

Submitted for review and approved 21 March 2008

State Immigration Legislation and Immigrant Flows: An Analysis

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Abstract:

In recent decades, states have attempted to discourage flows of immigrants—legal and illegal alike—through ballot measures that deny illegal entrants certain state services. Scholarly work on this issue has not come to a conclusion on whether such measures, such as California’s Proposition 187, really do discourage immigration. Using a multivariate ordinary least squared framework, this paper examines immigration flows to U.S. states between 2000 and 2006 to determine if the enactment or consideration of Proposition 187-like measures does indeed affect Mexican, Latin American, or total immigrant flows to a state. Its results show that the consideration or enactment of Proposition 187-like measures does not affect any type of legal immigrant flow to a state. On the other hand, the enactment of measures that give extra benefits to illegal immigrants—such as Maryland’s licensing scheme—does indeed bring additional legal flows of Mexican, Latin American, and all immigrants to a state.

Keywords: immigration policy, Proposition 187, immigration regression analysis, Mexican immigration, Maryland licensing scheme.

I. Introduction

In the past fifteen years, there has been much debate at the federal and state level over the topic of immigration. Numerous interest groups, media figures, and politicians have warned that the United States is experiencing an “invasion” of immigrants that, without a proper response, will cause the U.S. to experience higher unemployment, lower educational attainment, a breakdown of its social welfare system, and even a bifurcated society where English-speaking Anglo-Americans forever dominate a lower class of Spanish-speaking Latinos. To counter this threat, they argue, the United States should limit illegal immigrants’ rights and access to services, and place limitations on the privileges of those who have immigrated to the U.S. legally.

In 1994, this concern came to the forefront of the political debate in California. Frustrated with a lack of action on the national level, state assemblyman Dick Mountjoy successfully put Proposition 187—the “Save our State” (SOS) initiative—on the ballot for that year’s statewide election. Concerned with poor polling numbers, Governor Pete Wilson saw the initiative as a way to win re-election and bolster his party’s representation in the California Assembly. Therefore, he vigorously campaigned for Proposition 187, and on the coattails of its approval, won re-election to serve a second term as Governor.

A closer examination of Proposition 187 reveals an interesting dichotomy—in *writing*, the proposition was created to limit the access of illegal immigrants to California’s social services, but in *purpose*, by the admission of its own supporters, Proposition 187 was created to send a strong signal that California was not open to further immigration flows of all types at their present level. This bill, its supporters argued, would discourage future immigrants, legal and illegal, from entering the state.

Soon after the approval of Proposition 187, a flurry of look-alike bills came to the political stage in states as diverse as Illinois, New York, Arkansas, and Colorado. Again, all aimed in *writing* to limit the ability of illegal immigrants to access state services, but in *fact* were meant to be a sign of “collective dislike” that would discourage any new immigrant from taking residence in the state. Although the vast majority of such propositions failed, Arizona, Virginia, and Colorado passed Proposition 187 “clones” in 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively (Matthews, 1).

Empirical study of the after-effects of this legislation is rather spotty. While *Borjas* (2002) argues that Proposition 187 has indeed discouraged further immigration of certain groups to California, *Portes* (1999) shows that the initiative has had little impact on where immigrants ultimately decided to reside. Unfortunately, no comprehensive work has assessed this issue beyond the use of interviews or rudimentary observations of immigrant data.

This paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature on the effects of anti-immigrant legislation. Using immigrant data during the 2000-2006 period, it will determine if the enactment of Proposition 187-like legislation actually slows legal immigration into a state. Moreover, it will examine if a simple showing of anti-immigration sentiment or “talk” of an anti-immigrant bill on a statewide level will slow immigration to a state. Finally, it will study states with pro-illegal immigrant policies to see if legal immigrants respond to “positive” signals of statewide immigrant support.

II. Specification

To test the results of state-specific immigrant sentiment and legislation on legal immigration, this paper incorporates numerous variables known to affect statewide flows of legal immigrants. Therefore, for its dependent variable, this study utilizes legal immigrant flows into each state. Because Proposition 187-like bills are largely targeted toward Latino, and more specifically, Mexican immigrants, this paper employs three different dependant variables to study the overall and group-specific effects of 187-style legislation. In the first specification, total legal immigrant flows to each state in the U.S. is used as the dependant variable, while in the second and third specifications, state-specific flows of Latin American and Mexican immigrants are used, respectively, as the dependant variable.

For the study's "controls," the major theorized influences on state-specific immigration are employed. Total and group-specific foreign-born populations by state is added as a variable to account for the "network" effect of immigration: immigrants are likely to settle where larger immigrant communities reside because these communities ease the transition new immigrants must undertake to incorporate themselves into American social and economic life. Next, the population of each state is used. This is added to account for job-specific "pull" effects on immigration: because many immigrants seek low-skilled, service-sector jobs, they tend to settle in states with a "critical mass" of population that is large enough to have a demand for such service occupations. Additionally, state per capita income is used as an independent variable. This variable is employed to control for the "wage effect" in which immigrants seek out states with higher mean incomes. Fourthly, per capita income growth is used as a "job creation" variable. If a state's income is rising, it is likely that labor is in short supply, and thus the state will attract more immigrants because they can more readily find work there. To account for the "push" side of immigrant decision-making, state unemployment is used—immigrants will, on average, avoid settling in a state where they cannot find work. Sixth, this study incorporates control variables for state spending. An immigrant will, all other factors being equal, settle in a state that provides more services to him or her, whether it be healthcare, schooling, transportation, or food subsidies. Due to the colinearity of total per capita spending and per capital healthcare and education spending—a one dollar increase in per capita healthcare spending will *necessarily* increase per capita total spending by one dollar—the per capita healthcare and education variables are estimated separately from the total per capita variable. Finally, a binary variable for those states sharing a border with Mexico—California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas—is employed to control for the "proximity effect" of Mexican immigrants. Because many Mexican immigrants prefer to settle in a location where they can regularly contact and visit their families, they, *ceteris paribus*, choose to settle in "border states" over those farther from Mexico. Given that Mexican immigrants are a large share of all immigrant flows to the United States, this effect strongly determines total immigrant flows in addition to those of Mexicans and Latin Americans.

Once the study's controls are in place, the "tested" variables are included in the specification. Firstly, a binary variable that includes all those states that have enacted a Proposition 187-like bill is employed. If 187-style legislation does indeed reduce immigrant flows, one would expect this variable to affect a state's yearly intake of immigrants negatively. Secondly, the study's specification incorporates a binary variable that includes all the states that have had anti-immigrant ballot measures in at least three of the last four statewide elections. If a simple showing of some state-specific anti-immigrant sentiment—rather than a majority voting for an anti-immigrant resolution—is all that is needed to divert immigrants elsewhere, this variable will have a negative relation to immigrant flows. Finally, a binary variable that includes states that have passed referendums legislating extra benefits to illegal immigrants is included to see if the converse to the Proposition 187 hypothesis is true: that immigrants

will, *ceteris paribus*, seek out states that have proven they are welcoming to all new immigrants. If this is indeed true, a positive relation between this binary variable and immigrant flows is expected.

The first, “total” theorized specification is therefore as follows:

$$(1) \quad totalflow = \beta_0 + \beta_1 foreignborn + \beta_2 pop + \beta_3 perkincome + \beta_4 perkincomegrowth + \beta_5 unemp + \beta_6 perkspending + \delta_0 borderstate + \delta_1 prop187 + \delta_2 antimmig + \delta_3 proimmig + u$$

where *totalflow* represents the total yearly number of immigrants entering a state, *foreignborn* signifies the foreign-born population of that state, *pop* shows the state’s total population, *perkincome* represents the per capita income of the state, *perkincomegrowth* signifies the per capita income growth (in percent) of the state, *unemp* shows the state’s unemployment rate, *perkspending* represents the state’s total per capita spending, *borderstate* shows whether or not the state is on the U.S.-Mexican border, *prop187* shows whether or not the state has enacted a Proposition 187-like proposal, *antimmig* denotes if state has held (but not passed) anti-immigration referendums, and *proimmig* denotes if a state has approved pro-illegal immigrant legislation. Additionally, *u* denotes other factors.

As mentioned earlier, to avoid colinearity, per capita state spending on health and education cannot exist in the same specification as total state per capita spending. Therefore, the specification in which these variables are incorporated is as follows:

$$(2) \quad totalflow = \beta_0 + \beta_1 foreignborn + \beta_2 pop + \beta_3 perkincome + \beta_4 perkincomegrowth + \beta_5 unemp + \beta_6 healthspend + \beta_7 eduspend + \delta_0 borderstate + \delta_1 prop187 + \delta_2 antimmig + \delta_3 proimmig + u$$

where *healthspend* signifies the state’s per capita spending on health and *eduspend* represents the state’s per capita spending on education. All other variables are identical to those used in equation (1).

In the immigrant group-specific regressions, Latin American and Mexican flows into a state and the Latin American and Mexican-born populations living in a state substitute the *totalflow* and *foreignborn* variables in specifications (1) and (2).

The specifications that explore Latin American immigrant flows are as follows:

$$(3) \quad LAflow = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LAforeignborn + \beta_2 pop + \beta_3 perkincome + \beta_4 perkincomegrowth + \beta_5 unemp + \beta_6 perkspending + \delta_0 borderstate + \delta_1 prop187 + \delta_2 antimmig + \delta_3 proimmig + u$$

$$(4) \quad LAflow = \beta_0 + \beta_1 LAforeignborn + \beta_2 pop + \beta_3 perkincome + \beta_4 perkincomegrowth + \beta_5 unemp + \beta_6 healthspend + \beta_7 eduspend + \delta_0 borderstate + \delta_1 prop187 + \delta_2 antimmig + \delta_3 proimmig + u$$

where *LAflow* signifies the total yearly number of legal immigrants settling in a state that were born in Latin America and *LAforeignborn* shows the number of residents already living in the state that were born in Latin American countries. As explained above, a separate specification is included for the per capita state health and education spending variables.

The specifications that explore Mexican immigrant flows are as follows:

$$(5) \quad mexflow = \beta_0 + \beta_1 mexforeignborn + \beta_2 pop + \beta_3 perkincome + \beta_4 perkincomegrowth + \beta_5 unemp + \beta_6 perkspending + \delta_0 borderstate + \delta_1 prop187 + \delta_2 antimmig + \delta_3 proimmig + u$$

$$(6) \quad mexflow = \beta_0 + \beta_1 mexforeignborn + \beta_2 pop + \beta_3 perkincome + \beta_4 perkincomegrowth + \beta_5 unemp + \beta_6 healthspend + \beta_7 eduspend + \delta_0 borderstate + \delta_1 prop187 + \delta_2 antimmig + \delta_3 proimmig + u$$

where *mexflow* signifies the total yearly number of legal immigrants settling in a state that originated in Mexico, and *mexforeignborn* shows the number of residents already living in the state that were born Mexico. Again, as explained above, a separate specification is included for the per capita state health and education spending variables.

Finally, it should be noted that this study seeks to examine if pro- or anti-illegal immigrant legislation has had a different effect on legal immigrant flows over time. Therefore, all six specifications will be tested against data collected the years 2000, 2003, and 2006.

III. Data

This paper gathers its data from a number of U.S. government and other sources. Total and origin-specific immigration data by state is drawn from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for 2000, and its successor organization, the Citizenship and Immigration Services bureau of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (USCIS) for 2003 and 2006. For 2000, data on immigrants establishing legal residence the U.S. by region of origin has not been published, and therefore there is no data on the number of immigrants from Latin America entering the U.S. for this year.

Data on the number of immigrant stocks currently living as legal residents in the U.S. is collected from United States Census reports for the years 2000, 2003, and 2006. Next, information on state population, per capita income by state, state per capita income growth, and statewide unemployment rates is gathered for each sample year from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Lastly, state spending data is gathered for each sample year from the National Conference of State Legislators. Data for the binary variables was compiled for this study according to the methods explained in the Specification section of this paper. A full listing of the “border” states, those states that have enacted Proposition 187-like legislation, states that have routinely had anti-immigrant ballot measures, and those states that have enacted pro-illegal immigrant legislation is included in Appendix A of this study.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Scale	Mean	Median	Standard Deviation	Min	Max	Observations	Data Sets For:
Total Legal Immigrant Flow	Persons	13,684.9	3,804	28,444.1	253	175,579	51	2000, 2003, 2006
Latin American Legal Immigrant Flow	Persons	4,902.4	1,163	12,800.0	24	80,822	51	2003, 2006
Mexican Legal Immigrant Flow	Persons	2,264.8	474	7,892.0	5	51,269	51	2000, 2003, 2006
Total Foreign-Born Population	Thousands of Persons	657.5	184.0	1,466.4	10.6	9,187.2	51	2000, 2003, 2006
Foreign-Born Latin American Population	Thousands of Persons	343.8	63.2	851.8	1.4	5,031.7	51	2003, 2006
Foreign-Born Mexican American Population	Thousands of Persons	196.3	37.1	630.1	0.1	3,967.1	51	2000, 2003, 2006
State Population	Thousands of Persons	5,701.9	4,114.5	6,428.7	501.5	35,466.4	51	2000, 2003, 2006
State Per Capita Income	Hundreds of USD	308.6	299.4	49.1	234.5	483.4	51	2000, 2003, 2006
State Per Capita Income Growth	Percentage	3.2	2.8	2.4	0.1	14.8	51	2000, 2003, 2006
State Unemployment	Percentage	5.6	5.6	1.1	3.5	8.1	51	2000, 2003, 2006
Total Per Capita State Spending	Hundreds of USD	76.6	70.9	18.9	59.2	153.3	51	2000, 2003, 2006
Per Capita State Healthcare Spending	Hundreds of USD	22.6	22.4	3.4	16.8	35.3	51	2000, 2003, 2006
Per Capita State Education Spending	Hundreds of USD	17.3	16.6	5.5	10.8	45.9	51	2000, 2003, 2006
Border With Mexico	Binary	0.04	0	0.103	0	1	51	2000, 2003, 2006
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted	Binary	0.04	0	0.196	0	1	51	2000, 2003, 2006
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered	Binary	0.24	0	0.428	0	1	51	2000, 2003, 2006
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants	Binary	0.08	0	0.272	0	1	51	2000, 2003, 2006

Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of each variable. It would be an exhaustive process to describe every variable and every data vintage chosen for this study in a detailed manner, so only mean statistics are shown and only the most remarkable variables have been chosen for special note. Total, Latin American, and Mexican immigrant flow numbers show significant variation, where the maximum values of these variables are near or above 100,000 persons, while the minimum immigration flow values are in the single digits, tens, or hundreds. These statistics follow the long-known observation that the vast majority of immigrants settle in a few states—most notably New York, California, Texas, Florida, and Illinois—while most other states only receive a trickle of immigrants. This observation also follows the “stock” values of foreign-born populations already living in the United States: again, there is great variation in the size of foreign-born resident groups in each state, and as shown by the large difference between this variable’s mean and median values, a few states account for the majority of foreign-born U.S. residents while many others have relatively small stocks of residents that were born outside the United States.

The other interesting statistics to note are those of the three “experimental” binary variables: states that have enacted Proposition 187-like bills, those that have considered anti-immigrant ballot measures, and states that have enacted pro-illegal immigrant reforms. As shown in the mean values of these variables in Table 1, only 4% of all states have enacted Proposition 187-like measures, 8% have enacted pro-illegal immigrant measures, and 24% have considered anti-illegal immigrant legislation. The clear majority of states, therefore, have taken no action towards immigrants, showing the strong disagreement among social and political groups over what action, if any, government should take to reform the immigration standards of the United States.

Examining the data by state, results are very much as expected. As supported by numerous studies, there is one state that receives more immigrants of all types than any other: California. Wyoming, North Dakota, and Vermont—three of the least-populous states that have some of the smallest immigrant communities and fewest economic opportunities for immigrants—took in the lowest number of total, Latin American, and Mexican immigrants, respectively, over this study’s sample period. For the state spending variables, Alaska and New

Table 2: State-Level Statistics

Variable	Max State(s)	Min State(s)
Total Legal Immigrant Flow	California	Wyoming
Latin American Legal Immigrant Flow	California	North Dakota
Mexican Legal Immigrant Flow	California	Vermont
Total Foreign-Born Population	California	Wyoming
Foreign-Born Latin American Population	California	Vermont
Foreign-Born Mexican American Population	California	Vermont
State Population	California	Wyoming
State Per Capita Income	Connecticut	Mississippi
State Per Capita Income Growth	South Dakota	Delaware
State Unemployment	Oregon	South Dakota
Total Per Capita State Spending	Alaska	Oklahoma
Per Capita State Healthcare Spending	Alaska	Tennessee
Per Capita State Education Spending	New York	Nevada
Border With Mexico	Binary	Binary
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted	Binary	Binary
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered	Binary	Binary
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants	Binary	Binary

York lead all other states, while Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Nevada spend the least per capita in all types of spending, healthcare disbursements, and education spending, respectively. Alaska is the “leader” of the total and healthcare spending groups for one simple reason: its small population and high oil revenues give it the fiscal leeway to spend generously on its citizens. Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Nevada, on the other hand, are known to be rather fiscally conservative, and therefore do not spend as much on their citizens as other states. New York is a very interesting case: it does not garner a particularly high amount of revenues per person and does not have significant energy resources, and yet it has the highest per capita spending on education in the country. This, therefore, is due more to strong policy support for education in New York and the powerful teachers’ union lobby in its state legislature.

IV. Empirical Results

Due to the sheer number of regressions done for this study—over thirty-seven in all—a full listing of the regressions for the total, Latin American, and Mexican immigrant populations in 2000, 2003, and 2006 are reserved for Appendix B of this paper. Page 9 contains a summary of this study’s results; each table shows the interaction of the independent variables with statewide immigration flows across all three sample years. Note again that due to a lack of available data, the regressions showing the influences on Latin American immigration by state are not available for the 2000 sample year.

A. Control Variables

As shown on page 9, the great majority of theorized variables that affect immigrant flows by state produced statistically and economically significant results in all the regressions performed for this study. The number of foreign-born residents living in a state, whether total, Latino, or Mexican, had the predicted positive effect on the immigrant flows of their respective nationalities. For example, in 2003, a 1,000-person increase in the Latino-born population living in a state, *ceteris paribus*, increased the legal immigrant flows of Latinos into that state by approximately 16 persons, therefore confirming the “ease of entry” theory that suggests that new immigrants will choose to settle in states where their compatriots are already living. The population of a state has a much weaker—but significant—effect on immigration flows: again, in 2003, an increase in a state’s population by 10,000 persons increased the number of immigrants settling in the state by approximately one person. Therefore, although the effect of a “critical mass” of population that creates demand for service-sector jobs is shown to be significant in affecting immigrant flows, it has a very slight effect compared to the other variables in this study. Also, due to the positive and significant results of the per capita income variable across all populations and time periods, it can be seen that immigrants do choose to settle in states with higher average incomes.

The strongest “control” variables of this study are state unemployment rates and the proximity of a state to Mexico. In 2006, for example, a one percent increase in the unemployment rate of a state decreased the total number of legal migrants it received by approximately 6,000 persons. Also in this year, if a state shared a border with Mexico, it saw its total immigrant flows, *ceteris paribus*, increase by 33,000 people. This again supports the argument that immigrants choose to settle in states with low unemployment rates and in those that are closer to Mexico.

Additionally, all the spending variables, whether per capital total, healthcare, or education, were found to be statistically significant and positively related to immigrant flows across all populations in 2003 and 2006. The exception to this observation occurred in the year 2000: in this year, only the healthcare variable among all immigrants and the education variable among Mexicans were seen to be significant. This shows that, at least currently, immigrants do respond to higher social spending in their choice of where to settle. Furthermore, when the healthcare and education variables are significant, per capita

healthcare spending typically has a stronger effect on immigrant flows; this difference is especially pronounced among Latin American immigrants and all immigrants settling in a state. This result may point to the possibility that immigrants respond more to better healthcare than to improved education standards in their decision of where to settle in the United States. While a more detailed study of this interaction is necessary for more definite results, this paper theorizes that because immigrants tend to be of lower educational attainment and thus hold more manual jobs, they tend to require healthcare services strongly and value education to a lesser extent. This difference in demand, therefore, will cause immigrants to choose to reside in states with strong healthcare programs over states with robust educational systems.

Another interesting result of this study is that there are few major differences over what attracts immigrants to a state across the total, Latino, and Mexican legal immigrant populations. Only the weights of the variables are different—for example, total and Latino immigrant flows tend to be more strongly affected than Mexican flows by per capital state social spending.

One variable, interestingly enough, did not show significance across all the groups studied and across all the years examined for this paper—that of state per capita income growth. Therefore, it appears that either using income growth as a proxy for job demand is ineffective, or that immigrants do not react in any significant way to statewide job demand in their decision to settle in a particular state.

B. Experimental Variables

As seen by Table 4, there appears to be little evidence to show that the enactment of a Proposition 187-like measure will decrease legal immigrant flows into a state. Across all immigrant groups and time periods—with the notable exception of Mexicans in 2000—the Proposition 187 dummy variable was insignificant in determining the number of legal immigrants who decide to settle in a state. Therefore, there is very strong evidence to suggest that total and Latin American flows are not affected by Proposition 187-like legislation.

Table 4: Regression Results for Experimental Variables Across All Populations and Time Periods

Variable	All Legal Immigrants	Latin American Legal Immigrants	Mexican Legal Immigrants
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted	No Significance	No Significance	No Significance in 2003 and 2006
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered	No Significance	No Significance	No Significance
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Positive

For Mexican flows, there is evidence to show that a Proposition 187-style measure did discourage Mexican-born immigrants from settling in a state in the year 2000, where, *ceteris paribus*, states with Proposition 187-like legislation—and the only state with such legislation at this time was California—saw inflows of Mexican legal immigrants decrease by approximately 24,000 persons. There are two possible theories to explain this result. The first pertains to the methodology of the study: because the only major state that had enacted legislation to deny illegal immigrants services in the year 2000 was California, the Proposition 187 binary variable for that year only included one state: California. Therefore, there is a possibility that the results of the 2000 regression for the Mexican population detected some other California-specific variable and not the effects of Proposition 187. The second possibility for the finding that Mexican legal immigration was reduced due to Proposition 187-like measures in 2000 and not 2003 and 2006 is much more theoretical. It may be that the “fear” of immigrating to a state that has enacted legislation created to, in part, show a “collective distaste” for immigrants has worn off over time, and especially after more and more states have passed this type of measure. As legal immigrants have discovered that 187-style laws have not negatively affected their lives in any meaningful way, new immigrants have been less fearful of immigrating to a state with Proposition 187-style legislation. Additionally, the fact that four additional states—Arizona, Colorado, and Virginia—have passed laws with 187-style restrictions, and that there is debate for such laws in

many other states may have dispersed the “fear” of settling in a state with laws hostile to illegal immigrants. Because many immigrants now believe such legislation is inevitable across the United States (Cornelius, 13), they may no longer include the presence of 187-style legislation in their decision-making over where to settle—in their eyes, they will face a “collective distaste” wherever they decide to live. Consequently, over time, the enactment of Proposition 187-like laws has become ineffective in discouraging legal immigrant flows.

A similar scenario is apparent for states that have proposed anti-illegal immigrant ballot measures in past general elections. In all immigrant groups and across all years, this showing of anti-immigrant sentiment has had no effect on state-specific immigrant flows. This result is rather logical given the previous results for states that have passed anti-immigrant legislation through plebiscites—if the “stronger” showing of a broad “collective distaste” for immigrants does not discourage immigrant flows into a state, it is very apparent that a show of anti-immigrant sentiment by only a portion of a state’s population will also fail to discourage immigration into a state.

Although the results of this study demonstrate that a show of distaste for immigrants through the discussion or enactment of anti-illegal immigrant legislation does not have any effect on a state’s legal immigrant flows, they do demonstrate that pro-illegal immigrant legislation does indeed have a strong, positive effect on legal immigration across all immigrant groups and time periods. For example, in 2006, *ceteris paribus*, if a state enacted pro-illegal immigrant legislation—whether it was subsidies on college tuition for illegal immigrants, the ability for illegal migrants to acquire state driver’s licenses, or workers’ protection agencies for illegal immigrants—a state would receive 12,000 additional legal immigrants. Furthermore, the effect of this “incentive” variable is weaker for Latin American and Mexican immigration flows than those of the total immigrant population. For 2006, a state would receive 2,000 additional legal Latin American immigrants and approximately five hundred additional legal Mexican immigrants if it enacted pro-illegal immigrant legislation.

The difference between the effects of this variable on Latin American, Mexican, and total flows is primarily a repercussion of the size of immigrant flows: total flows, quite obviously, are larger than Mexican and Latin American flows. On the other hand, they are not ten to twenty-six times as large as Latin American and Mexican flows, as the results would suggest. As shown by a study done by *Cornelius* (2006), this difference may be due to decreased knowledge of pro-illegal immigrant legislation among the Latin American and Mexican legal immigrant populations. This outcome is also quite interesting—while the signals sent by pro-illegal immigrant legislation are most certainly intended for all Mexican and Latin American immigrants because the majority of illegal immigrants in the U.S. are of Latin American and Mexican descent, these groups are the *least* affected by pro-illegal immigrant bills.

One final notable observation in this study’s empirical results is the dichotomy between the effectiveness of pro-illegal immigrant legislation in encouraging legal immigrant flows and the ineffectiveness of anti-illegal immigrant legislation in discouraging legal flows. While both rely on the effects of “collective judgments” on where a legal immigrant decides to live, it seems that immigrants only respond to positive displays of support in their choice of where to settle in the United States. This study believes that this is due to a “dilution” bias in feelings toward immigrants: because nearly one-quarter of the states in the U.S. have publicly discussed an expression of dislike towards immigrants, immigrants may feel that they will be disliked wherever they decide to settle. On the other hand, because only a few states have signaled their embrace of immigrants, states such as Washington, Maryland, and New Mexico garner much more attention among immigrant groups as desirable places to live. Therefore, the very fact that Proposition 187-like legislation has been so popular is the reason why it is so ineffective.

Table 5: Regression Results for the “Total,” Latin American, and Mexican Models in 2000

Variable	All Legal Immigrants	Latin American Legal Immigrants	Mexican Legal Immigrants
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted	No Significance		Strong Negative
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered	No Significance		No Significance
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants	Strong Positive		Strong Positive
Foreign-Born Population	Positive		Positive
State Population	Weak Positive		Weak Positive
State Per Capita Income	Positive		Positive
State Per Capita Income Growth	Ambiguous Significance		Ambiguous Significance
State Unemployment	Strong Negative		Strong Negative
Total Per Capita State Spending	Strong Positive		Positive
Per Capita State Healthcare Spending	Positive		Ambiguous Significance
Per Capita State Education Spending	Ambiguous Significance		Positive
Border With Mexico	Strong Positive		Strong Positive

Table 6: Regression Results for the “Total,” Latin American, and Mexican Models in 2003

Variable	All Legal Immigrants	Latin American Legal Immigrants	Mexican Legal Immigrants
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted	No Significance	No Significance	No Significance
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered	No Significance	No Significance	No Significance
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Positive
Foreign-Born Population	Positive	Positive	Positive
State Population	Weak Positive	Ambiguous Significance	Weak Positive
State Per Capita Income	Positive	Positive	Positive
State Per Capita Income Growth	Ambiguous Significance	Ambiguous Significance	Ambiguous Significance
State Unemployment	Strong Negative	Strong Negative	Strong Negative
Total Per Capita State Spending	Positive	Positive	Positive
Per Capita State Healthcare Spending	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Positive
Per Capita State Education Spending	Positive	Positive	Positive
Border With Mexico	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Positive

Table 7: Regression Results for the “Total,” Latin American, and Mexican Models in 2006

Variable	All Legal Immigrants	Latin American Legal Immigrants	Mexican Legal Immigrants
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted	No Significance	No Significance	No Significance
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered	No Significance	No Significance	No Significance
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Positive
Foreign-Born Population	Positive	Positive	Positive
State Population	Weak Positive	Weak Positive	Weak Positive
State Per Capita Income	Positive	Positive	Ambiguous Significance
State Per Capita Income Growth	Ambiguous Significance	Ambiguous Significance	Ambiguous Significance
State Unemployment	Strong Negative	Strong Negative	Strong Negative
Total Per Capita State Spending	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Positive
Per Capita State Healthcare Spending	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Positive
Per Capita State Education Spending	Positive	Strong Positive	Positive
Border With Mexico	Strong Positive	Strong Positive	Strong Positive

V. Conclusion

The primary finding of the study is this: after controlling for the major “inputs” behind immigration flows to individual U.S. states, there is no evidence to show that Proposition 187-style legislation decreases yearly total and Latin American legal immigration into a state. For Mexican immigration flows, there is some evidence to show that Proposition 187-style legislation did decrease the number of Mexicans immigrating legally into a state in 2000, but thereafter, this type of legislation also became ineffective in slowing Mexican immigration flows. This result for Mexican immigrants may be primarily due to a waning of the “fear factor” of such initiatives over time and a “dilution” bias that makes all “collective distaste” initiatives ineffective as more and more states seek to emulate Proposition 187. Additionally, the discussion of Proposition 187-style bills has been found to be ineffective in reducing the number of yearly legal immigrants that a state receives. Therefore, in sum, this study’s results suggest that at present, a state cannot slow legal immigration flows of any type through Proposition 187-style ballot initiatives.

This study’s second major finding is that the enactment of pro-illegal immigrant legislation does indeed encourage additional legal immigration to a state. It appears that while legal immigrants do not respond to “collective dislike” measures, they do favor settling in a state that has shown openness to new immigrants. Additionally, this “signaling mechanism” appears to be more effective among all immigrants than the Latin American and Mexican immigrant populations. Therefore, if a state wishes to signal its openness to Mexican and Latino legal immigrants in particular, it should devise other ways to attract these groups.

Based upon the findings of this paper, there are several additional routes for further study. Firstly, this study’s “control” variables can be refined through the study of the mean date of entry of foreign-born groups living in the U.S. It would be very interesting to see if immigrants are attracted to states in which foreign-born groups have resided in the U.S. longer due to the relatively greater amount of job connections and wealth that older immigrant groups hold in the United States. Secondly, further polling could shed more light into one of the most interesting findings of this paper—that immigrants do respond to “positive” signals on the state level, but do not respond to measures meant to encourage new legal immigrants to settle elsewhere. Lastly, further studies could also better identify the types of social and educational spending that are the most attractive to entering legal immigrants. If more legal immigrants choose enter a state because it spends more on food subsidies than housing assistance, for example, state spending policy could be much more specially targeted to attract or discourage additional legal immigrants.

If the results of this paper can be corroborated—and there is ample evidence to suggest that they can be—this study is of much benefit to America’s immigration debate. Future supporters of Proposition 187-style legislation will have to admit that such legislation will not stem the tide of nearly 90% of all immigration to the U.S.—the tide of legal immigration. Therefore, anti-illegal immigrant propositions will do little to prevent the “bifurcated society” and loss of “Anglo-American values” that deeply worries some in American political circles. If these activists do indeed wish to “save their country,” they must find other ways to accomplish their goal.

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Appendix A: Latin American and Binary Variable Definitions

Latin American Countries	Border States All Years	States With Proposition 187-Like Measures			States Giving Extra Benefits to Illegal Immigrants			States Considering Anti-Illegal Immigration Legislation		
		2000	2003	2006	2000	2003	2006	2000	2003	2006
Argentina	Arizona	California	Arizona	Arizona	Maryland	Maryland	Maryland	Alabama	Alabama	Alabama
Bolivia	California		California	California	New Mexico	New Mexico	New Mexico	Arizona	Arizona	Arizona
Brazil	New Mexico			Colorado	New York	New York	New York	Arkansas	Arkansas	Arkansas
Chile	Texas			Virginia	Washington	Washington	Washington	California	California	California
Colombia						Illinois	Illinois	Colorado	Colorado	Colorado
Costa Rica							Rhode Island	Florida	Florida	Florida
Cuba								Georgia	Georgia	Montana
Dominican Republic								Nebraska	Montana	Nebraska
Ecuador								Nevada	Nebraska	North Carolina
El Salvador								North Carolina	Nevada	Virginia
Guatemala								Tennessee	North Carolina	
Honduras								Virginia	Tennessee	
Mexico									Virginia	
Nicaragua									West Virginia	
Panama										
Paraguay										
Peru										
Uruguay										
Venezuela										

Source: Author's Research

Appendix B: Regressions for All Immigrant Groups in 2000, 2003, and 2006

A. 2000 Regressions

1. Total Immigrant Flows

Dependant Variable: Immigrant Flows (persons)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Foreign-Born Population (thousands of persons)	25.40 <i>1.19***</i>	25.30 <i>1.28***</i>	29.27 <i>1.53***</i>	27.37 <i>3.43***</i>	27.02 <i>4.07***</i>	28.74 <i>3.43***</i>	29.38 <i>3.26***</i>	26.46 <i>3.83***</i>
State Population (thousands of persons)	0.18 <i>0.1*</i>	0.26 <i>0.08***</i>	0.10 <i>0.03***</i>	0.31 <i>0.03***</i>	0.89 <i>0.43**</i>	0.11 <i>0.04***</i>	0.05 <i>0.02**</i>	0.16 <i>0.08*</i>
Per Capita Income (hundreds of USD)	20.01 <i>9.17**</i>	22.03 <i>8.77**</i>	21.84 <i>8.99**</i>	24.22 <i>8.82***</i>	23.54 <i>9.34**</i>	6.20 <i>3.48*</i>	20.20 <i>23.13</i>	12.41 <i>9.91</i>
Per Capita Income Growth (%)		403.24 <i>331.17</i>	308.33 <i>221.93</i>	343.55 <i>176.41*</i>	387.03 <i>531.17</i>	352.78 <i>431</i>	359.95 <i>188.35*</i>	
Unemployment (%)		-1298.20 <i>744.09*</i>	-1304.29 <i>678.41*</i>	-1298.66 <i>654.86*</i>	-1298.20 <i>384.09***</i>	-1225.66 <i>291.03***</i>	-1130.91 <i>546.48**</i>	1043.57 <i>538.8*</i>
Total Per Capita Spending (hundreds of USD)		89.18 <i>33.12**</i>	106.50 <i>40.82**</i>		75.35 <i>32.16**</i>			63.58 <i>29.96**</i>
Per Capita Healthcare Spending (hundreds of USD)				26.31 <i>8.19***</i>		28.11 <i>14.52*</i>	22.24 <i>12.09*</i>	
Per Capita Education Spending (hundreds of USD)				57.27 <i>34.04</i>		45.97 <i>32.02</i>	69.49 <i>25.66***</i>	
Border With Mexico			10451.41 <i>4710.88**</i>	10416.83 <i>4681.65**</i>	10422.38 <i>4675.65**</i>		10416.83 <i>4681.65**</i>	10846.08 <i>4467.95**</i>
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted			-19224.18 <i>19570.46</i>	-20243.44 <i>24595.49</i>	-20491.21 <i>20233.49</i>	-25295.95 <i>24595.49</i>	-20491.21 <i>19898.45</i>	-23244.16 <i>23032.51</i>
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered				-1239.14 <i>1706.24</i>	-934.27 <i>834.3</i>	1109.14 <i>1706.24</i>	934.27 <i>1460.98</i>	1908.47 <i>1223.46</i>
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants			4217.37 <i>1827.52**</i>	4315.12 <i>2093.66**</i>	4248.90 <i>1942.92**</i>	4611.12 <i>2693.66*</i>	4248.90 <i>2136.95*</i>	5624.31 <i>3187.62*</i>
Intercept	-4306.33 <i>2758.15</i>	5713.30 <i>14360.19</i>	14648.48 <i>12615.07</i>	99722.37 <i>19055.15***</i>	12438.15 <i>12454.15</i>	8434.37 <i>11725.15</i>	12438.15 <i>11403.29</i>	6209.95 <i>6450.2</i>
F-Value	668.25	217.60	217.60	311.80	301.99	341.80	422.51	439.86
R-Squared	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
Number of Observations	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00
Heteroskedasticity?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in italics. Bold signifies significance.
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%

2. Mexican Immigrant Flows

Dependant Variable: Mexican Immigrant Flows (persons)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Foreign-Born Mexican Population (thousands of persons)	22.03 <i>1.39***</i>	21.88 <i>1.45***</i>	16.41 <i>0.54***</i>	16.40 <i>0.79***</i>	23.63 <i>1.39***</i>	23.64 <i>1.35***</i>	23.96 <i>1.44***</i>	16.68 <i>0.75***</i>	16.51 <i>0.82***</i>
State Population (thousands of persons)	0.08 <i>0.06</i>	0.08 <i>0.06</i>	0.07 <i>0.02***</i>	0.07 <i>0.02***</i>	0.06 <i>0.01***</i>	0.14 <i>0.08*</i>	0.13 <i>0.08</i>	-0.02 <i>0.04</i>	0.11 <i>0.04***</i>
Per Capita Income (hundreds of USD)	11.62 <i>4.75**</i>	10.06 <i>4.84**</i>	10.42 <i>2.75***</i>	10.43 <i>5.6*</i>	14.61 <i>5.05***</i>	13.31 <i>6.3**</i>	14.75 <i>8.69*</i>	11.23 <i>4.08***</i>	11.23 <i>2.65***</i>
Per Capita Income Growth (%)	140.13 <i>98.91</i>	207.42 <i>129.61</i>	-38.48 <i>48.3</i>	-38.28 <i>47.18</i>	168.97 <i>106.93</i>	170.66 <i>96.35*</i>			1.90 <i>42.64</i>
Unemployment (%)		-254.60 <i>72.01***</i>	-146.53 <i>92.94</i>	-142.85 <i>93.43</i>	-237.28 <i>40.83***</i>	-179.85 <i>54.27***</i>	-207.23 <i>128.62</i>	-101.93 <i>129.39</i>	-146.16 <i>71.17**</i>
Total Per Capita Spending (hundreds of USD)						15.12 <i>5.89**</i>	16.39 <i>7.78**</i>	13.31 <i>3.03***</i>	
Per Capita Healthcare Spending (hundreds of USD)		112.82 <i>17.34***</i>	50.04 <i>19.98**</i>	50.06 <i>30.99</i>	79.78 <i>49.92</i>				19.01 <i>6.16***</i>
Per Capita Education Spending (hundreds of USD)		16.77 <i>8.77*</i>	17.18 <i>7.57**</i>	17.19 <i>11.12</i>	19.49 <i>8.39**</i>				23.59 <i>10.43**</i>
Border With Mexico				3013.92 <i>905.4***</i>	3614.54 <i>1162.26***</i>	3675.42 <i>1168.06***</i>	3988.04 <i>1298.67***</i>	3643.77 <i>846.67***</i>	3323.71 <i>942.24***</i>
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted			-24107.48 <i>11511.48**</i>	-24124.14 <i>1806.36***</i>				-23230.16 <i>1606.12***</i>	-23513.61 <i>1865.45***</i>
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered			-447.97 <i>305.5</i>	-448.32 <i>307.49</i>	525.65 <i>944.82</i>	639.52 <i>889.45</i>	353.01 <i>757.15</i>		
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants			478.84 <i>226.35**</i>	474.67 <i>299.49</i>	1978.61 <i>962.26**</i>	1888.66 <i>922.12**</i>	1942.22 <i>849.96**</i>	1543.53 <i>469.64***</i>	1539.74 <i>479.86***</i>
Intercept	-707.73 <i>823.233</i>	139.06 <i>2265.853</i>	1015.91 <i>1341.983</i>	1009.99 <i>1280.961</i>	1401.45 <i>2145.184</i>	-52.50 <i>1138.005</i>	1113.37 <i>1145.369</i>	-179.56 <i>613.984</i>	-40.30 <i>1226.152</i>
F-Value	73.08	37.87	40.18	54.84	46.09	56.40	62.45	52.05	48.66
R-Squared	0.98	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00
Number of Observations	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
Heteroskedasticity?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in italics. Bold signifies significance.
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%

B. 2003 Regressions

1. Total Immigrant Flows

Dependant Variable: Immigrant Flows (persons)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Foreign-Born Population (thousands of persons)	18.62 <i>0.69***</i>	19.30 <i>0.92***</i>	19.20 <i>0.59***</i>	19.18 <i>0.57***</i>	20.02 <i>0.82***</i>
State Population (thousands of persons)	0.11 <i>0.02***</i>	0.09 <i>0.03***</i>	0.06 <i>0.02***</i>	0.07 <i>0.03**</i>	0.08 <i>0.02***</i>
Per Capita Income (hundreds of USD)	30.45 <i>13.34**</i>	27.52 <i>12.83**</i>	16.95 <i>9.6*</i>	16.79 <i>9.92*</i>	16.82 <i>9.91*</i>
Per Capita Income Growth (%)		555.14 <i>307.99*</i>	141.12 <i>154.2</i>	139.09 <i>153.72</i>	281.90 <i>151.17*</i>
Unemployment (%)	-150.26 <i>87.11*</i>	-253.54 <i>120.03**</i>	-47.11 <i>23.1**</i>	-62.34 <i>32.08*</i>	-81.15 <i>45.37*</i>
Total Per Capita Spending (hundreds of USD)		17.18 <i>5.95***</i>			25.54 <i>6.63***</i>
Per Capita Healthcare Spending (hundreds of USD)			252.53 <i>124.57**</i>	240.72 <i>106.13**</i>	
Per Capita Education Spending (hundreds of USD)			60.53 <i>25.57**</i>	55.89 <i>24.13**</i>	
Border With Mexico		10349.02 <i>122.54***</i>	10983.46 <i>2104.05***</i>	11017.08 <i>2162.54***</i>	7782.31 <i>2750.53***</i>
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted		-7430.30 6322.47	-7447.04 6319.81	-7574.90 6466.91	
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered		-153.95 837.82		-182.27 887.81	-341.61 974.31
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants		8003.45 <i>2152.03***</i>	7699.46 <i>2001.7***</i>	7681.73 <i>2027.05***</i>	6718.75 <i>1610.83***</i>
Intercept	-8425.56 <i>4443.54*</i>	-8526.60 <i>5840.777</i>	-7444.80 <i>5285.887</i>	-7138.12 <i>5444.461</i>	-5837.49 <i>5512.819</i>
F-Value	923.85	720.17	4580.78	4182.81	991.51
R-Squared	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00
Number of Observations	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00
Heteroskedasticity?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in italics. Bold signifies significance.
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%

2. Latin American Immigrant Flows

Dependant Variable: Latin American Immigrant Flows (persons)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Foreign-Born Latin American Population (thousands of persons)	15.45 <i>1.27***</i>	15.83 <i>1.34***</i>	15.48 <i>1.28***</i>	15.46 <i>1.28***</i>	15.99 <i>1.53***</i>
State Population (thousands of persons)	0.08 <i>0.03**</i>	0.14 <i>0.1</i>	0.12 <i>0.06*</i>	0.11 <i>0.04***</i>	0.15 <i>0.12</i>
Per Capita Income (hundreds of USD)	3.26 <i>1.42**</i>	3.27 <i>1.67*</i>	3.54 <i>1.47**</i>	4.46 <i>1.27***</i>	3.09 <i>0.93***</i>
Per Capita Income Growth (%)		101.99 <i>96.48</i>	69.97 <i>33.3**</i>	35.95 <i>70.03</i>	88.12 <i>41.76**</i>
Unemployment (%)	-135.75 <i>79.35*</i>	-107.09 <i>45.81**</i>	-72.46 <i>13.31***</i>	-49.16 <i>18.73**</i>	-64.16 <i>16.49***</i>
Total Per Capita Spending (hundreds of USD)			39.90 <i>16.84**</i>	36.17 <i>16.46**</i>	
Per Capita Healthcare Spending (hundreds of USD)		85.54 <i>39.91**</i>			106.56 <i>47.09**</i>
Per Capita Education Spending (hundreds of USD)		35.15 <i>12.04***</i>			38.83 <i>18.5**</i>
Border With Mexico			3722.82 <i>1764.13**</i>	3764.82 <i>1823.92**</i>	536.09 <i>1945.12</i>
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted			-6902.95 <i>5619.86</i>	-7077.59 <i>6708.32</i>	-173.27 <i>711.53</i>
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered				-300.93 <i>585.8</i>	-281.93 <i>322.4</i>
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants			935.80 <i>528.78*</i>	897.94 <i>468.48*</i>	879.16 <i>302.79***</i>
Intercept	-1085.95 <i>1525.044</i>	-2051.27 <i>2813.683</i>	-4112.97 <i>2713.352</i>	-3590.50 <i>2380.397</i>	-2412.92 <i>2439.069</i>
F-Value	73.90	47.47	77.96	68.95	45.26
R-Squared	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.99	0.98
Number of Observations	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00
Heteroskedasticity?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in italics. Bold signifies significance.
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%

3. Mexican Immigrant Flows

Dependant Variable: Mexican Immigrant Flows (persons)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Foreign-Born Mexican Population (thousands of persons)	12.91 <i>0.48***</i>	13.03 <i>0.49***</i>	13.29 <i>0.41***</i>	13.28 <i>0.42***</i>	13.51 <i>0.51***</i>
State Population (thousands of persons)	0.05 <i>0.02**</i>	0.06 <i>0.02***</i>	0.07 <i>0.02***</i>	0.07 <i>0.02***</i>	0.08 <i>0.03**</i>
Per Capita Income (hundreds of USD)	2.25 <i>1.1**</i>	2.50 <i>1.32*</i>	1.87 <i>1.08*</i>	1.92 <i>1.06*</i>	1.71 <i>0.67**</i>
Per Capita Income Growth (%)		60.01 35.82	55.24 <i>20.22***</i>	54.49 <i>20.48**</i>	48.33 29.32
Unemployment (%)	-102.55 <i>58.38*</i>	-135.51 <i>65.61**</i>	-49.72 <i>20.53**</i>	-54.16 <i>20.78**</i>	-110.75 <i>51.43**</i>
Total Per Capita Spending (hundreds of USD)			5.28 <i>2.56**</i>	4.53 <i>2.48*</i>	
Per Capita Healthcare Spending (hundreds of USD)		11.49 <i>2.5***</i>			13.63 <i>3.72***</i>
Per Capita Education Spending (hundreds of USD)		12.46 <i>4.93**</i>			16.15 <i>9.34*</i>
Border With Mexico			2093.78 <i>761.49***</i>	2096.29 <i>780.99**</i>	1093.14 <i>622.52*</i>
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted			2430.79 <i>1991.55</i>	2470.27 <i>31022.43</i>	2670.27 <i>5002.43</i>
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered				279.40 <i>264.09</i>	111.22 <i>328.63</i>
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants			721.31 <i>287.72**</i>	709.15 <i>303.17**</i>	719.33 <i>291.97**</i>
Intercept	43.99 <i>597.386</i>	399.70 <i>832.967</i>	-171.19 <i>583.442</i>	-65.20 <i>608.529</i>	450.50 <i>728.019</i>
F-Value	163.66	114.88	320.82	284.39	116.01
R-Squared	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00
Number of Observations	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00
Heteroskedasticity?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in italics. Bold signifies significance.
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%

C. 2006 Regressions

1. Total Immigrant Flows

Dependant Variable: Immigrant Flows (persons)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Foreign-Born Population (thousands of persons)	21.65 <i>4.62***</i>	21.40 <i>5.6***</i>	25.89 <i>4.54***</i>	25.72 <i>4.58***</i>	25.64 <i>4.59***</i>
State Population (thousands of persons)	1.90 <i>1.01*</i>	1.90 <i>1.06*</i>	1.73 <i>0.57***</i>	1.67 <i>0.54***</i>	1.72 <i>0.62***</i>
Per Capita Income (hundreds of USD)	5.54 <i>2.65**</i>	2.99 <i>0.84***</i>	9.88 <i>5.7*</i>	13.10 <i>6.49*</i>	11.82 <i>5.15**</i>
Per Capita Income Growth (%)		60.40 <i>32.41*</i>	47.54 28.7	32.06 26.59	41.78 <i>22.01*</i>
Unemployment (%)	-7642.28 <i>4166.95*</i>	-8657.19 <i>4691.28*</i>	-6241.32 <i>3071.84**</i>	-6006.79 <i>2981.78*</i>	-5951.87 <i>3028.67*</i>
Total Per Capita Spending (hundreds of USD)		371.85 <i>216.48*</i>			333.88 <i>196.75*</i>
Per Capita Healthcare Spending (hundreds of USD)			390.99 <i>130.59***</i>	376.15 <i>149.18**</i>	
Per Capita Education Spending (hundreds of USD)			32.68 <i>15.16**</i>	47.07 <i>11.11***</i>	
Border With Mexico			34983.29 <i>10958.66***</i>	32991.22 <i>15918.24**</i>	34697.87 <i>10297.22***</i>
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted		-1588.44 <i>7856.05</i>	-211.93 <i>7367.12</i>	-2964.94 <i>8344.97</i>	
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered				3784.82 <i>5867.81</i>	2509.32 <i>5106.62</i>
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants			11568.89 <i>5755.14*</i>	12061.91 <i>6000.06*</i>	12127.54 <i>6720.49*</i>
Intercept	522.65 <i>19222.02</i>	7091.86 <i>32038.57</i>	23815.94 <i>30699.72</i>	15277.71 <i>32582.56</i>	16959.29 <i>33720.29</i>
F-Value	36.83	30.73	35.95	36.35	40.43
R-Squared	0.95	0.95	0.97	0.97	0.97
Number of Observations	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00
Heteroskedasticity?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in italics. Bold signifies significance.
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%

2. Latin American Immigrant Flows

Dependant Variable: Latin American Immigrant Flows (persons)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Foreign-Born Latin American Population (thousands of persons)	19.90 <i>4.25***</i>	17.89 <i>3.66***</i>	23.46 <i>5.57***</i>	23.37 <i>5.71***</i>	23.76 <i>5.79***</i>
State Population (thousands of persons)	0.11 <i>0.03***</i>	0.41 <i>0.12***</i>	0.19 <i>0.05***</i>	0.18 <i>0.09*</i>	0.17 <i>0.09*</i>
Per Capita Income (hundreds of USD)	9.47 <i>7.99</i>	11.67 <i>3.53***</i>	18.85 <i>5.17***</i>	18.03 <i>5.61***</i>	20.28 <i>4.8***</i>
Per Capita Income Growth (%)		172.73 <i>78.74**</i>	150.73 <i>138.91</i>	130.47 <i>58.02**</i>	142.67 <i>145.96</i>
Unemployment (%)	-3020.33 <i>1033.39***</i>	-3187.15 <i>1449.89**</i>	-2289.48 <i>1033.8**</i>	-2235.73 <i>1285.51*</i>	-2086.04 <i>1016.44**</i>
Total Per Capita Spending (hundreds of USD)			84.87 <i>21.05***</i>	91.23 <i>30.28***</i>	
Per Capita Healthcare Spending (hundreds of USD)		708.16 <i>340.4**</i>			985.05 <i>418.29**</i>
Per Capita Education Spending (hundreds of USD)		427.33 <i>241.2*</i>			171.31 <i>88.96*</i>
Border With Mexico			20321.27 <i>10321.09*</i>	19779.01 <i>9121.88**</i>	22270.07 <i>12507.76*</i>
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted		-3398.54 <i>5797.84</i>	-3037.48 <i>5340.19</i>	-3759.59 <i>6255.49</i>	-3398.53 <i>5797.84</i>
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered		-823.88 <i>3724.625</i>		-960.02 <i>3989.86</i>	-687.73 <i>3459.39</i>
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants			2070.45 <i>561.9***</i>	1960.10 <i>962.56**</i>	1828.69 <i>969.35*</i>
Intercept	8701.97 <i>13224.44</i>	19309.96 <i>25782.16</i>	24954.24 <i>24692.78</i>	22855.63 <i>26068.11</i>	25018.92 <i>27790.21</i>
F-Value	29.11	16.35	34.67	30.69	33.21
R-Squared	0.89	0.90	0.93	0.93	0.93
Number of Observations	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00
Heteroskedasticity?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Standard errors are in italics. Bold signifies significance.
***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%

3. Mexican Immigrant Flows

Dependant Variable: Mexican Immigrant Flows (persons)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Foreign-Born Mexican Population (thousands of persons)	15.19 <i>0.15***</i>	15.16 <i>0.13***</i>	14.80 <i>0.15***</i>	14.79 <i>0.15***</i>	14.79 <i>0.15***</i>
State Population (thousands of persons)	0.10 <i>0.02***</i>	0.19 <i>0.02***</i>	0.30 <i>0.15*</i>	0.40 <i>0.2*</i>	0.40 <i>0.23*</i>
Per Capita Income (hundreds of USD)	11.29 <i>4.57**</i>	13.40 <i>5.62**</i>	12.93 <i>7.67*</i>	13.24 <i>6.91*</i>	13.17 <i>6.88*</i>
Per Capita Income Growth (%)		1.66 <i>1.23</i>	0.44 <i>8.85</i>	9.29 <i>2.72***</i>	8.79 <i>2.53***</i>
Unemployment (%)	-770.41 <i>310.9**</i>	-501.75 <i>191.54**</i>	-828.61 <i>473.48*</i>	-918.49 <i>302.16***</i>	-922.30 <i>300.99***</i>
Total Per Capita Spending (hundreds of USD)			26.46 <i>13.12*</i>	27.92 <i>13.85*</i>	
Per Capita Healthcare Spending (hundreds of USD)		43.42 <i>12.07***</i>			62.06 <i>29.12**</i>
Per Capita Education Spending (hundreds of USD)		23.41 <i>11.74*</i>			13.20 <i>5.59**</i>
Border With Mexico			1947.10 <i>357.47***</i>	1755.08 <i>388.11***</i>	1841.70 <i>360.15***</i>
Proposition 187-Like Measure Enacted			-250.64 <i>152.01</i>	-157.66 <i>354.09</i>	-204.15 <i>101.04**</i>
Anti-Illegal Immigrant Legislation Considered				-417.51 <i>312.23</i>	-348.74 <i>236.07</i>
Extra State Benefits Given to Illegal Immigrants			456.26 <i>252.75*</i>	513.93 <i>238.47**</i>	515.55 <i>234.67**</i>
Intercept	110.32 <i>577.852</i>	446.81 <i>732.785</i>	167.57 <i>733.015</i>	1089.20 <i>1043.354</i>	996.91 <i>1006.604</i>
F-Value	21692.13	19481.78	25621.66	17666.63	13889.77
R-Squared	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Number of Observations	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00	51.00
Heteroskedasticity?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

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***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%