

# Executive Summary Background

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## Time for a New United Nations Peacekeeping Organization

*Brett D. Schaefer*

One of the United Nations' primary responsibilities is to maintain international peace and security, and the U.N. Charter places principal responsibility for this task on the U.N. Security Council. The Charter gives the Security Council extensive powers to investigate disputes, to call on disputing parties to settle the conflict peacefully, to impose mandatory economic and diplomatic sanctions, and ultimately to use military force.

Traditionally, U.N. peace operations deployed in support of Security Council resolutions have involved relatively low-risk situations such as truce monitoring. However, since the end of the Cold War, U.N. peace operations have become more common and frequently involve more robust deployments in which peacekeepers are at greater risk. The unprecedented frequency and size of recent U.N. deployments and the resulting financial demands have overwhelmed the capabilities of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and other U.N. departments supporting peace operations, leading to serious problems of mismanagement, misconduct, poor planning, corruption, sexual abuse, unclear mandates, and other weaknesses.

**Increased U.N. Peacekeeping Deployments.** The size and expense of U.N. peace operations rose to unprecedented levels in 2006 and will likely rise even higher in 2007.

- As of October 2006, the estimated budget for the DPKO—just one department in the U.N.

Secretariat—from July 1, 2006, to June 30, 2007, was approximately \$4.75 billion. Expenditures could reach as high as \$7 billion if U.N. missions in East Timor, Darfur, and Lebanon become fully operational. By comparison, the annualized regular budget for the rest of the Secretariat was \$1.9 billion in 2006.

- As of February 2007, there were 16 U.N. peacekeeping operations led by the DPKO and another two political missions directed and supported by the DPKO. The 16 peacekeeping missions involved 80,094 uniformed personnel, including 68,923 troops, 2,446 military observers, and 8,675 police personnel. The total number of U.N., local, and volunteer personnel serving in 18 DPKO-led peace operations was 101,642 individuals. These operations involved the deployment of more uniformed personnel than are deployed by any single nation in the world other than the United States.

**DPKO Problems.** The U.N. has taken some steps to address the management and oversight failings, but many problems remain. Some of the more serious problems include:

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- **Mismanagement, fraud, and corruption.** An Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) audit of \$1 billion in DPKO procurement contracts over a six-year period found that at least \$265 million was subject to waste, fraud, or abuse. The Department of Management and the DPKO accepted a majority of the 32 OIOS audit recommendations, but a number of disagreements remain, and it remains to be seen whether the new procedures are sufficient to prevent a recurrence of fraud and corruption.
- **Sexual misconduct.** In recent years, there have been harrowing reports of U.N. personnel committing crimes ranging from rape to forced prostitution of women and young girls in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Guinea, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. Sexual exploitation and abuse in U.N. operations undermine the credibility of U.N. peace operations and must be addressed through an effective plan and commitment to end abuses and ensure accountability. Prince Zeid Ra'ad Al-Hussein of Jordan submitted a report to the Secretary-General making recommendations on how to address the sexual abuse problem. The General Assembly adopted the recommendations in principle in June 2005, and some recommendations have been implemented. However, countries continue to fail to investigate, try, and punish those guilty of such crimes.
- **Unclear mandate for the use of force.** Uncertainty over rules of engagement and peacekeepers' responsibilities to protect civilians contributed to situations such as the tragic decisions to stand down in the face of atrocities in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995, U.N. peacekeepers being taken hostage, and the inability to quickly support U.S. personnel in Somalia in 1993. As U.N. peace operations become more robust and missions are charged with peace enforcement and other responsibilities that will likely result in military action, the mission mandates must more clearly provide robust mission statements and rules of engagement that permit the use of lethal force to protect peacekeepers, civilians, and mission objectives. The U.N. has addressed some of these issues, but uncertainty remains over lines of

authority, permissible defensive use of force, and when aggressive action is permitted.

- **Unreliable troop contributions.** Because the U.N. has no standing armed forces, it is entirely dependent on the willingness of member states to donate troops and personnel to fulfill peace operation mandates. Nations should maintain control of their armed forces, and establishing armed forces without national oversight is not recommended. However, this arrangement makes raising personnel for U.N. peace operations difficult. The U.N. needs a better system for identifying, locating, and securing qualified troops and personnel for its operations.

**A Possible Solution.** Just tinkering with the U.N. bureaucracy will not resolve these serious ongoing problems, and the slow and arduous process of Charter reform is not necessary. Instead, establishing a new, independent U.N. Peacekeeping Organization (UNPKO) overseen by an Executive Peacekeeping Board and charged with managing, implementing, and overseeing peace operations authorized by the Security Council could make U.N. peace operations more coherent, transparent, efficient, and accountable. An independent UNPKO could immediately adopt modern management, procurement, logistical, and oversight practices, sidestepping the management and human resources deadlock in the General Assembly.

**Conclusion.** U.N. peacekeeping problems are serious and need to be addressed, and the Administration and Congress need to consider carefully any requests by the United Nations for additional funding for a system in which procurement problems have wasted millions of dollars and sexual abuse by peacekeepers is still occurring. Merely tinkering with the U.N. bureaucracy will not solve the problems. Without fundamental reform, these problems will likely continue and expand, undermining the U.N.'s credibility and ability to accomplish one of its primary missions—maintaining international peace and security.

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# Background

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## Time for a New United Nations Peacekeeping Organization

*Brett D. Schaefer*

One of the United Nations' primary responsibilities—and one with which most Americans agree—is to maintain international peace and security, but the United Nations has come under increasing criticism, both within the United States and around the world, for its inability to keep the peace where peace is most needed. The U.N. Charter places principal responsibility for this task on the U.N. Security Council.<sup>1</sup> The Charter gives the Security Council extensive powers to investigate disputes to determine whether they endanger international peace and security; to call on participants in a dispute to settle the conflict through peaceful negotiation; to impose mandatory economic, travel, and diplomatic sanctions; and ultimately to authorize the use of military force.

Traditionally, United Nations-led operations have involved deployments into relatively low-risk situations such as truce monitoring. U.N. peace operations were rare during the organization's first 45 years, and missions were rarely authorized with the expectation of the use of force. Since the end of the Cold War, however, U.N. peace operations have become more common and frequently involve more robust deployments with greater risk to the peacekeepers, and these deployments have met with mixed success.

In general, the U.N. and its member states have accepted the fact—in the wake of the Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Sierra Leone missions in which there was no peace to keep—that U.N. peace operations should not include a mandate to enforce peace outside of limited circumstances and should focus instead on assist-

### Talking Points

- In general, U.N. peace operations have proven to be a means for the U.S. to intervene in situations that affect U.S. national interests but do not require direct U.S. intervention.
- The unprecedented frequency and size of recent U.N. deployments since the end of the Cold War and resulting financial demands have overwhelmed the capabilities of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, leading to mismanagement and corruption, misconduct and sexual abuse, poor planning and unclear mandates, and other weaknesses.
- Without fundamental reform, these problems will likely continue and expand as new responsibilities are given to U.N. peacekeepers.
- An independent U.N. Peacekeeping Organization overseen by an Executive Peacekeeping Board charged with managing, implementing, and overseeing peace operations authorized by the Security Council and reporting to the Security Council on their status is the best way to make U.N. peace operations more coherent, transparent, efficient, and accountable.

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ing countries to shift from conflict to a negotiated peace and from peace agreements to legitimate governance and development.<sup>2</sup> As noted in the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (the Brahimi Report):

[T]he United Nations does not wage war. Where enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter.<sup>3</sup>

Yet the situations short of war that may involve a U.N. peace operation are often rife with danger and subject to great demands in personnel, resources, and management.

The unprecedented frequency and size of recent U.N. deployments and the resulting financial demands have challenged the willingness of member states to contribute troops and uniformed personnel in support of U.N. peace operations and have overwhelmed the capabilities of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and other parts of the Secretariat like the Department of Management that have a role in supporting peace operations, leading to mismanagement, misconduct, poor planning, corruption, sexual abuse, unclear mandates, and other weaknesses. The Administration and Congress need to consider carefully any requests by the United Nations for additional funding for a system in which procurement problems have wasted millions of dollars, sexual abuse by personnel participating in U.N. peace operations is still occurring, and significant problems challenge the ability of the U.N. to fulfill the objectives of peace operations efficiently and effectively.

Just tinkering with the U.N. bureaucracy will not

resolve these serious ongoing problems, but Charter reform, a slow and arduous process fraught with political pitfalls, is not necessary. Instead, establishing a new, independent U.N. Peacekeeping Organization (UNPKO) overseen by an Executive Peacekeeping Board of member states that contribute heavily to U.N. peace operations and charged with planning, managing, and overseeing peace operations authorized by the Security Council could make U.N. peace operations more coherent, transparent, efficient, and accountable and give more influence to the countries that contribute greatly to U.N. peace operations. As a new, independent organization, the UNPKO could immediately adopt modern management, procurement, logistical, and oversight practices, sidestepping the deadlock in the General Assembly over management and human resources that has stalled broader U.N. reform.

Before laying out the structure and methods for establishing such a new organization, it is necessary to outline why such a reform is needed now, why the current system is no longer sufficient, and how such a revitalized U.N. peacekeeping organization could best be instituted, given the political environment at the United Nations.

## Evolution of U.N. Peace Operations

Article I of the U.N. Charter states that a primary purpose of United Nations is:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or

1. Charter of the United Nations, Article 24, at [www.un.org/aboutun/charter](http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter) (February 1, 2007).
2. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 20, at [www.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8196.pdf](http://www.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8196.pdf) (February 6, 2007); James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga Timilsina, "The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq," RAND Corporation, 2005, p. xvi, at [www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND\\_MG304.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG304.pdf) (February 1, 2007); and Victoria K. Holt, testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, May 18, 2005, at [www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/hol051805.pdf](http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/hol051805.pdf) (February 1, 2007).
3. U.N. General Assembly and U.N. Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000, p. 10, at [www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/docs/a\\_55\\_305.pdf](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/docs/a_55_305.pdf) (February 6, 2007).

settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.<sup>4</sup>

The Charter outlines only a limited role for the General Assembly in maintaining international peace and security:

The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security...may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it...may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both...[and] may call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.<sup>5</sup>

In addition, “the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations.”<sup>6</sup>

The Charter clearly places the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and secu-

rity on the Security Council, specifying that the General Assembly shall refer any question about the maintenance of international peace and security to the Security Council. The Charter also restrains the General Assembly from making recommendations if the Security Council is dealing with the matter, except upon request of the Security Council.<sup>7</sup>

Security Council powers in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security are clearly defined in the Charter. The Security Council can “call upon the parties to settle their dispute”; “investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute”; seek a solution through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement; resort to regional agencies or arrangements; enforce peace through sanctions or use of force; and call on member states to render assistance.<sup>8</sup>

In matters of international peace and security, the U.N. Security Council was envisioned as responsible for approving and using force to address threats to international peace and security, except for the inherent right of every state to defend itself if attacked, if facing an imminent attack, or if facing an immediate threat, which the Charter explicitly acknowledges.<sup>9</sup> This robust, activist role for the

4. Charter of the United Nations, Article 1.

5. *Ibid.*, Article 11.

6. *Ibid.*, Article 14.

7. *Ibid.*, Articles 11 and 12. Even so, the General Assembly has acted on matters of international peace and security. For instance, in 1950, notwithstanding Article 12 of the U.N. Charter, the General Assembly debated and passed Resolution 377 (Uniting for Peace Resolution), which states: “[I]f the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The United States initiated this resolution as a means of circumventing possible Soviet vetoes regarding the Korean War. See *Uniting for Peace, 377(V)*, U.N. General Assembly, 5th Sess., 302nd plenary meeting, November 3, 1950, at [www.un.org/Depts/dhl/landmark/pdf/ares377e.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/landmark/pdf/ares377e.pdf) (February 1, 2007).

8. Charter of the United Nations, Articles 33–38 and 41–43. In reference to the relevant U.N. Charter chapters, U.N. peace operations are often referred to as Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations. Chapter VI operations are generally undertaken with the consent of the major parties to a dispute and are charged with monitoring and facilitating a peace agreement, providing buffer support for a cease-fire, or supporting diplomatic negotiations to establish long-term political settlement. Chapter VI operations are ambiguous, but troops and personnel are expected to avoid violence and not participate in the conflict. Chapter VII peace operations (or peace enforcement operations), while generally falling short of war, are more robust than Chapter VI operations and use or threaten the use of military force to encourage compliance with Security Council resolutions or sanctions or to maintain or restore peace and order. There are also so-called Chapter VI ½ operations that fall between the two categories.

organization quickly ran athwart the interests of the member states, particularly during the Cold War when opposing alliances prevented the council from taking decisive action except when the interests of the major powers were minimal.

As a result, between 1945 and 1990, the Security Council established only 18 peace operations, despite a multitude of conflicts during that period that threatened international peace and security to greater or lesser degree.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the bulk of these peace operations were fact-finding missions, observer missions, and other roles in assisting peace processes in which the parties had agreed to cease hostilities. For example, the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was established in 1948 to observe the cease-fire agreements among Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel and still operates today.

Interestingly, the first venture into peacekeeping was taken by the General Assembly in 1956 after the Security Council was unable to reach a consensus on the Suez Crisis. The General Assembly established the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF I) to separate Egyptian and Israeli forces and to facilitate the transition of the Suez Canal when British and French forces left. Because the UNEF resolutions were not passed under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, Egypt had to approve the deployment. The UNTSO and UNEF I missions are examples of “traditional” U.N. peace operations:

[Such missions are characterized by] the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, with the consent of all the parties concerned, as a confidence building measure to monitor a truce while diplomats negotiated a comprehensive peace. Peacekeeping was therefore designed as an interim arrangement where there was no formal determination of aggression, and was frequently used

to monitor a truce, establish and police a buffer zone, and assist the negotiation of a peace.... Monitoring and traditional peacekeeping operations were strictly bound by the principle of consent.... It reduces the risk to the peacekeepers and preserves the sovereignty of the host state.<sup>11</sup>

By contrast, U.N. peace enforcement operations “extend from low-level military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the enforcement of cease-fires and, when necessary, authoritative assistance in the rebuilding of so-called failed states.”<sup>12</sup> Such operations are more complex and more dangerous for mission troops and personnel because they may not have the support of the government or all parties involved in the conflict.

The first U.N. venture into peace enforcement was the U.N. Operation in the Congo (1960–1964), in which U.N.-led forces confronted a mutiny by Congolese armed forces against the government, sought to maintain the Congo’s territorial integrity, and tried to prevent civil war after the province of Katanga seceded. According to a RAND Corporation study:

UN achievements in the Congo came at considerable cost in men lost, money spent, and controversy raised.... As a result of these costs and controversies, neither the United Nations’ leadership nor its member nations were eager to repeat the experience. For the next 25 years the United Nations restricted its military interventions to interpositional peacekeeping, policing ceasefires, and patrolling disengagement zones in circumstances where all parties invited its presence and armed force was to be used by UN troops only in self-defense.<sup>13</sup>

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.N. Security Council has been far more active in establishing peace


9. Charter of the United Nations, Article 51.

10. Since 1945, there have been approximately 300 wars, resulting in over 22 million deaths. The U.N. has authorized military action to counter aggression just twice: in response to the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

11. Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, pp. 13–14.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

13. Dobbins *et al.*, “The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq,” p. xvi.



operations. The Security Council has approved over 40 new peace operations since 1990. (See Chart 1.) These new operations often involved a dramatic expansion in scope, purpose, and responsibilities beyond traditional peace operations. Moreover, these missions reflected a change in the nature of conflict from interstate conflict between nations to intrastate conflict within states by authorizing a number of missions focused on quelling civil wars, instability, or other violence within a nation.<sup>14</sup> This trend was pursued despite questions about territorial inviolability espoused in the Charter, which states:

Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to inter-

vene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.<sup>15</sup>

Such issues were circumvented through the exercise of Chapter VII of the Charter and justified by pointing out the international consequences of the conflict, such as refugees fleeing to neighboring countries, or the necessity of upholding international human rights standards in the country. While such actions may be justified in some cases, they

14. According to one estimate, 80 percent of all wars from 1900 to 1941 were conflicts between states involving formal state armies, while 85 percent of all wars from 1945 to 1976 were within the territory of a single state and involved internal armies, militias, rebels, or other parties to the conflict. See Charter of the United Nations, Article 2, and Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, p. 11.

15. Charter of the United Nations, Article 2.

represent a dramatic shift from earlier doctrine and interpretation of the Charter. As a result, from a rather modest history of monitoring cease-fires, demilitarized zones, and post-conflict security, U.N. peace operations have expanded to include multiple responsibilities including robust military interventions, civilian police duties, human rights interventions, reconstruction, overseeing elections, and post-conflict reconstruction.

As of February 2007, there were 16 U.N. peace operations led by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and another two political missions (in Afghanistan and Sierra Leone) directed and supported by the DPKO. Half of these operations were in Africa; one was in Latin America (Haiti); two were in Europe (Kosovo and Cyprus); and the remaining missions were in Asia and the Middle East. The 16 peace operations involved 80,094 uniformed personnel, including 68,923 troops, 2,446 military observers, and 8,675 police personnel. The total number of U.N., local, and volunteer personnel serving in 18 DPKO-led peace operations was 101,642 individuals.<sup>16</sup> (See Chart 2.) The U.N. has more troops deployed than are deployed by any nation in the world, except for the United States.<sup>17</sup>

In general, the U.S. has supported this trend. It contributes the greatest share of funding for the operations and provides logistical and lift capabilities for many missions. Multiple Administrations have concluded that it is in America's interest to support U.N. operations as a useful, cost-effective way to influence situations that affect the U.S. national interest but do not rise to the level of requiring direct U.S. intervention. Although the U.N. peacekeeping record includes significant failures, U.N. peace operations overall have proven to be a convenient multi-

lateral means for addressing humanitarian concerns in situations where conflict or instability make civilians vulnerable to atrocities, for promoting peace efforts, and for supporting the transition to democracy and post-conflict rebuilding.

While the U.S. clearly should support U.N. peacekeeping operations when they support America's national interests, broadening U.N. peace operations into nontraditional missions like peace enforcement and the inability to garner broad international support in terms of troop contributions, logistics support, and funding raise legitimate questions as to whether or not the U.N. should be engaged in the current number of missions and whether these situations are best addressed through the U.N. or through regional, multilateral, or ad hoc efforts, ideally with Security Council support. Concerns are growing that the system for assessing the U.N. peacekeeping budget is inappropriate, given the far larger financial demands of this expanded role for U.N. peacekeeping. Such questions are primarily political questions that can be resolved only by the member states.<sup>18</sup>


Outside the political realm, however, is the fundamental question of whether the system as currently structured is capable of meeting its growing responsibilities. Indisputably, the unprecedented frequency and size of recent U.N. deployments and the resulting financial demands have challenged and overwhelmed the capabilities of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other U.N. departments charged with supporting U.N. peace operations, leading to serious problems of mismanagement, misconduct, poor planning, corruption, sexual abuse, unclear mandates, and other weaknesses.

16. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Note," November 30, 2006, updated February 2007, at [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote010101.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote010101.pdf) (February 8, 2007).

17. "Call the Blue Helmets," *The Economist*, January 4, 2007, pp. 22 and 24, at [www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story\\_id=8490163](http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8490163) (February 1, 2007).

18. The broadening of U.N. peacekeeping into these non-traditional missions and the mixed U.N. record in pursuit of these missions raise legitimate questions as to whether the U.N. should be engaged in these activities. Such a question is beyond the scope of this paper and is primarily a political question that can be resolved by the members of the Security Council, particularly by the permanent members. For more information, see John R. Bolton, "United States Policy on United Nations Peacekeeping: Case Studies in the Congo, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Kosovo and East Timor," testimony before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, January 21, 2000, at [www.aei.org/publications/pubID.17044.filter.all/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.17044.filter.all/pub_detail.asp) (February 1, 2007).





## Problems with U.N. Peacekeeping

U.N. peace operations now include situations that, prior to 1990, were almost exclusively left to national authorities or addressed through unilateral or multilateral interventions outside of the United Nations. The increasing demands of expanded peace operations led the U.N. to establish the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 1992 to plan, manage, deploy, support, and provide executive direction to U.N. peace operations. In short, the DPKO is required to evaluate the requirements of peace operations under consideration, provide recommendations to the Security Council through the Secretary-General, plan the mission, recruit troops and other necessary personnel from contributing

countries, determine equipment and logistical requirements, coordinate pre-deployment training, match mission requirements to the budget, and finally deploy the forces and implement the mission. The DPKO must also maintain liaison with other U.N. partners in-country to coordinate efforts.

The logistical challenges for these operations are immense. Over the past three years alone, nine operations have been established or expanded, and three others are starting up or being expanded.<sup>19</sup> As noted by the DPKO:

In 2005 alone, U.N. peacekeeping operations rotated 161,386 military and police personnel on 864 separate flights, and car-

19. Thalif Deen, "U.N. Chief Moves to Restructure World Body," *Asian Tribune*, January 24, 2007, at [www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/4262](http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/4262) (February 1, 2007).

ried 271,651 cubic meters of cargo. Peacekeeping operations undertook long-term charters on 207 aircraft for the movement of 711,224 passengers within peacekeeping missions and DPKO operated or deployed some 220 medical clinics and 21 military hospitals.<sup>20</sup>

As a result of these expanded responsibilities, former Under-Secretary-General for Management Catherine Bertini observed, “DPKO is a huge operational department. Its current budget is far larger than that of the Secretariat, yet it operates institutionally like a staff department [of the Secretariat].”<sup>21</sup>

As of October 2006, the estimated budget for the DPKO—just one department in the U.N. Secretariat—from July 1, 2006, to June 30, 2007, was \$4.75 billion.<sup>22</sup> Including budgetary requirements for the peacekeeping operations support account and the U.N. logistics base in Italy, the estimated budget from July 1, 2006, to June 30, 2007, was nearly \$5.3 billion as of February 2007.<sup>23</sup> Expenditures could reach as high as \$7 billion if U.N. missions in East Timor, Darfur, and Lebanon become fully operational.<sup>24</sup> By comparison, the annualized regular budget for the rest of the Secretariat was \$1.9 billion in 2006. (See Chart 2.)

All of these peace operations activities are overseen by only 600 headquarters personnel and for the most part continue to operate under restrictions designed for less operational parts of the Secretariat.<sup>25</sup> According to Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno:

I feel that the rules and regulations of the United Nations were designed for a headquarters organization that would run conferences but that would not run field operations. So there is a disconnect between the kind of life that we live in the field, deploying in the middle of nowhere, having to organize bases, and organizing conferences in New York....

What we need is much more...flexibility and a different approach to the management of human resources, for instance so that people can go back and forth between headquarters and the field.... [I]n the DPKO we have much more movement between field and headquarters than in other parts of the secretariat. But...the rules, the status... doesn't really encouraged [sic] that.

In the...budget, finance...we have processes that are not at all in sync with the operational needs of the field, to move quickly, to be adapted to all the uncertainties of an operation where a true (contributor?) will delay departure, or there will be a need to accelerate. All that is completely not factored in the rules and regulations.<sup>26</sup>

Given the limited staff and inappropriate constraints applying to the DPKO as part of the U.N. Secretariat, it is no surprise that the current structure for planning, managing, and overseeing U.N. peace operations systems is overstretched, overwhelmed, and poorly structured for dealing with

20. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Fact Sheet,” September 2006, at [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/factsheet.pdf) (February 1, 2007).

21. Catherine Bertini, former U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Management, statement in hearing, *Reforming the United Nations: Budget and Management Perspectives*, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., May 19, 2005, at [www.commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa21309.000/hfa21309\\_0.htm](http://www.commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa21309.000/hfa21309_0.htm) (May 2, 2006).


22. Press release, “United Nations Military, Police Deployment Reaches All-Time High in October,” PKO/152, U.N. Department of Public Information, November 10, 2006, at [www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/pko152.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/pko152.doc.htm) (February 1, 2007).

23. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Background Note.”

24. Press release, “United Nations Military, Police Deployment Reaches All-Time High in October.” (February 1, 2007).

25. U.S. Institute of Peace, Task Force on the United Nations, *American Interests and U.N. Reform*, June 2005, pp. 56 and 93, at [www.usip.org/un/report/usip\\_un\\_report.pdf](http://www.usip.org/un/report/usip_un_report.pdf) (February 1, 2007).

26. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, “Key Challenges in Today's UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 18, 2006, at [www.cfr.org/publication/10766/key\\_challenges\\_in\\_todays\\_un\\_peacekeeping\\_operations](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10766/key_challenges_in_todays_un_peacekeeping_operations) (February 1, 2007).



its new responsibilities. In 2000, a panel headed by Lakhdar Brahimi, created after 500 U.N. peacekeepers were taken hostage in Sierra Leone by a rebel group and had to be rescued by the British military,<sup>27</sup> made a number of recommendations to improve U.N. peacekeeping, including the admonition that, while the U.N. should not “wage war,” it must be able to “project credible force” to defend mission personnel and civilians from aggression.<sup>28</sup>

According to *The Economist*, Brahimi’s recommendation to create multinational brigades around the world ready to deploy at short notice has made “only fitful progress,” but the U.N. has acted on proposals for creating “a more powerful headquarters to oversee the UN effort; stockpiling equipment; compiling lists of military officers, police, and other experts who will be on call to join UN missions; and meshing peacekeeping with ordinary policing, government reform, and

27. Philo L. Dibble, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, “UN Peacekeeping Reform,” statement before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, May 18, 2005, at [www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/46522.htm](http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/46522.htm) (February 1, 2007).

28. U.N. General Assembly and U.N. Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, pp. 1 and 10.

economic development.” However, many problems remain.<sup>29</sup>

**Mismanagement, Fraud, and Corruption.** The Secretariat procured over \$1.6 billion in goods and services in 2005, mostly to support peacekeeping, which has more than quadrupled in size since 1999. An Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) audit of \$1 billion in DPKO procurement contracts over a six-year period found that at least \$265 million was subject to waste, fraud, or abuse.<sup>30</sup> The U.S. Government Accountability Office concluded:

While the U.N. Department of Management is responsible for U.N. procurement, field procurement staff are instead supervised by the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which currently lacks the expertise and capacities needed to manage field procurement activities.<sup>31</sup>

As Ambassador John Bolton noted:

Without accountable, cost-effective, efficient and transparent U.N. procurement practices, the U.N. will not have its essential goods and services, billions of dollars of contributions might be ill-spent or not properly accounted and the effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping operations would be jeopardized.<sup>32</sup>

In reaction to the OIOS audit, the Department of Management and the DPKO accepted a majority of the 32 OIOS audit recommendations for addressing the findings.<sup>33</sup> However, a number of

disagreements remain, and it remains to be seen whether these new procedures are fully implemented or are sufficient to prevent a recurrence of fraud and corruption.

In a related area, political pressure, favoritism, and cronyism still plague appointments to U.N. peace operations and the DPKO, resulting in institutional weaknesses and a staff that is less than ideally equipped to complete the required tasks.

**Sexual Misconduct.** In recent years, there have been several harrowing reports of crimes committed by U.N. personnel, from rape to the forced prostitution of women and young girls, the most notorious of which involved the U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Indeed, allegations and confirmed incidents of sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. personnel have become depressingly routine, with allegations being reported in Bosnia, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Guinea, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan.<sup>34</sup> The alleged perpetrators of these abuses include U.N. military and civilian personnel from a number of U.N. member states involved in peace operations and from U.N. funds and programs. The victims are refugees—many of them children—who have been terrorized by years of war and look to the U.N. for safety and protection.<sup>35</sup>

After intense lobbying by the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Mission to the United Nations since early 2004, as well as pressure from several key Members of Congress, the U.N. Secretariat agreed

29. “Call the Blue Helmets,” pp. 22 and 24.

30. U.N. Security Council, “Peacekeeping Procurement Audit Found Mismanagement, Risk of Financial Loss, Security Council Told in Briefing by Chief of Staff,” SC/8645, U.N. Department of Public Information, February 22, 2006, at [www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8645.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8645.doc.htm) (February 1, 2007).

31. David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, “United Nations: Internal Oversight and Procurement Controls and Processes Need Strengthening,” GAO-06-701T, testimony before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, April 27, 2006, at [www.gao.gov/new.items/d06701t.pdf](http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06701t.pdf) (February 1, 2007).

32. John R. Bolton, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, statement in the U.N. Security Council, February 22, 2006, at [www.un.int/usa/06\\_032.htm](http://www.un.int/usa/06_032.htm) (February 1, 2007).

33. U.N. Security Council, “Peacekeeping Procurement Audit Found Mismanagement.”

34. See Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, “UN Staff Accused of Raping Children in Sudan,” *The Daily Telegraph*, January 4, 2007, at [www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/01/03/wsudan03.xml](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/01/03/wsudan03.xml) (February 1, 2007); Kate Holt and Sarah Hughes, “Sex and the UN: When Peacemakers Become Predators,” *The Independent*, January 11, 2005, at [www.news.independent.co.uk/world/africa/article14411.ece](http://www.news.independent.co.uk/world/africa/article14411.ece) (February 1, 2007); and Colum Lynch, “UN Faces More Accusations of Sexual Misconduct,” *The Washington Post*, March 13, 2005, p. A22, at [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30286-2005Mar12.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30286-2005Mar12.html) (February 1, 2007).

to adopt stricter requirements for peacekeeping troops and their contributing countries.<sup>36</sup> The U.S. also helped the DPKO publish a resource manual on trafficking for U.N. peacekeepers.

In 2005, Prince Zeid Ra'ad Al-Hussein of Jordan, the Secretary-General's adviser on sexual exploitation and abuse by U.N. peacekeeping personnel, submitted his report to the Secretary-General with recommendations on how to address the sexual abuse problem, including imposing a uniform standard of conduct, conducting professional investigations, and holding troop-contributing countries accountable for the actions of their soldiers and for proper disciplinary action. In June 2005, the General Assembly adopted the recommendations in principle, and some recommendations have been implemented. For instance, contact and discipline teams are now present in most missions, and troops are now required to undergo briefing and training on behavior and conduct.<sup>37</sup>

However, despite this action and then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan's announcement of a "zero tolerance" policy, the perpetrators of these crimes are rarely punished, as was revealed in a January 2007 news report on U.N. abuses in southern Sudan.<sup>38</sup> The standard memorandum of understanding between the U.N. and troop contributors clearly grants troop-contributing countries jurisdiction over

military members participating in U.N. peace operations, but little is done if these countries fail to investigate, try, and punish those guilty of such crimes.

In addition to the horrible mistreatment of those under the protection of the U.N., sexual exploitation and abuse undermines the credibility of U.N. peace operations and must be addressed through an effective plan and commitment to end abuses and ensure accountability.<sup>39</sup>

**Unclear Mandate for the Use of Force.** After the Cold War ended, the U.N. Security Council began to authorize U.N. peace operations in situations in which the threat of military force was greater than was typically the case during the Cold War period. Yet it neglected to update its rules of engagement to meet these new circumstances. As a result, U.N. peacekeepers were often unsure of what they were or were not permitted to do in the performance of their duty. This uncertainty contributed to tragic, embarrassing, and disastrous situations such as the willful decision to stand down in the face of atrocities in Rwanda in 1994 and Srebrenica in 1995; U.N. peacekeepers failing to defend themselves and being taken hostage, as happened with 350 Dutch peacekeepers in 1995 near Sarajevo and 500 peacekeepers in Sierra Leone in 2000; and the inability to quickly support U.S. troops who came under fire in Somalia 1993.

35. For more information on U.N. peacekeeping abuses, see Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., "The U.N. Peacekeeping Scandal in the Congo: How Congress Should Respond," Heritage Foundation *Lecture* No. 868, March 1, 2005, at [www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/upload/76028\\_1.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/upload/76028_1.pdf).

36. See Kim R. Holmes, "United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Case for Peacekeeping Reform," testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., March 1, 2005, at [http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa99590.000/hfa99590\\_0.HTM](http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa99590.000/hfa99590_0.HTM).

37. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, *United States Participation in the United Nations 2005*, October 2005, pp. 43–44, at [www.state.gov/documents/organization/74052.pdf](http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/74052.pdf) (February 1, 2007).

38. According to Fox News, "U.N. military officials have the power to direct the troops placed under their command, but are relatively powerless when it comes to punishing them if they are accused of crimes against humanity. There are 13 misconduct investigations ongoing at the Sudan mission, [and] some include sexual abuse. From January 2004 to the end of November 2006, investigations were conducted for 319 sexual exploitation and abuse cases in U.N. missions throughout the world. These probes resulted in the dismissal of 18 civilians and the repatriation on disciplinary grounds of 17 police and 144 military personnel.... What's frustrating to military commanders on the ground is that there is little they can do to offending peacekeepers, other than putting them on desk duty, restricting them to quarters, and requesting a full investigation and repatriation." Liza Porteus, "U.N. Peacekeepers Accused in Sudan Sex-Abuse Case Get Reprimand," Fox News, January 05, 2007, at [www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,241960,00.html](http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,241960,00.html) (February 1, 2007).

39. U.S. Institute of Peace, *American Interests and U.N. Reform*, pp. 94–96.

As U.N. peace operations become more robust and missions are charged with peace enforcement and other responsibilities that are likely to result in military action, the mission mandates must provide robust mission statements and clear rules of engagement that permit the use of lethal force to protect peacekeepers, civilians, and mission objectives. The U.N. addressed some of these issues by implementing recommendations in the Brahimi Report, such as expanding mission mandates to include protection of civilians and including language that instructs peacekeepers to protect civilians under imminent threat in all mandates for Chapter VII operations since 1999. However, considerable uncertainty remains over lines of authority, differing understanding over when and to what extent defensive use of force is permitted, and when aggressive action is permitted.

**Unreliable Troop Contributions.** Because the U.N. has no standing armed forces, it is entirely dependent on member states to donate troops and other personnel to fulfill peace operation mandates. Nations should maintain control of their armed forces and refuse to support the establishment of armed forces outside of direct national oversight and responsibility. However, the current arrangement's weaknesses are evident.

The result is an ad hoc system plagued by inadequately trained personnel; insufficient numbers of military troops, military observers, civilian police, and civilian staff; inadequate planning; inadequate or non-functional equipment; and logistical gaps. Recently, the authorized operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), and Lebanon all experienced difficulties in raising the numbers of troops authorized by the Security Council.

The U.N. has established a Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), wherein member states make conditional commitments to prepare and maintain specified resources (military units, specialized personnel, services, materiel, and equipment) on "stand-by" in their home countries to fulfill spec-

ified tasks or functions for U.N. peace operations.<sup>40</sup> However, the resources committed under the UNSAS fall far short of needs. As Under-Secretary-General Guéhenno noted:

[A]s the mandate gets more challenging, you need very specialized capacities to be able to deliver the mandate—force enablers, force multipliers—that kind of capacity in any army in the world is always in short supply. So if you have a limited pool of countries to get those capacities, you are in trouble. We've been looking sometimes for a year to find the transport units.<sup>41</sup>

Moreover, while the DPKO has the authority to set training and equipment specifications for troops and personnel contributed by member states through a memorandum of agreement and on-site inspection and evaluation, contributions often fall short of agreed specifications. Yet, because of the extreme difficulty in getting personnel, the U.N. is very reluctant to send personnel back to the contributing nations even if they fall well below agreed specification. The U.N. needs a better system for identifying, locating, and securing qualified troops for its operations.

**The Need for Fundamental Reform.** Without fundamental reform, these problems will likely continue and expand as new responsibilities are given to U.N. peacekeepers. Many of these problems also plague the broader U.N. Secretariat, but the urgency of dealing with the problems within the DPKO is elevated by its enormous budget and the consequences of failure by U.N. peace operations for civilians, peacekeepers, and international peace and security.

New Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has unofficially voiced similar concerns. According to news reports, Ban argued that the extraordinary period of growth in peacekeeping activities in the field is straining the DPKO's capabilities:

While the current figure of field-based peacekeeping personnel is now just under 100,000, maintaining this presence requires

40. U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS)," April 30, 2005, at [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/jgs2/unsas\\_files/sba.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/jgs2/unsas_files/sba.htm) (February 1, 2007).

41. Guéhenno, "Key Challenges in Today's UN Peacekeeping Operations."

that the DPKO actually manage roughly twice that number on an annual basis, given the constant rate of troop/police rotations, personnel transfers, and new mission requirements that must be taken into account....

The nature of the challenge is far more than a quantitative one. Qualitatively, many of the newer peacekeeping missions operate at extreme levels of sensitivity, visibility and risk, with complex mandates to assist state-restoration and state-building processes after decades of conflict, in remote, austere and increasingly quite dangerous environments—sometimes with factions outside the peace process totally hostile to a U.N. presence.<sup>42</sup>

According to Secretary-General Ban, the sensitive nature of these operations requires coherent, clearly articulated, and efficient structures, management systems, and work processes. Without change, the risk of inefficiency, ineffectiveness, or abuse in U.N. peace operations and management is greatly increased.<sup>43</sup>

### What Is Needed to Improve U.N. Peacekeeping

At a minimum, an overhauled U.N. peace operations structure should:

- **Transform the DPKO organizational structure** to enable it to handle increased peace operations demands and plan for future operations more effectively. This requires more independence; more resources for staff, supplies, and training; and greatly improved oversight by an
- **Build a database of qualified, trained, pre-screened military, civilian, and police specialists** that countries have made available for U.N. peace operations. This database should include information on individuals' and units' past experience in U.N. operations; disciplinary issues; performance evaluations; expertise (e.g., language, engineering, and combat skills); and availability for deployment.
- **Equip a logistics base with increased amounts of equipment and commonly required supplies to facilitate new and ongoing operations.** The DPKO could update the U.N. logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, which coordinates the U.N.'s strategic deployment stocks, or establish a logistics base

42. Deen, "U.N. Chief Moves to Restructure World Body."

43. *Ibid.*

44. According to the Secretary-General, "gratis personnel were not regulated until the adoption by the General Assembly of resolutions 51/243 and 52/234, in which the Assembly placed strict conditions on the acceptance of type II gratis personnel. Among the conditions set out in administrative instruction ST/AI/1999/6, is the requirement that type II gratis personnel be accepted on an exceptional basis only and for the following purposes: (a) to provide expertise not available within the Organization for very specialized functions or (b) to provide temporary and urgent assistance in the case of new and/or expanded mandates of the Organization." See U.N. General Assembly, "Gratis Personnel Provided by Governments and Other Entities," A/61/257/Add.1, August 9, 2006, at [www.centerforunreform.org/system/files/A.61.257.Add.1.pdf](http://www.centerforunreform.org/system/files/A.61.257.Add.1.pdf) (February 6, 2007). The restrictions on gratis personnel were adopted at the behest of the Group of 77 developing nations, which thought that their nationals were not being given equal opportunity to fill positions at the U.N. because their governments could not afford to provide staff gratis. A possible solution could be to allow the countries to receive credit toward their assessed dues equivalent to the estimated salaries of gratis personnel. See "U.N. Gratis Personnel System Is Undemocratic, Says G-77 Chairman," *Journal of the Group of 77*, January/February 1997, at [www.g77.org/Journal/janfeb97/6.htm](http://www.g77.org/Journal/janfeb97/6.htm) (February 6, 2007).

in Africa or another region that would be closer to most of its large peace operations.

- **Implement a modern logistics system and streamline procurement procedures** so that missions receive what they need when they need it. To be effective, procurement and contracting must “have a formal governance structure responsible for its oversight and direction,” as former Under-Secretary-General for Management Catherine Bertini advised Congress in 2005.<sup>45</sup> Critically, the new logistics system and the procurement system must be subject to appropriate transparency, rigorous accountability, and independent oversight accompanied by robust investigatory capabilities and a reliable system of internal justice.<sup>46</sup>
- **Draft contingency plans in anticipation of potential deployments and scenarios that are likely to require peace operations**, including estimates of required personnel and support, so that the DPKO can quickly implement Security Council decisions. Contingency planning is standard practice in the Pentagon and other modern militaries. For example, U.S. regional combatant commands have multiple war plans on the shelf to respond to specific scenarios. While the plans may not be ideally suited to a specific emergency, they can be adapted to the specific circumstances in less time than creating a new plan from scratch would take.
- **Implement mandatory, uniform standards of conduct for civilian and military personnel participating in U.N. peace operations.** This would be a concrete step toward ending sexual exploitation, abuse, and other misconduct by peacekeepers. Member states contributing personnel to U.N. peace operations should be

required to cooperate with investigations of abuses or misconduct conducted by the U.N. or authorities in the nation where the alleged crime occurred. It should not necessarily involve yielding jurisdiction over personnel to the U.N. or non-national judicial authority, but it should entail commitments by member states to investigate, try, and punish their personnel when credible evidence exists and, critically, to inform the U.N. and the host nation of the results of such efforts. Equally important, a reformed DPKO must be more willing to hold member countries to these standards. States that fail to fulfill their commitments to discipline their troops should be barred from providing troops for peace operations.

### Avoiding Half Measures

Former Secretary-General Annan had recommended reforms to address some of the problems afflicting U.N. management and implementation of peace operations, particularly weak oversight and accountability in the DPKO, but those reforms fell victim to infighting in the General Assembly.<sup>47</sup> Secretary-General Ban has proposed splitting the overburdened U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations into two departments: a Department of Peace Operations focused on mission operations and a Department of Field Support focused on management, procurement, and logistics. Each department would be headed by an Under-Secretary-General.<sup>48</sup>

While the details of Ban’s proposal have yet to be formally announced, two “non-papers”<sup>49</sup> justifying the restructuring have been given to U.N. political and regional groups. Reportedly, the non-papers are vague on the details. For instance, it is unclear to whom the two new peacekeeping departments

45. Bertini, in hearing, *Reforming the United Nations*.

46. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *United Nations: Procurement Internal Controls Are Weak*, GAO-06-577, April 2006, at [www.gao.gov/new.items/d06577.pdf](http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06577.pdf) (February 1, 2007).

47. See Brett D. Schaefer, “The Status of United Nations Reform,” Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 966, October 3, 2006, at [www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/upload/hl\\_966.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/upload/hl_966.pdf).

48. Evelyn Leopold, “UN Chief Wants to Split Peacekeeping Department,” Reuters, January 26, 2007, at [http://za.today.reuters.com/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2007-01-26T062503Z\\_01\\_BAN623090\\_RTRIDST\\_0\\_OZATP-UN-BAN-PEACEKEEPING-DISARMAMENT-20070126.XML](http://za.today.reuters.com/news/NewsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2007-01-26T062503Z_01_BAN623090_RTRIDST_0_OZATP-UN-BAN-PEACEKEEPING-DISARMAMENT-20070126.XML) (February 9, 2007).

49. Unofficial presentations of policy.



would report and which department would have precedence in various situations. While Ban should be commended for recognizing the need to reform the DPKO, his plan is unlikely to address the current system's many weaknesses. Indeed, his plan appears to be more of a cosmetic reorganization than a fundamental transformation.

The problems identified by Secretaries-General Ban and Annan were also noted in the 2005 report of the congressionally mandated U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) Task Force on the United Nations, which recommended that:

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should become a more independent program, with separate staff support and distinct rules and regulations appropriate for its operational responsibility for comprehensive peacekeeping missions. Its responsibilities must include coordination with broader reconstruction and development activities of the United Nations.<sup>50</sup>

The USIP task force also observed that the DPKO cannot fulfill its responsibilities while hobbled by member-state micromanagement of the current budgetary and oversight process. To address this situation, it recommended a separate and streamlined management, organizational, and budget process that provides strong roles for major financial and troop contributors.

These recommendations echo those made by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke in 2000. In the wake of the embarrassing kidnapping of U.N. peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, Ambassador Holbrooke declared a need for "true reform—in the way we finance peacekeeping, and in the way U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations functions—or else the very future of the United Nations is endangered."<sup>51</sup> More specifically, he declared a dire need to bolster DPKO staff, streamline logistics

and procurement, and get resources to the field more quickly.

While Secretary-General Ban and the USIP task force have correctly recognized the weaknesses of the DPKO, both make the mistake of recommending that a restructured DPKO remain within the Secretariat. It is difficult to understand how such an arrangement would permit greater independence or lead to necessary reforms in a timely fashion.

### **A Better Option: Create a New U.N. Peacekeeping Organization**

The proposals by the USIP task force on U.N. reform and Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon are not likely to overcome the DPKO's problems. The struggle to adopt U.N. management reforms over the past few years shows that reforming the U.N. will probably be slow and arduous. Already, Ban's proposal is meeting strong resistance in the General Assembly.<sup>52</sup> Moreover, the current structure—tasking a single subsidiary organ (the DPKO) in the Secretariat with implementing the instructions of the Security Council, with all of the accompanying costs and responsibilities—is seriously flawed.

Based on the recent experience of creating the Peacebuilding Commission as an advisory organ subsidiary to both the Security Council and the General Assembly, creating a new, independent U.N. organization might be a swifter and more effective approach to addressing the weaknesses of U.N. peacekeeping than tinkering with the current structure would be. This new organization could be called the U.N. Peacekeeping Organization (UNPKO).

**Structure.** The new UNPKO would be beholden primarily to the Security Council because the Security Council is the body responsible for authorizing U.N. peace operations. All current U.N. peace operations and political missions led by the DPKO would be placed under the authority of the new

50. U.S. Institute of Peace, *American Interests and U.N. Reform*, p. 56.

51. Richard C. Holbrooke, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, statement to the 5th Committee, United Nations, May 16, 2000, at [www.un.int/usa/00\\_062.htm](http://www.un.int/usa/00_062.htm) (February 1, 2007).

52. See Maggie Farley, "Ban's U.N. Peacekeeping Reforms Rejected," *Los Angeles Times*, February 7, 2007, at [www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-peacekeeping6feb06,1,4125695.story](http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-peacekeeping6feb06,1,4125695.story) (February 8, 2007), and Thalif Deen, "Scepticism Greets Plan to Split U.N. Peacekeeping," *IPS Terra Viva*, February 2, 2007, at [www.ipsnews.net/login.asp?redir=news.asp?idnews=36408](http://www.ipsnews.net/login.asp?redir=news.asp?idnews=36408) (February 6, 2007; subscription required).

UNPKO, which should be given responsibility for planning, managing, and overseeing those operations and reporting to the Security Council on their status.<sup>53</sup> The UNPKO should be given the additional resources and independence necessary for it to be an apolitical advisory and operational vehicle for investigating, planning, managing, supporting, and implementing Security Council–mandated peace operations.

The current system of assessing the U.N. peacekeeping budget is no longer appropriate, given the far larger financial demands of the expanded role of U.N. peace operations. As Ambassador Holbrooke noted:

The UN's system for financing was created in a bygone Cold War era, the result of a last-minute compromise in 1973. The system was designed for a single, \$30 million operation in the Sinai. Everyone...who spoke in that debate 27 years ago agreed that the arrangement was temporary, just for one operation, and not precedent-setting. Yet it has never been revised or properly reexamined. Now it has put the United Nations in a potentially fatal financial straightjacket.<sup>54</sup>

Inherent in these problems is the lack of linkages between those who make decisions and those who are responsible for supporting and carrying out those decisions.<sup>55</sup> If a UNPKO is created, the General Assembly should no longer have a role in setting the U.N. peacekeeping budget or setting the scale of assessments—no more than the General Assembly sets the budget of other U.N. funds, programs, specialized agencies, or independent bodies, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Instead, a new Executive Peacekeeping Board of member governments should oversee the new UNPKO and prepare the budget for approval by UNPKO member states. Similarly, the board would make recommendations to the member states on the scale of assessments and policies for assessed and voluntary contributions to support U.N. peace operations authorized by the Security Council. One option for the makeup of the new UNPKO Board, based on relevant criteria, could be as follows:

- Seven members of the Security Council, including all permanent members.
- The seven top financial contributors to U.N. peace operations not already on the board.

53. Such an action would merely require a General Assembly resolution, probably with the concurrence or approval of the Security Council. One precedent for this is the creation of the World Food Program in 1961 by separate resolutions of the General Assembly and the Food and Agriculture Organization Conference. The WFP administers at least one program previously established by the General Assembly and is currently governed by an executive board of 36 states, with the Economic and Social Council and the Food and Agriculture Organization Council each selecting half of the members. See Paul C. Szasz, "The Complexification of the United Nations System," in Jochen A. Frowein and Rüdiger Wolfrum, eds., *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, Vol. 3 (Leiden, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999), pp. 43–44, at [www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/szasz\\_3.pdf](http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/szasz_3.pdf) (February 1, 2007).

54. Holbrooke, statement to the 5th Committee.

55. Many have used this as a justification for reforming the Security Council membership, and there is some merit to those arguments. However, while Security Council expansion may address some of the council's perceived weaknesses, it would leave others unresolved and aggravate still others. For instance, Security Council reform would not implicitly resolve the essential issue of whether the council will use sound judgment when deciding to authorize peace operations. A reformed Security Council might continue to authorize missions without due consideration of the availability of troops or personnel, resources, rules of engagement, and mission objectives. In addition, an expanded council likely would be even less willing to confront threats to peace and security. Moreover, such a process would require a Charter amendment—at least for the issue of Security Council membership—and would inevitably be slow and arduous. Reforming how U.N. peace operations are planned, managed, and supported should not wait for these changes. Ultimately, decisions about Security Council membership and peacekeeping budget assessments will be resolved, but such a process is unpredictable and ultimately political in nature. This paper strives to offer a more practical solution to the operational, management, and oversight problems beleaguering U.N. peace operations. A detailed discussion of the merits and demerits of various proposals to reform the Security Council is beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of Security Council reform, see Nile Gardiner, Ph.D., and Brett D. Schaefer, "U.N. Security Council Expansion Is Not in the U.S. Interest," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 1876, August 18, 2005, at [www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/upload/81963\\_1.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/upload/81963_1.pdf).

Contributions would include the assessed U.N. peacekeeping budget and, possibly, voluntary contributions in support of U.N. peace operations.

- The seven top providers of uniformed personnel to U.N. missions not already on the board.
- Six additional members elected by the General Assembly to reduce geographical imbalances or include countries greatly affected by conflicts or instability addressed through existing U.N. peace operations.

The authority to approve peace operations would remain solely with the Security Council as required by the U.N. Charter, but having the Executive Peacekeeping Board report to the Security Council would elevate the authority of its recommendations because they would be coming from member states rather than just from a Secretariat department via the Secretary-General. This would make its recommendations more difficult to ignore.

A new UNPKO Board would also provide the ancillary but significant benefit of permitting major contributors to U.N. peace operations to exercise greater input through UNPKO reports to the Security Council and greater influence over the management and implementation of peace operations. In addition, while the Security Council would remain in New York, current technology capabilities would make it possible for the UNPKO to be located virtually anywhere in the world. Locations in Europe or Africa, for example, would have the advantages of being close to active missions or supply and training bases.

The Executive Peacekeeping Board should also assume the responsibility of selecting the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (perhaps renamed the Special Representative of the Security Council or the Executive Peacekeeping Board) who heads each peace operation and is responsible for implementing the mission's mandate. Although the integrated missions planning process is increasingly well developed and should be adapted for the new UNPKO,<sup>56</sup> the Security Council should more

Table I		B 2006	
<b>Illustrative UNPKO Executive Board</b>			
<b>Security Council Members</b>			
China		France	
Russia		United Kingdom	
United States		Peru	
South Africa			
<b>Members Chosen for Level of Financial Contributions</b>			
Japan		Germany	
Italy		Canada	
Spain		Netherlands	
Australia			
<b>Members Chosen for Level of Personnel Contributions</b>			
Pakistan		Bangladesh	
India		Jordan	
Ghana		Nepal	
Uruguay			
<b>Additional Members Chosen by the General Assembly to Balance Regional Representation</b>			
Brazil		Egypt	
Guatemala		Kenya	
Namibia		Poland	
<b>Source:</b> Author's possible scenario.			

clearly identify the Special Representative as the overall authority and empower this individual to direct or approve all U.N. system activities in-country for the duration of the peace operation. This enhanced authority should also result in the Special Representative's being held responsible for lack of coordination, mismanagement, and misconduct and any inability to meet mission objectives due to factors within his control.

**UNPKO Staff.** As with other funds, programs, and specialized agencies, UNPKO daily operations would be overseen by a director and senior staff. Without support staff and military expertise, the UNPKO would just become another layer of bureaucracy.

To make U.N. peace operations more effective, the UNPKO must oversee the operational and management aspects of U.N. peace operations currently

56. See United Nations, "Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP): Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General," June 13, 2006, at [www.action.web.ca/home/cpcc/attach/06\\_DPKO\\_IMPP\\_final\\_.pdf](http://www.action.web.ca/home/cpcc/attach/06_DPKO_IMPP_final_.pdf) (February 1, 2007).

embedded within the Secretariat. The functional elements of the DPKO, including the Office of the Military Adviser and the Civilian Police Adviser,<sup>57</sup> along with other relevant offices in other parts of the Secretariat that are focused predominantly on peace operations or funded through the peacekeeping support account, should be transferred to the newly formed UNPKO. As a new, independent organization, the UNPKO should also immediately adopt modern management, procurement, logistical, and oversight practices. This would permit U.N. peace operations to sidestep the deadlock in the General Assembly over management and human resources reform. Critically, the UNPKO should be subjected to strengthened oversight and accountability by a new, independent inspector general dedicated to auditing, overseeing, and investigating misconduct, procurement, and procedures.

However, simply transferring relevant portions of the DPKO staff to the UNPKO would not address the strategic assessment and advisory shortfalls. For instance, noting that there was no mission implementation plan nine months after the Haiti mission started, the USIP task force observed:

This absence of strategic guidance reflects not only a problem within the mission, but also deficiencies in the general development of common doctrine, which would identify roles, missions, and force employment principles to address the contemporary challenges faced by peacekeepers. These problems in Haiti also appear to reflect deficiencies in strategic and tactical planning within the UN Secretariat.<sup>58</sup>

Based on recommendations in the Brahimi Report, the U.N. is striving to adopt integrated mission plans for most operations to merge and coordinate the stages from ending a conflict to establishing a peace to post-conflict peace building and development.<sup>59</sup> However, as illustrated in the USIP task force report, the DPKO's 600-person staff is not

capable of meeting current demands. Staff levels need to be strengthened and augmented to permit better development of integrated plans that incorporate and coordinate political, police, military support, and other specialized activities. The most expeditious ways to address this staffing shortfall would be to rely on seconded military and other professionals provided gratis by member states to meet exceptional demands for U.N. peace operations and to permit the UNPKO to use short-term contracts to meet surge demands. As an independent organization, the UNPKO would not be subject to the restrictions on gratis personnel that constrain the Secretariat.

Both approaches would incorporate supplementary staff with the expertise and experience necessary to assist the core staff in tracking threats to peace and security around the world in anticipation of peace operation requirements, providing threat assessments and options for addressing situations under consideration by the Security Council, maintaining liaison with their national militaries, soliciting threat assessments and intelligence, updating the capability and willingness of nations to provide soldiers and other personnel, coordinating training, assessing the capabilities of available personnel, estimating deployment timelines, estimating the minimum requirements to meet mission objectives, and preparing appropriate rules of engagement to ensure the safety of peacekeepers and civilians and to achieve mission objectives.

An important advantage of gratis personnel is that they would place a minimal financial burden on the U.N. system. If the demand for U.N. peace operations ebbs, they could be sent back to their countries without the concerns that reducing career staff would entail.

**Troop and Personnel Contributions.** Even if the U.N.'s capacities to organize, manage, and oversee its peace operations improve, success ultimately depends on member states' willingness to contribute

57. For more information on the responsibilities of the Office of the Military Adviser and the Civilian Police Adviser, see U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Office of the Military Adviser," at [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/oma/oma\\_tasks.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/milad/oma/oma_tasks.htm) (February 1, 2007), and "United Nations Police," at [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/civpol/civpol1.html](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/civpol/civpol1.html) (February 1, 2007).

58. U.S. Institute of Peace, *American Interests and U.N. Reform*, p. 91.

59. See United Nations, "Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP): Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary-General."

troops to support U.N. operations. At present, not enough countries are willing or able to contribute the assets or personnel needed for difficult and dangerous peace operations, and not enough have specialized enablers like engineers, aviation, or medical units to contribute to peacekeeping operations. An additional problem is that personnel contributed by developing nations often require outside materiel and support from the U.N. and developed nations, including logistics, equipment, planning and organizational support, and transportation.<sup>60</sup>

Although some developed countries regularly provide lift and logistics support, many developed countries that possess trained personnel and other essential resources are generally reluctant to participate directly in U.N. peace operations. As noted in Table 2, the five permanent members contribute a total of only about 5 percent of U.N. uniformed personnel. The top 10 contributors are Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Jordan, Nepal, Ghana, Uruguay, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and South Africa.<sup>61</sup> A number of reasons account for this situation, including the fact that major contributors use U.N. participation as a form of training and income<sup>62</sup> and the fact that countries like the U.S., while providing the bulk of financial resources, are focusing troops and other personnel on efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Having the major troop-contributing countries on the UNPKO Executive Peacekeeping Board would provide the Security Council with a readily available assessment of how many troops key countries would be willing to provide for specific missions. One possible solution for getting the permanent members of the Security Council more involved in peace operations would be to revive the

largely ignored Military Staff Committee, which is made up of military representatives from the permanent members of the Security Council.<sup>63</sup> It could advise the Security Council and the UNPKO on the threats to international peace and security, propose options for addressing a range of situations, estimate the resources and personnel needed to fulfill those options, and detail the available resources and anticipated deployment timetables.

Giving the armed forces of major powers more input into U.N. operations could help to engage those countries in peacekeeping and provide a hotline back to capitals about the requirements for missions under consideration. Input from both sources could help to ensure that Security Council decisions are grounded in realistic assessments and expectations based on capabilities and resources.

Another alternative is for the U.N. Security Council to rely more heavily on regional and multilateral efforts to address threats to international peace and security, especially in situations that may require war fighting or robust rules of engagement—areas in which the U.N. has proven less capable than national and coalition-led efforts. Indeed, perhaps driven by limited resources, the U.N. Security Council has recently demonstrated increased willingness to support regional and multilateral efforts to address threats to international peace and security, such as Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force effort in Afghanistan, African Union intervention in Burundi and Sudan, European Union deployment in the Democratic Republic of Congo to assist U.N. forces during the election, and intervention by the Economic Community of West Afri-

60. Victoria K. Holt, testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, May 18, 2005, at [www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/hol051805.pdf](http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/hol051805.pdf) (February 1, 2007).

61. Troop contributor data are as of August 31, 2006. See U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Fact Sheet.”

62. According to the United Nations Foundation, “The UN pays the governments of troop contributing countries \$1,110 per soldier each month of deployment.” This amount is far more than most nations pay the troops participating in the missions. United Nations Foundation, “Season of the Blue Helmets,” *UNF Insights: New Ideas for International Cooperation*, at [www.unfoundation.org/features/unf\\_insights/season\\_blue\\_helmets.asp](http://www.unfoundation.org/features/unf_insights/season_blue_helmets.asp) (February 6, 2007).

63. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) is the U.N.’s longest-standing subsidiary council and the only subsidiary body of the Security Council named in the Charter (Articles 26 and 45–47). The MSC was originally envisioned as the military planning arm of the Security Council. It consisted of military representatives from the permanent members of the Security Council. During the Cold War, the MSC quickly became gridlocked, and its biweekly meetings continue today as a formality.

B 2006

## U.N. Peacekeeping Personnel as of December 31, 2006, by Mission, Category, and Source

Mission	Total U.N. Peacekeeping Personnel			U.S. Participation			Participation by Permanent U.N. Security Council Members			
	Troops	Civilian Police	Military Observers	Troops	Civilian Police	Military Observers	Troops	Civilian Police	Military Observers	
	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	Total	
UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	-	-	150	-	-	3	-	-	15	15
UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)	-	-	41	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	853	64	917	-	-	-	269	-	-	269
UN Disengagement Force (UNDOF)	1,048	-	1,048	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	11,563	-	11,563	-	-	-	1,807	-	-	1,807
UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	31	4	183	-	-	-	-	-	53	53
UN Observer Mission in Georgia (ONOMIG)	-	12	127	-	-	-	-	2	13	15
UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	-	1,960	37	1,997	223	-	-	400	3	403
UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)	16,487	1,075	734	18,296	-	-	218	13	47	278
UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	2,063	-	222	2,285	-	7	-	-	20	20
UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	13,613	1,097	188	14,898	6	5	21	575	16	635
UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	7,847	992	190	9,029	-	-	-	185	21	216
UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)	6,684	1,692	-	8,376	3	50	53	5	266	271
UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)	1,656	14	75	1,745	-	-	-	-	3	3
UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)	8,734	680	592	10,006	-	11	11	572	29	633
UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)	-	1,099	32	1,131	-	4	4	-	2	7
UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)	223	-	11	234	-	-	-	-	1	1
<b>Political or Peacebuilding Missions</b>										
UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL)	-	17	9	26	-	-	-	-	2	4
UN Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)	-	3	11	14	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>70,802</b>	<b>8,709</b>	<b>2,602</b>	<b>82,113</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>3,631</b>	<b>774</b>	<b>4,630</b>

**Note:** Numbers for ONUB are from November 30, 2006. The ONUB mission completed its mandate on December 31, 2006, and was succeeded by the U.N. Integrated Office in Burundi. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations estimates that the total number of peacekeeping personnel could surge to about 140,000 when the peacekeeping operations in East Timor, Lebanon, and Darfur become fully manned. See U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "UN Peacekeeping Operations: Surge 2006," November 1, 2006, at [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/surge2006.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/surge2006.pdf) (January 31, 2007).

**Sources:** U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "UN Missions Summary of Military and Police," November 30 and December 31, 2006, at [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/nov06\\_4.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/nov06_4.pdf) and [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/dec06\\_4.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2006/dec06_4.pdf) (January 31, 2007), and U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "UN Mission's Contributions by Country," November 30 and December 31, 2006, at [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/contributors/2006/nov06\\_5.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/contributors/2006/nov06_5.pdf) and [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/contributors/2006/dec06\\_5.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/contributors/2006/dec06_5.pdf) (January 31, 2007).

can States in Liberia. In several cases, once the peace was secured, the operations were turned over to a U.N. mission.

While such efforts may need additional support,<sup>64</sup> it makes sense for regional actors to lead such efforts. As Sir Winston Churchill noted, “Only those countries whose interests were directly affected by a dispute...could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigor to secure a settlement.”<sup>65</sup>

## Conclusion

Although the United States often chooses not to commit personnel to U.N. peace operations, it should support U.N. operations that are in the national interest. The U.N. offers a useful means for the U.S. to act upon situations that affect the national interest but do not require direct U.S. intervention. U.N. peace operations can be used to address humanitarian concerns where conflict or instability makes civilians vulnerable to atrocities, to promote peace efforts, or to support a country’s transition to democracy and post-conflict rebuilding.

The utility of U.N. peace operations has led to a sharp increase in their number and complexity, but their mixed record of success since the end of the Cold War indicates that the Security Council may not be giving sufficient consideration to mission mandates, circumstances, and available resources when deciding to authorize operations and should exercise more caution. Barring a disaster like Somalia, which led to a decline in U.N. peace operations in the mid-1990s, however, there seems to be little indication that the current enthusiasm for U.N. peace operations will ebb. It is therefore essential that member states—especially members of the Security Council, which approves peace operations—ensure that peace operations are equipped and managed in a manner that enables them to meet their mandates.

The increasing complexity, size, and frequency of U.N. peace operations have revealed significant weaknesses in oversight, accountability, and conduct. Without fundamental reform of the organization itself, the problems afflicting U.N. peace operations will likely grow as the number of operations increases. Although many of these problems also continue to plague the U.N. Secretariat and demand reform, the urgency of dealing with these problems in the DPKO and other U.N. departments charged with supporting U.N. peace operations is elevated by the consequences of the failure of U.N. peace operations for civilians, peacekeepers, and international peace and security.

While Secretary-General Ban’s proposal to reform the DPKO would not fix the fundamental problems facing U.N. peace operations, it is at least an attempt to confront the issue. Regrettably, as with many other critical reform proposals, it is being opposed by the G-77, which refuses to offer a credible alternative plan. In light of this opposition to reform, the Administration and Congress need to consider very carefully any requests by the United Nations for additional funding for a system in which procurement problems have wasted millions of dollars and sexual abuse by peacekeepers is still occurring.

The difficulty of reforming the U.N. over the past few years makes it highly unlikely that these problems can be addressed effectively through the General Assembly in the near term. In light of this opposition, the U.S. should propose creating a new U.N. Peacekeeping Organization to spur necessary reform. Based on the recent experience of creating the U.N. Peacebuilding Commission, the quickest and most realistic solution may be to create a new organization that would plan, coordinate, and conduct the operations under the authority of the Security Council, subject to an independent oversight,

64. Such support is also necessary from bilateral sources such as the U.S. Global Peace Operations Initiative and the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. See U.S. Department of State, “Foreign Military Training: Joint Report to Congress, Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006,” Bureau of Political–Military Affairs, September 2006, at [www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/74680.htm](http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2006/74680.htm); U.S. Department of State, “Global Peace Operations Initiative Team,” at [www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoiteam](http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoiteam) (February 1, 2007); and GlobalSecurity.org, “Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)/African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance,” modified April 26, 2005, at [www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/acri.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/acri.htm) (February 1, 2007).

65. Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, *FDR and the Creation of the United Nations* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 72.

auditing, and investigatory authority.<sup>66</sup> Certainly such a radical proposal would meet resistance in the General Assembly, but Ban's more modest proposal to reorganize the management structure is also meeting such opposition. The opportunity for major contributors of uniformed personnel and funding for U.N. peacekeeping to increase their influence through a new peacekeeping organization should tempt some key developed and developing nations to consider the proposal.

Unless circumstances change dramatically, the Security Council will continue to place volatile situations under the responsibility of U.N. peacekeepers. It is imperative for international peace and security, for those hoping to be protected by U.N.

peacekeepers, and for the safety of the peacekeepers themselves that U.N. capabilities be overhauled to improve the effectiveness, accountability, and operational preparedness of peace operations. A new peacekeeping organization would provide an opportunity for the member states of the U.N. to accomplish these goals speedily and without the bureaucratic infighting that has so greatly impeded other U.N. reform efforts.

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66. Some may argue that maintaining international peace and security is an inherent responsibility of the U.N. as a whole and that management and implementation of peace operations should not be separated from the Secretariat. Yet the multidimensional nature of modern peace operations already shows that they can work in conjunction with other independent U.N. entities (e.g., UNICEF, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and the U.N. Development Program). The DPKO does this to a great extent through its integrated mission plans. There is every reason to believe that a new U.N. Peacekeeping Organization could develop similar relations with relevant Secretariat departments and experts, U.N. funds, programs, and specialized agencies where their responsibilities would contribute to the overall mission. Indeed, this multidimensional aspect of post-conflict recovery and stability led to the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission, with its mandate to develop and implement integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery in conjunction with regional organizations, regional banks, and international financial institutions.