is positively linked with several religious antecedents of a more social nature where 'moderation' in networking and socialization considerations is important. At the same time, it also appears that more traditional religious priors, such as earlier denominational attachment, manifest themselves as more traditional gender-role ideologies related to educational attainment and workforce participation. The greater continuing familial orientation of Orthodox Jewish family units is certainly consistent with a lesser level of Orthodox female employment even after controlling for family size (Hartman and Hartman 1996).

The story for Jewish men is somewhat more erratic. As with the women, non-Orthodoxy is associated with greater college completion, but the linkages are somewhat stronger for men. In contrast to women, men have higher earnings if they were raised Orthodox, had extensive Jewish education, and/or have had a moderate childhood Jewish friendship network. Higher earnings are also linked with *higher* scores on the networking index, but *lower* scores on the social index, all of which are consistent with stronger over-time social networking and enhanced earning opportunities. Additionally, some of the stronger Orthodox-earnings connection may reflect an attempt by these men to compensate for the fact that their spouses are more likely to remain at home.

For men, from a household earnings perspective, higher income is independently linked with a moderate level of personal religiosity as well as strong prior evidence of Jewish networking. All of the above is consistent with the thesis that non-extremist self-identification—be it secular or non-secular in nature—and prior religious linkages translate into positive adult social and economic outcomes. As a generalization, it appears that the female Jewish-connected trajectory exhibits stronger connections with educational and household outcomes, while the male pattern is more evident in connections between non-secular antecedents and earnings levels.

As a final note, it is suggested that the connections between religious upbringing and related values with adult secular outcomes is considerable. Regardless of gender, one should not anticipate that extremes are optimal predictors of later outcomes, regardless of whether they are very religious or non-religious in orientation. There is some evidence that a middle ground regarding religiosity may have the largest payoff, even after taking into account the importance of educational antecedents, an issue we plan to explore further. This finding may be indicative of a variety of factors inculcated from the religion as well as personality traits that

may reflect internalized values, rituals and historic traditions passed along through familial and societal interactions and networking experiences. It may be that combinations of non-secular and secular childhood connections, as has been suggested in some other research, may be optimal for many in that it can enhance both a broader range of social skills in conjunction with a wider range of academic/intellectual competencies in comparison with alternative upbringings. As a final caveat, the extent to which these within-religion characteristics may translate into subsequent secular success or failure for other religious groups may be at least partly sensitive to group size as well as the extent to which a particular religious group is more or less integrated within the larger society.

Note: For References, refer to the Bibliography at the end of this issue.

**Appendix: Variable Descriptions For Variables in Multivariate Analyses**

Variable Names	Variable Question and/or Description
<i>Outcome Variables</i>	
<b>College Degree Receipt</b>	<p>“What was the highest degree or year of school you have completed?”                      Respondent received a 4-year, college degree (bachelors degree) or more = 1                      Respondent has less than a college degree = 0</p>
<b>Graduate Schooling</b>	<p>Respondent has at least attended graduate school = 1                      Respondent has not attended graduate school = 0</p>
<b>Spouse Employment</b>	<p>This variable is coded 1 if spouse/partner is employed and 0 otherwise</p>
<b>Respondent Earnings</b>	<p>This is the respondent’s annual individual employment earnings (for those who are employed). We used the same recoded scale as with the household income variable (ranging from 0-60)</p>
<b>Household Income</b>	<p>“Stop me when I mention the category that includes your household’s total income, before taxes, for 1999.”                      The income and earnings estimates in the survey were precoded into discrete categories of uneven size, with the lowest category being less than 15,000 and the highest half a million or greater. Because of the uneven ranges across categories, we (1) estimated a mid point for each category, (2) we then assigned the midpoints a value from one to sixty (rounding to the nearest 10,000 unit) Thus, our earnings/income range is between one and 60, although of course not all unit estimates are necessarily included.</p>

**Inputs**

<b>Age</b>	Continuous variable = Ranges from 25 to 39 years
<b>Children Ever Born</b>	Respondent has one or more children = 1 Respondent is childless = 0 (Due to data limitations, this variable was only created for female respondents)
<b>Currently Married</b>	Respondent is currently married = 1 Respondent is not currently married = 0
<b>Parental Education</b>	<b>“What was the highest degree or year of school completed by your mother/father?”</b> Both parents have an M.A., M.S., or 4-year degree = 1 Only Dad has an M.A., M.S., or 4-year degree = 1 Only Mom an M.A., M.S., or 4-year degree = 1 Neither parent has an M.A., M.S., or 4-year degree = 0 (omitted reference category)
<b>Elementary Jewish Education</b>	<b>“Which of the following types of Jewish Education did you receive in grades 1 to 7? For how many years?”</b> Low (between 0 and 7 day-years) = 1 High (between 19.5 and 52.5 day-years) = 1 Moderate (between 7 to 19.5 day-years) = 0 (omitted reference category) Because of the limited number of items available for this measure, we were constrained in our ability to operationalize this concept. The survey asked only the number of years of elementary education for each child and the type of education received, which we translated into an approximate number of days a week. The number of weeks of education for each child was not asked. As a result, we were forced to assume equality in weeks for children across a given year. Our measure then is days per week times years or “day-years”. If our assumption about week equality is reasonable, then our estimate would be mathematically equivalent to average days per year as the week measure would cancel out across the full sample.
<b>Unable to Read/Speak Hebrew</b>	<b>“How well can you read Hebrew, such as in a prayer book, regardless of the amount you understand?”</b> Not at all = 1 Can sound out words slowly or can read words fluently = 0
<b>Childhood Denomination</b>	<b>“Thinking about how you were raised, were you raised as...”</b> Conservative = 1 Reform = 1 No Affiliation /Just Jewish/Other) = 1 Not raised Jewish = 1 Orthodox = 0 (omitted reference category)
<b>Attended/Worked Jewish Camp</b>	<b>“Did you attend or work at a Jewish sleep-away camp before the age of 25?”</b> Yes = 1 No=0



<b>Childhood Friends</b>	<p>“During high school how many of the people you considered your closest friends were Jewish?”</p> <p>Mostly Non-Jewish (Some or None) = 1                  Mostly Jewish (Most or all) = 1                  About Half = 0 (omitted reference category)</p>
<b>Visited Israel</b>	<p>“Have you ever visited and/or lived in Israel?”</p> <p>Yes = 1                  No = 0</p>
<b>Level of Personal Religiosity</b>	<p>“In general, how religious would you say you are personally?”</p> <p>Very Religious = 1                  Not Very (or not at all) Religious = 1                  Somewhat Religious = 0 (omitted reference category)</p>
<b>Employment Status</b>	<p>“Are you currently employed either full- or part-time?”</p> <p>Yes = 1, No = 0</p>
<b>Network Index</b>	<p>The network index was created by combining the Jewish Elementary Education variable with Childhood Jewish Friends variable. Values for each independent variable were assigned as follows:</p> <p>Jewish Education:                  Mostly Non-Jewish (Some or None) = 1                  7 to 19.5 Days per year = 2                  Between 19.5 and 52.5 days per year = 3</p> <p>Childhood Jewish Friends:                  Mostly Non-Jewish (Some or None) = 1                  About Half = 2                  Mostly Jewish (Most or All) = 3</p> <p>RANGE: 2-6</p>
<b>Social Index</b>	<p>The Social Index was created by combining “ Attended Jewish Camp before age 25” with having ever visited Israel</p> <p>Attended/Worked Jewish Camp before age 25 = 1, Not attended=0                  Visited or Lived in Israel = 1, Not visited=0</p> <p>Range 0-2</p>