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ROCHESTER POLICE DEPARTMENT PATROL DIVISION REORGANIZATION AN INTERIM EVALUATION

Prepared for:
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INTRODUCTION

CGR (Center for Governmental Research Inc.) was engaged by the Rochester Police Department (RPD) in the spring of 2005 to conduct an initial assessment of the effects of the reorganization of the Patrol Division of the RPD which became effective in June, 2004. The intent of this evaluation was to give initial feedback to the department about the impact of the reorganization based upon a survey of data available for the first six months after the reorganization. To conduct this evaluation, CGR used data for comparable six month time periods (or longer, if it was available) both before and after the reorganization. RPD recognizes the need for and expects to undertake a more comprehensive evaluation of the reorganization after a full year's worth of data becomes available. It will require a much larger study to analyze 911 data in detail, develop a comprehensive assessment of the impact of the reorganization from the perspective of the greater community and recommend additional changes to improve upon the changes achieved through the reorganization to date.

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THE BASIS FOR THE REORGANIZATION

The RPD patrol division reorganization was based on a study commissioned by the RPD and completed by CGR in March 2003. The purpose of the original study was to evaluate the demands for service placed on the patrol division and to determine if there was a more efficient and equitable way to allocate patrol division resources to meet demand for service. The patrol division is the largest unit within the department, and is responsible for providing the officers on the streets who patrol neighborhoods and respond to 911 calls for assistance. The RPD crime prevention officers assigned to the City's NET offices are also included in the patrol division organization. Thus, it is the patrol division staff that most citizens and business owners interact with on a routine basis.

The reorganization report was based on extensive interviews with community leaders, city and RPD staff and a detailed analysis of demand for services and RPD response times as measured by 911 calls for service. The report concluded that the department's ability to respond rapidly to calls for service was the most important issue facing the department at that time. Since adding resources to the department (i.e. adding more staff) was not considered an option given the fiscal constraints facing the city, CGR evaluated different models for changing the way the RPD patrol division was organized in order to improve the department's ability to manage its existing resources and respond to calls for service. After testing various models with RPD command staff, CGR proposed reorganizing the patrol division by moving from the 7-section, 41-car-beat organization which had existed since the mid 1970's into a 2-section, 22-patrol service area (PSA) model. CGR's basic 2-section model was refined by the RPD to take into account existing constraints and practical considerations (such as current work rules, existing staffing and 911 dispatch protocols). The reorganization officially started on June 16, 2004.

THE REORGANIZATION OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of the reorganization was to improve public safety in the Rochester community. This would be accomplished in two ways:

- ❖ Response time would be decreased (i.e. the RPD would be able to respond to 911 calls for service more rapidly), and
- ❖ Pro-active time would be increased (i.e. RPD officers would have more time to spend doing pro-active community policing, not simply responding to calls for service).

The study projected that reorganizing the patrol division as proposed would permit the department to more effectively utilize its existing staff, thereby freeing up time and resources to decrease response time and have more pro-active time. The new 2 section structure was also intended to permit RPD command staff to equalize workload among officers and command staff and potentially reduce overtime costs.

Shift from a strictly geographic model to a combination temporal and geographic model

The reorganization anticipated that there would be a major conceptual change in how RPD managed patrol division resources. It was assumed that this change would decrease response time and increase pro-active time.

The “old model” was based on focusing attention and devoting resources to smaller geographic areas, i.e. car beats and sections. Thus, a captain was responsible around the clock, 365 days a year, for what was happening within the captain’s section. Officers were responsible for what was happening within their car beats. As the study found, however, these artificial “boundaries” created barriers to providing a rapid response to calls for service throughout all areas of the city.

The “new model” shifted from a strictly geographic model to a combination temporal and geographic model. After the reorganization, a captain became responsible for police activities on one side of the city during a specific time 8 hour time period of the day. Officers were to be responsible primarily for what was happening within the geographic areas identified by their PSA’s, however, they could be moved around anywhere within their side of the city to respond to calls for service.

IMPACTS OF THE REORGANIZATION THAT COULD BE MEASURED IN THIS STUDY

In order to measure impact of the reorganization (reorg), CGR compared data for the comparable time period prior to reorg with the same time period after reorg. Depending on availability of the data, the comparable time periods were: pre-reorg period of July 1, 2003 to either December 31, 2003 or May 31, 2004; post-reorg period of July 1, 2004 to December 31, 2004 or May 31, 2005

CGR was able to identify and obtain eleven performance measures to ascertain whether or not the initial intended objectives have been met by the reorganization. CGR attempted to collect information about both internal changes (within the RPD) and external changes (for the greater community). However, as noted below, several questions could not be answered at this time, and should be studied in more depth to give RPD command staff the information they need to make adjustments to the reorganization to address those issues.

1. Impact on Criminal Activity


It was not a specific objective of the reorganization to reduce criminal and other unlawful or undesirable activity within the city, although that clearly is a desired outcome of any law enforcement activity. However, both major (Part 1) crime and total crime, as reported to the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) have dropped in Rochester since the reorganization. The rate of change from July, 2003 through March, 2005 is similar to activity occurring in the three other major upstate cities, as shown on FIGURES 1A and 1B.

The reorganization has had neither a positive or negative impact on the overall crime rate

Since the overall rate of crime in Rochester appears to be, in general, tracking what is happening in other upstate cities, CGR concludes that the reorganization does not appear to have had either a positive or negative impact on the overall crime rate.

FIGURE 1A


Major Crime Trends in Rochester, Albany, Buffalo and Syracuse



Source: DCJS, Uniform Crime Reporting system

FIGURE 1B

Total Crime Trends in Rochester, Albany, Buffalo and Syracuse



Note: Data is missing for Syracuse for January-May 04
 Source: DCJS, Uniform Crime Reporting system

2. Impact on Demand – Calls for Service

Before actually comparing the service provided by RPD during the comparison time periods, CGR verified whether or not the demand for service (i.e. calls to 911 for service) changed after the reorganization. In the period July 1 – December 31, 2003 (the pre-reorg test period), there were 212,991 police events logged into the 911 system. CGR refers to these as calls for service, although technically a small number of police events are not actually generated by calls into 911 from the community. For example, a police car out of service for fueling is a Priority 4 police event. For the period July 1 – December 31, 2004 (post-reorg) there were 215,585 police events. CGR did not analyze in detail the types of calls in both periods. However, there were 4% more highest priority (E and 1P) events, 4% fewer lowest priority (3 and 4) events, and almost exactly the same number Priority 1 and 2 events in the post-reorg time period. These differences are small enough to suggest that the types of calls have remained consistent with historical patterns.


FIGURE 2 shows a graph of the police events (calls for service) for both time periods, plotted to show the time of day the events occurred. The graphs overlap almost perfectly, and, it should be added, match almost exactly the same graphs that were created for the initial reorganization report. Thus, patterns of demand have not changed over many years, and are highly predictable.

CGR also evaluated the number and types of calls into the 311 service center for both time periods, and they were almost exactly the same.

The reorganization does not appear to have changed demand for service patterns

Demand for service patterns was similar before and after the reorganization, and these patterns are essentially the same as the patterns identified in the original study. Thus, the assumptions about the need for adjusting patrol division staffing to more closely match peaks and valleys in demand in order to be more efficient are still valid.

FIGURE 2
Comparison of Actual Calls for Service Before and After
the Reorganization



Source: RPD from 911 data

3. Impact on Response Time

Since a primary objective of the reorganization was to reduce response time, i.e. speed up the time between when a call was received by 911 and the time an officer arrived at the scene, CGR evaluated response time data provided by the RPD from 911 data. This data was sufficient to draw conclusions for this initial evaluation report, but did not involve the same high level of analytic work required to produce the models developed by CGR that supported the reorganization recommendations.

At the time this report was written, response time data for all events was available through May 31 of each comparison year. That is, we could compare the eleven months before reorg and the eleven months after reorg.

911 data contains enough information to permit an analysis of the two major time components required to determine the length of time for a response.

The first major time component is called “Wait Time” – which is the time between when the 911 dispatcher received the call and when the dispatcher is able to place the call with a police car that can respond. If every available police car is responding to a call,

the dispatcher has to wait until a car becomes available and the officer can accept the new call. Thus, wait time is measured as the time between when the call was received and the first officer is dispatched to the call.

Once the first officer is dispatched, the officer then has to travel to the location of the incident. This is measured as “Travel Time,” and is defined as the time between when an officer is dispatched (i.e. accepts the call from 911) and when the officer arrives at the location (i.e. calls into 911 and reports they have arrived).

The total time, from the time the call is first received at the 911 center until an officer arrives at the location, is defined as “Response Time.”

Average TOTAL response time has been reduced 10.3%

As shown in TABLE 1, average total response time, i.e. the average length of time between when 911 received the call and an officer arrived at the location, has been reduced by 3 minutes and 29 seconds, or 10.3%, after the reorganization.

TABLE 1
Comparison of Total Response Time Before and After the Reorganization

<i>Time Period</i>	<i>Number of Police Events</i>	<i>Average Response Time</i>
7/1/03 – 5/31/04	139,656	33 minutes:43 seconds
7/1/04 – 5/31/05	139,594	30 minutes:14 seconds

Note: Only events with complete dispatch and arrival times were counted.
Source: RPD from 911 data

While overall response time has been reduced, analysis of available data suggests that several interesting changes have also occurred after the reorganization. The descriptions that follow are based on CGR’s review of the major components of response time. The times noted for the components will not appear to be consistent with the total, however, because of variations in the data available for analysis of each of the components.

Average WAIT time for dispatch has decreased 17.3%

Wait time, i.e. the time that a call is waiting in the queue in 911 for an officer to accept the call, dropped by an average of 6 minutes and 4 seconds, or 17.3%, after the reorganization. CGR's discussions with RPD command staff and the Director of 911 suggest that there are two likely reasons for this to have occurred. First, the reorganization broke down the traditional car beat and section boundaries, which appears to have created the flexibility for more officers to respond to calls. Second, once the traditional car beat boundaries were eliminated, 911 was able to change its dispatch protocol and move from a more limited geographic based model to a rotational dispatch model. In effect, since the reorganization, 911 dispatchers have many more options available to identify officers who can respond to calls for service.

Average TRAVEL time per officer has increased 10.5%

On the other hand, travel time, i.e. the time between when an officer accepts a call and arrives at the location, has increased by an average of 51 seconds, or 10.5% after the reorganization. This is consistent with the fact that officers from anywhere on one side of the city can be dispatched to anywhere else on that side. The 911 rotational dispatch protocol is designed to identify available officers who are closest geographically to the incident, however, at certain times, officers can be expected to drive through a good portion of the city to respond.

Response time decreased significantly across priority categories

Data for the first six months of the reorganization also show that response times have decreased at different rates for different types of police events. While average total response times for the highest priority calls (E and 1P) were within 1% of each other (essentially the same), an officer arrived at a high priority (1) call on average 1 minute, 28 seconds faster or 8% faster (from 18 minutes: 17 seconds down to 16 minutes: 49 seconds). Priority 2 event average response time was reduced by 19 minutes and 45 seconds, or 19% faster. Priority 3 and 4 event average response time was reduced by 5 minutes and 57 seconds, or 10% faster.

These data demonstrate that response times have been reduced essentially across the board after the reorganization. Overall average response time has decreased by 10.3%.

4. Impact on the RPD Organization

The new two-section model was intended to permit RPD command staff to better match resources with demand.

Reorganization was also intended to equalize workload among officers and command staff and potentially reduce overtime costs.

Officers on duty more closely match demand for service

Consistent with the initial study recommendations, as part of the reorganization, the RPD changed the number of officers on duty during the three primary time shifts (first platoon – 11 p.m. to 7 a.m., second platoon – 7 a.m. to 3 p.m., and third platoon – 3 p.m. to 11 p.m.) to more closely match the actual pattern of demand for service (FIGURE 2). In addition, both before and after the reorganization, fourth and fifth platoon officers have been used by the RPD to provide additional officers to meet periods of peak demand in addition to their assignments for special duty. Prior to reorg, standard staffing assumed a base level of 41 officers (1 per car beat) on duty around the clock, supplemented by fourth and fifth platoon. After reorg, authorized base level staffing has changed over the course of a day, from 40 officers in the first platoon to 52 officers in the second platoon and 60 officers in the third platoon, supplemented by fourth and fifth platoon officers as available.

Work load and command staff ratios have become more equalized

TABLE 2 shows that before reorg., the highest volume section had over four times the number of police events than the lowest volume section. However, as described in the original study, the highest volume section did not have a corresponding difference in the number of officers assigned to it compared to the lowest volume section. TABLE 2 also shows that before reorg., the highest volume car beat had over six times the number of calls than the lowest volume car beat. These two factors created a disparity in workload among officers and an imbalance of staff resources available to meet demand.

TABLE 2 also shows that after reorg., the number of calls handled by the two sections has been almost exactly equal, and the difference in volume of calls among PSA's is half as much as the difference in volume of calls had been among car beats. Thus, the work load for officers has become more equalized as a result of the reorganization.

TABLE 2
Comparison of Work Loads Before and After the Reorganization

	Number of Events	<i>Ratio High to Low</i>
<i>Number of Police Events Per Section ¹</i>		
Highest Volume Section Before Reorg.	110,373	4.44
Lowest Volume Section Before Reorg.	24,834	
East Section After Reorg.	132,971	1.04
West Section After Reorg	127,999	
<i>Events per Smallest Geographic Area ¹</i>		
Highest Volume Car Beat Before Reorg.	17,584	6.13
Lowest Volume Car Beat Before Reorg.	2,867	
Highest PSA After Reorg.	17,410	2.72
Lowest PSA After Reorg.	6,400	

Note: 1. The number of events prior to reorg. refers to information for the full year 2000 as described in the original report. The number of events after reorg. is for six months 7/1/04 through 12/31/04 per 911 data provided by RPD.

The reorganization permitted the RPD to equalize both the number of officers between the two sections, and to achieve more equal ratios of command staff to officers. Based upon the weighted call for service data provided in the original study, the RPD intentionally created geographic boundaries for 22 PSA's that would have approximately equal calls for service, and divided the PSA's so that the West side command had 12 PSA's and the East side command had 10 PSA's. TABLE 2 shows that, for the first six months of the reorg., the number of calls on for the East and West sides were nearly equal. There continues to be a difference among PSA's, with the highest having almost three times the number of calls than the lowest. Shifting PSA boundaries could more closely equalize calls among PSA's if that becomes an important priority for the department.

TABLE 3 shows the sergeant- and lieutenant-to-officer ratios both before and after the reorganization. The differences in the

number of officers supervised have clearly been reduced since the reorganization, and the supervisory work loads more equalized.

TABLE 3
Comparison of Command Staff Ratios Before and After the Reorganization

	Officers per <u>Lieutenant</u>	<i>Ratio</i> <i>High to</i> <u>Low</u>	Officers per <u>Sergeant</u>	<i>Ratio</i> <i>High to</i> <u>Low</u>
Highest Number Before Reorg	22	3.5	6.8	2.5
Lowest Number Before Reorg	6.3		2.7	
Highest Number After Reorg	22.5	1.7	10	2
Lowest Number After Reorg	13		5	

Note: The ratios prior to reorg. is based on the original report. Ratios after the reorg. are based on the RPD Patrol Division Organization Table as of 6/1/05.

5. Budget Impact

The original study anticipated that there would be several budget impacts as a result of the reorganization. First, it was assumed that the number of positions would remain the same after reorg., at least until the two sections became fully operational in their new locations. Second, some overtime savings were anticipated.

The number of authorized positions has not changed as a result of reorg.

A review of the City of Rochester Adopted Budgets from 2003/04 through 2005/06 indicates that total authorized positions in the department have decreased slightly from 873 to 866. Two of those positions were sworn staff and the remaining five were civilians. Since those reductions were the result of special programs funding and shifting of staff within the overall department, it is not possible to trace precisely whether or not the reorganization resulted in any staff reductions. However, a review of the RPD's internal patrol division organization chart indicates that the department planned for a total of 306 officers and command staff to be assigned to first through fifth platoon operations prior to the reorganization (153 positions evenly split between the East and West side) and the department has continued with that staffing plan. Thus, CGR concludes that as of this time, there has not been a budget impact in terms of number of positions or staffing costs.

The city has initiated plans, as projected in the reorganization plan, to create two larger section offices, and reduce the costs of the smaller section offices. The 2005/06 City budget reflects an estimated savings of \$52,400 in lease costs as a result of the reorganization. It is too early to estimate the total one-time capital costs associated with the reorganization.

It is also too soon to determine whether or not other operating costs, such as vehicle and fuel costs, have changed significantly as a result of the reorganization. Expenses to date have been within budget. However, as noted above, travel time for officers has increased 10.5% because officers are driving more miles in responding to calls for service across larger areas of the city. It was not possible for CGR to determine how many more miles have been driven on patrol division cars since the start of reorg. We assume, however, that patrol cars are, on average, driving more miles. This would increase fuel costs and may require speeding up the vehicle replacement cycle. The City needs to closely track the number of miles driven by the fleet of patrol cars and fuel and vehicle maintenance costs to determine how much these costs have increased because of the reorganization.

Overtime costs have been reduced by 28%

The original study did anticipate that the two-section model would give the RPD the flexibility to utilize its officers in ways that would reduce overtime pay. TABLE 4 shows that, through May 31, direct overtime pay and the cash equivalent of comp time paid has been 28% lower after the reorganization. Just using direct cash payments, overtime costs were reduced by 29%. Discussions with RPD command staff suggest that it is not possible to determine how much of that savings is due explicitly to the reorganization, because in the summer of 2003, there were several initiatives within the RPD that could have driven overtime costs higher than normal. However, the original study estimated that overtime could be reduced by approximately \$250,000 per year, because use of overtime could be determined based upon the staffing needs for two large sections rather than seven smaller sections. Given the size of the overtime savings to date, the initial savings estimate seems conservative.

TABLE 4
Patrol Division Overtime Pay Before and After the Reorganization

Time Period	Cash Payments for Comp Time	Cash Value of Comp Time	TOTAL	Overtime Hours Worked
7/1/03 - 5/31/04	\$2,155,200	\$1,141,800	\$3,297,000	70,008
7/1/04-5/31/05	<u>\$1,536,600</u>	<u>\$821,200</u>	<u>\$2,357,800</u>	<u>48,398</u>
<i>Decrease</i>	<i>\$618,600</i>	<i>\$320,600</i>	<i>\$939,200</i>	<i>21,610</i>
<i>Percent Reduction</i>	<i>29%</i>	<i>28%</i>	<i>28%</i>	<i>31%</i>

Source: RPD data using nominal dollars

IMPACTS OF THE REORGANIZATION WHICH COULD NOT BE MEASURED IN THIS STUDY

Since this review was designed to be carried out within a limited budget and time-frame, CGR could not thoroughly evaluate impacts of the reorganization that could not be easily measured. During the course of this project, three areas in particular were described to CGR as possible unresolved issues affected by the reorganization. We believe these should be researched further in order both to fairly measure the impact of the reorganization and to identify changes that the RPD may wish to make in order to improve its current operations.

The three areas CGR identified as unresolved issues all appear to have an impact on the perception, voiced by various members of the community, that reorganization has negatively affected their perception of “community policing.” Determining the impact of reorganization on “community policing” is going to be very difficult, for at least two reasons. First, that term has different meanings to different constituents; thus, measuring “community policing” will have to examine a number of hard to define expectations. Second, since no survey was taken prior to the reorganization to measure expectations about “community policing,” no benchmark indicators exist against which to measure

whether or not the reorganization had an effect on those indicators. Thus, any study undertaken now that attempts to measure community expectations for police service will be just that, a measurement at a specific point in time, not a comparison to past expectations.

That being said, some variables *could* be measured, both before and after the reorganization, and CGR believes that measuring these and other variables and making changes based upon what this shows might affect perceptions about “community policing” in the future.

Unresolved Issue 1 – Has Proactive Time Increased?

911 data will have to be analyzed in detail to determine if proactive time has increased

As noted in the beginning of this report, one of the two major objectives of the reorganization was to increase pro-active time for officers. That is, the reorganization was intended to create more time for RPD officers to spend in pro-active community policing, not simply responding to calls for service.

In order to determine whether or not pro-active time has been affected by the reorganization, the RPD will have to conduct a detailed analysis of 911 data, using weighted calls for service similar to the analysis performed by CGR in the original report. In that report, CGR concluded that, taking all types of calls into account and weighting them appropriately, the average call consumed 51.5 minutes of officer time. Analysis of post-reorg data will determine whether the average call consumes *less* than 51.5 minutes of officer time, in which case officers have more time to spend on pro-active work, or *more* than 51.5 minutes of officer time, in which case officers have even less time to spend on pro-active community policing. We simply do not know yet how the reorganization has affected this key variable.

Unresolved Issue 2 – How Much Has Beat Integrity Been Affected?

Clearly, the reorganization changed the relationship of individual car beat officers with their geographic boundaries – this was clearly understood from the start, especially since the management model changed from a strictly geographic model to a combination temporal and geographic model.

What is not clear, and what CGR could not measure in the context of this study, is the extent to which individual neighborhoods have lost or had reduced contact with a common group of officers, and vice versa. However, based on interviews and other information

collected in this study, CGR did identify certain variables that likely affect perceptions about beat integrity.

During the first few months, as can be expected, there was a shakeout period as RPD command officers adjusted to the changes in assigning officers as a result of the reorganization. CGR was informed that, except for approximately 25-30 officers (who could select their assignment on the basis of seniority rights), essentially all officers were assigned PSA's that kept them in the same geographic area as their old beats. PSA boundaries typically included two or three of the old car beat boundaries, and are staffed, during high volume periods, by several officers. Thus, individual officers have a larger area to cover (i.e., a PSA rather than a car beat). Still, officers do have responsibility for a well defined area. In addition, crime prevention officers continue to be assigned to specific sectors out of the NET offices.

Reorganization retained the concept of assigning the same officers to the same geographic areas

Geographic integrity is also supported by the fact that individual officers in the first, second and third platoons are regularly assigned the same PSA and car, which is similar to the old car beat assignment process. Therefore, the same officers are assigned to the same geographic areas on a consistent basis. In addition to PSA integrity, the sections have become operationally divided into north and south quadrants, with officers in each quadrant providing primary support for each other. Thus, officers have geographic responsibility for, in order of priority, their PSA (their neighborhood), then quadrant (quarter of the city), then section (half of the city).

Officers moving outside of assigned geographic areas may be affecting the perception of geographic integrity

However, for this study, CGR did not measure the extent to which officers move out of their geographic areas to respond to calls. Officers moving around among geographic areas may be a contributing factor to the perception that the community does not have a consistent group of officers responding to calls. One additional factor that may contribute to this perception is that, as a result of the reorganization, fourth and fifth platoon officers can be assigned throughout a section; thus, they do not have local geographic responsibility. Prior to reorganization, fourth and fifth platoon officers were assigned to specific sections; therefore, they were a consistent group of officers within the same geographic boundaries. The assignment and deployment of fourth and fifth

platoon officers is something that RPD command staff may want to revisit as a way to improve the reorganization concept.

Unresolved Issue 3 – Has the Vacancy Factor Had an Impact?

A key assumption about how the reorganization model would work was that the patrol division would be staffed at the levels proposed, in order to meet projected demands for service. In fact, if staffing is less than proposed in the model, it could be expected that RPD would not be able to provide the level of service desired by the community.

In the original report, CGR had prepared an ideal recommended staffing model based upon the number of officers that should be available, per four-hour time blocks, to meet projected calls for service, and still leave an average of 20% of each officer's time available for pro-active community policing. CGR compared the ideal model with staffing that the RPD developed for the reorganization. On paper, the RPD did a good job of matching the ideal model, after taking into account practical considerations of managing the department.

The actual number of officers available is 16% lower than the ideal model

However, an important factor has prevented RPD from staffing the patrol division at the level anticipated in the original model - the number of long term vacancies. CGR found that the actual number of officers available to report to duty in the patrol division in the first week of June, 2005, was 16% lower than the ideal number. There are two components to the vacancy factor: unfilled vacancies due to lack of available officers (9%) and long-term leaves of absence due to military leave, extended sick leave or training (7%).

27 additional officers could be used to improve community policing

The RPD will likely always have to expect that a certain portion of its staff will be on long-term leaves of absence (although the numbers are currently high by historical standards because of the war). However, the 9% vacancy factor due to lack of available officers equates to approximately 27 positions that are budgeted but unfilled. It is quite likely that being understaffed at 9% below the model could be a contributing factor to the perception that the RPD is not providing community policing at the level desired after the reorganization. Further analysis would determine how the department could use the additional 27 officers to better meet the needs of the community.

CONCLUSION

Factual information available at this time indicates that after the patrol division reorganization became effective in June, 2004, officers have responded more quickly (by an average of 10.3%), than in the same time period prior to the reorganization. Further, internal management improvements within the RPD (equalizing workloads and command/staff ratios) have also occurred, and patrol division overtime costs have been reduced by \$939,000 since the reorganization.

However, 911 data has not been sufficiently analyzed to determine whether or not pro-active time for officers has increased or decreased as a result of the reorganization. Further, the perception that community policing has been sacrificed as a result of the reorganization could be a result of the increased size of PSA's compared to car beats, the fact that a certain number of officers are now shifted around within larger geographic territories, and the fact that the department vacancy factor means that there are less officers actually on duty than the model anticipated. These are issues the RPD can address to even further improve its service to the community.