

Family-Friendly Policies: Boosting Mothers' Wages

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Executive Summary

Family-friendly policies allow workers to meet their family responsibilities, along with their work responsibilities. Family-friendly policies often entail a “flexible workplace,” where the workday or workplace can be altered according to the family and caring responsibilities of the worker. This report looks at two types of flexible workplace policies—scheduling flexibility and access to leave for the birth of a child (a form of anticipated leave)—and finds that they have either positive effects or little to no effect on wages.

Workplace flexibility can take the following forms:

- **Scheduling flexibility.** Allows workers to set or alter their day-to-day schedule.
- **Unanticipated leave.** Allows workers to take leave for personal obligations, such as taking care of a sick child or attending a parent-teacher meeting.
- **Anticipated paid leave.** Gives workers time off for vacations, longer-term illnesses, and family caregiving.
- **Work location.** Offers flexibility in the location of work, allowing employees to telecommute.
- **Career flexibility.** Offers workers the chance to move in and out of the labor market, as necessary, to balance their work and family life.

Access to workplace flexibility has real implications for wages. The ability to take time off with leave can protect workers against future earnings losses. The present-day wages of mothers who worked prior to the birth of their first child and received pay during their maternity leave are 9 percent higher than for mothers who had not taken leave (controlling for other personal and job-related characteristics). Thus, leave policy can limit the long-term effects of stepping out of the labor market to provide family care.

Mothers who report working their current schedule because it helps them address their caring responsibilities—child care, elder care, or care for a sick family member—do not suffer a wage penalty as a result. The effect of a flexible schedule on wages is negligible. However, this model controls for occupation, industry, and part-time status, all of which do affect wages. Since many mothers work part-time to address their caring responsibilities, these mothers may suffer a wage penalty for part-time work.

Corporate America cannot create flexible workplaces on their own; they need the government to regulate labor markets, establish standards, and prevent a race to the bottom. Relying on the goodwill of employers has meant that many workers, especially low-wage workers, do not have access to any kind of workplace flexibility. Uniform standards remove workplace flexibility from the realm of competition, allowing us to focus on what workers need, rather than competition among companies, as the focal point of policy. We can no longer view the rigidities of the workplace as an individual problem; rather, we must view them as a threat to all families and something that must be dealt with by policy.

Introduction

Women's earnings are an increasingly important part of total family income. Over the past few decades, mothers' employment rates have risen considerably and their earnings now comprise about two-fifths of family income. As more mothers now remain in the labor market while they have children in the home, new questions have arisen concerning how parents can balance their work responsibilities with the caring needs of their families.

Most workers arrive on the job at times that suit their employer, having little or no say about their schedule. For parents, this can pose difficulties, as they may need to coordinate their work hours with their child's daycare provider or school schedule. Further, most workers do not have access to paid sick leave or other paid leave that would allow them to take time off work when they—or their children—need extra care.

“Family-friendly” policies, in the form of workplace flexibility, can provide parents with the flexibility and time off that they need to balance their work responsibilities with their commitment to their family. Workplace flexibility policies range from reduced hours or flexible schedules to time off to care for a family member.

Taking advantage of workplace flexibility may, however, entail costs such as lower wages or fewer fringe benefits. For example, it is often noted that part-time work, which parents may choose in order to have more family time, results in lower wages compared to other comparably skilled workers. On the other hand, these policies may increase the ability of mothers to remain in the labor market, thus improving their earnings over time compared to those mothers who drop out of the labor force.

This report looks at two specific kinds of workplace flexibility—scheduling flexibility and access to leave for the birth of a child (a form of anticipated leave)—and finds that they have either positive effects or little or no effect on mothers wages. Mothers who worked before the birth of their first child and had access to paid leave for maternity have present-day wages that are 9 percent higher than mothers who had not taken leave, controlling for the mother's personal and job-related characteristics. There was no effect on wages for mothers who self-financed their maternity leave.

Being able to choose a schedule that fits with caring responsibilities does not appear to lower wages. Mothers who reported that they were working a particular schedule because it fit in with their caring responsibilities have wages that are not statistically different from mothers who have no choice about their schedules. Thus, having this kind of flexibility does not entail a price for mothers, once we account for part-time status.

These findings should focus policymakers' attention on what “works” for working parents, and the role that social policy can play in improving labor market outcomes for workers across the wage distribution. If workplace flexibility can help parents by improving their options for work/family balance without creating wage penalties, then policymakers should focus on ways to

extend these policies to more workers and to create labor standards that recognize the importance of work/family balance for working families.

Workplace Flexibility

Family-friendly policies allow workers to meet their family responsibilities, along with their work responsibilities. Family-friendly policies often entail a “flexible workplace,” where the workday or workplace can be altered according to the family and caring responsibilities of the worker. Flexible workplaces can take many forms, but the unifying characteristic is that the policy allows the worker some control over their workday. Employees in a flexible workplace may be able to set their starting and ending hours of work; they might be able to determine when to take a break or whether to take a day (with pay) to care for a sick child, tend to their own illness, or meet other personal needs; or they might be able to take planned, paid leave for a vacation, to recover from an illness, or when a new child comes into their family.

A flexible workplace is not the same thing as a flexible labor market, which usually entails non-traditional schedules or non-standard work. This kind of flexibility suits the employer, rather than the employee. Non-standard employment can take many forms, but the basic premise is that the worker has little or no control over their workday. For example, many workers are required to work overtime with little or no warning. This provides the employer with the flexibility to evaluate immediate work needs, but gives the employee little leeway to cope with finding child-care or addressing other personal or family needs.

Scheduling flexibility. One of the most common kinds of workplace flexibility is scheduling flexibility. Some workers are able to choose their own hours based on their personal needs or may choose a specific job because it gives them the flexibility necessary to address work/family issues. Scheduling flexibility can take many forms, but essentially it revolves around whether or not a worker can set or alter their day-to-day schedule. Workers may be able to set hours around a “core” set of hours that they must be at work, for example, working eight hours per day as long as they are at the office between 10:00 am and 4:00 pm. Such flexibility implies being able to set these hours at some regular interval—such as daily, monthly, or quarterly. Scheduling flexibility implies that the worker does not have alternating schedules imposed on them.

Anticipated leave. A second type of workplace flexibility is anticipated leave to care for young children or a sick family member. This leave can be paid or unpaid. To be family friendly, however, the leave must be scheduled by the worker, at their convenience. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides workers (employed for at least 1,200 hours over the past year at a firm employing 50 or more workers) with 12 weeks of unpaid leave for their own illness, to care for a new child (adopted, foster, or birth), or to care for a sick family member. This legislation was lauded as a linchpin in meeting the family care needs of workers, who previously had no guarantee of time off to care for their families’ needs. In important respects, the FMLA was a significant step in solving the problem of care brought on by the widespread employment of mothers. However, the restrictions on the FMLA make it less likely that women will qualify, since they are more likely to work part-time and at small firms, and the fact that it is unpaid may discourage its use, especially among the neediest populations.

Unanticipated paid leave. Other kinds of workplace flexibility policies include short- or medium-term unanticipated paid leave, which enables workers to deal with unanticipated or irregularly occurring events. This includes being able to “step out of the office” for a few hours to go to a parent-teacher meeting or being able to call in sick on the morning that a child comes down with the flu without worrying about losing a day’s pay. This flexibility requires the availability of paid sick leave policies, both for the worker’s illness and that of a close family member, and flexible workplace practices that allow this leave to be taken as needed in short time increments.

Location of work. Workplace flexibility policies can also include discretion over the location of work. Some workers get workplace flexibility by being able to work at a satellite office closer to home, to work at home, or to telecommute regularly.

Career flexibility. Workplace flexibility policies can help create career flexibility for workers as they move through their life-cycle. This entails the option to move in and out of the labor market over time as family and personal needs change. This may entail short-term income penalties, but stepping out of the labor market for a year to care for an ailing parent or child, or recover from a serious illness, should not spell the end of one’s career.

The key to workplace flexibility is that participation is at the worker’s discretion, the timing suits the worker, and it does not entail pay or promotion penalties. Working parents, and workers more generally, have commitments over which they have little control, such as the time that their child’s school opens and closes, the hours that their daycare provider works, or accidents such as when an aging parent takes a fall and needs care. Workplace flexibility—if it is voluntary and if workers feel that they may take advantage of it—gives workers the ability to address these issues and find solutions that work for them and their employer.

Workplace Flexibility: How Common Is It?

This analysis focuses in on two specific kinds of workplace flexibility: access to maternity leave for the birth of a child, a form of anticipated leave, and scheduling flexibility. Access to these kinds of workplace flexibility is far from universal, even for working mothers. The data for this analysis come from the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The sample for this analysis consists of mothers aged 25 to 54 who worked prior to the birth of their first child. (See the Appendix for a complete description of the data and methods.)²

Access to maternity leave is more common than scheduling flexibility (Table 1). Mothers can report up to 15 different kinds of activities upon the birth of their first child and these are grouped into three categories: (1) the mother received pay during her maternity leave—through paid maternity leave, or by using paid sick or disability leave, paid vacation, or other paid leave;

² The SIPP only asks questions about leave-taking of mothers, thus this analysis is unfortunately unable to include an analysis that includes fathers.

(2) the mother “self-financed” her leave—through quitting her job, or using any kind of unpaid leave; or (3) the mother took no leave at all.³ Very few mothers took no leave at the birth of a child—only 1.8 percent of those currently employed and 1.9 percent of those not currently employed. Among those currently employed, 58.3 percent had self-financed their maternity leave, while 47.6 had received some pay during maternity leave. Mothers not currently employed are more likely to have had to self-finance their maternity leave, at 71.1 percent, while less than a third (32.5 percent) had pay during maternity leave.

Table 1. Mothers' access to workplace flexibility

Percent		
	Currently employed	Currently not employed
Access to maternity leave for birth of first child		
Received pay during maternity leave	47.6	32.5
Self-financed maternity leave	58.3	71.1
Did not stop working when child born	1.8	1.9
Scheduling flexibility		
Schedule suits personal needs (school, second job, other)	10.8	
Schedule suits caring needs (child care, elder care, other)	22.3	

Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels.

Notes: Sample is mothers age 25 to 54 who worked prior to the birth of their first child.

Mothers have scheduling flexibility when they report that they have their current work schedule either because it helps them to address a caring responsibility, including child care, elder care, or care for a sick family member, or because it meets their needs in any other way, such as school or a second job. No scheduling flexibility is when the mother reports that they are working their current schedule because it is the only schedule offered or because it suits their employer's needs. The bottom panel of Table 1 shows that relatively few mothers have access to scheduling flexibility. Among working mothers, one fifth (22.3 percent) reported that they worked their schedule because it suited their caring needs. One-in-ten (10.8 percent) reported that they had their current schedule in order to address any other personal needs, such as school or a second job.

Table 2 shows more detail on the kinds of maternity leaves that mothers took and how this differs by the educational attainment of the mother. The majority of mothers who worked prior to the birth of their first child took some type of leave. Overall, 28.5 percent of mothers had paid

³ The data only includes information on births that occurred up to 16 years ago. See the Appendix for more information on the data and methods.

maternity leave and another 18.4 percent used other paid leave after their first child was born. The share of first time mothers who received pay during maternity is 42.9 percent.

The share of mothers who “self-financed” their maternity leave—using either unpaid leaves or leaving their jobs—is 62.3 percent, higher than the share who had received some pay. The differences by educational attainment are striking: among mothers who have no more than a high-school degree, 70.3 percent bore the costs of maternity without any paid leave and only 32.9 percent had any paid leave. Among mothers with at least some college, 47.1 percent had some pay during maternity leave and 59.0 percent self-financed their maternity leave. Nearly one-quarter of all mothers (24.3 percent) quit working when they had their first child, however among mothers without more than a high-school degree, the share who quit was higher, 30.7 percent, and among mothers with at least some college, the share was lower, 21.5 percent.

Table 2. Leaves and other actions upon birth of first child, by educational attainment

Percent	Stopped working at birth of first child		
	All	High-school diploma or less	Some college or more
Received pay during maternity leave			
Paid maternity leave	28.5	22.5	31.0
Used other paid leave for maternity (including sick leave, disability, and vacation)	18.4	12.3	21.1
Total	42.9	32.9	47.1
Self-financed maternity leave			
Quit	24.3	30.7	21.5
Let go	2.0	2.4	1.8
Unpaid maternity leave	25.9	26.9	25.4
Used other unpaid leave for maternity (including sick leave and vacation)	6.6	6.6	6.6
Other (including self-employed and employer went out of business)	4.4	4.1	4.6
Total	62.3	70.0	59.0
Did not stop working	1.8	1.6	1.9


Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels.

Notes: Sample is mothers age 25 to 54 who worked prior to the birth of their first child. Columns do not sum to 100 percent because mothers may take more than one type of leave.

Figure 1 shows the leave or other events that occurred when mothers had their first child, by the mother's educational attainment. Mothers with less education were more likely to quit and to be let go from their job, compared to mothers with more education. Mothers with more education,

however, were more likely to have access to paid maternity leave or to use other paid leave, while mothers with less education made more use of unpaid maternity leave.

Figure 1. Share of mothers taking leave or other activities upon birth of their first child



Source: Author's analysis of SIPP 1996 and 2001 panels.
 Notes: Sample is mothers age 25 to 54 who worked prior to the birth of their first child.

Workplace Flexibility: How Beneficial Is It to Working Mothers' Wages?

A goal of workplace flexibility is to positively affect mothers' employment patterns by helping them return to work after the birth of a child. However, the potential effects of workplace flexibility on wages are less clear. Access to workplace flexibility should make it easier for mothers to balance their jobs with their family responsibilities, thus making it more likely that mothers do not need to exit employment because of family stresses. Thus, all else equal, mothers with workplace flexibility should be more likely to stay employed. In terms of wages, on the one hand, over time, one would expect higher wages as mothers become less likely to drop out of the labor force. On the other, it may be that mothers pay a price for these "perks" in terms of lower wages or benefits or, if workplace flexibility puts mothers on a "mommy track," they may gain access to employment, but lose out on wages.

Lack of access to leave may be part of the reason for mother's lower wages. On average, mothers are paid less than other women, and all women earn less, on average, than men. This gender pay gap has been studied extensively and while some of the gap is due to differences between men and women in human capital and the characteristics of the jobs they hold (Blau and Kahn 2000),

research has also found that part of the gap is to the presence of children (Budig and England 2001). Women who have children move onto a lower earnings profile, relative to women who have not (Waldfogel 1998b). Access to workplace flexibility may mitigate this “family gap” in pay: research has found that women with access to leave have wages that are higher, compared to mothers who did not have access to leave (Waldfogel 1998a).

Mother’s Wages are Higher if They Received Pay During Maternity Leave

Mothers who had access to paid leave for the birth of their first child earn more now than mothers who did not take such leave, but having scheduling flexibility has no significant effect on wages (Table 3). The table shows the overall effect of maternity leave and scheduling flexibility on mother’s current wages, controlling for the mother’s personal and job-related characteristics, including age, race/ethnicity, citizenship, educational attainment, part-time hours, union, region, year, and 14 occupation and 23 industry dummies. (See the Appendix for a complete description of the regression estimates.)

Mothers who took maternity leave and received pay have current wages that are 8.9 percent higher than mothers who either took no leave or self-financed their maternity leave. Self-financing a maternity leave has no discernable effect on current wages, so there is not a long-term penalty for this, at least for first-time mothers.

Working a flexible schedule does not have a statistically significant effect on mother’s wages. However, it is important to note that the model accounts for part-time status, which does have a significant negative effect on wages of 7.7 percent (shown in Appendix), as well as industry and occupation. Thus, mothers who work a flexible schedule that is part-time to care for their children after school may indeed face a wage penalty. Further, it may be that some occupations are more open to flexibility and thus controlling for occupation would reduce the significance of why a mother had her current schedule because the negative (or positive) effects of the schedule may be captured by the occupation. However, given this, scheduling flexibility on its own does not create a penalty for mother’s wages.

Table 4 breaks down leave-taking into more detail. Mothers who had access to paid maternity leave, without using other paid leave, such as sick leave or vacation, have current wages that are 6.5 percent higher than mothers who did not take leave. However, once the detail is exposed, there is a penalty for quitting—of -8.0 percent—upon the birth of a mother’s first child. Other kinds of leaves and scheduling flexibility remain statistically insignificant.

Table 3. Effects of leave-taking and flexibility on mother's current wages

Percent	Percent change in current wages
Access to maternity leave for birth of first child	
Received pay during maternity leave	8.9***
Self-financed maternity leave	-1.5
Scheduling flexibility	
Schedule suits personal needs (school, second job, other)	-0.6
Schedule suits caring needs (child care, elder care, other)	1.7

Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels.

Notes: Estimates are from regressions including age, race, citizenship, educational attainment, part-time hours, union, 14 occupations, 23 industries, region, and year dummies. See Appendix for full results.

*** statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 4. Effects of leave-taking and flexibility on mother's current wages, detailed

Percent	Percent change in current wages
Detailed access to maternity leave for birth of first child	
Received pay during maternity leave	
Paid maternity leave	6.5***
Used other paid leave for maternity (including sick leave, disability, and vacation)	4.8
Self-financed maternity leave	
Quit when had child	-8.0***
Let go when had child	-2.9
Unpaid maternity leave	-1.3
Used other unpaid leave for maternity (including sick leave and vacation)	-2.3
Other (including self-employed and employer went out of business)	-1.5
Scheduling flexibility	
Schedule suits personal needs (school, second job, other)	-0.6
Schedule suits caring needs (child care, elder care, other)	1.7

Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels.

Notes: See notes to Table 3.

*** statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Benefits of Maternity Leave Differ by Mother's Education

The U.S. labor is highly segmented and jobs that require less skill also generally pay less and offer fewer benefits. This might have an effect both on the potential of leaves being offered mothers as well as the costs or benefits of taking leave or staying continuously in the labor market. Mothers with more educational attainment are less likely to have quit their job upon the birth of their first child and more likely to have had access to paid maternity leave (Table 5). Having received pay during maternity leave leads to a larger effect on current wages for women with no more than a high-school degree, a 13.6 percent increase, compared to women with at least some college where the increase is only 8.3 percent. This may be because having access to pay is much less likely for less educated women; those that have it may have exceptionally good jobs or supportive employers, which helps them later during their careers.

Looking at detailed access to maternity leave, access to paid maternity leave helps the current wages of both groups of women, increasing wages by 7.0 percent for women with no more than a high-school degree and 6.5 percent for women with some college or more. However, the effects of quitting are only significant for women with at least some college: their wages are 9.2 percent lower, compared to not taking leave. Quitting has a statistically insignificant effect on the current wages of women with no more than a high-school degree. For professional women, or women who have invested time and energy into training and education to get themselves on a career path, quitting work appears to be more detrimental to their earnings power relative to women who are less educated and have invested less in their “human capital” and earning potential.

Scheduling flexibility continues to have no discernable effect on mother's wages. Because the estimates control for part-time status and the kind of job, this finding is important because it implies that the use of a flexible schedule in and of itself does not lead to lower wages, regardless of which educational grouping the mother is in.

Table 5. Effects of leave-taking and flexibility on mother's current wages, by educational attainment

Percent

	Percent change in current wages	
	No more than high-school degree	Some college or more
Access to maternity leave for birth of first child		
Received pay during maternity leave	13.6***	8.3***
Self-financed maternity leave	5.1	-2.4
Detailed access to maternity leave for birth of first child		
Received pay during maternity leave		
Paid maternity leave	7.0*	6.5**
Used other paid leave for maternity (including sick leave, disability, and vacation)	12.4	3.4
Self-financed maternity leave		
Quit when had child	-2.2	-9.2***
Let go when had child	11.3	-8.6
Unpaid maternity leave	1.1	-1
Used other unpaid leave for maternity (including sick leave and vacation)	3.6	-3.7
Other (including self-employed and employer went out of business)	0.8	-0.8
Scheduling flexibility		
Schedule suits personal needs (school, second job, other)	-0.8	-1.0
Schedule suits caring needs (child care, elder care, other)	3.7	0.6

Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels.

Notes: See notes to Table 3.

*** statistically significant at the 1 percent level; ** statistically significant at the 5 percent level;

* statistically significant at the 10 percent level.

Leave-Taking is Associated with Longer Employment Tenure and Greater Likelihood of Going Back to Work After Maternity Leave

The effects of maternity leave on current wages likely works through the probability of going back to work and staying employed after the birth of a child. Table 6 evaluates the probability of current employment for mothers who had taken leave upon the birth of their first child. The rows in this table indicate whether and what kind of leave a mother took; the “No” column indicates that the mother did not have the row’s characteristic, and the “Yes” column indicates that she did. The “Difference” column indicates the effect of having that characteristic. Thus, reading across the first row, “received pay during maternity leave,” mothers who had this benefit have a 78.7 probability of currently being employed, 13.5 percentage points higher than mothers who did not have pay. Mothers who self-finance their maternity leave are no more likely to still be

employed, and are less likely to currently be employed (72.1 percent) than mothers who received pay during maternity leave.

Looking at the detailed analysis, the most important factors in changing the predicted current employment are whether a mother used other paid leave, such as sick leave or vacation, for her maternity, or whether she quit. Mothers who used other paid leave are 10.2 percentage points more likely to be currently employed, for a 79.7 likelihood of currently being employed. Mothers who quit are 10.2 percentage points less likely to currently be employed, for a 63.7 probability of current employment.

Table 6. Effects of leave-taking after the birth of the first child on probability of current employment

Discrete Predicted Probabilities

	No	Yes	Difference
Access to maternity leave for birth of first child			
Received pay during maternity leave	65.2	78.7	13.5***
Self-financed maternity leave	70.3	72.1	1.8
Detailed access to maternity leave for birth of first child			
Received pay during maternity leave			
Paid maternity leave	70.6	74.0	3.4***
Used other paid leave for maternity (including sick leave, disability, and vacation)	69.5	79.7	10.2***
Self-financed maternity leave			
Quit when had child	73.9	63.7	-10.2**
Let go when had child	71.7	66.2	-5.5
Unpaid maternity leave	71.2	72.8	1.6***
Used other unpaid leave for maternity (including sick leave and vacation)	71.6	71.7	0.2
Other (including self-employed and employer went out of business)	72.2	56.1	-16.1

Source: Author's analysis of the 1996 and 2001 SIPP panels.

Notes: Estimates are from regressions including number and age of children, age, race, citizenship, educational attainment, marital status, region, year, and dummies indicating the number of labor market breaks the woman has ever taken. See Appendix for full results.

*** statistically significant at the 1 percent level; ** statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

However, current likelihood of employment does not tell us whether this is because the mother quit stopped work with she had her first child, or later in her career. Table 7 shows that most women returned to work after their first child was born, with over 90 percent who had access to either paid or self-financed leave returning to work, on average. Women least likely to return to work were those who quit, where they only had a 79.8 probability of returning to work, 15.7 percentage points less than if they had not quit. Being let go also significantly reduced the likelihood of returning to work, by 12.4 percentage points. Since receiving pay increases the likelihood of returning to work, this may also affect the likelihood of future employment.

Table 7. Effects of leave-taking on probability of going back to work after first child born

Discrete Predicted Probabilities

	No	Yes	Difference
Access to maternity leave for birth of first child			
Received pay during maternity leave	89.7	95.1	5.4***
Self-financed maternity leave	94.1	91.3	-2.8***
Detailed access to maternity leave for birth of first child			
Received pay during maternity leave			
Paid maternity leave	92.9	94.4	1.6***
Used other paid leave for maternity (including sick leave, disability, and vacation)	93.0	94.8	1.8***
Self-financed maternity leave			
Quit when had child	95.5	79.8	-15.7***
Let go when had child	93.5	81.1	-12.4***
Unpaid maternity leave	93.2	93.6	0.4***
Used other unpaid leave for maternity (including sick leave and vacation)	93.3	93.6	0.3
Other (including self-employed and employer went out of business)	93.5	87.6	-6.0*

Source: Author's analysis of SIPP 1996 and 2001 panels.

Notes : See notes to Table 6.

*** statistically significant at the 1 percent level; *statistically significant at the 10 percent level.

Conclusion

This report finds that having access to workplace flexibility raises women's earnings at best and, at worst, does not hurt them. Under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), about half of women in the U.S. labor market currently have access to unpaid leave for the birth or adoption of a child or to care for a sick family member. However, just over half do not have access. Moving towards universality in access to leave could help to close the gap in women's pay and could help more women stay in the labor market over time.

Over their lifetimes, women earn less than half of what men earn; over a 15 year period, prime-age women workers earn 38 percent of what men earn (Hartmann and Rose 2004). Recent research has pointed to the presence of children and the lack of family-friendly policies as one of the most important factors explaining women's lower lifetime earnings. The "family gap" is the gap among women between those with and without children. As with the gender gap, much of the family gap is explained by workers' demographics, educational attainment, job characteristics, and years of experience. The unexplained portion of the family gap—the gap due to the presence of children—is about 5 percent (Budig and England 2001), some of which may be due to leave-taking or breaks in employment for caring for families.

Family-friendly policies may mitigate the family gap in pay. A cross-country comparison of seven industrialized nations finds that the family gap is largest in the United Kingdom, followed by the other Anglo-American nations and Germany (Harkness and Waldfogel 1999). Parents in Anglo-American nations have less access to family-friendly policies. Researchers point to these differences in maternity and child care policies in creating differences in the family gap across countries.

The returns to having paid maternity leave are high, however, the costs of providing this leave are relatively low. A recent estimate for the state of Massachusetts found that implementing a paid parental leave program of 12 weeks at 50 percent of wages would incur an annual cost on every worker in the state of between \$19 and \$22—about the price of two movie tickets (Albelda and Clayton-Matthews 2005). Thus, a small investment up front can lead to significant gains for working mothers over the rest of their careers.

One thing is certain: We cannot rely on the private sector to voluntarily provide all workers with workplace flexibility. This analysis finds that most mothers—especially those without any college—did not have pay during maternity leave for the birth of their first child. Workplaces have not created broad paid family leave programs on the heels of the FMLA. We can no longer view the rigidities of the workplace as an individual problem; rather, we must view them as something that poses a threat to all families and is something that must be dealt with by policy.

There is some movement in this direction. In 2002, California Governor Gray Davis signed a bill providing workers with paid leave to care for a sick family member or bond with a new child. This legislation, which took effect in June 2004, is the first of its kind in the United States. This law pays workers 55 to 60 percent of wages (subject to a cap) for six weeks of leave and is financed entirely by payroll taxes on employees. Other states are working towards implementing their own paid leave legislation; such legislation just passed the Senate in Washington State, for example.

Workers need access to workplace flexibility to allow them coordinate their personal lives with their work lives. Employers need government intervention to level the playing field. Employers who offer workplace flexibility should not bear the full costs of implementing good workplace practices, while other employers are allowed to ignore their employees' needs. Nationally applicable labor standards should include workplace flexibility policies, such as access to paid leaves and flexible scheduling. Relying on the goodwill of employers has meant that many workers, especially low-wage workers, do not have access to any kind of flexibility. The solutions to this problem are to be found not only in employer policies, but through broader universal policy solutions as well.

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Appendix: Data and Specification

Data

This analysis makes use of the 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP is a multi-panel, longitudinal survey of the civilian, non-institutional population in the United States, conducted by the U.S. Census. It is designed to examine issues related to participation in income maintenance programs, such as welfare and unemployment insurance and contains extensive information on individuals' backgrounds, employment and earnings, and access to services, including health insurance and child-care. Unlike other available longitudinal datasets, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics or National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, it covers all workers and contains monthly, rather than annual data.

The SIPP data are structured so that every month one-fourth of the sample is interviewed; over each four-month interval (a "wave"), all sample members are interviewed. During each wave, respondents are asked a set of core questions, which cover labor market participation, wages, and participation in income support programs; additional questions from topical modules change each wave.

For this analysis, the 1996 and 2001 data is pooled. The 1996 SIPP panel includes interviews from December 1995 through March 2000. The 2001 panel includes interviews from December 2000 through January 2004. The data is reshaped to be in person-month format and there is one observation per person per month. The data for this analysis is drawn from topical modules two and four, which occurred during waves two and four. The current employment and earnings are taken from wave four, which covers the Spring of 1997 in the 1996 panel and the Spring of 2002 in the 2001 panel.

These SIPP panels provide a unique opportunity to study the effects of leave-taking and workplace schedules on employment and earnings. Topical module two includes a battery of questions on mother's leave-taking for the birth of their first child, as well as employment and earnings around the time of the leave. The variables of interest for leave-taking are whether or not a mother took any pregnancy or maternity leave for the birth of her first child and whether that leave was paid or unpaid. If the effects of leave-taking on employment and earnings are different for first and subsequent children, then our findings will only apply to mothers with one child.

The work schedules questions were asked in the topical modules of waves four and ten. These questions are similar to those asked in the Current Population Survey Work Schedules Supplement. The variables of interest for work schedules for this analysis is whether the hours a woman works are voluntary, and whether the hours are voluntary and specifically for caring activities, including both child care and care for other family members.

The dependent variable for the wage models is the log of hourly wages. SIPP respondents can report either hourly wages or monthly earnings; we calculate hourly wages for observations without wage data, but with valid data for both earnings and hours per week. The wage data is adjusted for topcoding. (See Boushey (2004) and Boushey and Schmitt (2004) for a complete analysis of SIPP wage data.) The dependent variable for the employment models is whether the respondent indicated a positive value for wages or earnings that month.

The final sample for the analysis includes women, aged 25 to 54 who worked prior to the birth of their first child. The analysis includes retrospective information about leave-taking for the birth of the first child from wave two, but uses employment and earnings from wave four, when the scheduling flexibility questions were asked. The estimation includes all person-month observations, not only those who remain in the panel for the entire 48 months of the survey.

Specification

This analysis estimates wages using a standard OLS model. Although women's wages are often estimated with a Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979), this is inappropriate here. The logic of the Heckman model is that given that we cannot observe the wages of women who are not employed, and that women who are not employed are likely to have lower wages than those who are employed, the estimation of wages should account for this bias. The solution to this model is to find variables that strongly affect the chances for observation—which here is the reservation wage—but not the observed outcome—which here is the actual wage. Usually, the presence of children is used to control for selection into employment. However, this model *assumes* that the presence of children affects women's wages and that is why leave-taking and flexibility are important. Thus, OLS is the preferred specification of the wage model. The probability of employment is estimated using a logit model.

Table A1 shows the regression results for the wage model and Table A2 shows the logit results for the employment models.

Table A1. Wage regression results

	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
			No more than high-school degree	Some college or more	No more than high-school degree	Some college or more
Received pay during maternity leave		0.089 (4.11)***			0.136 (3.13)***	0.083 (3.24)***
Paid maternity leave	0.065 (3.19)***		0.070 (1.73)*	0.065 (2.72)***		
Other paid leave used for maternity	0.048 (2.35)**		0.124 (3.04)***	0.034 (1.44)		
Self-financed maternity leave		-0.015 (0.67)			0.051 (1.17)	-0.024 (0.92)
Quit when had child	-0.080 (3.19)***		-0.022 (0.50)	-0.092 (3.00)***		
Let go when had child	-0.029 (0.58)		0.113 (1.45)	-0.086 (1.31)		
Unpaid maternity leave	-0.013 (0.60)		0.011 (0.26)	-0.010 (0.37)		
Used other unpaid leave for maternity (including sick leave and vacation)	-0.023 (0.83)		0.036 (0.69)	-0.037 (1.09)		
Other (including self- employed and employer went out of business)	-0.015 (0.39)		0.008 (0.13)	-0.008 (0.17)		
Schedule suits personal needs (school, second job, other)	-0.006 (0.38)	-0.006 (0.35)	-0.008 (0.32)	-0.010 (0.50)	-0.009 (0.36)	-0.010 (0.52)
Schedule suits caring needs (child care, elder care, other)	0.017 (0.81)	0.017 (0.82)	0.037 (1.00)	0.006 (0.25)	0.037 (0.99)	0.006 (0.23)
Demographics						
Age	0.040 (3.51)***	0.040 (3.52)***	0.028 (1.42)	0.048 (3.40)***	0.028 (1.46)	0.048 (3.34)***
Age squared	-0.000 (2.54)**	-0.000 (2.56)**	-0.000 (1.09)	-0.000 (2.47)**	-0.000 (1.16)	-0.000 (2.43)**
High-school graduate (less than high-school omitted)	0.088 (2.56)**	0.095 (2.75)***	0.090 (2.79)***	0.000 (.)	0.095 (2.94)***	0.000 (.)

Table A1. Wage regression results, cont.

	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
			No more than high-school degree	Some college or more	No more than high-school degree	Some college or more
Some college	0.149 (4.34)***	0.157 (4.59)***	0.000 (.)	-0.194 (10.12)***	0.000 (.)	-0.193 (10.06)***
College degree	0.351 (9.54)***	0.359 (9.75)***	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Post-college degree	0.560 (13.55)***	0.570 (13.81)***	0.000 (.)	0.205 (8.03)***	0.000 (.)	0.206 (8.10)***
African American (white omitted)	-0.020 (0.99)	-0.019 (0.94)	0.008 (0.24)	-0.032 (1.25)	0.011 (0.32)	-0.030 (1.19)
Hispanic	-0.022 (0.85)	-0.022 (0.85)	-0.029 (0.72)	-0.024 (0.74)	-0.029 (0.72)	-0.025 (0.78)
Other race	-0.033 (0.97)	-0.033 (0.97)	0.001 (0.01)	-0.054 (1.30)	-0.007 (0.12)	-0.055 (1.31)
Naturalized citizen (native-born omitted)	0.054 (1.54)	0.057 (1.62)	0.080 (1.34)	0.049 (1.15)	0.084 (1.40)	0.053 (1.23)
Non-citizen	-0.098 (2.97)***	-0.098 (2.98)***	-0.113 (2.28)**	-0.074 (1.70)*	-0.111 (2.23)**	-0.070 (1.61)
Job characteristics						
Part-time (less than 35 hours/wk)	-0.076 (5.04)***	-0.077 (5.11)***	-0.117 (4.52)***	-0.066 (3.54)***	-0.118 (4.60)***	-0.065 (3.51)***
Union	0.113 (5.32)***	0.115 (5.42)***	0.214 (5.14)***	0.088 (3.50)***	0.213 (5.13)***	0.090 (3.56)***
<i>Industry (Agriculture excluded)</i>						
Mining	0.476 (2.04)**	0.493 (2.11)**	0.000 (.)	0.409 (1.65)*	0.000 (.)	0.434 (1.75)*
Construction	0.254 (2.42)**	0.253 (2.41)**	0.298 (1.58)	0.237 (1.87)*	0.304 (1.61)	0.233 (1.84)*
Manufacturing: durables	0.148 (1.62)	0.149 (1.63)	0.225 (1.33)	0.091 (0.84)	0.237 (1.40)	0.093 (0.85)
Manufacturing: nondurables	0.076 (0.82)	0.081 (0.87)	0.140 (0.83)	0.038 (0.33)	0.149 (0.88)	0.046 (0.41)
Transportation	0.207 (2.18)**	0.208 (2.19)**	0.183 (1.04)	0.198 (1.74)*	0.187 (1.06)	0.200 (1.76)*
Communications	0.156 (1.55)	0.162 (1.60)	0.137 (0.73)	0.129 (1.08)	0.147 (0.78)	0.135 (1.12)
Utilities	0.165 (1.38)	0.162 (1.36)	0.331 (1.51)	0.090 (0.63)	0.329 (1.50)	0.091 (0.64)
Wholesale Trade	0.096 (1.02)	0.099 (1.04)	0.219 (1.28)	0.017 (0.15)	0.224 (1.30)	0.019 (0.16)

Table A1. Wage regression results, cont.

	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
			No more than high-school degree	Some college or more	No more than high-school degree	Some college or more
Retail trade	-0.198 (2.22)**	-0.193 (2.17)**	-0.089 (0.53)	-0.253 (2.36)**	-0.080 (0.48)	-0.244 (2.28)**
Finance	0.108 (1.20)	0.110 (1.23)	0.208 (1.24)	0.051 (0.48)	0.212 (1.26)	0.054 (0.51)
Private Household Services	0.075 (0.40)	0.076 (0.40)	0.445 (1.46)	-0.211 (0.88)	0.501 (1.65)*	-0.230 (0.96)
Business Services	0.033 (0.36)	0.039 (0.42)	0.085 (0.50)	-0.003 (0.03)	0.092 (0.54)	0.006 (0.06)
Personal Services	-0.054 (0.56)	-0.050 (0.52)	0.126 (0.73)	-0.202 (1.64)	0.133 (0.77)	-0.198 (1.61)
EntertainRec. Services	-0.122 (1.22)	-0.126 (1.25)	0.090 (0.50)	-0.230 (1.88)*	0.087 (0.48)	-0.238 (1.95)*
Hospitals	0.178 (1.98)**	0.183 (2.03)**	0.081 (0.46)	0.147 (1.38)	0.089 (0.51)	0.154 (1.44)
Medical Services	0.087 (0.97)	0.090 (1.00)	0.134 (0.79)	0.051 (0.48)	0.140 (0.83)	0.055 (0.52)
Educational Services	-0.189 (2.12)**	-0.187 (2.10)**	0.031 (0.18)	-0.254 (2.40)**	0.032 (0.19)	-0.250 (2.35)**
Social Services	-0.216 (2.34)**	-0.217 (2.35)**	-0.008 (0.05)	-0.304 (2.76)***	-0.010 (0.06)	-0.305 (2.77)***
Other Professional Services	0.053 (0.58)	0.057 (0.63)	0.115 (0.65)	0.000 (0.00)	0.133 (0.75)	0.005 (0.04)
Forestry	0.009 (0.02)	-0.005 (0.01)	0.000 (.)	-0.033 (0.07)	0.000 (.)	-0.055 (0.12)
Public Administration	0.044 (0.49)	0.046 (0.50)	0.058 (0.33)	0.010 (0.09)	0.068 (0.39)	0.012 (0.12)
Armed Forces	0.213 (0.71)	0.215 (0.72)	0.564 (1.33)	-0.033 (0.08)	0.553 (1.30)	-0.027 (0.07)
<i>Occupation (Executive, Administrative, and Managerial, excluded)</i>						
Professional Specialty	0.011 (0.48)	0.010 (0.42)	-0.150 (2.33)**	0.024 (0.91)	-0.148 (2.30)**	0.021 (0.83)
Technicians and Related Support	-0.082 (2.52)**	-0.086 (2.64)***	-0.105 (1.32)	-0.084 (2.30)**	-0.109 (1.37)	-0.089 (2.42)**
Sales	-0.166 (5.75)***	-0.169 (5.84)***	-0.226 (4.83)***	-0.133 (3.56)***	-0.233 (4.98)***	-0.137 (3.68)***
Administrative Support, Including Clerical	-0.237 (11.35)***	-0.237 (11.34)***	-0.196 (5.14)***	-0.255 (10.09)***	-0.194 (5.09)***	-0.257 (10.14)***

Table A1. Wage regression results, cont.

	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
			No more than high-school degree	Some college or more	No more than high-school degree	Some college or more
Private Household Services	-0.575 (3.13)***	-0.578 (3.14)***	-0.739 (2.62)***	-0.532 (2.21)**	-0.781 (2.78)***	-0.520 (2.16)**
Protective Services	-0.112 (1.19)	-0.121 (1.29)	-0.013 (0.08)	-0.146 (1.29)	-0.015 (0.09)	-0.156 (1.38)
Services, except Household and Protective	-0.439 (15.82)***	-0.441 (15.91)***	-0.488 (11.15)***	-0.410 (10.93)***	-0.493 (11.29)***	-0.415 (11.04)***
Farming, Forestry, and Fishing	-0.414 (3.23)***	-0.415 (3.24)***	-0.324 (1.78)*	-0.499 (2.85)***	-0.331 (1.82)*	-0.500 (2.85)***
Precision Production, Craft, and Repair	-0.258 (5.18)***	-0.259 (5.19)***	-0.231 (3.35)***	-0.304 (4.18)***	-0.236 (3.42)***	-0.306 (4.21)***
Machine Operators, Assemblers, and Inspectors	-0.406 (10.01)***	-0.407 (10.03)***	-0.430 (7.46)***	-0.372 (6.00)***	-0.435 (7.57)***	-0.377 (6.07)***
Transportation and Material Moving	-0.222 (3.38)***	-0.229 (3.49)***	-0.166 (1.62)	-0.257 (3.07)***	-0.176 (1.72)*	-0.264 (3.15)***
Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers, and Laborers	-0.302 (4.96)***	-0.303 (4.96)***	-0.285 (3.83)***	-0.357 (3.54)***	-0.293 (3.94)***	-0.365 (3.61)***
Armed Forces	-0.382 (0.80)	-0.359 (0.75)	0.000 (.)	-0.176 (0.31)	0.000 (.)	-0.159 (0.28)
Middle Atlantic (New England omitted)	-0.016 (0.53)	-0.018 (0.59)	-0.044 (0.84)	-0.004 (0.12)	-0.046 (0.88)	-0.004 (0.10)
E. North Central	-0.078 (2.64)***	-0.079 (2.70)***	-0.070 (1.42)	-0.083 (2.30)**	-0.073 (1.48)	-0.083 (2.31)**
W. North Central	-0.155 (4.77)***	-0.156 (4.83)***	-0.108 (1.89)*	-0.173 (4.41)***	-0.105 (1.84)*	-0.175 (4.46)***
South Atlantic	-0.149 (4.97)***	-0.150 (5.01)***	-0.152 (2.97)***	-0.151 (4.12)***	-0.156 (3.06)***	-0.151 (4.12)***
E. South Central	-0.252 (6.92)***	-0.252 (6.93)***	-0.221 (3.61)***	-0.268 (6.00)***	-0.222 (3.61)***	-0.266 (5.95)***
W. South Central	-0.124 (3.83)***	-0.126 (3.87)***	-0.091 (1.61)	-0.140 (3.53)***	-0.098 (1.75)*	-0.138 (3.48)***
Mountain	-0.140 (3.82)***	-0.142 (3.89)***	-0.131 (2.21)**	-0.155 (3.39)***	-0.130 (2.19)**	-0.158 (3.46)***

Table A1. Wage regression results, cont.

	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
			No more than high-school degree	Some college or more	No more than high-school degree	Some college or more
Pacific	0.039 (1.30)	0.037 (1.20)	0.056 (1.04)	0.036 (0.97)	0.054 (1.01)	0.034 (0.93)
1997 (1996 omitted)	0.042 (1.31)	0.042 (1.28)	0.030 (0.59)	0.033 (0.79)	0.039 (0.78)	0.035 (0.84)
2001	0.134 (3.78)***	0.135 (3.79)***	0.158 (2.74)***	0.123 (2.75)***	0.161 (2.80)***	0.129 (2.88)***
2002	0.155 (4.57)***	0.155 (4.57)***	0.106 (1.97)**	0.159 (3.69)***	0.117 (2.18)**	0.162 (3.75)***
Constant	1.549 (6.85)***	1.516 (6.70)***	1.733 (4.50)***	1.783 (6.37)***	1.663 (4.31)***	1.771 (6.33)***
Observations	5102	5102	1530	3572	1530	3572
R-squared	0.42	0.41	0.34	0.37	0.34	0.37

Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table A2. Employment regression results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Current employment	Current employment	Employed after maternity	Employed after maternity
Received pay during maternity leave		1.973 (0.195)***		2.241 (0.343)***
Paid maternity leave	1.186 (0.112)*		1.299 (0.212)	
Other paid leave used for maternity	1.721 (0.167)***		1.367 (0.229)*	
Self-financed maternity leave		1.091 (0.109)		0.655 (0.106)***
Quit when had child	0.619 (0.066)***		0.187 (0.032)***	
Let go when had child	0.774 (0.156)		0.299 (0.080)***	
Unpaid maternity leave	1.083 (0.107)		1.066 (0.181)	
Used other unpaid leave for maternity (including sick leave and vacation)	1.008 (0.128)		1.047 (0.235)	
Other (including self-employed and employer went out of business)	0.491 (0.072)***		0.488 (0.110)***	
Demographics				
Age of mother's oldest child	1.066 (0.013)***	1.056 (0.013)***	1.209 (0.023)***	1.153 (0.021)***
Children 0 to 5	0.603 (0.044)***	0.603 (0.044)***	0.767 (0.091)**	0.761 (0.087)**
Children 6 to 12	0.772 (0.060)***	0.790 (0.061)***	0.939 (0.108)	1.021 (0.112)
Children 13 to 17	0.912 (0.101)	0.940 (0.103)	0.548 (0.091)***	0.628 (0.100)***
Age	0.818 (0.043)***	0.819 (0.043)***	0.807 (0.065)***	0.839 (0.066)**
Age squared	1.002 (0.001)***	1.002 (0.001)***	1.002 (0.001)**	1.002 (0.001)*
High-school graduate (less than high- school omitted)	1.537 (0.199)***	1.554 (0.200)***	0.917 (0.174)	0.960 (0.177)

Table A2. Employment regression results, cont.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Current employment	Current employment	Employed after maternity	Employed after maternity
Some college	1.731 (0.220)***	1.764 (0.223)***	1.229 (0.232)	1.296 (0.239)
College degree	1.560 (0.211)***	1.572 (0.211)***	0.989 (0.196)	0.994 (0.192)
Post-college degree	2.071 (0.319)***	2.085 (0.318)***	1.573 (0.370)*	1.609 (0.367)**
African American (white omitted)	1.507 (0.160)***	1.502 (0.159)***	1.273 (0.218)	1.330 (0.222)*
Hispanic	1.299 (0.142)**	1.300 (0.141)**	1.042 (0.174)	1.022 (0.165)
Other race	1.605 (0.238)***	1.589 (0.235)***	1.004 (0.224)	0.979 (0.211)
Naturalized citizen (native-born omitted)	0.858 (0.127)	0.855 (0.126)	1.546 (0.404)*	1.485 (0.375)
Non-citizen	0.680 (0.086)***	0.664 (0.084)***	0.646 (0.115)**	0.591 (0.101)***
Never married (Married/cohabitating omitted)	1.393 (0.172)***	1.402 (0.171)***	1.279 (0.240)	1.263 (0.229)
Widowed	2.062 (0.211)***	2.054 (0.210)***	1.725 (0.281)***	1.678 (0.269)***
Divorced/separated	0.955 (0.310)	0.903 (0.288)	2.922 (1.773)*	2.769 (1.690)*
Middle Atlantic (New England omitted)	0.873 (0.112)	0.873 (0.111)	0.650 (0.118)**	0.690 (0.120)**
E. North Central	0.997 (0.126)	0.986 (0.123)	1.154 (0.213)	1.156 (0.206)
W. North Central	1.151 (0.164)	1.170 (0.166)	1.893 (0.435)***	1.920 (0.427)***
South Atlantic	0.874 (0.110)	0.875 (0.109)	1.106 (0.204)	1.110 (0.197)
E. South Central	1.176 (0.196)	1.172 (0.194)	1.107 (0.276)	1.160 (0.280)
W. South Central	0.829 (0.115)	0.826 (0.114)	1.070 (0.222)	1.055 (0.210)
Mountain	0.700 (0.106)**	0.694 (0.104)**	1.006 (0.224)	0.966 (0.208)
Pacific	0.789 (0.101)*	0.801 (0.102)*	1.144 (0.217)	1.156 (0.212)

Table A2. Employment regression results, cont.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Current employment	Current employment	Employed after maternity	Employed after maternity
1997 (1996 omitted)	0.952 (0.139)	0.954 (0.138)	1.231 (0.243)	1.239 (0.236)
2001	0.840 (0.134)	0.826 (0.130)	2.061 (0.470)***	2.038 (0.448)***
2002	0.790 (0.120)	0.775 (0.117)*	1.885 (0.396)***	1.819 (0.369)***
One labor market breaks (continuous work history omitted)	0.390 (0.023)***	0.370 (0.021)***	0.321 (0.029)***	0.267 (0.023)***
Two labor market breaks	0.487 (0.056)***	0.458 (0.052)***	0.740 (0.140)	0.564 (0.103)***
Three labor market breaks	0.383 (0.087)***	0.375 (0.085)***	1.319 (0.678)	1.108 (0.563)
Four or more labor market breaks	0.197 (0.053)***	0.204 (0.055)***	0.298 (0.106)***	0.299 (0.102)***
Observations	7548	7548	7548	7548

Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%