

# MOVEMENT

GROWING UP  
BY I.B. SINGER





# MOMENT

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# JEW, MORE OR LESS

It seems our numbers aren't shrinking after all—but that's not the whole story. A conversation with two experts tells why.

STEVEN M.  
COHEN  
CALVIN  
GOLDSCHIEDER

**MOMENT:** The “demographic crisis” is by now a familiar theme in Jewish sidewalk sociology. It's hard to imagine that there's a Jew left anywhere in America who doesn't believe that the number of Jews is shrinking as a consequence of assimilation, a low birth rate and intermarriage. Is all that true? What are the facts?

**Steven Cohen:** As you know, I am much more concerned with the quality of Jewish life in America, which I believe is at a critical crossroads, than I am with issues of quantity. Quantitatively, we're in relatively decent shape. Since that violates the popular perception, let me explain why I say it.

Most demographers would agree that demographic decline depends most critically on birth rates, on how many children women will have. If you want to know about Jewish numbers in the years ahead, you've got to know how many children the Jewish women who are marrying now will have in years to come. There were studies done in the late 60s and early 70s—specifically the National Jewish Population Study of 1970-71—that led some demographers to conclude that since younger women were not having babies as early or perhaps as often as their mothers had, they would probably end up having an average of 1.6 or 1.7 children instead of the 2.1 that are needed for a population to replace itself.

But Goldscheider and others have suggested that the issue is not one of overall fertility so much as it is one of timing. Jewish women, it turns out,

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weren't refraining from marriage, as was widely supposed; they were simply marrying later. And they were not refraining from childbearing; they were just having their children later. Indeed, the early analysis that Paul Ritterband has done of the New York Jewish Population Studies shows that women who are now in the 35-44 age bracket have had an average of about 2.1 children.

We've also got to pay attention to the cultural shift that we have witnessed. Women who were responding to questionnaires in the late 60s and early 70s were the products of a particular cultural moment in American history: the entry of women into the labor force, the growth of the feminist movement, and so forth. There has been a change in the atmosphere. Even if we assume that the women of the late 60s and early 70s were indeed less family-oriented, less prone to have large families—which is very doubtful if you look at the data—there is no reason to assume that the same predilections are carrying over into the early and mid-eighties.

**MOMENT:** Let's be sure we have this right, because through all of the conversations over the last decade or so about intermarriage and assimilation and the debate over their consequences and their impact, the one constant has been the presumed extraordinarily low birth rate for Jews. The general assumption has been that America as a whole is reproducing at below replacement rate, at about 1.8 children per family, and that Jews are about twenty-five percent below the general American norm. You're saying now that that wasn't so then and isn't so now, that it's a question of timing and values, but that in New York you're finding that we're doing slightly better than the replacement rate.

**Calvin Goldscheider:** On the one hand it is true that since the 1920s, average family size of Jews has been around replacement level. That we know and that has been relatively constant, through the 1920s, through the depression, through the post-war baby boom. There have been some fluctuations, but basically the average Jewish family has had two children.

The critical change over the last ten years or so has not been in the number



of children born but in the proportion of women who have married. So we shift the whole argument. In the past, up to 1960, it was generally the case that universal marriage characterized the Jewish community. Everybody got married. In the late 60s and early 70s, some women didn't get married. The question then becomes, were these women *delaying* their marriage, postponing it, getting divorced and re-marrying, setting up families at different times, therefore having babies at different times, or were they dropping out of child-bearing altogether? That has never been systematically studied.

We do have some hunches. We know there's been some postponement, but the evidence suggests very clearly that Jews and non-Jews are marrying at about the same ages. Education, even graduate school education, doesn't postpone marriage for Jewish women any more than for anybody else. The problem is that all the data we have on fertility relate to married women. For married women, Steve is right. All the evidence, including the New York study and the Boston studies and the national studies and estimates based on national data show 2.0, 2.1, 2.3. (The different estimates result from the fact that some of the women you're talking to haven't finished their childbearing, so you're talking about *expected* family size.)

We don't know what the new tempo is. We do know that for the general population in the United States there has been a very sharp increase in fertility among women aged 30-39, unlike previous periods. Women delayed marriage, entered the labor force, and are having babies somewhat later in life. They still have plenty of time to have two children. So I think the demographic question associated with fertility relates to the proportion of the American Jewish community that is never going to marry. And nobody knows the answer to that question.

I should add here that population size is not only a function of how many babies are born. As demographers we can say that there has been a delay in child-bearing, and eventual child-bearing will be two children. But—and this is a very important matter—population is not affected only

by fertility and mortality. Jewish population is affected, for example, by intermarriage and by migration.

In this same period of time, even if fertility has declined, even if we're not dealing just with postponement of child-bearing, we've got major Jewish immigration to the United States. We have immigration from Israel, from the Soviet Union, and, to a lesser degree, from Iran and South Africa. And our numbers are affected by that. Migration doesn't increase the birth rate in the United States, but it has an effect on the Jewish community and its size, and I want to emphasize the fact that there is no responsible demographic projection, including those that appear in the American Jewish Yearbook, that predicts any decline in the American Jewish population for the next twenty-five years.

Now, it's true that we know nothing about the quantitative impact of intermarriage. We don't know much about

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## The effect of intermarriage on the number of Jewish children is somewhere between a very modest loss and a substantial gain.

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the children of the intermarried, or about how intermarried people identify within the Jewish community. We just don't know those numbers. We know very little about marriage in the 70s and 80s, we're just beginning to find that out. We know little about the Jewish identity of the immigrants. So with all those unknowns, over the next twenty years, nobody can reliably predict population. But: On the basis of what has occurred up to now, there is no foundation for predicting more than—at most—a minor decline in number—and there is just as good reason to predict an actual increase.

**M:** Do we know whether intermarriage is still a very common phenomenon? And if it is, is it a source of significant loss of numbers?

**SC:** There are two or three issues concerned with intermarriage. One is the rate of intermarriage. And to estimate the rate, we first have to define what an intermarriage is. Second, what are the consequences of intermarriage for Jewish population size, and/or for numbers of actively Jewish individuals?

Let's look at rates. The early reports from the National Jewish Population Study alleged that something like one-third of all Jews were marrying people who were non-Jewish and were staying non-Jewish. Later analyses of the same data disagreed with those projections. One recently published analysis says the rate is more appropriately characterized as 20 to 25 percent, another suggested 14 percent. The rate of one-third that was trumpeted around the country as of the late 1960s might well be inaccurate.

We now have data coming out of New York and also out of other studies that seem to indicate that intermarriage nationally has leveled off. At what level we don't know. In the New York area, which has an intermarriage rate—or did at least in the late 60s—of less than half the national rate, we can now say that 11 percent of Jews marrying in the 70s married someone who was born non-Jewish and stayed non-Jewish, or, at least, was non-Jewish as of our study in 1981.

In other words, the rate doesn't seem to be that phenomenal; it's not going through the roof. And then, as Calvin has said, you've got to look at the consequences of intermarriage. Again, the evidence is sparse, but what evidence we have suggests that at worst there is an exchange. There's an acquisition, if you will, of perhaps a quarter or so of the once non-Jewish wives; they become Jewish. The vast majority of the Jewish women in intermarriages retain not simply Jewish identity but Jewish activity of some sort, men somewhat less so. On the whole, it seems—at least from the scant data that we have—that intermarriage brings about at most a slight decline in the number of Jewish children who would have been born to these people had they married other Jews, or, possibly, a rather substantial increase in the number of Jewish children. That's the range—somewhere



between very modest loss and quite substantial gain.

My own view, about which I feel quite confident, is that because of intermarriage there are more Chanukah candles being lit across America today, because there are more homes where at least that level of Jewish involvement is taking place than there would have been if the Jews had married each other. There may also be more Jews who are living in homes with Christmas trees, but there are probably more Jews with Chanukah candles and with what they regard as a Passover seder because of intermarriage. So we might be increasing the number of Jews—children, or the intermarried—who are living what some regard as a low level of religious Jewish life, but are nevertheless identified as Jews.

In short, intermarriage may be slightly increasing Jews and slightly decreasing Jewishness.

**CG:** Let's go back to the matter of rate. There is tremendous variation across the country, and therefore it's very hard to come up with a national estimate because it neutralizes all the variation, and it doesn't say anything. If we say it's 20 percent or 30 percent, that conveys a feeling rather than some demographic fact. My guess is that because studies across the country have defined their study populations in various ways, we come up with different numbers, just on the basis of that. We have a real problem—someone who says I was born non-Jewish but I feel Jewish now, is that Jewish? Do conversions within a religious system have to take place in order for that person to be part of the Jewish community? What are the tests of adherence to the community?

I'm a sociologist; therefore, I'm bound neither by theology nor by the norms of the community. What I say is this: I have a population; how do I define the people who belong to it? It really doesn't matter what their genes look like, and it doesn't matter what they are racially, because I can't find that out anyway. Someone who is born non-Jewish but does things that identify that person as part of a community, who says I'm part of a community, the community says he or she is part of the community—these peo-

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## The real question is not about quantity; it's about quality.

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ple are Jews. Rabbis may have difficulties with that, but the people in the community don't seem to have any difficulty with that any more. There's been a tremendous change in the acceptance of the intermarried within the community. That's very powerful. In the 1920s and 30s and 40s, when the rate of intermarriage was very low, the intermarried were pushed away from the community. If you intermarried then, indeed you were out of the community. But today if you are intermarried, you may in fact be a very important part of the community.

I don't want the evidence that Steve presented to be misunderstood as trivial—well, so they light Chanukah candles, big deal, that's not really what Jewishness is about. I don't want that evidence to be understood in that context. I think if you view not only the religious dimension—which is only one part of being Jewish, and I don't even think the most important part in America today—but also if you look at the kinds of patterns of interaction between Jews and Jews, the networks that have developed among Jews, and then ask where the intermarried fit into those networks, how do they fit not into the organized membership part of the community but into friendship patterns, educational patterns, cultural patterns, visits to Israel patterns and so on, you find very little difference between those in intermarried households and those not in intermarried households.

It's remarkable, because we've always said if they don't really keep kosher, they're really not Jewish. But most Jews don't keep kosher. So if that's your criterion, you're going to wipe out 70-80 percent of the popula-

tion that was born Jewish, that is genetically Jewish. I don't want to wipe out the intermarried on those criteria. I want to find out how they are related to the community. If the community accepts them, and if they say most of their friends are Jewish, and if they live in Jewish neighborhoods, and if though they don't live in Jewish neighborhoods they would like to live in Jewish neighborhoods, and if they don't reject Jewishness, then I can't count them as lost, nor can I count the non-Jewish-born partner, even without conversion, as being lost.

So I have a problem: if I don't reject them, and I say they're part of the community quantitatively, then I'm not sure how much of a loss intermarriage involves. And if then I add in the children, even if it's less than 50 percent of the children, then intermarriage adds to the Jewish population!

The only question then becomes quality. Are these qualitatively good Jews? Well, if we could come up with a definition of quality that there would be a consensus on, then I would say let's measure it and test it. We don't even know what the qualitative dimensions are for Jews who are born Jews; there's hardly consensus on that. Therefore we have to set up the categories that will define quality. When we do that, which involves looking at community affiliations, identification at a social-psychological level, doing something that's Jewish in a religious sense, concern about Israel and so on, we see a very strong Jewishness of the intermarried.

And that brings us to the question Adin Steinsaltz asks. A Jew, he says, is a person whose grandchildren will be Jewish. That's the real definition. That's three generations. But we don't know much about the children of the intermarried; *a fortiori* we don't know much about the grandchildren of the intermarried. Still, my guess is they're not going to be very different from the Jewishly born population.

I do think that there are communities in the United States and neighborhoods that have lost population because of intermarriage, because neighborhoods have aged and because people have moved out. You go to the institutions of those neighborhoods, and you say, "Boy, it's a disaster." No-



body goes to shul, our Hebrew schools don't have any pupils, obviously there are no babies born. In the narrow focus they're right, but if they look at the suburbs, everything is growing there. You really need a total picture of those areas that are growing, those areas that are declining, and when you have that picture, the quantitative element is not bad.

**M:** If the problem, as both of you seem to be agreeing, is not numbers, that leaves an obvious question. The community seems to be obsessed with the matter of numbers. Over and over again, one reads in the Jewish press doomsday predictions about the consequences of our sluggish identification and our proneness to intermarriage. Indeed, as both of you know very well, an article that appeared more than ten years ago in *Midstream* projected the possibility that 100 years hence there might be as few as 10,720 Jews left in America. I bet if you did a survey of knowledgeable Jews around the country, that remains one of the most memorable articles of the last twenty years. People were absolutely riveted by it, quote it and cite it to this day. Why do you suppose the community is so committed to its crisis orientation?

**SC:** There are a number of interrelated reasons. One is that, to some extent, perceptions change more slowly than reality. The community people have a perception of Jews today which probably suits Jews of the 30s, 40s and 50s. That is, there was a time in American history when some Jews were running away from being Jewish. That model of Jews rejecting, running away from their Jewishness, is applied to any instance of bad news about the Jews today. In fact, I think Charles Silberman and Calvin and others have shown that the Jews aren't running away anymore. But there is a lag in perception, so we apply old concepts to current realities.

Second, a lot of people who are in what we might call "the Jewish identity industry" are interested in—for admirable reasons—acquiring more support for Jewish identity, culture and education. They think or feel that by trumpeting bad news, there will be more support for their activity.

There is a third reason the major in-

terpreters of Jewish life and culture—rabbis, educators, people whose business it is to instill Jewish identity—are pessimistic. That is that they apply the standards of their own lives and their own experience to the Jewish masses, and they say, "You know, they're not measuring up. They don't know Torah and they don't love Israel the way we do, and they don't celebrate the holidays the way we do," and so on. With the benefit of either a time machine or a historian, one would find out that their standards were *never* met by the masses of the Jewish people. So they have an honest reaction, not simply a cynical, manipulative reaction; they come into contact with the masses and are sorely disappointed.

There's a fourth reason, which relates to all three preceding reasons, which is that Zionist scholars, who are good Zionists and believe that Israel is the last hope of the Jewish people—there are also good Zionists who

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## Doomsday predictions are demographic nonsense.

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don't believe that—are led to overinterpret any pessimistic evidence about the future of American Jewry.

So you have all these reasons which combine to foster an exaggerated, pessimistic view of the condition and the future of American Jewry.

**M:** Two other reasons come to mind: one is the relative importance, in popular perception, of anecdotes rather than evidence. Very many people are anecdotally exposed to either intermarriage or assimilation, and these things are pretty traumatic for the people who are thus exposed. The tendency is to generalize from your own personal experience rather than to consume social science evidence.

And the other is that social science evidence, in addition to being present-

ed in rather obscure places, is confusing. The lay person doesn't know which social scientist to believe. How is the layperson to choose between the doomsday predictions and the more upbeat predictions that you good gentlemen present?

**CG:** I think you're right in suggesting that one of the problems is that the evidence is not clear. Therefore, you can choose how you want to present the evidence, depending on how you want to make your argument. We all have some ideological blinders, and the social scientist tries—not always successfully—to remove some of them. Straight line predictions, which is what the doomsday article you referred to earlier engaged in, are totally useless. They are what I and others have called demographic nonsense.

My feeling is that in addition to the reasons both of you suggest, there is another fact we must take into account. We focus on numbers because we don't know what else to focus on; there is no internal consensus within the American Jewish community. There is no agreement on what it takes to make a good Jew, what a good Jew should do, how he should behave and so on. There's no agreement on religion, religious ritual and practice, or on the role of institutions, and there's less agreement on Israel than there used to be. So what holds the American Jewish community together? It's hard to get excited every year about the Syrian Jews or the Iraqi Jews, they're far away and few in number. So, if you can't agree on the dimensions of quality, then what you can agree about is numbers—something you know nothing about. So you agree that the experts say we are declining in population.

Let me just add a footnote to that. Steve and I were talking in Jerusalem when he came up with the finding from the New York study of 2.2 children expected for the younger population. He said, "I'm going to call up some other demographers at Hebrew University who have argued about the decline and see how they react to this." I suggested to him, much more cynically than he has suggested, that if he changed it around, and said, "I came up with 1.5," not 2.2, they would say, "Amen! You're right,



you've found the right answer." But if you come up with 2.2, they'll tell you all the methodological limitations of your study, they'll suggest that maybe you should look at it another way because it really doesn't fit.

I think that's really what happens. The studies that we have done are always suspect and subject to limitations. And if you find what you want to find, if it's consistent with your ideology, you'll cite it, and if you find something a little bit out of line, you'll say it's a limited study, it's not quite clear. For example, all the intermarriage studies that are popularly reported are very bad methodologically. But they are consistent. They show that intermarriage rates are going up, and we're losing X numbers of people. We'll use those data for our purposes in this crisis syndrome because that's how we can make money and bring the community together and have advertisements in the *New York Times* that say "Will your grandchildren be Jewish?" That's the concern, and it's not whether your grandchildren will be able to make the *bracha* or keep kosher, because not everybody agrees on that.

**M:** Calvin's reference to your thought to call your colleagues at the Hebrew University reminds me of one of Abba Eban's classic lines, where he suggests that the Jewish people is a people that can't take yes for an answer. There is something deeply ingrained within us—and I think we've been dancing a little around its edges—that prompts us to prefer "no" for an answer. I think we have been taught that "no" is the standard answer that our history provides to the Jewish people. So "no" is, in a sense, a more familiar answer to us. We don't know quite what to do with "yes." And it's an answer, as you suggest, that's been picked up by very many people both out of their own very genuine belief and tactically. Tactically, of course, we have argued against it vehemently in these pages on the grounds that it creates a genuine disincentive to Jewish identity and activity.

**SC:** But if you look at the evidence of when and where and which people are involved in Jewish life, you find that the people who are involved in Jewish life are affluent, residentially

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## Let's not expect 18-34 year olds to act in the same ways as 35-50 year olds.

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stable, and most important of all, are married couples with children or with children who have recently left the home. Those who deviate from that model—the mobile, the single, the poor—are much less involved in community activities, and somewhat less involved in ritual activities in the home. The fact of the matter is that there are constituencies that are activated and constituencies that are not activated. Given that people experience a tremendous rise in the visible indicators of Jewish activity between the time they marry and have school-age children, given that people who move reaffiliate after 3-7 years in a community, one must presume that when people don't affiliate, and aren't active, and don't do things in the home, that it's not because they don't want to be Jewish. There's something else going on.

Now if we think the problem is motivational, when in fact it's structural, we're going to come up with the wrong strategy for dealing with it.

**M:** Are you saying that one of the issues is the structural inertia of the community, that we have a community whose institutions have been created to service a particular kind of population and that we don't know what to do with these "new" people with their new lifestyles?

**CG:** Well, partially it's an issue of resources. The people who pay for the community tend to be affluent, stable, parents with children, and they may not be especially concerned with or sensitive to the supports we provide for other kinds of people.

**M:** But their children tend to be the single post-college graduates, the ones we feel are left out of the communal

structure.

**CG:** That's true, but even if you look at the institutions that service college students, Hillel and related institutions, if you look at the budgets of Jewish community centers and synagogues, and the extent to which they are geared for young adults who are not members, any analysis of numbers of employees or the numbers of dollars that are directed at the population between 18 and 30 or 34 shows that the resources committed to that population are significantly less than those committed to the population between 35-50. Those are the people who are paying for most of the institutions, and also organizing those institutions.

My point here is that it's not atypical of American life to find a tremendous variation in voluntary activity of all sorts over the life cycle. It turns out that this is even more accentuated with regard to religious activity. And that may mean that our task is probably a lot easier than we think, because we're really not dealing with motivation, with any built-in reluctance to "be" Jewish, but with some life-cycle issues and some resource issues.

**SC:** We have a problem of underserved constituencies. People are asked to join groups of people who are not like them. That's one issue, and we could use the networks that already exist among such people and try to make them more Jewish, so to speak, instead of insisting that these people—say, for example, the post-college generation—act in ways that aren't plausible for them, join organizations and institutions that are geared to a different constituency.

We also have a problem with respect to competence. Jews like to feel competent, and they think that most Jewish activities require them to do things at which they believe they are not competent. So there is a strong confidence barrier to participation in much of Jewish life. I think that the social barrier and the confidence barrier are in fact the issue, and not the issue of motivation, which is the model that most of us have been carrying around in our heads. If we operate on the motivation model, we conclude that Jews don't want to be too Jewish, that's why they're not at the synagogue or the Y, that's why they don't light



Shabbat candles. I think the issue is that Jews are not part of networks that are Jewishly active, and those who might be or would like to be, feel incompetent to participate in most forms of Jewish life, as they understand it.

**M:** So the statement "I don't want to be Jewish," in whatever version one may hear it, may well be a defense against these feelings of inadequacy, of Judaic inadequacy. In a sense, the person who says those words may be saying, "Inside I may know that I can't be Jewish, I'm not qualified to be Jewish, but I'll be damned if I'm going to confess that. So you can't fire me, I quit. I don't want to be Jewish."

**CG:** It seems to me that we tend to think of being Jewish in very traditional categories. You do something religious, however that's defined ritually, or attend a synagogue, go to the Y, or do something that's institutional.

What we haven't done yet, as social scientists and as people in the Jewish community, is to redefine the nature of being Jewish in a way that's consistent with how people behave. For example, we have often heard that "only X proportion of the Jews goes to synagogue regularly. Most of the Jews only go for Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, only for the High Holidays." Now I turn that around and say, if 90 percent go on the High Holidays that's an incredible figure. In a voluntary modern society which is largely secular, how is it possible that 90 percent or 80 percent or even 60 percent go at least once a year to the synagogue? That's an incredible figure. If you say they *only* light Chanukah candles, that means they should be doing a lot more, look, all they're doing is lighting these silly candles. But my feeling is that this is a powerful piece of evidence that suggests that we should begin to define being Jewish in new ways, that stress patterns of interaction with other Jews. If the pattern of interaction occurs within the context of the synagogue, that's one dimension. If it means that they interact with other Jews on their job, that's another dimension, perhaps no less important and maybe more important. That they interact with Jews in their neighborhood, at social events for their friends, those are all different bases of being Jewish in a community. Clearly

someone who lives in a totally Jewish neighborhood, who works only with other Jews, who interacts with other Jews and goes to shul three times a day, is at the center. What I would argue is that those who only do five out of the thirty-five possibilities are also Jewish, just in different ways.

It makes a lot of sense to propose that those 18-34 year olds who are not married and don't interact with other Jews in the traditional contexts of interaction do interact in many other ways. Many Jews who find the programming at Hillel either too Israeli-oriented, or too book-oriented, or too unrelated to what they're interested in, "only go to Israeli dancing." But Israeli dancing is a powerful basis of interaction, because they don't go to Hindu dancing. And what they do at Israeli dancing is have the opportunity to maximize certain kinds of interactions. That's a very powerful basis of continuing Jewish cohesion for a group and for people who are at various stages in their life cycle. Surely they're not going to give money to Jewish Federation because they're away from home and they don't have money to give, etc., etc. They're not formal members of synagogues. But nobody 18-34 is a formal member of any institution. That's where formal membership is weakest. We shouldn't throw away the informal identification and the informal interaction.

And we shouldn't try to make 18-34 year olds look like 35-50 year olds, or expect that they will want to do the same things, or mourn when they don't.

**SC:** Let me talk a little bit about what we can think about, what we can project, if not predict, about the future of even the conventional, dreary measures of Jewish life that Calvin has suggested we go beyond. When in the New York study we looked at young people versus old people, we found that yes, the "young adults" were significantly less involved in Jewish life in terms of communal affiliations, ritual practice, and even friends. Then we looked at people who had married and had children, ranging from 25-64 years old. We found that on these conventional measures of Jewish life (which don't pick up the ways in which young people are Jewish), once

they marry and have children, over the forty year age span, there were hardly any differences in the level of overt Jewish expression and involvement. So again we get back to the demographic question. Do we believe that young people today who haven't yet married and have children, will never marry and have children, or do we believe that in fact they are simply postponing that decision? I come down on the side of postponement. But now we have a communal question: what do you do with the people 25-34, who haven't yet married and had children, who are pulling down all those wonderful rates of Jewish involvement and membership and so forth? Do we presume that they don't want to be Jewish? We don't make that presumption at all. We presume that there are other measures of Jewishness that we could find if we devised them properly.

At the same time, it's true that from a community point of view, we haven't yet devised institutions that seem to excite their interest and involvement. There are these two issues here.

**M:** We have to close now, but let's note that if you follow your social science argument to its logical conclusion, you will define Judaism as simply that which Jews do. Which may be a definition of Judaism, but is hardly the classic definition. It may be that one of the reasons we dance around these kinds of demographic data as much as we do is to avoid raising the normative question—that is, the question of what Jews, by whatever criterion, *should* do. We want to avoid that question because it is explosive, there being no consensus on it. And we want to avoid it because social scientists are, of course, not trained to deal with the normative question. We are reluctant to don the mantle of prophecy, or even of priesthood, so we stick to the facts, as it were. But there is a sense in which a people that thinks of itself as a religious civilization is bound, ultimately, to go beyond the facts, to set its ideas and ideals before itself. That may not be a proper task for social scientists, but it does need to be done—so long as, in doing it, we don't confuse our descriptions and our prescriptions. ★