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Ritual Variation among Modern Orthodox Jews in the United States

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While many outsiders view Orthodox Jewry as a monolith, the Orthodox, like Jewry in general, are characterized by distinctions and divisions. Many of the important differences among them can be arrayed on a continuum. On one end are those who wish to be *of* as well as *in* the larger society; at the other end are those who seek *segregation.* "In order to protect their souls [they have] attempted to fence in their members and fence out the secular."[1] And in the center are those who dualistically and with ambivalence try to be both cosmopolitan and parochial, modern and Orthodox.

For contemporary Orthodox Jews, many of whom see themselves as living a life guided by Halakhah (Jewish law, literally, the way) and shaped by its observances—a life which many of them call "Torah-true"—the great challenge has been to come to terms with the situation of modernity in which all of them find themselves. Some, the "modern Orthodox," have tried to find a middle course, a way to remain true to what they see as the demands of sacred tradition while avoiding social insularity. They seek to be both cosmopolitan and parochial, an approach once enunciated by Moses Mendelsohn: "Comply with the customs and civil constitutions of the countries in which you are transplanted, but at the same time, be constant to the faith of your forefathers."[2] Many would agree with Ephraim Sturm, executive director of the Young Israel movement, that "the Torah as a divine document must perforce be livable and applicable in all societies. The trick of course is to separate the eternal concepts of Torah from those things which were products of Europe and its self-contained Jewish community."[3] And many would undoubtedly also concur with Rabbi Dr. Norman Lamm, president of Yeshiva University, a major modern

47. *Ibid.*, 10 October 1920, p. 4.
48. *Ibid.*, 11 October 1920, p. 4.
49. *Ibid.*, 6 July 1921, p. 3.
50. *Ibid.*, 13 October 1922, p. 6.
51. *Ibid.*, 20 October 1922, p. 5.
52. A. Hafftka, "Zycie Parlamentarne Zydow," pp. 293–95.
53. For committee assignments, see *Haynt*, 15 December 1922, p. 2.
54. *Der Yid*, 19 March 1923, p. 3.
55. SSSU, okres I, session 97; 8 February 1924, cols. 8–9, 23.
56. *Haynt*, 7 February 1924, p. 3.
57. *Ibid.*, 10 February 1924, p. 4.
58. SSSU, okres I, session 123, 3 June 1924, col. 23 and appendix; *Haynt*, 4 June 1924, p. 3.
59. *Der Yid*, 16 December 1927.
60. Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars* (Seattle, 1974), pp. 57–59. See *Der Yid*, 26 September 1927, p. 6.
61. L. Halpern, *Polityka Zydowska*, pp. 32–33; *Der Yid*, 29 January 1928, p. 6; 27 March 1928.
62. See report on Jewish political parties, "Archiwum Akt Nowych" (Warsaw)—Interior Ministry, Organizational Department, Nationalities Division, file 1062. See also S. J. Paprocki (ed.), *Minority Affairs and Poland* (Warsaw, 1935), pp. 148–49.
63. A. Hafftka, "Zycie Parlamentarne Zydow," pp. 299–300.
64. L. Halpern, *Polityka Zydowska*, pp. 41–42.
65. *Dos Yidishe Togblat*, 16 December 1933, p. 1.
66. *Ibid.*, 7 November 1932, p. 4; 8 November 1932, p. 4; 6 November 1933, p. 3.
67. SSSU, session 3, 16 December 1930, col. 102.
68. *Dos Yidishe Togblat*, 12 February 1932, p. 2.
69. *Ibid.*, 8 November 1934, p. 4.
70. *Ibid.*, 4 March 1932, p. 4.
71. *Ibid.*, 6 November 1933, p. 3; 8 November 1934, p. 4; 8 February 1935, p. 10.
72. See, e.g., Joseph Kermisz, "Di yidishe reprezentants in varshever shtotrat," in A. Tartakower (ed.), *Sefer ha-shanah/Yorbukh* III (1970), pp. 279–93.
73. See Jacob Lestchinsky, "The Jews in the Cities of the Republic," *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science* I (1946), pp. 156–77.
74. L. Hass, *Wybory Warszawskie*, p. 87.
75. See, e.g., *Haynt*, 13 May 1923, p. 4.
76. See, e.g., *Haynt*, 1 December 1922, p. 9; *Moment*, 6 December 1921, p. 5.
77. *Moment*, 5 March 1926, p. 2; *Der Yid*, 29 January 1928, p. 4.
78. See, e.g., *Der Yid*, 21 January 1921, p. 3.
79. *Der Yid*, 15 May 1921, p. 3; *Dos Yidishe Togblat*, 21 February 1932, p. 8; 7 March 1933, p. 5.
80. J. Shatzky, "Yidishe politik," col. 237; Antony Polonsky, *Politics in Independent Poland* (Oxford, 1972), p. 397.
81. *Dos Yidishe Togblat*, 27 February 1936, p. 2; 6 March 1936, pp. 1–2, 10, 12; 19 March 1936, p. 6.

Orthodox institution, who wrote that they "must be receptive to new ideas, honest questions, and novel situations."[4]

Others, the "traditionalist Orthodox," emphatically reject in their rhetoric an obligation to be a part of secular culture. For them, the modern world and host society are at best a "background setting for Torah" but by no means something of which they wish to be actively a part.[5] These are Jews who see "the worlds of Halakhah and American life as mutually exclusive paths incapable of integration within the lifestyle of the individual."[6] "The 'traditionalists' are characterized by an attitude of disdain toward any attempt at compromising ritual with the demands of the contemporary outside world. Unlike the 'modern Orthodox' they feel perfectly at home with the most rigid of halakhic prescriptions."[7]

Yet while there may be differences between the modernist and traditionalist trends in Orthodoxy, "they agree in making the symbol of the Torah, representing the element of continuity, primary to Judaism and central to the definition of a Jew."[8] "When confronted with a contradiction between a halakhic statement and a sociological trend or scientific 'truth', Torah, as it has always been understood, must prevail."[9] That is, the official rhetoric of Orthodoxy, traditionalist and modern, articulates an ideological commitment to the way of tradition, ritual, and Halakhah.

Heretofore, a considerable literature has explored traditionalist Orthodox Jews (particularly the Ḥasidim), those who seek to remain culturally and socially (although not economically) apart from the contemporary world. However, only recently have some social scientists turned their attention to those whom we have called the modern Orthodox Jews, those who fashion an accommodation between the perceived ideal of Judaism as an all-encompassing life-form and the contemporary world.

On some matters modern Orthodox Jews conform to the beliefs and practices of their traditionalist counterparts. In others, the two groups diverge. Insofar as they do, we might surmise that some modern Orthodox Jews experience a sense of "falling short" or "not living up to" their self-imposed obligation to follow traditional Jewish laws and practices to the letter. On the other hand, many of them resemble, in several ways, those who may be called nominally Orthodox or even non-Orthodox. In each instance, modern Orthodox Jews distinguish themselves from what they perceive to be the extremes of the modernist "left" and the traditionalist "right." Precisely how they relate their accommodation to the extremes, the nature of their compromises, and the limits of flexibility are analyzed below.

One area crucial to the lives of modern Orthodox Jews and to distinctions among them is, of course, that of ritual practice. In this paper, we try to accomplish two related research aims in this area. First, we attempt to simply demonstrate the existence of a perceivable and structured gradient of ritual observance among the modern Orthodox. For those (primarily outsiders) who are unclear as to how highly ordered distinctions among modern Orthodox Jews manifest themselves in ritual practice (or who may be unclear about whether significant distinctions in religious practice even characterize the modern Orthodox), our documentation and description of ritual distinctions among those we shall term "nominal," "mainstream," and "traditionalist" Orthodox should prove instructive.

Second, we also demonstrate how social factors other than the symbolic or religious significance of certain ritual practices operate to influence the frequency with which they are performed by various subgroups within the modern Orthodox. Thus, many (including, perhaps, most insiders) might think that modern Orthodox Jews, whose rhetoric speaks of devoted adherence to ancient Jewish religious law and whose practice sets them apart not only from the larger society but from other American Jews as well, are primarily influenced in their choice of which religious norms to follow primarily by symbolic considerations. We demonstrate that other factors—such as the ability of the Orthodox community to punish transgression or award compliance with religious law or the social costs entailed in performing certain practices—have powerful influences upon the frequency with which many rituals are undertaken.

This paper, then, focuses on important differences in ritual practice among varieties of modern Orthodox Jews.[10] We will attempt to derive from the analysis of our data a sense of how people come to grips with tradition in the contemporary context, of how those we term "cosmopolitan parochials" cope with and commonly resolve the tensions of simultaneously living in different worlds.

THE DATA

In 1979 and 1980 we conducted surveys of several samples of American Jews, most of whom were Orthodox. We began by administering mail-back questionnaires to mailing lists supplied by an association of Orthodox professionals, an Orthodox periodical, a Young Israel synagogue in the Boston area, and a modern Orthodox synagogue in northern New Jersey. We also administered the questionnaire to students in a Queens College class in the sociology of American Jewry and

we surveyed the membership (again through the mails) of a "right-wing" Conservative synagogue in Queens, New York.

From these samples we collected approximately 570 interviews in roughly equal number from all sources, with the exception of the college class, which supplied only 18 completed questionnaires. We then initiated a preliminary analysis of the data, modifying our conceptualization of the study. As a result, we made some minor changes in the questionnaire, dropping a few items and adding some others.[11]

We then mailed the revised questionnaire to approximately 1,000 members of Lincoln Square Synagogue on Manhattan's fashionable Upper West Side. The synagogue is a vital congregation with large numbers of young couples and singles, many of whom, it is thought, derive from non-Orthodox backgrounds and prior affiliations. After mailing two waves of questionnaires, we obtained completed interviews from approximately 490 respondents. These comprise the largest single source of the 1,023 usable interviews.[12]

Very traditional Orthodox Jews are almost totally unrepresented in our study. We have few, if any, ḥasidic Jews or those affiliated with the traditionalist Agudat Israel movement. Thus, most of our sample is from the more modern wing of Orthodoxy in the northeastern United States. Our best educated guess is that the type of Orthodox Jews we are examining represents not more than 5% of American Jewry (about 8%–10% of American Jewry is Orthodox and we have largely excluded the 5% or so who are highly traditional and insulated).

We make no claim to accurately represent this universe, vague as its definition might be. Modern Orthodox Jews in the New York and Boston areas may well be more or less observant, insular, or politically conservative (or liberal). We simply do not know either how to define precisely the boundaries of American modern Orthodoxy or, as a result, whether our sample accurately represents that community. We therefore make only very modest demands of our data, demands which we believe are commensurate with the very modest quality of our sampling. That is, as we discuss below, we have defined within our sample a non-Orthodox control group, one which neither regards itself as Orthodox nor meets our criteria for Orthodox observance. We have divided the remaining 665 Orthodox respondents into three subgroups (nominals, centrists, and traditionalists) on the basis of their ritual observance. Our analysis focuses upon differences between these four groups. We readily admit that the distribution of these groups in the American Orthodox community may well differ from that found in our sample (we have placed about 60% of our Orthodox respondents in the middle group of "centrists" with roughly equal proportions of about 20% in the two wings of "nominals" and "traditionalists"). However,

we do contend that the patterns of variation and the broad conclusions we draw are generally applicable to the larger world of contemporary modern Orthodoxy in the United States.

THE CENTRALITY OF RITUAL PRACTICES: COUNTING MITZVAS

Our decision to contrast centrist or mainstream modern Orthodox with traditionalists and the nominally Orthodox immediately raised the question of how to find boundaries (somewhat real, somewhat imputed) among these groups. There are various ways of going about this task. We could define the groups for research purposes solely in terms of their theological beliefs, that is, the extent of commitment to particular fundamental tenets of faith (such as belief in God, confidence in revelation at Mount Sinai, or conviction about the coming of the Messiah). Alternatively, we could have measured social involvement in a segregated Orthodox community consisting of family, friends, neighbors, coworkers, and communal institutions.

We chose instead to define the three Orthodox groups—the "traditionalists," "centrists," and "nominals"—in terms of ritual practice, what insiders call "the observance of mitzvas." We felt that we had good substantive reasons for preferring ritual practice—mitzvas—over beliefs and social ties as a starting point. Most critically, Orthodox norms strongly emphasize practice, and the ethos of praxis has become an integral part of the taken-for-granted reality of Orthodox Jewish life.

The centrality of ritual practice is also apparent in the extraordinary attention Orthodox Jews pay not only to their own ritual practice, but also to that of their neighbors, friends, and kin.[13] Insiders easily locate themselves and others on the traditionalist-modern continuum by noting performance of key indicator rituals in conjunction with an implicit standard of ritual observance. Particular observances may not be the most important in the doctrinal sphere, but they do indicate to the insider a pattern of ritual behavior which is usually consistent with a particular religious profile.

We demonstrate that between the ritually very active traditionalists and the relatively less observant nominals lies a complex middle ground occupied by the mainstream of the modern Orthodox. Although they vary considerably among themselves in several aspects of Jewish identity and commitment, they also differ considerably in several crucial ways from their Orthodox counterparts to the modernist "left" or traditionalist "right."

THE CENTER AND THE EXTREMES: BOUNDARY-SETTING RITUALS

Our questionnaire asks respondents about a wide range of Jewish ritual practices. Some of these are in fact observed by many, if not most, American Jews; others are practiced by very few, primarily the traditionalist Orthodox. We could have chosen to classify our respondents in terms of all the available ritual practices. However, such a procedure would have precluded further examining variation in ritual practice among Orthodox Jews. One of our key research questions—the one we address in this paper—is to discover which rituals in fact typify each of the three Orthodox groups. By using only a few indicator rituals to define all three groups, we can still examine how the observance of other rituals—the ones we left out of our index—varies across Orthodoxy.

With this strategy in mind, we first separated the Orthodox (N = 665) from the non-Orthodox (N = 358). Respondents were asked whether they saw themselves as "Orthodox," "Conservative," "Reform," or something else. Only those who answered "Orthodox" qualified for inclusion in one of the three Orthodox groups.

Among the self-defined Orthodox, we constructed our index by counting the practice of seven indicative observances. We make no claims for the theological centrality of these observances; we simply find them to be useful and statistically reliable sociological indicators of Orthodoxy. As such, they must be viewed not as ends in and of themselves but rather as research tools. Two of them (1 and 2 below) deal with fasting on commemorative holidays, three (3, 4, and 5) pertain to dietary laws, and the last two (6 and 7) concern observance of the Sabbath.

(1) *Fasting on the Tenth of Tevet:* This is a minor fast day commemorating the first siege of Jerusalem by the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar. Consistent with sex-linked patterns in our data as well as cultural norms of Orthodoxy, we awarded one point in our index to men who fasted a whole day on this holiday and one point to women who fasted at least part of the day.

(2) *Fasting on Tisha B'av:* This a major fast day which commemorates the destruction of the two Holy Temples in 586 B.C.E. and 70 C.E. respectively. Men who fasted the entire fast and women who fasted at least part of the day received one point on our index of Orthodoxy.

(3) *Refraining from eating cold salads at the home of a friend where kashrut is not observed:* Distinctions between "recipe knowledge" and formal religious laws of behavior abound in connection with

Jewish dietary laws and customs. In practice, some Orthodox Jews make use of a degree of latitude provided in the formal legal system in connection with cold foods such as salads which are not rendered unkosher by contact with non-kosher utensils. Those who refrained from utilizing this latitude received a point on our index.

(4) *Refraining from eating warm "kosher" food cooked at the home of a friend where kashrut is not observed:* Eating food which is kosher prior to cooking but which has been cooked in a non-kosher kitchen entails for most Orthodox a breach of traditional religious law and contemporary custom. Those who refrained from doing so received a point on our index.

(5) *Maintaining two sets of dishes for meat and dairy:* Those who observed this prescription have what most Orthodox regard as the minimal requisites of a kosher home, and received a point on our index.

(6) *Refraining from turning lights on during the Sabbath:* Commensurate with prevailing Orthodox interpretation of Biblical and rabbinic prohibitions against using fire on the Sabbath, those who practiced this observance received one point on our index.

(7) *Refraining from "going to work on your job" on the Sabbath:* This observance, based on the premise that the Sabbath is a holy day of rest, also earned the respondent one point on the index of Orthodoxy.

Both empirical and substantive reasons led us to choose these particular indicators of Orthodoxy. Empirically, we found wide variations in the frequencies of performance. Two of the practices—fasting on the Tenth of Tevet and refraining from eating even a cold salad in a non-kosher home—were observed infrequently in our sample. (The proportions are only 43% and 35% among all our Orthodox respondents.) The Tisha B'Av fast, refraining from turning lights on and off on the Sabbath, and refraining from eating warm foods in a non-kosher home were observed with about the same high level of frequency among the Orthodox (85%, 82%, and 74% respectively). Virtually all those who called themselves "Orthodox" kept the last two practices (not going to work on the Sabbath = 93%, and two sets of dishes = 96%). Thus we can speak of "hard" and "easy" criteria of Orthodoxy. To qualify as "traditionalist Orthodox" on our scale, respondents had to pass hard as well as easy tests; they had to observe all seven rituals. Those we called "centrist Orthodox" performed most (four) of the rituals; that is, they passed moderate to easy tests. Finally, those whom we defined as "nominally Orthodox" performed a minority (three or fewer) of these rituals, clustered around the "easy" set of observances, but nevertheless identified themselves denominationally as "Orthodox."

Our substantive reasons for choosing these particular rituals derive

Table 1. Seven Ritual Practices Used to Construct the Orthodoxy Index

	Degree of Orthodoxy			
	% Non-Orth.	% Nominal	% Centrist	% Traditional
Fasting on the 10th of Tevet				
Men (whole day/part day)	0/2	3/18	53/26	100/0
Women (whole day/part day)	0/1	0/0	15/27	66/34
Fasting on Tisha B'Av				
Men (whole day/part day)	7/19	31/34	95/3	100/0
Women (whole day/part day)	8/17	29/34	78/18	100/0
No cold salads at non-kosher friends' homes	6	5	20	100
No warm "kosher" foods at non-kosher friends' homes	8	16	79	100
Two sets of dishes	54	80	99	100
Never goes to work on Sabbath	47	70	97	100
Never turns on lights on the Sabbath	2	18	92	100
Approx. N =	358	110	410	145

in part from our understanding of community norms and practices—recipe knowledge. According to it, Orthodox Jews see keeping kosher and Sabbath observance as cornerstones of religious commitment. Their transgression virtually guarantees exclusion from Orthodoxy. Insiders also recognize different degrees of keeping kosher and Sabbath observances; gradations which they use, at least tacitly, to label and identify themselves and one another.

The other components in the scale revolve around two fast days—Tisha B'Av and the Tenth of Tevet. "The general effect of fasting, apart from its obvious physiological consequences, is to produce a kind of corporate solidarity among those who manage to hold out."[14] Thus, fasting serves as a kind of boundary mechanism, a means by which those who fast separate themselves from others.

Table 1 permits a clearer understanding of how we defined the three groups of Orthodox Jews, and by implication, how we constructed the ritual observance boundaries separating them.

As noted above, traditionalist Orthodox Jews, by definition and in line with the strict demands of Jewish tradition, performed all rituals. The centrist modern Orthodox differed from them primarily in their failure to perform the two most stringent, least popular practices (the Tevet fast and eating no cold salads in non-kosher homes). Only about half the centrist modern Orthodox met the sex-specific criteria for

fasting on the minor fast day, and as few as 20% claimed that they do not eat cold salads in non-kosher homes. (Clearly, they must fail to meet at least one of these "hard" tests, otherwise they would probably qualify as traditionalist Orthodox.) These practices, then, are the two rituals in our index which served most frequently to separate traditionalists from the centrists.

While divided on the two "hard" rituals, nearly all the centrists qualified on all the other rituals. Thus, almost every one (95%) of the centrist men reported fasting the entire day of Tisha B'Av and a similar number (96%) of the centrist women fasted at least a part of the day. Almost all (92%) of the centrists "never" turned lights on and off on the Sabbath. Similarly nearly all (97%) never went to their job on that day and 99% kept two sets of dishes. A substantial majority (79%) did not eat warm kosher foods in non-kosher homes. (Apparently, more centrists maintain ties with the non-kosher world than do traditionalists.)

The two most widely observed practices in the table—not going to work on the Sabbath and keeping two sets of dishes—distinguished the nominally Orthodox from both the non-Orthodox and from the rest of the Orthodox. These two practices were almost universally observed among the traditionalists and centrists, but among the nominals—those who at the very least call themselves Orthodox—a noticeable minority worked on the Sabbath or had no separate dishes. Nevertheless, more of them observed these practices (70% and 80%) than the non-Orthodox (47% and 54%).

In short, typical centrist Orthodox respondents never worked on the Sabbath, had two sets of dishes (for meat and dairy), fasted on Tisha B'Av (and possibly although not necessarily on the Tenth of Tevet), did not turn lights on and off on the Sabbath, and were unlikely to eat warm foods in non-kosher homes, but would eat cold salads there. Hardly any nominally Orthodox Jews fasted on the Tenth of Tevet, or refrained from either eating in non-kosher places or from turning lights on and off on the Sabbath. Most nominals fasted at least part of Tisha B'Av, while large majorities did not work on their jobs on Sabbath and had two sets of dishes.

Lastly, we may discover how the non-Orthodox differed from the Orthodox in terms of the rituals reported in Table 1. Few non-Orthodox observed fast days other than Yom Kippur; most ate in non-kosher homes; and most turned lights on and off on the Sabbath. However, roughly half of these (most of whom in our sample belong to an Orthodox or Conservative synagogue) observed the more popular practices of refraining from Sabbath work on the job and maintaining meat and dairy dishes.

We make no claim for the inviolability of these distinctions. In fact,

we suggest quite the opposite by drawing upon sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld's concept of "the interchangeability of indices." Our selection of questions may strike some persons as arbitrary—another group of tests could do as well. Moreover, the location of our intergroup boundaries is also arbitrary. One may certainly raise or lower the criteria of observance which demarcate the traditionalists from the centrist modern Orthodox, or the centrists from the nominals. That judgment largely depends upon the size of the sample and the distribution of respondents over the traditionalist-nominal Orthodox continuum. Moreover, those who may be relatively traditionalist in one community or sample may be fairly centrist in another context and vice-versa.

We fully appreciate the element of arbitrariness, therefore, in distinguishing among Orthodox subgroups. However, we still contend that studying differences among these groups is both possible and fruitful. Even though our ritual-based distinctions may seem arbitrary to some, we shall show that they are nevertheless associated with all sorts of patterned variations and therefore are useful indices. In fact, if we do admit to a degree of arbitrariness in our definitions of these various Orthodox types, whatever differences we do find among them are that much more impressive in light of the crude techniques available for distinguishing varying levels of religious Orthodoxy.

VALIDATION BY THE RESPONDENTS

One immediate way of confirming that we have adequately distinguished groups with differing levels of Orthodoxy is to turn to the respondents themselves and see whether they agree with our evaluations. Accordingly, we asked them to reckon their own degree of Orthodoxy with the question: "Would you characterize yourself as 'Strictly Orthodox,' 'Fairly Orthodox,' 'Slightly Orthodox,' or 'Not Orthodox'?" As Table 2 demonstrates, the respondents' evaluations did indeed accord with our own.

Nearly all (90%) of those we called "traditionalist Orthodox" deemed themselves "Strictly Orthodox." At the other end of the spectrum, hardly any (10%) of the nominally Orthodox referred to themselves as "Strictly Orthodox." Most (64%) called themselves "Fairly Orthodox." Interestingly, those we defined as centrist divided in the way they viewed themselves, a hint of the ambivalent character of the group in the middle which is *both* modern *and* Orthodox; half characterized themselves as "Strictly Orthodox" (50%) a proportion halfway between that of the other two Orthodox groups.

The close correspondence between the respondents' own evalua-

Table 2. "Strictness" of Orthodoxy (Self-Evaluated): "Would you characterize yourself as . . . Orthodox?"

	Degree of Orthodoxy			
	% Non-Orth.	% Nominal	% Centrist	% Traditional
Strictly	2	10	50	90
Fairly	5	64	46	10
Slightly	20	23	4	0
Not	73	3	0	0
	100	100	100	100
N =	176	107	404	142

tions and our ritual-based classification suggests something about the respondents and about our classification. About the respondents, it indicates that members of the Orthodox community know that certain ritual practices are expected of the Orthodox Jew. To be sure, the reference points for determining whether one is "Strictly," "Fairly," "Slightly," or "Not Orthodox" varies from one person or community to another; but within the boundaries of their community, individuals know more or less where they belong.

With regard to our classification, the correspondence with self-evaluations shows that we have captured in our index a reasonable representation of social reality. In other words, the respondents agree not only that there are varying degrees of Orthodoxy; they also concur in general terms with the ways—faulty as they may be—in which we have divided them.

THE HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE OF RITUAL PRACTICE

Previous studies of American Jewish religious behavior have documented what cultural natives and insiders well understand: there is a hierarchical structure to ritual observance. Very simply, not every ritual commandment is practiced with equal attention and regularity.[15] Not only does the frequency of observance of certain rituals vary considerably, but particular observances are commonly linked to one another in predictable ways. Jews who observe the "hard" rituals (for example, refusing to ride, spend money, or use electricity on the Sabbath) will almost certainly perform the "easy" and most popular ones (for example, fasting on Yom Kippur or lighting Ḥanukkah candles). Conversely, Jews who fail to perform the "easy" practices are highly unlikely to carry out the "hard" ones. These linkages constitute a hierarchy of ritual practice among American Jews.

Traditionalist Orthodox Jews

Accordingly, we would expect to find a similar structuring of ritual practices among Orthodox Jews. In the hierarchy of practice we would expect that almost all traditionalists would observe all the ritual items found in our survey. Sometimes the logic is quite direct and obvious. Since traditionalists by our definition fast on one of the minor fast days, they should also fast on all the others; since they refrain from eating even a cold salad in a non-kosher home, there is no reason to believe that they would do so at a restaurant. But, we would also expect the traditionalists' observance to extend beyond the domain of just those rituals which are conceptually proximate to those embodied in our operational definition of a traditional Orthodox Jew. We would expect their observance to extend to areas further afield such as dress, ritualized text study, synagogue attendance, Sabbath observance, and the laws of "family purity" which among other things require monthly immersion in a *mikveh* (ritual bath) by married women, following the menstrual period. In fact, Table 3 demonstrates nearly universal compliance by traditionalists with all these areas of observance.

Among traditionalists, 95% or more of the men fasted not only on the Tenth of Tevet (the observance contained in our definition of a traditionalist) but also on the three other minor fast days. Similarly among the women, nearly all observed the fasts at least part of the day.

The traditionalists' compliance with the strictest interpretation of the dietary regulations was almost universal as was their observance of the Sabbath. In fact, almost all the men (95%) reported usual attendance at all three Sabbath services (Friday evening, Saturday morning, and Saturday afternoon).

Significantly, as we suggested and as any insider would anticipate, the punctilious observance by traditionalists extends to areas far removed from those explicitly contained in our operational definition of Orthodox traditionalism. Virtually all (99%) of the traditionalists reported that the women of the house used the *mikveh* (ritual bath); almost all of the men (94%) studied sacred texts weekly, usually on the Sabbath (90%)—in line with their respective halakhic obligations.

Perhaps the most telling pieces of evidence of the traditionalists' commitment to Orthodoxy came from those practices which visibly distinguish the Orthodox Jews from their contemporaries. All (100%) of the traditionalist respondents reported that the man of the house kept his head covered (with a hat or yarmulke) "on the street" and that he wore *tzitzit,* fringes mandated in the Bible (Num. 15). (Only among the traditionalists did we find a sizeable proportion—15%—who wore their *tzitzit* outside their shirt where it is easily visible.) Traditionalist

Table 3. Ritual Practices

	Degree of Orthodoxy			
	% Non-Orth.	% Nominal	% Centrist	% Traditional
Fasting (% whole/% part day)				
17th of Tammuz				
Men	0/4	5/18	60/26	99/1
Women	0/2	3/13	21/31	80/20
Tzom Gedalia				
Men	0/3	5/15	53/21	95/3
Women	1/1	0/0	15/27	66/27
Fast of Esther				
Men	2/5	8/22	63/21	97/3
Women	2/6	5/17	31/33	77/23
Yom Kippur (% whole day only)				
Men	78	97	100	100
Women	84	91	98	100
Kashrut				
Buy only from kosher butchers	56	81	100	100
No warm foods in non-kosher restaurants	13	24	81	99
No salads in non-kosher restaurants	6	8	23	91
Sabbath				
Never do housework	30	70	93	96
Never watch television	8	34	92	99
Attend Sabbath morning services (% usually/% sometimes)				
Men	25/47	59/38	93/5	100/0
Women	18/53	51/37	70/24	75/23
Attend all 3 Sabbath services (% usually/% sometimes)				
Men	4/20	23/43	61/32	95/4
Women	4/7	18/25	10/34	9/37
Other practices				
Woman regularly goes to mikveh	3	26	79	99
Studies texts weekly (% usually/% sometimes)				
Men	14/34	30/35	62/33	90/10
Women	6/32	23/49	35/45	30/68
Usually studies texts on Sabbath				
Men	28	56	81	94
Women	17	60	56	67
Man keeps his head covered "on the street"	3	22	71	100
Man wears tzitzit (% inside/% outside shirt)	2/0	19/0	73/2	85/15
Married woman covers head in public	0	5	34	91
Synagogue Attendance				
Men (daily)	1	9	26	66
(more than once a week)	6	21	39	28
(once a week)	15	28	26	4
Women (once a week or more)	15	28	57	48

married women also were distinguished in their practice of the religious custom of covering their hair in public (either with a kerchief [*tikhl*], wig [*shaytl*], or hat).

In short, there are no rituals in our survey where the traditionalist Orthodox departed from traditional norms.

The Centrist Modern Orthodox

The centrist modern Orthodox, on the other hand, while substantially complying with many if not most ritual norms, nevertheless displayed markedly lower rates of observance in certain areas. One difference for example between the centrists and traditionalists concerns the observance of the minor fast days. The centrists fasted about 30 to 40 percentage points less often than the traditionalists.

Similarly, the centrists deviated from the traditionalists in their pattern of compliance with the dietary laws. Only about 4 in 5 (81%) would not eat warm nominally kosher foods in non-kosher restaurants. The discrepancy with respect to cold salads was even greater. Less than a quarter of this group refrained from eating cold salads in non-kosher places of dining, compared with 100% of the traditionalists. We may assume the centrists were aware of the nuances of religious law and the legalistic distinctions drawn between hot and cold foods. Although they were more compromising in both regards than were the traditionalists, they were significantly more accommodating to modern norms of eating anywhere and with anyone when they believe the law provides some latitude, some discretion for individual decision-making.

A similar case can be discerned in the case of Sabbath prayer service attendance. The centrist men attended the synagogue on Sabbath mornings almost as often as the traditionalists (93% versus 100%). However, fewer attended all three services (61% versus 95%). Here, as with fasting and observance of the restrictive dietary laws, the more demanding the practice, the greater the discrepancy between the traditionalists and centrists. Moreover, they treated Sabbath morning as a holy day—therefore going to prayers—and the afternoon as a holiday—therefore staying at home, reading the paper, visiting friends, etc.

Interestingly, centrist women attended Sabbath services at least as often as their traditionalist counterparts. Apparently the mutually offsetting effects of two factors combined to maintain a relatively high rate of attendance among the former. On the one hand, these women exhibited lower rates of ritual observance than the traditionalist women. They were, for example, much less likely to fast a whole day on the Seventeenth of Tammuz (21% versus 80%) and fewer used the

mikveh (79% versus 99%). We might therefore expect lower service attendance rates among centrist women. However, not only were they less ritually oriented than the traditionalists, they were also more distant from the traditionalist cultural heritage which regards communal religious practice such as synagogue attendance as a predominantly male preserve. Thus, the centrists' greater laxity in overall ritual observance (which would diminish attendance rates) was counterbalanced by modernity's relatively greater sexual egalitarianism which promotes female participation in such aspects of public Jewish life as synagogue attendance.

The centrists differed from the traditionalists in numerous other ways. Significantly fewer men (by 25 to 30 percentage points) studied sacred texts on the Sabbath, kept their heads covered on the street, and wore *tzitzit* (fringes). As noted, fewer centrist women used the *mikveh*. Consistent with earlier findings in connection with "harder" observances, only about a third of the centrist wives kept their hair covered in public as compared with 91% of their traditionalist counterparts.

Just as centrists were substantially less observant than the traditionalists, so nominally Orthodox Jews were less ritually active than the centrists. Looking to the left, then, centrists see themselves as stricter in their Orthodoxy. Looking to the right, they assume, in the words of one: "We probably don't come up to specs."[16]

The Nominally Orthodox

Aside from fasting on Yom Kippur, the rates of ritual observance among the nominally Orthodox in no case approach those among the centrists. For example, about 50 percentage points separated the two groups' rates of fasting on minor fast days; hardly any nominally Orthodox fasted a whole day on those occasions. Men among these two types of Orthodox differed greatly with regard to keeping their heads covered in public or wearing *tzitzit*. Only about a fifth of the nominals observed these practices, whereas two-thirds to three-fourths of the centrists did. Hardly any nominally Orthodox refrained from eating cold salads in non-kosher restaurants and only a quarter (24%) refrained from eating warm kosher foods in such places. Although a large majority (70%) of the nominally Orthodox did not do housework on the Sabbath and most of the men and women (59% and 51%) usually attended Sabbath morning services, these figures are still substantially lower than those found among the centrists.

Even greater variations between the two groups can be found with regard to Sabbath observances. Whereas almost all the centrists (92%)

reported never watching television on the Sabbath, only a third (34%) of the nominals made such a claim. Apparently, those who identify with Orthodoxy but reside on its marginal left wing keep the Sabbath as a special day, but not entirely in traditional terms. While they faithfully attend synagogue services on Sabbath morning, they do not refrain from watching television. That is, the Sabbath for these Jews has become largely a family day set aside for rest, relaxation, synagogue attendance, and leisure, as expressed, in addition to other forms of activity, by television viewing.

While the nominally Orthodox performed ritual practices less often than other Orthodox groups, the religious behavior of the women in this group is especially noteworthy. Among the centrists and traditionalists, women fasted, studied texts, and attended synagogue services much less often than did men, keeping with sex-linked differences in the traditional normative expectations. As noted earlier, the discrepancy between the sexes was smaller among the centrists than among the traditionalists; but among the nominals, these sex-linked differences in ritual practice disappeared almost entirely. Nominally Orthodox women fasted on minor fast days, studied sacred texts, and attended Sabbath services at about the same levels as their male counterparts. Nominally Orthodox women were much less likely to use the *mikveh* (26%) than the centrists (79%) or traditionalists (99%). Thus, relative to their more observant peers, the nominally Orthodox women have substantially departed from traditional norms regarding the use of the *mikveh,* where there are special obligations for the Jewish woman, but have maintained a similar level of observance in areas which among the traditionals produces higher male observance (i.e., fasting, studying, and synagogue prayer). Clearly, while the nominals were less observant, so too were they here also more sexually egalitarian (a reflection of their attachment to liberal American [rather than Jewish] values) as evidenced in the similar levels of Jewish practice among nominally Orthodox men and women.

The Non-Orthodox

The non-Orthodox in our sample, although more observant than most American Jews, had a substantially lower rate of ritual performance than Orthodox Jews. Hardly any of the non-Orthodox fasted on the minor fast days. None of the married women covered their hair in public and almost none of the men kept their head covered on the street or wore *tzitzit.* Nearly all ate salads or heated kosher foods in non-kosher restaurants. In fact, they were probably as likely to eat *non*-kosher foods there as well. Few regularly studied sacred texts and few

refrained from watching television on the Sabbath. Indeed, on that day, only 30% refrained from housework. Relatively few attended Sabbath morning services with regularity—25% for the men and 18% for the women.

Substantial compliance with traditional law and custom among these non-Orthodox was evident only with regard to those practices kept by a large proportion of American Jews in general: Yom Kippur fasting and the purchase of kosher meat. This finding highlights the existence of a distinctive set of ritual practices which sets apart all varieties of Orthodox from the remainder of American Jews.

SOCIOLOGY VERSUS HALAKHAH: EXPLAINING VARIATION IN RITUAL OBSERVANCE

While the foregoing discussion has focused on different patterns of practice among Orthodox Jews of varying degrees of ritual observance, we have yet to concentrate on the rituals themselves and why some are more readily observed than others. The centrist modern Orthodox offers an ideal locus in which to study this question. They seemingly exercise some discretion in choosing which ritual commandments to follow and which to ignore, trying to find a middle course.

Most centrists are thoroughly socialized into Orthodox society and tradition and thus know what is expected of them. Many, in fact, have friends or family from the more traditionalist wing to their ideological right, and on occasion conform in their behavior to their most stringent demands. Why, then, do many—if not most—centrist modern Orthodox Jews choose to keep some religious prescriptions and violate others, of whose significance they must be aware?

The obverse of this question is of equal interest. Many centrists are also intimately connected through ties of family and friendship with the more marginal, nominally Orthodox Jews who hold out a much laxer model of religious observance. Why then do the centrists shun that model, and instead remain more punctilious in their observances of certain rituals? In short, we ask, why and how does the center exist?

A similar concern has been raised by sociologists and historians in examining the experience of post-emancipation Jews. Many such Jews sought to balance the demands of citizenship in the host culture with commitments toward the parochial obligations of Judaism. Many modern Jews sought to overcome their historically stigmatized pariah status and to enter civil society with their Jewish identities intact; nonetheless they often modified their religious behavior with an eye to social acceptance. Practices which severely inhibited integration—or

at least appeared to do so—were among those which modernizing Jews most readily abandoned. The dietary restrictions, for example, created a barrier to socializing between Jews and other citizens; the prohibitions of work on the Sabbath had direct economic consequences for Jewish workers and Jewish employers. On the other hand, many Jews maintained practices which they believed could be reinterpreted to comport with, or which could be understood and accepted by, the host culture. Those they felt they could not reinterpret or explain, they sometimes changed or at the very least kept from public view.

In some ways, the centrist modern Orthodox have adopted a similar approach. Their ritual practices are influenced somewhat by social acceptance criteria similar to those once used by the emancipated Jews. Not wishing to be too remote from the host American culture, they—more than non-Orthodox Jews who also try to be both traditionally Jewish and modern American—reinterpret, compartmentalize, and sometimes modify their Jewish existence in the light of contemporary patterns of culture, even as they place great emphasis on their ties to Orthodox beliefs and practices.

We believe three sorts of influences explain variation in ritual observance among the Orthodox in general and among the centrists in particular: (1) religious meaning, that is, the import of the rituals within the traditional culture and heritage; (2) concern with a sense of belonging to the Orthodox community; and (3) concern about a sense of belonging to the larger non-Jewish society. In short, modern centrist Orthodox Jews (like non-Orthodox Jews) observe specific practices more or less frequently because of variations in the practices' religious, communal, and social implications. To them the public institutions of the Orthodox remain anchored to tradition while the private and individual domain is attached to American modern social norms.

As noted earlier, relative to the traditionalists, centrists were lax with certain ritual norms, especially practices that tend to symbolize and induce social segregation, and that are invested with what may be perceived as a discretionary element in terms of religious law and custom. Some interpretations of the law, for example, do not specifically forbid eating cold salads in non-kosher restaurants. Nevertheless, traditionalists find eating even technically kosher foods in a non-kosher milieu troubling. Their very presence in such a place might erroneously convey Orthodox approval of eating any foods in such places, or to sanction being in a non-Orthodox setting. Thus, while eating cold salads in a non-kosher restaurant may not technically transgress the letter of the law, for the traditionalist it transgresses its spirit. But for centrists—whose spirit is a mix of modern America and the parochial traditions of Orthodoxy—the solution of eating kosher

food without making halakhic contact with the non-kosher but making spiritual contact with it is ideal.

Similar considerations apply to the wearing of head coverings by married women. The centrists interpret the religiously based requirements for this practice as being ambiguous at best and more likely discretionary. The wearing of such coverings is seen as serving to sharply differentiate and ultimately segregate the Orthodox Jews from all others. (Interestingly, those centrist women who do wear headcovers—34%—often wear wigs with stylish coiffures which are unrecognizable as wigs to the untrained eye. This is a far cry from the obvious *peruke* worn by many Orthodox women with more insular proclivities.)

The data on synagogue attendance and on observing minor fast days reflect the limitations which centrists place on their embrace of parochial Jewish life. For example, many resort to fallback options rather than totally abandon certain practices. Many more centrists than traditionalists "usually" attended all three Sabbath services, but more still did so "sometimes." None said they "never" go, as did some nominals and non-Orthodox. A similar pattern appears with regard to behavior on minor fast days. While almost all traditionalist men fasted a whole day on the minor fast days, only a majority of centrists did so, and about a quarter fasted part days.

Communal controls are at work here. The norms of Orthodox culture as interpreted by the centrists demand male attendance at the main Sabbath service on Saturday morning; but they are effectively relaxed with respect to Friday evening or Saturday afternoon attendance. The presence of a significant quorum seems to satisfy the centrist community.[17] This is perfect ambivalence; the community wants a quorum so all services will take place; the individuals however, are less willing to commit themselves to coming to each of the services.

Similarly, fasting on minor fast days is often a non-public act. Those who do not fast or fast only part days are not publicly challenging the tenets of Orthodox Jewish practice as they would by undertaking other religious transgressions. This too reflects the ambivalence of the centrist. The fast remains legitimate in line with Orthodox norm; the individuals themselves do not always fast on them.

In fact, of all the minor fasts, the Fast of Esther is most closely tied to public performance, in that it is followed by the popular and well-attended synagogue celebration of Purim and the reading of the Scroll of Esther. At this gathering, those who have fasted a full day either can be distinguished or testify to their having fasted. Thus, of all the minor fasts, the Fast of Esther is, not surprisingly, the one centrist men observed most often for the public place remains framed and determined by institutional and traditional Orthodoxy.

The interplay of concern with traditional religion and acceptance by the Orthodox community and concern with acceptance by the larger society is well illustrated in a group of observances where the centrists' behavior differed less substantially from that of the traditionalists. Roughly three-quarters of the centrist men kept their heads covered in public; the same proportion wore the *tzitzit* (albeit under their shirts and out of public view); and about the same percentage of centrist wives followed religious law with regard to the *mikveh.* Practice of these activities among the traditionalists was nearly universal—99% to 100%.[18] What is significant about these patterns of centrist observance is that they exceed those of the other ritual practices discussed, and yet they are still less than those of the traditionalists. In each case, we must ask why the level of practice of this ritual is as high as it is, but still lower than the traditionalist rate.

Consider the covering of the head first. In principle, hats can be worn without especially distinguishing the wearer, but in practice they do set off the Orthodox Jew from the vast majority of men who do not wear them.[19] Yarmulkes on the other hand unmistakably distinguish the Orthodox male from the non-Orthodox.[20] As such, they are a recognized demarcating symbol. Since wearing a yarmulke is akin to making a public statement about one's attachment to the Orthodox community, failing to wear one may be symbolically understood as making an opposite assertion. The principal inhibition against publicly wearing a yarmulke, then, is that it creates an overt barrier between Orthodox and others, both non-Orthodox and gentile. The male who wears one thus expresses solidarity with his fellow Orthodox, while setting himself apart as something of an outsider. Hence there is both a high social cost and a high communal reward in wearing a yarmulke.

Unpredictably, the modernists among the Orthodox increasingly prefer the yarmulke to the hat. The former—particularly the small knitted type which modernists prefer to the larger, old-fashioned black velvet or cotton yarmulke—is seemingly not as stigmatizing as a hat in hatless America. As Jews have come to feel more at ease in expressing their distinctiveness in a contemporary America which exhibits a growing tolerance for symbolic expressions of ethnicity, they have increasingly begun to wear yarmulkes in public. That is, social cost has decreased, and consequently the rate of yarmulke wearing has increased. As we show elsewhere in our larger study, more younger centrist Orthodox kept their heads covered in public than their older counterparts. But the meaning attached to wearing that headcover may alter over the generations. In fact, the older man who does not cover his head in public may be, in many ways, more traditionalist in outlook and behavior than the son who wears a small knitted yarmulke. Today,

however, that little headcover has become the cultural *sine qua non* among younger Orthodox Jews, for all but the nominals. Yet its smallness and near-invisibility is again the reflection of centrist ambivalence.

The wearing of *tzitzit* and attendance at the *mikveh* are both essentially non-public, and as a result have few consequences for social integration. At the same time, they are invested with high religious significance deriving from the role ascribed to them by the Scriptures.[21] Wearing *tzitzit* is a symbolic medallion of Jewish Orthodoxy entailing minimal social cost. Going to the *mikveh* also has high religious and symbolic significance for Orthodox Jews with few adverse consequences for acceptance by the larger society. The Talmud and Halakhah have a great deal to say about the sexual conduct of married couples. According to Jewish law, the woman goes to the *mikveh* at night, unobtrusively. No one but she and her husband need know that she observes this ritual, and commonly they do not. To be sure, the user of the *mikveh* may interpret the meaning of her practice in any way she chooses; in traditional religious terms as a divine commandment, in symbolic terms as a dramatic enactment of her own bodily rebirth, in psychological terms as a way of renewing her husband's and her own sexual appetites, and so on. But the act itself is viewed as religiously essential while entailing little social cost. It is therefore performed by most centrists.

We have also seen that majorities of all three types of Orthodox men study religious texts, at least on the Sabbath (the rates were 94%, 81%, and 56% for the three groups of men). At the same time, however, such involvement clearly drops as one moves from the traditionalists to the nominals. Religious text study among Orthodox men is a highly social act, reflective of and generative of social ties to other Orthodox men. Increasing marginality from traditional Jewish social involvement or, put differently, social involvement with the larger or less traditionally Jewish world apparently diminishes involvement in ritual study. Among the traditionalists, as we show elsewhere in the larger study, communal ties to other Orthodox Jews abound and hence the vast majority of them engage in regular study.

In short, committed to a life somewhat apart, the centrists—like other modernists—seek whenever possible to mitigate their segregation. Where discretion seems possible, where the Jewish law appears to allow for latitude in the direction of participation in the host culture and contemporary life patterns, or where the Orthodox community can exercise few social sanctions for noncompliance with traditionalist norms, the centrist Orthodox sometimes adjust their behavior to that of the less observant world outside the strictly Orthodox one.

Table 4. Childbearing Variables

	Degree of Orthodoxy			
	Non-Orth.	Nominal	Centrist	Traditional
Number of children				
Married, 35+ years old	2.0	2.1	2.9	4.2
Married, 18–35 years old	1.1	0.7	1.5	2.1
Wrong to limit number of children (%)	9	14	27	60

CHILDBEARING VARIATIONS AMONG THE ORTHODOX

The biblical injunction to "be fruitful and multiply" is a norm taken to be of central significance in the Orthodox community. Not only is there a distinctive religious/symbolic significance attached to bearing and rearing children, there are other aspects of cultural significance as well. Jews have had a past of high fertility. Their adaptation to the modern world meant diminished birthrates and the adoption of lower fertility ideals of middle-class society. However, for Jews—as for some other religious groups—involvement in the contemporary traditionalist religious community has meant an affirmation of the pro-natalist, high fertility heritage.[22]

Accordingly, we would expect Orthodox traditionalism to be associated with higher than average childbearing rates. Table 4 presents data relating to number of children born (separating those over and those under 35 years old). Within age categories, the traditionalists had more children than the centrists, who in turn exceeded the nominally Orthodox.

Among those 35 or over (i.e., those with completed families), reading from right (traditionalists) to left (non-Orthodox), we find the mean number of children declining as follows: 4.2, 2.9, 2.1, 2.0. The younger adults (under 35) exhibit a similar pattern: 2.1, 1.5, 0.7, 1.1. Evidently the traditionalists not only have more children throughout their lives, but they have them earlier. Since we know that Jews are highly efficient at avoiding unwanted pregnancies (they are adept at contraception), we can infer that the different Orthodox groups are having different numbers of children precisely because they so choose.

More evidence to this effect can be gleaned from the results pertaining to the question of the advisability of voluntarily limiting the number of one's children. There are small increases in the proportions opposing this view (i.e., the use of contraception) as we move from non-Orthodox (9%) to the nominal Orthodox (14%), and to the centrists (27%). When we reach the traditionalists, the figure jumps dramatically

upward to 60% who believed that limiting childbirths is wrong. Clearly, traditionalists had the most pro-natalist attitudes among the Orthodox.

However, the traditionalists' actual birthrate, although the highest of all our groups, suggests that they do practice some form of birth control. Even those traditionalists over 35 with pro-natalist views had "only" a mean of 4.5 children (data not shown in the table). Obviously even Orthodox traditionalists have adapted to contemporary fertility norms by practicing some form of contraception, despite their stated support of high fertility ideals. They too share in the ambivalences that emerge in the contact between Orthodoxy and the modern world.

A general conclusion we can draw from these results is that even the traditionalists have adjusted their behavior—at least in the case of childbearing—to the modern world more readily than they have changed their attitudes—at least toward contraception. Lip service to ideals seems, at the very least in this case, to outlive their practice.

CONCLUSION

The essential lesson to be derived from this discussion of ritual variation within modern Orthodoxy is that religious/symbolic issues, communal ties, and social factors all play important roles in determining ritual performance. Thus modern centrist Orthodox Jews are not, as some have claimed, a world apart, but are rather similar to other American Jews in their desire to be both Jewish and American, both parochial and cosmopolitan, particular and universal. Ritual practices which inhibit integration and are perceived to be of low religious/symbolic importance are less likely to be undertaken and even the observance of important *mitzvas* shows some effects of cultural dualism.

Notes

This is a collaborative work and the order of the authors' names is not intended to indicate seniority.

We thank Professors Calvin Goldscheider and Charles Liebman for their critical comments.

1. Milton Himmelfarb, "Secular Society? A Jewish Perspective," *Daedalus* no. 12 (1968), p. 283; Leo Jung, "What Is Orthodox Judaism?" *The Jewish Library* second series, Leo Jung (ed.), (New York: 1930), pp. 113–132; Alan

Fisher, "The Outsider and Orthodox Judaism," *Tradition* vol. XIII, no. 3, Winter 1973, pp. 66–98; cf. Charles Liebman, "A Sociological Analysis of Contemporary Orthodoxy," *Judaism* (Summer 1964), pp. 285–304.

2. J. L. Blau, *Modern Varieties of Judaism* (New York: 1966), p. 27.

3. Ephraim Sturm, "Social and Religious Philosophies of the Early 1900s Which Influenced the Formation of the Young Israel Movement" (no date) unpublished, p. 9.

4. Norman Lamm, "The Voice of Torah in the Battle of Ideas," *Jewish Life* (March–April 1967), p. 30.

5. David Singer, "Voices of Orthodoxy," *Commentary* (July 1974), p. 58.

6. Saul J. Berman, "The Jewish Day School: A Symposium," *Tradition* vol. XIII, no. 1 (Summer 1972), p. 97.

7. Liebman, "A Sociological Analysis," p. 295.

8. Blau, *Modern Varieties,* p. 308.

9. Rabbi Nisson Wolpin, "Letters," *Commentary* (November 1974), p. 24.

10. As an aside, it is drawn from a larger study, now under way, which also delineates variations in religious beliefs, community involvement, and social attitudes.

11. Most of the additions concerned social and political items, areas we cover elsewhere in the larger study from which this paper is drawn.

12. We discarded from the published analyses an additional group of forty ritually observant respondents who called themselves non-Orthodox—generally Conservative—Jews. Though substantively intriguing, their small number precluded our obtaining stable statistics.

13. Samuel C. Heilman, *Synagogue Life: A Study in Symbolic Interaction* (Chicago: 1976).

14. Brian M. Bullivant, *Competing Values Traditions in an Orthodox Jewish Day School: A Study of Enculturation Dissonance* (Ph.D. dissertation, Monash University, 1975), p. 338.

15. Although regularity and attention are not identical—one may be "regular" in performance of a ritual but not give it much "attention," carrying it out mechanically and without devotion *(kavvanah)*—among Orthodox Jews there is a tacit understanding that while regularity is not sufficient for guaranteeing attention to ritual behavior, it is nevertheless necessary. Out of regularity, attention and intention may come. We could not survey pure attention and so we settled for regularity.

16. Heilman, *Synagogue Life,* p. 19.

17. Ibid., pp. 95–103.

18. The missing 1% could easily have resulted from errors by respondents, coders, or keypunchers.

19. Among Orthodox Jews even styles of hats and the way they are worn may serve as signals of one's affiliation. Thus, for example, black stetsons worn in a skewed fashion are headgear often associated with yeshiva students.

20. Cf. Heilman, *Synagogue Life,* pp. 53–56.

21. Numbers 15:37–39.

22. S. M. Cohen and P. Ritterband, in Paul Ritterband (ed.), *Modern Jewish Fertility* (Leiden: 1981), "Why Contemporary American Jews Want Small Families: An Interreligious Comparison of College Graduates."