

REDRAWING THE LINES: 1961

A Study of the Redistricting Process in California

THE ROSE INSTITUTE of STATE and LOCAL GOVERNMENT

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**POWER UNBRIDLED:
THE 1961 REDISTRICTING OF CALIFORNIA**

BY

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It began that September in Maine. In the nation's earliest elections, the Democrats, to everyone's surprise, won a majority of federal offices in the state for the first time in history. As Maine goes, so goes the nation. By the time everyone else voted in November of 1958, a landslide was apparent.

In Connecticut, the entire Republican delegation was defeated. As the tide rolled westward, ancient and venerable Republicans fell like bowling pins. Sen. Bricker of Ohio--the 1944 GOP Vice Presidential candidate--was voted out of office, as were Republican governors in Ohio, Nebraska, and South Dakota. The tide was at its crest by the time it smashed into California: on the one single day of November 4, 1958, the Democratic party swept away a half-century of Republican rule in the state.

First to fall was U.S. Senator William F. Knowland, who was running for governor. An institution in California for two decades, a protege of Earl Warren, the former majority leader of the U.S. Senate, and a man re-elected without opposition in 1952, Knowland was defeated by a million votes. Then there was the case of Goodwin J. Knight, who was running for Knowland's Senate seat. Knight had been governor for four years, after being elected by a landslide in 1954. In the 1958 senatorial race he was defeated by an obscure mountain-counties congressman. As for the rest of the GOP statewide slate, all but one were defeated. Three Republican congressmen lost their seats, and with them went the GOP majority in the state's congressional delegation. The Republican majority in the state legislature also disappeared, as ten Assembly seats and seven Senate seats were lost.

The election of 1958 was the most traumatic experience for the Republican party since 1912. The party was savaged by the voters both in California and in the nation at large. In California, perhaps, the defeat resulted from the arrogance of

power. The GOP had ruled both the legislative and the gubernatorial roosts in the state for sixteen years, and in those years the party had forsaken cooperation for backbiting and moderation for extremism. In 1958, it outraged California labor unions by embracing the unpopular issue of right-to-work. Sen. Knowland, ambitious for the Presidency, had forced Governor Knight to abandon his office in order to run for Knowland's Senate seat, while Knowland himself sought the governorship. This "great switch" angered many voters, and in the end it carried the entire GOP ticket to ruin.

At the 1956 Republican national convention in San Francisco--the last great event of the GOP's golden age in California--the state's delegation was divided among California's four leading Republicans. Senator Knowland got almost a third of the delegates; Governor Knight got a third; Vice President Nixon got a third; and Senator Thomas Kuchel got the rest. Within four years, however, Knight, Knowland, and Nixon were all out of office and the GOP's sole surviving major office-holder in California was Senator Kuchel, who most people thought wasn't a Republican anyway.

The 1958 election was quite a different sort of event for the victorious Democrats; for them, it was the dawning of a new and brighter day. But the Democratic triumph in 1958 was only a prelude to the greater heights of 1960, when the Democrats won the Presidency and strengthened their hold on California politics. By that time, though, their new governor, Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, was already on the verge of eclipse; but in 1960 there was a new power on the scene--the mighty boss of the State Assembly, and the Kennedy Administration's key California contact, Speaker Jesse Unruh.

Unruh first came to the legislature in 1954, already educated by the political wars in West Los Angeles. No one mastered the system faster, and by the beginning of the 1961 legislative session, Unruh was ready to wield all the powers

at his command--both for his own benefit and on behalf of the new Democratic Administration in Washington. Moreover, Unruh began that session with the kind of opportunities most politicians only dream about. His party's majority in the Assembly of 47-33 was the largest Democratic majority since the Depression. These Democrats would soon elect him to the post of Speaker, and in that office he would usher in a new style of legislative leadership. Unruh was already the Kennedy Administration's point man in California. And now Unruh was about to do the new Administration a great favor. Among the duties that fell to the Democratic legislative majority in the spring of 1961 was the pleasant task of reapportioning both the California Assembly and the California Congressional delegation.

For Unruh and his lieutenants in the Assembly, this was a moment to be relished. In their hands was the opportunity not only to undo what they saw as the dreadful Republican gerrymander of the 1951 redistricting--which had kept the moribund GOP in power far beyond its days--but to insure Democratic dominance of California government far into the future. Unruh saw to it that much of the responsibility for reapportioning California in line with the 1960 federal census went to his good friend, Assemblyman Robert Crown of Alameda. Together, he and Crown set about fashioning new lines for California's Assembly and Congressional districts; and in the process, they gerrymandered the state with the most partisan districting plan in its history.

Background of the 1961 Reapportionment: The Power Blocs.

The state that Unruh and Crown were about to apportion was very different from the California that Laughlin Waters and his Republican cohorts had carved up in 1951. The California population increased by fully 50 percent during the 1950s, as millions of people poured into the state, particularly into the urban areas of the south. In 1950, the state had had a population of 10.6 million; the 1960 census

showed that it now had 15.9 million. Los Angeles County alone had grown by nearly two million people. The population of San Diego County had doubled during the decade. Once-rural Orange County had gone from 216,000 people in 1950 to 719,000 ten years later.

In terms of registered voters, California went from 5.2 million in 1950 to 7.4 million in 1960; and in the process, the Democrats had increased their registration advantage from 1.1 million voters to 1.3 million, even though the registration percentages of the two parties had remained almost static, at 58 percent Democratic, 40 percent Republican. Thus, even though much of the increase in registrations during the 1950s had been Republican, even more of it was Democratic. More significant, though, was the fact that the new California Democrats had a habit of voting their party. They had no memory of the old "nonpartisan system." Cross-filing declined in the 1950s, so that the general election ballot for legislative seats always showed two candidates, one Democratic and one Republican. Most of the new California voters had no idea who their local representatives were, so they simply voted their party. And the Democrats reaped the benefit of party loyalty.

The impact of such partisan voting on California politics was tremendous. Not since the 1880s had the Democrats organized the California Senate. Even during the height of the New Deal, the Senate had remained in Republican hands. Seats in the California Senate were not apportioned on a population basis, but, like the seats in the United States Senate, were apportioned on a geographical basis (no more than three counties could be included in each Senate district). Under this system, and with the cross-filing tradition, nonpartisanship worked beautifully for the Republicans in the State Senate. Senators cross-filed year after year, and Republicans almost always won elections in Democratic counties. Such were the successes of the GOP that in 1951, for example, the Senate consisted of 28 Republicans and only 12 Democrats.

But then partisan voting replaced the old nonpartisan, cross-filing system, and Republican numbers in the Senate began to fall precipitously. Eighteen of the 28 GOP seats were lost during the 1950s, and by 1961 the upper house consisted of 30 Democrats and only 10 Republicans. This turnabout is easily explained: most counties in California are Democratic by registration, but most rural counties vote conservatively. Once people began voting their party, they simply replaced conservative Republicans with conservative Democrats.

Jesse Unruh and Robert Crown determined to use this new trend in partisan voting to maximize Democratic electoral prospects in a state where registered Democrats outnumbered registered Republicans by 4.3 million to 2.9 million. They also hoped to draw the new legislative and Congressional districts in such a way as to entrench the Democratic majority for many years to come. Surprisingly, it appeared that this would not be a difficult task. The 4.3 million California Democrats could be roughly divided into four district voting blocs. Although these four blocs did not always see eye to eye--and often seemed to fight one another more than they fought the Republicans--it was possible to apportion the Assembly and congressional seats among them in such a way that a Democratic statewide majority could always be guaranteed. Unruh and Crown thus determined that the 1961 lines would carefully carve up these Democratic blocks to assure a permanent Democratic majority.

The oldest partner in the Democratic coalition was the rural bloc. At one time, almost the entire strength of the Democratic party in California was concentrated in rural areas. During the 1920s, for example, the only Democrat in the California Congressional delegation was Clarence Lea, who represented eleven rural counties in the area north of San Francisco. Tiny mountain counties like Plumas always returned Democratic majorities, even when central Los Angeles was voting Republican. The rural Democratic base went back almost to the Civil War.

The 1950s had been kind to rural Democrats. With the rise of party-line voting, Republican after Republican in rural areas went down to defeat. By 1961, it was possible to drive down Highway 99 all the way from the Oregon border to Los Angeles without passing through a single Republican Congressional district. Of the State's nine rural Congressional districts, Democrats held eight; the only Republican rural district was located in a few counties along the central coast.

Unruh and Crown quickly decided that there was no reason to disturb the rural Democratic districts in the 1961 reapportionment. For one thing, the rural counties had not grown as fast as the state's urban areas, so there was no reason to give them additional Assembly or Congressional representation. The Democratic majority in the Senate was based on the rural counties, but the Senate would not be reapportioned at all in 1961, because apportionment of Senate seats was set in the state constitution. Moreover, Unruh wanted cooperation in the Senate when he sent his reapportionment bill to the Legislature. If Unruh could help it, not one rural district would be redistricted in a manner that would upset a rural legislator. The serious redistricting in 1961 would therefore be limited to the other three Democratic blocs.

If the rural bloc had given the party respectability during the bleak years of the 1920s, the second bloc -- the urban, blue-collar workers--had been the most loyal in the period from the 1930s through the 1950s. The latter decade marked the send-off of the arms race. American defense industries boomed, and California was a particular beneficiary of defense spending. Along with defense, the new aerospace industry was also providing thousands of blue-collar jobs, as were the automobile and construction industries. A large percentage of the new migrants to the state during the 1950s had come looking for jobs in these industries.

Unruh and Crown both represented Assembly districts with large working-class populations--districts that had been Republican during the nonpartisan years, but

which were now solidly Democratic. Unruh and Crown looked at the map and saw how the 1951 Republican reapportionment had jammed working-class neighborhoods into a few overwhelmingly Democratic districts. They decided to undo this. They would spread out the blue-collar neighborhoods in such a way as to maximize Democratic electoral prospects without wasting Democratic votes.

The working-class vote had been loyal to the Democrats since the Depression, and in 1958 the Republicans had seemingly written off the blue-collar voter forever by embracing right-to-work laws. In response, the unions--seeing right-to-work as a threat to their very existence--had mobilized as never before; and the determined effort of California's labor movement had contributed greatly to the Republican thrashing at the polls in 1958. Unruh was determined to reward blue-collar loyalty to the Democratic party with greater representation for blue-collar constituencies--particularly in the state's Congressional delegation, where California Congressmen with labor backing could contribute mightily to labor's cause in the national capital.

The third bloc in the California Democratic coalition was made up of the state's racial and ethnic minorities. Like the blue-collar workers, the minority voters had come to the Democrats during Franklin Roosevelt's Presidency, and their loyalty was unquestioned. Prior to 1960, however, black and Hispanic voters had not counted for much in California politics. Despite the state's large Mexican-American population, Mexican-Americans were not a political force at all. In 1960, not a single federal or state office in California was held by a Mexican-American. Spanish-speaking neighborhoods regularly returned huge Democratic majorities, but they exerted no political power of their own. Unruh and Crown saw such Hispanic neighborhoods as putty, to be shaped as necessary to maximize Democratic opportunities. The huge East Los Angeles barrio would be divided among six Assembly districts, and in 1962 all but one of these would be captured by

Anglo Democrats. The marginal nature of several of the Democratic victories, moreover, make it clear that the seats could not have been won without Mexican-American voters.

Black voters were a somewhat more potent political force than the Hispanics. During the 1950s, the booming defense and aerospace industries had attracted thousands of southern and urban blacks to California, and the black ghetto in south-central Los Angeles had grown immensely. Unlike Hispanics, however, blacks were not a benign voting bloc; they expected tangible rewards for their years of toiling in the Democratic vineyards. Early in 1961, Unruh and Crown were made aware of what black Democrats wanted from the reapportionment.

They wanted black neighborhoods united in districts, and not divided. In northern California, the only black legislator was Assemblyman Byron Rumford of Berkeley; they wanted his district strengthened, so that blacks could continue to hold it if and when the popular Rumford retired (he was rumored to be heading for Washington to take a post in the Kennedy Administration). In Los Angeles, blacks had even broader demands. Only one black served in the Legislature from south-central Los Angeles; this was Assemblyman Augustus Hawkins, who, having first come to Sacramento in 1935, was the senior Democrat in the Assembly. Black leaders wanted a Congressional seat for Hawkins and they wanted a second Congressional seat as well. Moreover, they wanted to increase their Assembly representation from one seat to four, by dividing the expanding black ghetto into four predominantly black Assembly districts.

Unruh and Crown would not accept all the blacks' demands. A Congressional district for Augustus Hawkins would be easy, and they could also agree to the creation of a second black Assembly district. Hawkins' Congressional seat, and the two Assembly seats, would all be located in the Watts area. But Unruh and Crown would not unite black neighborhoods, and thus dilute potential Democratic strength

in neighboring white districts, in order to meet the rest of the blacks' demands. Throughout the 1950s, white Democrats had held every Assembly district bordering on the ghetto, but these districts had remained safely Democratic only because each one contained a number of black precincts, where the Democratic nominee could also depend on a majority of 80 or 90 percent. Unruh and Crown were thus determined to keep the black seats to the minimum of one Congressional seat and two Assembly seats, and to apportion out the rest of south-central Los Angeles among white Democrats. Five districts would border the ghetto, and each would contain a number of black neighborhoods. In 1962, Democrats won all of these districts, including Unruh's own district in west-central Los Angeles--and in every case, the Democratic winner was a white. The white population in each of these districts was too large for a black to win the Democratic primary, but the eventual white nominee could depend on a big Democratic vote from blacks to carry him to victory in the fall.

It should be pointed out, however, that eventually the population in this area shifted to give blacks their desired "two-four" division in central Los Angeles. Blacks accelerated their movement westward from Watts in the 1960s, and within a few years some previously white Democratic districts become predominantly black. In 1966, a third black Assemblyman was elected in the area, followed by a fourth in 1972. And also in 1972, a second black Congressman was elected in central Los Angeles.

Despite these eventual successes, it cannot be denied that in the 1961 reapportionment, both blacks and Hispanics were cheated out of the additional representation that their numbers warranted. After years of faithful service to the Democratic party, they were denied the fruits of the first reapportionment conducted by the Democrats. The reasons for this were not racial, however, but political. By dividing the minority neighborhoods among several seats--rather than

uniting them into ethnic districts--the Democrats were able to win more seats for the party. In 1962, Democrats won all 15 of the Assembly districts in central Los Angeles; thirteen of the 15 contained significant minority populations, but only three of these districts were won by black and Hispanic candidates; white Democrats won all the rest. Had the districts in question been drawn as the minorities wanted, as many as six or seven black and Hispanic Democrats probably would have been elected. However, Republicans almost certainly would have carried the neighboring districts. (See map #1, central and east L.A. 1961 lines with black and Hispanic neighborhoods superimposed.)

While the Democrats can be faulted for their treatment of this loyal bloc of Democratic voters in 1961, the Republican record in the 1951 reapportionment was hardly better. In later years, Republicans made quite a point about the need to create ethnic seats.¹ But in 1951 they had largely disenfranchised blacks, by creating three oversized, "safe" Democratic districts in central and southern Los Angeles, in such a manner as to dilute the black vote. Watts ended up in a district that actually stretched all the way to the seashore. The Republicans might talk a good line later about the need for proper ethnic representation, but when they had had their chance to perform, they had done no better than the Democrats.

The fourth bloc within the Democratic party in 1961 was the ideological bloc; and if the minorities could be denied full representation in 1961, the ideologues could not. Out of the 1952 Democratic Presidential campaign had come the Stevenson movement, which in turn spawned dozen of volutary Democratic clubs and organizations dedicated to making Adlai Stevenson President. In 1953, these groups banded together into the California Democratic Council (CDC), which had

¹See for instance, "GOP Launches Drive for Fair Reapportionment Bill," Los Angeles Times, February 28, 1971, Section C, p. 1.

Alan Cranston as its first state chairman. The power base of these liberal Democrats was the heavily Jewish west side of Los Angeles. As the Democratic party revitalized itself during the 1950s, this liberal bloc grew increasingly stronger; by the 1960s the CDC liberals were a major force to be reckoned with in intra-party affairs.

Jesse Unruh had a shaky relationship with the party's liberals, but he still intended to give them more legislative seats and a greater voice in party affairs--even if this meant sacrificing the interests of a few more conservative, working-class Democrats. This decision on Unruh's part highlighted his relationship with Jewish Democrats. The 1951 GOP reapportionment had fractured west Los Angeles in order to reduce Democratic representation. In the process, Jewish representation had also suffered. California Jews, whether they resided in the wealthy precincts of Beverly Hills or in the poorer neighborhoods along Fairfax Avenue, shared a common attachment to the liberal wing of the Democratic party. The California GOP had virtually no ties with the Jews.

Jewish activists had major interests in the fortunes of the Democratic party, and hence a major interest in reapportionment. Unruh, for his part, was a product of West Los Angeles politics; he had close ties with Jewish activists, who provided much of the financial support for his own political endeavors, as well as the political endeavors of the Democratic party as a whole. Unruh's reapportionment chief, Assemblyman Crown, was Jewish himself, and both men were sensitive to the redistricting desires of West Los Angeles. Because of this sensitivity, the lines in a number of safe Democratic districts were drawn in 1961 so as to favor the nomination of more liberal Democratic candidates. Partly as a result, Jewish representation in the Democratic caucus since the 1960s has been somewhat greater than the percentage of the Democratic vote that has been cast by Jews. This is also a function of the fact that Jewish and liberal voters are generally more

loyal to the Democratic party than are other elements of the Democratic coalition. When the coalition fell apart in 1966, and the Republicans romped to a smashing comeback, both rural and working-class white districts went over to the GOP. However, not a single West Los Angeles district changed hands.

Unruh and Crown believed that these four elements of the California Democratic coalition--rural Democrats, blue-collar workers, minority voters, and liberal ideologues--which, among them, included about 60 percent of the state's voters, could be divided up in such a way that the Democrats would be guaranteed about two-thirds of the California Assembly and Congressional seats for years to come. The two men made a count of potential districts and determined that of the 80 Assembly districts, 58 of them could be parcelled out among the various elements of the Democratic coalition. Under this plan, only 22 Assembly districts would contain too many registered Republicans for a Democrat candidate to win. On the Congressional level, the numbers were even more pleasing to the Democrats. The 1960 census revealed that California was to gain an additional eight Congressional seats, bringing the state's total Congressional representation to 38 seats. Unruh and Crown believed that if the Democratic coalition held, the party could win 28 of these seats. Only 10 seats would go to the Republicans.

If they were to achieve their goals with the 1961 redistricting, the Democrats would have to congregate the small number of heavily Republican counties and precincts into a minimal number of super-safe Republican districts--and thus deny the GOP its proportional share of the two-party representation. This was the strategy the Republicans had followed with the Democrats in 1951 to redistrict Democratic representation, and the Democrats were perfectly willing to turn the tables in 1961. Also, it must be pointed out that the Democrats had a very strong political reason at the federal level for wishing to maximize their strength in the California Congressional delegation.

The Politics of the 1961 Redistricting

Some of the political considerations behind the 1961 Democratic gerrymander involved the man in the White House, Democratic President John F. Kennedy. When Kennedy came to the White House in 1961, there was a heavy majority of Democrats in both houses of Congress, as a consequence of the Democrats' 1958 electoral landslide. Despite this fact, however, Kennedy's New Frontier legislative program immediately ran into problems, because Democratic numbers did not always translate into Democratic votes. A large minority of Democrats, almost all of them from the South, actually formed a coalition with the Republicans in the House and Senate to frustrate a number of Kennedy's liberal initiatives. The White House therefore wanted to replace some of these recalcitrant Democrats with a more faithful variety, and to reduce still further the Republican representation in Congress. Needless to say, this was a tall order given the entrenched constituencies of most southern Democrats and the bulging Democratic majority in Congress.

Kennedy could not do much about the U.S. Senate, where the Finance Committee, controlled by the ancient Virginia Democrat Harry Byrd, bottled up much of his program. Kennedy could do something about the House, however. The 1962 election would be a reapportionment election, and some eight districts were being shifted from other states to California. A number of these seats had formerly belonged to southern Democrats. Kennedy had no interest in seeing the new California seats now go to conservative Republicans; however, if these formerly conservative seats should now fall to California Democrats, Kennedy might well prove a big winner. Much of his New Frontier program was presently stymied by the conservatives who controlled the House Rules Committee. This committee was dominated by another Virginian, "Judge" Howard W. Smith, an 81-

year old conservative who had come to Washington before the New Deal. Kennedy and his partisans were clearly hoping that enough liberal Democrats would be elected in California so that the power of "Judge" Smith and other conservatives might be broken in the Democratic caucus. Then the President's liberal programs could go forward.

Just as Republicans had turned to Laughlin Waters in 1951 to find the additional seats they needed to control the House of Representatives, so Kennedy turned to his friend Jesse Unruh ten years later to find the Democrats he needed to get the New Frontier program passed after the 1961 elections. As for Unruh, he knew exactly what was required of him.

The 1960 elections in California had sent 16 Democratic Congressmen and 14 Republicans to Washington; this breakdown corresponded quite closely to the proportions of the total vote that had been won by each party (54 percent and 46 percent, respectively). Unruh, however, assured the White House that his new district lines would put as many as 11 new Democrats--all of them Kennedy supporters--into the California Congressional delegation. Moreover, this would happen regardless of the two-party vote. Unruh's strategy would be to concentrate as many Republican voters as possible in just a few safe districts. Everywhere else, the districts would be either marginal or Democratic.

Of the 14 incumbent Republicans in the California Congressional delegation, four could be weakened and probably be defeated through reapportionment. Of the eight new seats allotted to the state, Unruh and Crown believed that only one would have to go to the Republicans; the other seven could be drawn in such a way that they would be either safely Democratic or leaning Democratic. Taken as a whole, this meant that the present Democratic edge of 16 seats to 14 for the Republicans might be increased to the point where there would be 27 Democrats and only 11 Republicans.

The Democrats decided to divide the eight new seats so that there would be three in northern California and five in southern California. This roughly reflected the breakdown in state population. Of the three northern seats, two would be placed in the Bay Area and would be carefully drawn so as to make them both Democratic. The other northern California seat would be on the central coast; it might possibly be made Democratic, too, although this could be done only by disturbing the rural Democrats in the Central Valley. In the end, the reapportionment chiefs decided against trying to squeeze out another northern Democratic seat, and allowed the new central-coast seat to go to the Republicans. They feared that incumbent rural Democratic Congressmen would resist the odd lines necessary to stretch their districts to the coast.

In southern California, however, there were no such restraints. San Diego and Orange Counties both deserved additional seats, and the Democrats saw a way to draw the new districts in such a way as to insure the election of Democrats in these two Republican counties. The other suburban counties of southern California could be left alone.

It was in Los Angeles County, however, that the Democrats were to score their most spectacular gains. In 1951, the Republicans had so cleverly divided the county that the GOP throughout the decade had elected more Congressmen from Los Angeles County than the Democrats had, even though the Democrats almost always outpolled the GOP. The Democrats were now ready for vengeance. Of the five million persons who had migrated to California during the 1950s, two million were living in Los Angeles County. It was therefore decided that of the eight new seats, three would be in Los Angeles County; moreover, all three of these would be safely Democratic. Unruh intended to accomplish this by turning to Democratic advantage a fact that had previously aided the Republicans. The 1951 reapportionment had made the four safe Democratic districts in central and southern Los

Angeles very much overpopulated. Unruh intended to create his three new seats out of their excess.

This was not the whole of the Democratic plan for Los Angeles County, however. Three incumbent GOP Congressmen--Gordon McDonough in west-central Los Angeles, Edgar Hiestand in the San Fernando Valley, and John Rousselot in the eastern part of the county--all had marginal seats. In 1960, McDonough had won by only 5,000 votes. Hiestand and Rousselot had done better, but they both represented tremendously oversized districts; careful carving could eliminate their Republican base. The Democrats decided to eliminate these three Republicans by giving them impossible districts.

As it turned out, the Democratic plan for Los Angeles County worked very well. Whereas in 1960 the Republicans had won seven Los Angeles districts to only five for the Democrats, in 1962, the Democrats won 11 and the Republicans only four. McDonough, Hiestand, and Rousselot all went down to defeat. Moreover, since it was constitutionally necessary in 1961 (as in 1951) that Assembly districts in the major counties overlap exactly with Congressional districts, Unruh and Crown were able to eliminate many Republican Assembly districts as they went about creating new Democratic Congressional districts. In 1951, the Republicans had managed to reapportion the Congressional seats while keeping almost all of the Assembly districts safe for the incumbent party. The Democrats in 1961 showed no such politeness toward their Assembly colleagues. In the 1962 elections, then, several incumbent Republican Assemblymen found their districts either collapsed entirely or made so hopelessly Democratic that they had no chance for reelection. Whereas in 1960 the GOP had won 33 of the 80 Assembly seats, in 1962 they won only 28 seats. This was their worst showing in modern history, and it occurred despite the fact that the Republican share of the two-party vote was bigger in 1962 than in 1960.

On the Congressional side, the Democratic lines in 1962 resulted in the election of 25 Democrats and 13 Republicans. This was a gain of nine new Congressmen for the New Frontier, and a loss of one seat for the Republicans. Again, the GOP percentage of the two-party vote in Congressional races was up over their percentage in 1960. Given the nature of the reapportionment, however, this fact was irrelevant.

The 1961 Democratic reapportionment was a disaster for the Republicans from which they have never entirely recovered. Although the GOP did manage to regain a great deal of lost ground in the late 1960s, the impact of the Democratic gerrymander on California politics is still with us. The 1962 election was a searing experience for the Republicans. It radicalized the party, brought to the fore a new GOP leadership, and led to the development of the so-called "California Plan"--a GOP legislative strategy aimed at targeting weak Democratic seats and eventually regaining the majority. The 1961 reapportionment also insured that future reapportionments would be more partisan than ever.

What emerges as most remarkable about the 1961 redistricting, however, is the manner in which many Republican Assemblymen, while being led to their own slaughter, helped the Democrats by providing crucial votes in support of the Unruh-Crown plan, while preventing their own party from trying to scuttle the plan. Indeed, the political maneuverings involved in the passage of the 1961 plan are almost as interesting as the plan itself.

Unruh and Crown had followed the example set by Laughlin Waters and Charles Conrad in 1951. They hired a professional staff, headed by Professor Leroy Hardy of Long Beach State College (Hardy had written his doctoral dissertation on the 1951 reapportionment). Hardy and his assistants gathered the relevant political and demographic data, and then went to work on a plan--after having received clear instructions from Unruh and Crown as to what kind of plan they wanted.

Unruh and Crown had a dual political strategy. First of all, of course, there was the need to increase the number of California Democrats in Congress, to help the Kennedy Administration. On the other hand, Unruh himself was subject to a very personal strategic consideration. He was not yet Assembly Speaker; that title rested with Ralph Brown, a long-time Democratic Assemblyman from Modesto. Governor Brown, however, was about to name Assemblyman Brown to the bench, and that would open up the Speakership. What better way for Unruh to gain the support he needed to be elected Speaker, than by creating safe districts in exchange for Speakership votes?

Unruh first worked on the Democrats, many of whom were already committed to his potential rival for the Speakership, Assemblyman Carlos Bee of Hayward. Unruh saw to it that every one of the 47 Assembly Democrats was given a district he found attractive. Two Democrats did end up with "unsafe" districts. Lloyd Lowery of Yolo County was placed in a district with a Republican, and the district of Charles Wilson of Los Angeles was shifted across town. However, both men had shots at open Congressional districts. In the end, the only vocal Democratic unhappiness was among black Democrats, who felt they had gotten too small a slice of the pie.

Even after satisfying Assembly Democrats, Unruh knew that Bee still had enough Democratic caucus support so that Unruh could not become Speaker without winning some Republican votes. So, after finishing with the Democrats, Unruh and Crown went to work on GOP members. One by one, Republicans were brought into the private chambers where Unruh, Crown, and the technical staff were pouring over maps and drawing the district lines. The Democratic strategy of concentrating Republicans into a few safe GOP districts--thus reversing the 1951 Republican strategy--meant that certain members of the opposition party, who formerly held marginal seats, would suddenly end up with dream districts. One such lucky member was John L. E. "Bub" Collier of Eagle Rock.

Collier had a seat that was centered on Highland Park and included a good deal of Republican territory in Eagle Rock and South Pasadena. Highland Park, however, was rapidly becoming Democratic. Collier had first gone to the Assembly in 1946, and had been virtually unopposed for re-election until 1954. From 1956 on, however, his re-election margins had been very thin. In 1958, Collier was re-elected by less than 1,300 votes, in 1960 by only 9,000. One more election, Unruh and Crown indicated, and he might be gone. They they showed him their plan for his seat: a district with a 62-percent Republican registration that would be his far into the future. It was unfortunate that in the process of creating this seat, the districts of GOP colleagues Montival Burke and Bruce Reagan would be eliminated, and that another of his colleagues, Frank Lanterman, would be displaced. All Collier had to do, however, was support Unruh for Speaker, and vote for Unruh's reapportionment plan on the Assembly floor, and the safe seat would be his.

Collier did not hesitate long. He quickly became a defender of the plan, outraging some of his fellow Republicans but assuring himself of continued tenure in the Assembly. (Ten years later Frank Lanterman still fumed over Collier's "sell-out" and the fact that Collier had purloined some of the best territory from his district.) Collier explained, "I am interested in salvaging as much as possible for the party. I feel we will have 29 Republican seats in this house--four less than now--after the negotiations are completed."²

The "negotiations" to which Collier referred were the efforts of some

²Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1961, p. 24.

Republicans to gain winnable seats for themselves, of other Republicans to lessen the effects of the reapportionment plan on future GOP hopes, and of Unruh and Crown to round up enough votes to win the Speakership. Among those Republicans who went into Crown's planning room and came out with better seats was Assemblyman Charles Conrad, one of the authors of the 1951 plan. Like Assemblyman Collier, he had almost been defeated in 1958 and 1960, but was ensconced in a safe district after 1961.

Assemblyman Glen Coolidge of Santa Cruz was a Republican who saw his underpopulated district combined with that of his colleague Allan Pattee of Salinas. But then the Democrats created that one Republican Congressional seat along the central coast, and it seemed tailor-made for Coolidge. He, too became an advocate for the Democratic plan--as did Pattee.

Other Republicans explained their support for the Unruh plan by looking back to the 1951 GOP gerrymander. "I'm voting for the bill," asaid Assemblyman James Holmes of Santa Barbara. "It's probably no worse than the 1951 Republican bill, and anyway I'm treated very nicely."³ Three other Republicans got safe seats as a result of trade-offs with neighboring Republican districts (neighboring districts then became Democratic). Assemblymen Milton Marks and John Busterud, two San Francisco Republicans, were thrown together; the seat favored Marks, and he voted for the plan. Assemblymen Walter Dahl and Don Mulford were thrown together, and Dahl, who also had the better part of the deal, gave his vote to the plan. Assemblyman Carl Britschgi of Redwood City, another Republican who had almost been defeated in 1958 and 1960, got a much safer seat when Hillsborough was taken away from his fellow Republican, Louis Francis, and given to him. Francis was left with almost no Republican base, and had to retire; Britschgi, however, voted for the bill.

³San Francisco Chronicle, May 24, 1961, p. 18.

On May 25, 1961, after a bitterly emotional debate on the floor, the Unruh-Crown plan passed the Assembly by a vote of 55-25. Ten Republicans -- Marks, Collier, Conrad, Coolidge, Holmes, Britschgi, Dahl, Pattee, Lou Cusanovich of Los Angeles, and William Grant of Long Beach -- joined 45 Democrats in favor of the bill. Only two Democrats, including black Assemblyman Byron Rumford, opposed it. In fairness, it should be said that the ten Republicans who supported the bill did receive assurances that the plan would be amended on the Senate side to assist a few of their colleagues.

By the time the negotiations on the reapportionment bill ended, Jesse Unruh had obtained enough pledges to assure himself of the Speakership, and the Democrats had about exhausted their ability to gerrymander the state for partisan advantage. Unruh and Crown had proven themselves more than willing to use their power for partisan ends; even they realized, however, that they may have gone too far.

For instance: four of the Republican Assemblymen most vocal in their opposition to the plan had found themselves united in the same Assembly district. Assemblymen Frank Lanterman of Pasadena, Howard Thelin of Glendale, Joseph Shell (the minority leader) of Hancock Park, and Chet Wolfrum of Los Angeles, all lived in the new 43rd Assembly District. Furthermore, only one of them had a neighboring safe district to move into. (See map #2, 43rd AD, original plan, with homes of legislators). Two senior Republican Congressmen, Glen Lipscomb and H. Allen Smith, were also thrown into the same district. Crown promised the ten Republicans who supported the bill that he would correct these outrageous aspects of the plan when it reached the Senate, and indeed he did so. Lipscomb and Smith got safe Republican districts, as did Lanterman and Thelin. Wolfrum, however got a seat he had little chance of winning, and Shell's district was eliminated.

Despite Crown's conciliatory gestures, Republicans remained fighting mad about the plan and spiteful of the ten Republican Assemblymen who had voted for it. On seeing four GOP incumbents endangered, the party's Congressional delegation fired off a telegram to the reapportionment chairman, claiming that the Elections and Reapportionment Committee, in reporting the bill, had "acted with reckless abandon against the best interest of the state of California."⁴ During the debate on the bill, Assemblyman Bruce Allen of San Jose, a bitter foe of Unruh, rose on the floor of the Assembly, looked at several of his GOP colleagues, and stated, "Any Republican who votes for these reapportionment bills, and I know there will be a few, will do so because he has been bought and paid for." An outraged Unruh shouted in reply, "I'm sick and tired of having this man stand up on this floor for six years and insult us."⁵ As Allen moved down the aisle, paying no attention to Unruh, Assemblyman Holmes suddenly rose and shoved him. The two men nearly came to blows. (Allen, although he had a safe seat, chose to run for Attorney General at the next election; and Holmes, despite his vote for the 1961 bill in return for a supposedly safe seat, went down to defeat in 1964. The bitterness between the two men lingered on even after they had both left the Assembly.)

The Republican chairman in Los Angeles County, Jud Leetham, said of the 1961 reapportionment plan that it "threatens the very existence of the two-party system in California."⁶ State chairman John Krehbiel sent an angry letter to Assemblymen Coolidge, Collier, and Holmes, complaining that their support of the plan "seriously damaged the unity of the Republican party."⁷ Coolidge replied,

⁴Telegram from Congressman Glen Lipscomb to Assemblyman Robert Crown, May 24, 1961.

⁵San Francisco Chronicle, May 26, 1961, p. 1.

⁶Los Angeles Times, May 20, 1961, p. 7.

⁷Letter from John Krehbiel to Assemblymen John Collier, Glenn Coolidge and James Hommes, June 9, 1961.

"Some of us have only been negotiating with the Democrats to see if we can save as many seats as possible for the party."⁸

During 1961, there was also some talk in the Assembly of trying to oust the two Republican leaders in the lower house, Assemblymen Shell and Busterud, because of their bitter statements about the ten GOP defectors. Both Shell and Busterud had lost their seats under the plan, and both would end up running the following year for statewide office. For now, however, they were furious at their colleagues who had broken the firm wall of GOP resistance to the reapportionment plan.

There were more reasons than just their own lost seats for the GOP leaders to be upset. When it became clear that the Democrats planned a broad gerrymander, the Republicans decided their only hope was a court challenge and a statewide referendum, to get the plan repealed. Surely Governor Brown would not veto a Democratic reapportionment, any more than Governor Warren had been willing to veto the GOP plan in 1951. And since only ten of the 40 State Senators were Republicans, there was no hope of blocking the gerrymander in the upper house, either. Therefore, the thin threads on which the Republicans put all their hopes were a court case and a referendum.

The ten defectors, however, snapped those last threads. There could be no successful challenge if the Assembly Republicans were themselves divided. Once those ten votes were cast for the Democrats' bill, the threat of a challenge ended. And that, of course, was one reason why Unruh and Crown had worked so hard to get some GOP votes for the bill. They had carefully created a division in the Republican ranks by promising safe districts to certain Republican Assemblymen

⁸San Francisco Chronicle, June 2, 1961, p. 12.

who faced tough races in the future. Their tactic worked beautifully.⁹

Given the defection of the ten Republican Assemblymen on first passage of the bill, there was little state GOP leaders could do but weep over their fate. State chairman Krehbiel declared: "Not only the Republican party, but every man, woman and child in California will suffer from Crown's slaughter of Assembly and Congressional lines."¹⁰ The bitter Assemblyman Shell blamed things on Governor Brown, who, he said, had engineered the carving up of California into Democratic districts. "If the governor pleads ignorance, he is simply adding another absurdity to those he has already committed in abundance."¹¹

Finally, word was heard from the prominent Republican whom Shell would face in the 1962 GOP gubernational primary -- former Vice President Richard Nixon. Just before the vote on the reapportionment bill in the State Senate -- where every Republican was announced in opposition -- Nixon called the Democratic plan "shameless and crude partisanship." Said Nixon, in gearing up for his race for governor, "It (the redistricting plan) is the latest in a series of inept and bungling actions which have reduced Gov. Brown's prestige to a new low. It is difficult to understand how Brown could have made such a blunder. He should have remembered that California voters, both Democratic and Republican, have always been

⁹The ten Republican defectors were reelected in 1962. It is interesting to note, however, that three of them later lost their seats to Democrats--Holmes and Conrad as Assemblymen, and Britschgi when he tried to move up to the State Senate. Cusanovich and Marks did go on successfully to the Senate. Grant and Dahl retired in 1962, and Grant's safe district was won by George Deukmejian, now the California Attorney General. Coolidge won the Republican primary for the new GOP Congressional district, but died before the election. Another Republican, Burt Talcott, eventually won the Congressional seat--although, interestingly, this one Republican Congressional seat that came out of the 1962 reapportionment is Democratic today. Assemblyman Pattee was killed in an automobile accident in 1969, and "Bud" Collier was defeated in the Republican primary in 1978.

¹⁰Los Angeles Times, May 20, 1961, p. 6.

¹¹San Francisco Chronicle, May 19, 1961, p. 12.

independent in their voting habits. They resent cheap, ward-healing political power plays. They believe in fair play."

Needless to say, it did not take the Democrats long to react to these words. "When the Republicans reapportioned the state in 1951," Brown replied, "Nixon as United States Senator never uttered a word about the immorality of bad reapportionment legislation." Brown went on to say that the latest reapportionment was as fair as it could possibly be; it simply undid some bad lines in the 1951 Republican plan.

Assembly majority leader William Munnell of Los Angeles was more direct in his reply to Nixon. He said criticism of the plan by the former Vice President "was an example of cheap (Nixon aide Murray) Chotiner politics in a form which inevitably reminds us of the disgraceful campaign waged by this pair against Helen Gahagan Douglas, as Nixon ruthlessly sought to scale the political heights."¹²

When the rhetoric finally cleared, the Crown plan passed the Senate by a vote of 27 to 10, and was returned to the Assembly. There, Crown agreed to make some changes, like undoing the infamous four-incumbent Assembly district, and strengthening a few GOP incumbents elsewhere. In return, he expected additional Republican "yea" votes. And in the end he got seven more Republican votes on final passage--from Assemblymen William Bagley of Marin, Clark Bradley of San Jose, Gordon Cologne of Riverside, Houston Flournoy of Claremont, Howard Thelin of Glendale, Bob Monagan of Tracy, and Chet Wolfrun of Los Angeles. With the ten original Republican votes, this made seventeen Republican Assemblymen in favor of the plan. In the final plan, all seventeen received seats that were supposedly safe.

Finally, as for Democratic fortunes, there can be little doubt that Jesse

¹²Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, September 28, 1962, pp. 1614-1615.

Unruh's handling of the tricky reapportionment process was a key factor in his rise to the Speakership. In his bibliography of Unruh, Ronnie and Jesse, Lou Cannon writes:

The victory of the Unruh-Crown reapportionment was an important rung on the political ladder for Jesse Marvin Unruh. When the session started, Unruh claimed the (Speakership) pledges of only half a dozen Assemblymen plus the sympathetic interest of perhaps a dozen more. The apparent consensus choice for the Speakership when the 1961 session began was Democratic Assemblyman Carlos Bee, a schoolteacher and a member of Unruh's freshmen class of 1955. Bee enjoyed substantial support from Republican members and from the Third House. His election seemed a foregone conclusion. At the beginning of the session Bee counted 37 pledges. He acquired only one more. It was one of the great con operations; said one veteran of the Unruh vote round-up. "We told them they'd better hurry and get on the winning term."¹³

Unruh's pursuit of power may have been a great "con game," but the redistricting plan his lieutenant Robert Crown developed for California was certainly effective in accomplishing Democratic ends. In 1962, with Unruh safely in the Speakership, California voters returned one of the greatest Democratic Assembly and Congressional majorities in history: 52 of 80 Assemblymen, and 25 of 38 Congressmen.

* * * * *

The 1962 Congressional Redistricting

In order to send to Congress those loyal Democrats whom John Kennedy wanted so badly, the Democratic redistricting plan usually cut up large and somewhat marginal Republican House districts, and then created new Democratic districts out of the pieces. Two of the three new seats in northern California, for example, developed in this way.

¹³Lou Cannon, Ronnie and Jesse (New York: Doubleday, Inc., 1969), pp. 111-112.

In 1961, the average population of a California Congressional district was 413,611 people. In drawing up their Congressional plan, Crown's technicians looked first at the Bay Area, where two neighboring districts, those of Republican Charles Gubser of San Jose and Democratic George Miller of Alameda, had populations of 741,930 and 611,086, respectively. Together, these districts contained enough population for three seats. Miller's Alameda County district was solidly Democratic, but Gubser's seat was only marginally Republican. Crown decided to take all of central and eastern Santa Clara County away from Gubser and to unite it with the southern part of Miller's district. Eastern Santa Clara County was heavily Democratic, and removing it from Gubser's district made his seat overwhelmingly Republican -- which really did not matter to Crown, since Gubser seemed likely to be re-elected no matter what his district. Uniting eastern Santa Clara County with the Hayward area of Alameda County, however created a new and heavily Democratic Congressional district, which was made to order for Hayward Assemblyman Carlos Bee, if he chose to run for Congress. As it turned out, Bee passed up the opportunity, and the new Democratic Congressional seat was won by San Jose attorney Don Edwards.

It was no more difficult to create the second new Democratic district in the Bay Area; again, it simply meant combining excess populations from two neighboring districts. In 1954, Republican John Baldwin of Martinez had defeated the incumbent Congressman in the district encompassing Contra Costa and Solano Counties. Baldwin's district, although a creation of the 1951 GOP plan, was basically Democratic; Baldwin held it because of his personal popularity. The Democratic plan for the area was to take Solano County away from Baldwin, leaving him with just Contra Costa County. That made his district much safer, but it also left Solano County as the nucleus of a new district.

To the north of Baldwin's district was the solidly Democratic seat of Rep. John Moss of Sacramento. In 1961, the population of Moss's six-county district was 665,000 people. It was, therefore, a simple task to withdraw all of Moss's rural counties and combine them with Solano County. This left Moss with just Sacramento County, and a district of 502,000 people. Solano plus the rural counties then became a second new seat, with a population of 310,000 people. Thanks to the Democratic nature of Solano County, the new district had a Democratic registration of 63 percent. Vallejo Assemblyman Robert Leggett easily won this seat in 1962.

The population variation between the Moss and Leggett seats, Districts 3 and 4, was nearly 200,000 people, with the Moss seat 21 percent over the state district norm, and the Leggett seat 25 percent under. These population variations were justified, however, by the state constitutional provision that rural Congressional districts must be made up of whole counties. There was little justification, however, for the fact that there was really no community of interest in the new district. Vallejo--and most of Solano County, for that matter--had nothing in common with Yuba City or Colusa, in the rural part of the district. However, community of interest was not a major consideration in the 1961 plan; politics was.

Nowhere were the political considerations more evident than in San Francisco. In the city itself there was enough population for two districts. Democrats were still smarting from the 1951 GOP lines, which had resulted in the election of William Mailliard, the Republican Congressman who now easily held the seat in western San Francisco. In the 1961, San Francisco had to lose one of its six Assembly districts, and to accomplish this the Democrats combined the city's two Republican-held Assembly districts into one seat. Yet, since the city now contained five Assembly districts, and since Congressional districts had to be constructed out of whole Assembly districts, it was clear that one San Francisco

Congressional district would contain two Assembly districts, while the other contained three.

The resulting division gave two heavily Democratic Assembly districts to Rep. John Shelley, whose 5th District as a result had a population of 301,872. Mailliard got the three-district seat, and a population of 438,444. Mailliard's new seat, however--the 6th District--took in the heavily Democratic 23rd Assembly District, a hodge-podge of Democratic neighborhoods that included the Outer Mission area, Noe Valley, and Visitacion Valley. Thousands of Democrats were thus added to Mailliard's district, making him suddenly vulnerable--particularly when the incumbent Democrat in the 23rd Assembly District, John O'Connell, announced that he would run against Mailliard for Congress.

Republicans had objected bitterly to the addition of these Democrats to Mailliard's district (although in fact the Democratic action was remarkably similar to what the GOP line drawers had done to Mailliard's predecessor, Democrat Franck Havenner, in 1951 to assure his defeat). The San Francisco Republican chairman said of the newly-created 23rd Assembly District, "This political bird is a vulture with its beak pointed at Park Merced, its square head in Saint Francis Woods, its neck and shoulders in Twin Peaks, its body in the Mission District and its talons in the Crocker-Amazon."¹⁴ (See map #3, 23rd Assembly District). On the Assembly floor, Republican Assemblyman John Busterud offered amendments "to make this vulture extinct." The Democrats laughed at his characterization of the 23rd District, and then voted down his amendments. The vulture district remained.

As it turned out, however, the attempt to defeat Mailliard was one of the few failures the Democrats encountered in 1962. In the election of that year, Mailliard easily defeated O'Connell, 105,762 votes to 74,429. Mailliard then held his odd-shaped district without serious challenge until the end of the decade. The

¹⁴San Francisco Chronicle, May 19, 1961, p. 12.

effort to defeat Mailliard through the 1961 reapportionment not only failed in San Francisco: it eventually cost the Democrats another seat. Along the coast north of San Francisco ran the 1st District, stretching all the way from Marin County to the Oregon border. Clem Miller, a Democrat, had won the seat in 1958 when the Republican incumbent retired, and he had narrowly retained his seat in 1960. Miller wanted his district improved, and about the only way to make it safer for a Democrat was to remove the heavily Republican Marin County. But where to put it? The Democrats had no desire to combine Marin with Solano County, since that would weaken the new Democratic 4th District. To unite Marin with Contra Costa County, however, would not only make the 14th District of GOP Rep. Baldwin that much safer, but it would also make Baldwin's district extremely oversized. Besides, Baldwin held a seat that leaned Democratic, and if he retired the Democrats might win the district; clearly, it was not in their interest to make the 14th District safe for the Republicans.

In the end, Marin County remained in Miller's 1st District, and the only thing done to help him was the removal of tiny Lake County. In 1962, Miller faced a hard re-election challenge from Del Norte County supervisor Don Clausen. Miller was slightly ahead in the polls when, in October of 1962, he was killed in a plane crash. Clausen immediately stopped campaigning out of respect for Miller, and the Democrats made a last-minute plea to the district's voters to re-elect the dead Clem Miller as a tribute to him. The voters responded, and Miller posthumously defeated Clausen by 3,000 votes. Miller's win provided the Democrats with their 25th seat in the 1962 sweep. However, in a 1963 special election, Clausen won the seat for the Republicans.

The Democrats made no other changes in the rural districts of northern California. The sprawling 2nd District of Rep. Harold "Biz" Johnson was unchanged, as were the districts of Democrats John McFall of Manteca, B.F. Sisk

of Fresno, and Harlan Hagan of Bakersfield. Two urban seats were likewise unchanged. Republican Rep. J. Arthur Younger continued to have all of San Mateo County as his district, and Democratic Rep. Jeffrey Cohelan had a seat in Berkeley and the Oakland hills.

Substantial changes were made, however, along the central coast, in order to create northern California's third new seat--the only new Republican seat in the state. GOP Rep. Charles Teague held a four-county district that stretched from Monterey to Ventura, and that was overpopulated by a quarter of a million people. In the redistricting, the Democrats reduced Teague's seat to Santa Barbara and Ventura Counties, and then combined San Luis Obispo, Monterey, San Benito, and Santa Cruz Counties into the new 12th District. This district was tailor-made for GOP Assemblyman Glenn Coolidge of Santa Cruz, and as a result Coolidge became one of the Republicans who favored the Democratic reapportionment plan. He never got his reward, however. The heavy favorite to win the new seat, Coolidge died just before the 1962 election. He was replaced on the ballot by Burt Talcott of Salinas, who went on to win the seat and to hold it for the next 14 years. (See map #4, northern California Congressional districts.)

The Republicans escaped from the Democratic reapportionment in northern California with something of a standoff--two new seats for both parties. As had happened during the 1951 redistricting, northern California was not badly gerrymandered because of the constitutional provision that counties could not be divided unless they contained two or more seats. This provision kept the reapportionment staff from drawing outrageous or elongated districts in the north. In the heavily populated counties of southern California, however, there were no such limitations. Here, in the south, the majority Democrats could wield the redistricting scalpel with precision.

Two seats in southern California were left unchanged. One of these belonged to Harry Sheppard, the Democratic Congressman from San Bernardino who, having entered the Congress in 1933, was the dean of the California Congressional delegation. Sheppard's district did not change, nor did the marginal seat held by Democratic Rep. D.S. Saund in Riverside and Imperial Counties.

For two other suburban seats of the south, however, the story was different. The most overpopulated district in California belonged to Republican James Utt. This district, consisting of all of Orange County and one Assembly district in San Diego County, had a population of 1,014,460 and was overwhelmingly Republican. Its neighbor to the south, the San Diego County district of Republican Rep. Bob Wilson, had a population of 722,475, and was also heavily Republican. It was clear that each of these two counties deserved an additional Congressional district, and that two of the five new districts in southern California should be located here. The Republicans had a slight edge in registration in Orange County, but in San Diego County there was a Democratic majority. Both counties, however, were Republican in their voting patterns, so that a casual observer might have assumed that the Republicans would win one or both of the new seats in the area. The Democratic map-drawers saw other possibilities. The existing districts of Utt and Wilson were reduced (in both cases by nearly half), but they were reduced to their most Republican precincts. What was left for the new districts was marginal at best. In San Diego County the Democrats managed to draw a new district, numbered 37, which had a Democratic registration of over 60 percent--even though Democratic registration in the county as a whole was only 51 percent. The Democrats were able to do this because their registrants were concentrated in downtown San Diego and in the communities stretching south to the Mexican border. The new Democratic seat was won in 1962 by radio broadcaster Lionel Van Deerlin, who narrowly defeated Dick Wilson, brother of Congressman Bob Wilson and one of the very few men named Wilson ever to lose an election in San Diego.

James Utt's huge district was reduced to one Assembly district in northern San Diego County and one in southern Orange County; it ended up with a Republican registration of 58 percent. This left all of northern Orange County for another new district, numbered 34--and again the Democrats had successfully bunched all their precincts into one district. This district, which had a Democratic registration majority of 53 percent, corresponded quite closely to the Assembly district of Democratic Assemblyman Richard Hanna, who at that time was the only Democrat who had ever won an Assembly seat in Orange County. Hanna ran in the new Congressional district in 1962 and narrowly edged out his GOP challenger. He had close calls throughout the rest of the decade, but always managed to retain his seat even when Republican candidates for other offices were running up huge totals in his conservative district.

The Democratic divisions of Orange and San Diego Counties did not look like a gerrymander (see map #5, Orange and San Diego CDs), but that was the effect. Both counties returned large Republican voting majorities in 1962, and in later years also, but Republicans never elected more than two of the four Congressmen in these counties. The following chart compares the two-party vote with the net results in 1960 and 1962.

1960 Election: Orange and San Diego Counties

28th CD	Utt	(R) :	241,765
	Woods	(D) :	155,221
30th CD	Wilson	(R) :	158,679
	Wencke	(D) :	108,882
Total Republican Vote: 400,444 (60%)			
Total Democratic Vote: 264,103 (40%)			
Total Won: Republicans two, Democrats none.			

1962 Election: Orange and San Diego Counties

34th CD	Hanna	(D) :	90,758
	Geier	(R) :	71,478
35th CD	Utt	(R) :	133,737
	Shamsky	(D) :	61,395
36th CD	Wilson	(R) :	91,626
	Godfrey	(D) :	56,637
37th CD	Van Deerlin	(D) :	63,821
	Wilson	(R) :	60,460

Total Republican Vote: 357,301 (57%)

Total Democratic Vote: 272,611 (43%)

Seats Won: Republicans two, Democrats two

The creation of these two new Democratic Congressional districts also resulted, of course, in the creation of new Assembly districts. Although Orange County should have received two new Assembly districts, it actually received only one. This is because the Democrats purposely underrepresented the growing suburban counties in the redistricting, in order to reduce the number of legislative Republicans. Thus, San Francisco County, which had a population of 741, 000 and was steadily losing people, was given five Assembly seats; while Orange County, with a growing population of 719,000, was allotted only three seats.

There was good reason for this Democratic strategy. Although the Republicans did less well than they might have hoped on the Congressional level in Orange and San Diego Counties, they managed to win all the new Assembly districts formed in those counties. The GOP picked up both the third Orange County seat and the one new seat in San Diego County; this gave them, after 1962, six of the eight Assembly districts in Orange and San Diego Counties. Moreover, they successfully ousted the Democratic state senator in San Diego County. On the Congressional level, however, where new seats were needed to help the Kennedy Administration, the Democrats prevailed.

The greatest Democratic victories under the 1961 redistricting were in Los Angeles County -- just as the greatest Republican wins had come in that county after passage of the 1951 plan. The Democrats managed a fundamental revision of Los Angeles County's Congressional representation, together with a major realignment of the power base within that county. When Unruh and Crown finished carving up Los Angeles County in 1961, they had accomplished the considerable task of creating six additional Democratic Congressional districts.

When the Democratic planners first looked at the county, though, such a revision did not seem likely. In 1960, the county's twelve districts broke down in population as follows:

15th District -- McDonough (R) :	389,753
16th District -- Bell (R) :	285,038
17th District -- King (D) :	773,555
18th District -- Hosmer (R) :	423,225
19th District -- Holifield (D) :	643,176
20th District -- Smith (R) :	253,360
21st District -- Hiestand (R) :	719,856
22nd District -- Corman (D) :	435,392
23rd District -- Doyle (D) :	532,779
24th District -- Lipscomb (R) :	266,659
25th District -- Rousselot (R) :	803,302
26th District -- Roosevelt (D) :	512,676

All five of the Democratic districts had populations above the statewide average. However, two of the largest districts in the county were those held by Republicans Rousselot and Hiestand. At first glance, it did not appear easy to weaken the two Congressmen with the largest districts, since, generally, large districts are thought to provide protection in reapportionment. But Unruh and Crown were not easily discouraged. Indeed, Rousselot and Hiestand, together with Gordon McDonough in the 15th District, were their prime targets in Los Angeles County.

The Democrats examined the county precinct by precinct, and made the following determination. The Democratic base was in central, western, and southern Los Angeles County, and was spreading southward toward Orange County and westward into the San Fernando Valley. The Republicans had two relatively small pockets of strength in the west, in Long Beach and in an area running along the coast from Pacific Palisades to Palos Verdes.

The big Republican base was the string of foothill communities extending from Glendale to Claremont, and this was an area of static population. Although two districts which generally overlapped this area, the 20th and the 24th, were both underpopulated, the foothill communities under the 1951 plan were also able to provide a Republican base for both Rousselot's 25th and Hiestand's 21st. Hiestand's district took in Monrovia, Sierra Madre, and most of Arcadia, and then ran over the mountains into the more Democratic territory of the San Fernando Valley. Rousselot's district included Alhambra, San Marino, and San Gabriel, as well as a number of Democratic towns south of Foothill Boulevard.

Under these circumstances, the line-drawing proved very easy for the Democrats. The 20th and 24th Districts were made solidly Republican by allowing them to absorb the foothill area formerly included in the Rousselot and Hiestand districts. (See map #6, 20th, 21st, 24th and 25th CDs, 1951 and 1961, with GOP base shaded, Foothill area). To add to the damage, Rousselot almost lost part of Whittier, while gaining South El Monte. His district had been marginal even with the 1951 Republican lines. Removing all this GOP territory gave the Democrats an edge in registration of 62 percent in Rousselot's district. In 1962, Rousselot lost by 8,000 votes to Democrat Ronald Brooks Cameron. Hiestand's district was not as badly mutilated, and although the new 21st District had a 59 percent Democratic edge, it also included areas of the San Fernando Valley that were experiencing fast Republican growth. In 1952, Hiestand had won this seat by beating Democrat

Everett Burkhalter. Burkhalter came back for a rematch in 1962, and ousted Hiestand by 6,000 votes.

The third seat Unruh and Crown aimed at was the 15th District seat of Gordon McDonough. This district had been made compact in the 1951 reapportionment to assist McDonough. But the district, situated in West Los Angeles along Wilshire Boulevard, was getting more Democratic every year; McDonough won by just 5,000 votes in 1960. Under the 1961 plan, his district was largely dismembered, and its declining Republican base was divided among three neighboring districts. The bulk of McDonough's district was shifted to East Los Angeles, and he was defeated handily in 1962 by Democratic City Councilman Edward Roybal, who became the first -- and only -- Hispanic Congressman from California.

Having disposed of the Republican parts of the county, the Democrats then turned to their own base in central and southern Los Angeles. The 1951 reapportionment had divided this area among four overpopulated but safely Democratic districts. The Democrats decided they could easily expand their holdings from four districts to seven, all of them safely Democratic. A new district was created out of some of the excess population in Democratic Rep. Chet Holifield's 19th District. This new district also borrowed a little of the Republican base in the foothills, but still had a Democratic registration of 63 percent. In 1962, the new district was won by Democratic Assemblyman George Brown of Monterey Park. Holifield and neighboring Congressman Clyde Doyle were left with safe seats. Doyle's district lost almost all of its blacks, being reduced to a white, working class base in Southgate, Downey, and Bellflower.

Rep. Cecil King, another Democrat with an overpopulated district, got a reduced but safe seat in Gardena, Torrance, and San Pedro. Rep. James Roosevelt occupied the fourth overpopulated seat in central Los Angeles. This was the old 26th District, carefully gerrymandered by the Republicans to unite the black

central core neighborhoods with all the low-income neighborhoods in West Los Angeles. (It was a common joke that Roosevelt, son of the former President and one of the most outspoken liberals in Congress, loved representing the district, but would not think of living there.) Roosevelt's seat was shifted into West Los Angeles, and he acquired Beverly Hills from the district of GOP Rep. Alphonso Bell--even though Bell's district was already underpopulated. The new Roosevelt seat contained the cream of the West Los Angeles Democratic base.

The reduction of the Doyle, King, and Roosevelt districts left the Democrats with enough population for two more new seats. In south-central Los Angeles, they created a black seat for senior Assemblyman Augustus Hawkins. A second seat was created by combining parts of McDonough's old district with the excess from the Roosevelt and King districts, and this new seat was won easily by Democratic Assemblyman Charles Wilson.

Two Republican seats and one Democratic seat remained to be dealt with. Rep. Craig Hosmer occupied a district that was marginal on paper. Hosmer had proven extremely popular since his election in 1952, however, and so his Long Beach seat was left basically unchanged. The next seat to be considered was that of freshman Republican Al Bell of Santa Monica, who was fated to get whatever the Democrats did not want. King's 17th Congressional District, for example, included the beach communities south of the Los Angeles airport, and King wanted to be rid of this growing Republican area. Likewise, no Democrat wanted the GOP-dominated Hollywood Hills, then represented by Democrat James Corman--who wanted a safer seat. Since Bell's current seat was losing its Democrats around Beverly Hills, it was decided to compensate him by moving all these Republican areas into his district, and creating one enormous district running all the way from the Ventura County line to San Pedro. As it turned out, the only way to do this, while maintaining the integrity of all the neighboring districts, was to connect the

northern and southern chunks of Bell's district with a narrow corridor stretching several miles along the coast, thus joining the Santa Monica-Hollywood-Valley portion of the district with the beach-Palos Verdes section. Bell's new district had a population of 588,933, making it by far the largest district in California. Geographically, it was held together at high tide by little more than a rock retaining wall running along the beach. (See map #7--28th CD). Republicans complained that the district made no sense and was far too large, but Unruh and Crown made it stick by noting that it was no worse than some of the 1951 Republican districts.

These trades allowed creation of a relatively safe seat, entirely in the San Fernando Valley, for Democrat James Corman, who was also in his first term. Corman easily won the new 22nd District in 1962.

In all, the Democrats had expanded their base in central Los Angeles from four to seven seats, eliminated the remaining Republican district in central Los Angeles, and weakened two suburban Republican districts. As a result, the Democrats in 1962 realized almost a clean sweep: they won every district they aimed for, and reduced the once large Republican delegation from Los Angeles County to just four Congressmen. (See map #8, L.A. CDs, Demo areas shaded.)

The results of the voting were as follows:

<u>District</u>	<u>Party Registration</u>	<u>1962 Winner</u>
17th	69% Dem. 28% Rep.	King (D)
19th	63% Dem. 34% Rep.	Holifield (D)
20th	39% Dem. 57% Rep.	Smith (R)
21st	80% Dem. 17% Rep.	Hawkins (D)
22nd	55% Dem. 41% Rep.	Corman (D)
23rd	65% Dem. 32% Rep.	Doyle (D)
24th	39% Dem. 57% Rep.	Lipscomb (R)

25th	62% Dem. 34% Rep.	Cameron (D)
26th	63% Dem. 32% Rep.	Roosevelt (D)
27th	59% Dem. 37% Rep.	Burkhalter (D)
28th	45% Dem. 50% Rep.	Bell (R)
29th	63% Dem. 34% Rep.	Brown (D)
30th	61% Dem. 35% Rep.	Roybal (D)
31st	62% Dem. 34% Rep.	Wilson (D)
32nd	56% Dem. 41% Rep.	Hosmer (R)

The Republican proportion of the seats won--just four out of 15--did not reflect at all their percentage of the two-party vote. With just 50 percent of the two-party vote, the Democrats had managed to win 73 percent of the seats. Some supporters of the Democratic lines later claimed that they were more equitable than the 1951 Republican lines, because there was only one excessively oversized district (Alphonso Bell's 28th District). However, this was the case only because Los Angeles County contained 31 Assembly districts, and in 1961 the Democrats had to divide these up among 15 Congressional seats. As a result, there was only one three-Assembly-district Congressional seat--Bell's. Elsewhere in the state, however, there were large population variations that definitely favored the Democrats--particularly in the underrepresentation of Orange County and the overrepresentation of San Francisco.

Gerrymandering, however, is the process of trying to decide tomorrow's elections based on yesterday's returns. In the case of Los Angeles County, much of the force of the Democratic gerrymander dissipated over the decade. The Republicans won a fifth seat in the county very soon after the 1962 rout, when Democratic Rep. Clyde Doyle of Downey died in early 1963. Heavily favored to succeed him was Democratic Assemblyman Carly Porter of Compton. But in a

special election that summer, Porter was upset--despite President Kennedy's having personally campaigned for him--by Republican Del Clawson. Thus the 25-to-13 Democratic edge in the state's Congressional delegation was almost immediately reduced to 24 Democrats and 14 Republicans. Moreover, there was a particularly serious message for the democrats in Clawson's victory of 1963, because he had won not in traditionally Republican territory, but by securing the votes of working-class whites who had, in the past, formed part of the backbone of the state Democratic party. The drift of the labor vote to the Republicans, leading up to the Reagan landslide of 1966, first became evident with Clawson's election. In the process, Republicans won two more essentially working-class districts: Burkhalter's 27th District when he retired in 1964 and Cameron's 25th District in a surprise upset in 1966. After the 1966 election, the 15 Los Angeles seats were divided among eight Democrats (King, Holifield, Hawkins, Corman, Thomas Rees (replacing Roosevelt), Brown, Roybal, and Wilson) and seven Republicans (Smith, Clawson, Lipscomb, Charles Wiggins who defeated Cameron, Ed Reinecke who succeeded Burkhalter, Bell, and Hosmer). This ratio continued for the rest of the decade.

The 1961 Congressional plan was changed somewhat in 1967 by a bipartisan plan that was intended to make most incumbents safer. Still, the Republicans continued to gain. By 1970, the two-party breakdown had gone from 25 Democrats and 13 Republicans to 20 Democrats and 18 Republicans. Republicans had won not only three additional seats in Los Angeles County, but the Riverside seat as well, together with the Bakersfield seat and the San Bernardino seat. The only lasting Republican loss during the decade was the Contra Costa seat, which Democratic Assemblyman Jerry Waldie won after the death of GOP Rep. John Baldwin.

In another respect, however, the Democratic gerrymander did its work throughout the decade. In 1966, 1968, and again in 1970, the Republicans won a

majority of the two-party Congressional vote, but each year they won only a minority of the seats. This would not have happened had it not been for the careful lines developed by Unruh and Crown in 1961. The effect of those lines is indicated below:

1962 Vote:	Seats Won:
Rep: 2,685,000 (48%)	Rep: 13 (34%)
Dem: 2,885,000 (52%)	Dem: 25 (66%)
1964 Vote:	Seats Won:
Rep: 3,213,000 (46%)	Rep: 15 (39%)
Dem: 3,609,000 (54%)	Dem: 23 (61%)
1966 Vote:	Seats Won:
Rep:	Rep: 17 (45%)
Dem:	Dem: 21 (55%)
1968 Vote:	Seats Won:
Rep: 3,745,000 (55%)	Rep: 17 (45%)
Dem: 3,035,000 (45%)	Dem: 21 (55%)
1970 Vote:	Seats Won:
Rep: 3,061,000 (50%)	Rep: 18 (47%)
Dem: 3,058,000 (50%)	Dem: 20 (53%)

* * * * *

The 1962 Assembly Redistricting

In 1951 the Republicans had done little to change the party balance in the Assembly, although they gained a number of seats in 1952 because of Democratic retirements and the Eisenhower landslide. In 1962, however, the Democrats purposely eliminated several Republican seats. They also strengthened a few GOP members as a way of gaining votes for the Unruh-Crown plan.

In northern California, the Democrats eliminated three Republican districts and weakened three others. San Francisco contained two GOP Assembly districts, one marginal and one safe. These were combined into a single safe Republican seat. Alameda County, which was in the process of losing its Republican base, likewise had two GOP Assembly districts (down from four districts just ten years earlier). These two seats also were combined into one district with an absolute Republican majority. That seat began immediately to go Democratic, however, and in 1970 a Democrat captured it, ending GOP representation in Alameda County.

The two districts in suburban Contra Costa County were both held by Democrats, and an attempt was made to split the county's growing Republican areas between them. (This did not prevent a Republican from winning one of the two seats in the 1966 landslide.) The greatest changes, however, were in San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties, where the GOP held all four seats. San Mateo was redrawn to combine almost all of the Republican precincts into a single district, thus allowing the Democrats to win the other seat. The same thing was done in Santa Clara County, where a safe Democratic seat was created in the eastern third of the county. Most of the Republicans in Santa Clara County were jammed into an elongated westside seat that ran from Palo Alto to Gilroy. Santa Clara had gained a seat in redistricting, and this was placed in the middle of the county. It was essentially a marginal district, but slightly more Democratic than the county as a whole. GOP Assemblyman Clark Bradley was expected to run here, but he opted to run for the State Senate instead, and Democrat Al Alquist won the new seat. (The Democratic seat on the county's east side was won by a Democrat in 1962, and he was re-elected in 1964. But the Reagan landslide of 1966 put a Republican in this essentially working-class seat, and that Republican's narrow re-election in 1968 gave the GOP the 41st vote it needed to gain control of the Assembly.)

The Unruh and Crown redistricting also eliminated one Republican seat when Santa Cruz County and Monterey County were combined into a single district. Population shifts justified this union of the two coastal counties, but politics was probably the determining factor.

In the rural Sacramento Valley, a Republican and a Democratic seat were combined in the Crown plan, and a new seat was established in Sacramento. Democrats won both the new Sacramento seat and the remaining Valley seat in 1962, although Republicans got back the Valley seat in 1964. As with the Congressional districts, none of the other rural northern California Assembly districts were affected. Still, the Democrats had plenty to show for their handiwork in northern California. Whereas there had been 16 GOP Assembly districts in the north in 1960, that number was reduced to 10 in 1962. Republicans made some comebacks in subsequent elections, winning 18 northern California seats in 1968--their recent high point.

There was little change in most of southern California, except, again, in Los Angeles County, which kept its 31 Assembly districts but apportioned them very differently. Republicans actually did reasonably well in the suburban counties of southern California, winning the new seats allotted to Orange and San Diego Counties in 1962 and taking the Imperial County seat away from the Democrats. They also added an additional seat in San Diego County, going from a two-two split with the Democrats in the county to a four-to-one margin in favor of the Republicans. Los Angeles County, however, was another story.

Before reapportionment, Republicans elected 13 of the 31 Los Angeles Assemblymen: after Unruh and Crown were finished, they elected only nine. All but one of the GOP-held districts in 1962 overlapped the four Republican Congressional seats, indicating that the pattern of concentrating Republicans into safe districts, the basis of the Congressional plan, was followed in redistricting the Assembly as well.

As had happened in the 1951 redistricting, most of the incumbents' seats were made safer for them: after all, they had to vote for the plan. There were some important exceptions, however. Four Republican Assembly districts in the foothills north of the city of Los Angeles were reduced to two. These four were the 47th District of Frank Lanterman, the 48th District of Bruce Reagan, the 53rd District of Montival Burke, and the 54th District of John L. E. Collier. All four were underpopulated, and in the crunch the districts of Reagan and Burke were both dismembered. Reagan chose to run unsuccessfully for statewide office, while Burke was left with no choice but retirement. This reduction of GOP seats brought about the emergence of a new San Fernando Valley seat in Sunland-Tujunga, and in 1962 a Democrat managed to win that seat. This part of the Valley was fast going Republican, however, and in 1964 the GOP won back the Sunland-Tujunga seat.

Assemblyman Chet Wolfrum was one of the four Republicans who, in the initial Crown bill, found all their seats combined in one district. In the end, Wolfrum got a seat of his own, but it was so weak that he lost in 1962. Wolfrum's district overlapped McDonough's weak Congressional district, and it is probably true that eventually both he and McDonough would have lost, even without the assist provided by the Democratic redistricting.

The final GOP seat lost in 1962 was the Wilshire area seat held by minority leader Joseph Shell. This seat had a history that reflected well the population changes that had occurred in Los Angeles in the 1940s and 1950s. Once the Wilshire district was the most fashionable place to live, and the area's upper-middle-class residents regularly returned huge Republican majorities. But then came the freeways and the smog, and the affluent Republican voters began moving westward or out to the Valley. Finally, by 1961, there was just a small enclave of GOP precincts around Hancock Park, and it was surrounded by growing Democratic neighborhoods.

In 1951, the Wilshire area was reapportionment chairman Laughlin Water's own district, and it had a Republican edge of 6,000 in registration. By 1956, however, this edge had declined to just 4,000, and in 1958 it stood at just 1,500. By 1960, the Democrats had taken the lead in registrations, and by 1962 their lead had grown to 3,000--even while the overall registration in the district remained steady at 80,000. It was no problem for Unruh and Crown, in 1962, to slice up this district and apportion its bits and pieces among other seats.

Altogether, the Republicans lost four Assembly seats in the 1961 Los Angeles realignment: two of them in the foothills, where they were strong, and two more in West Los Angeles, where they were in decline. By 1968, however, the Republicans had picked up four of the newly created Democratic seats. One of these was the San Fernando Valley's 62nd District, into which many of the Republican voters fleeing the downtown had moved. Another was the nearby 41st District, around the city of San Fernando--formerly a Democratic, working-class stronghold. The Democratic 50th and 52nd Districts fell to the GOP in 1966, providing a further indication that the way to Republican victory in Los Angeles County was to win the white, working-class neighborhoods. (See map #9, L.A. ADs with GOP 1964, 1966, and 1968 gains shaded.)

There is no way, of course, that the Democrats could have foreseen what would happen in the cities in the 1960s. All previous political research, in fact indicated that once the Republican Assemblymen were concentrated into a few heavily GOP districts, Republicans would be kept a permanent minority. However, as the turmoil of the 1960s spread into the old-line Democratic, working-class neighborhoods, they left their political moorings. The Republicans never won back those seats in West Los Angeles that the movement of population, and Crown's map drawers, had taken away; but they made up for their losses with successful forays into the Democratic working-class heartland. By 1968, the GOP had undone the

Democratic gerrymander in Los Angeles County, and again they elected 13 of the 31 Assemblymen. Even in 1978, with 28 Los Angeles County Assembly districts, the Republicans managed to carry 12 of them--and three of these were in heavily Democratic areas.

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The 1961 Redistricting--An Assessment

The 1961 reapportionment lasted unchanged for only two elections (see maps 10 and 11, CD and AD state maps, 1961), and then the Assembly lines were modified in 1965 to conform with the Supreme Court's one man-one vote decision. The Congressional districts were changed in 1967.

The most remarkable thing about the 1961 redistricting was the manner in which the district representation fluctuated over the succeeding decade. Running in basically the 1961 districts, the Republicans increased their statewide Congressional representation by five seats through 1970, and several other districts changed back and forth between the parties. The Assembly variations were even greater.

Almost immediately after 1962, the Assembly gerrymander began breaking down. In 1964, the Republicans took four seats away from the Democrats--three in rural areas and one in the San Fernando Valley--while losing one coastal seat to the Democrats. The 1966 election, the year of the Reagan landslide, saw an additional seven seats go to the Republicans. In just four years, the GOP numbers had increased from 28 to 38. It should be pointed out also that almost all of the Republican gains in 1966 were in rural or working-class districts--evidence of the drift of these two pivotal blocs away from the Democratic coalition. Three more Assembly seats went to the GOP in 1968, giving the Republicans an Assembly majority. This was something Unruh and Crown would not have believed possible just six years earlier.

After this 13-seat gain, however, the 1970 election dealt the GOP an unexpected blow. Five seats, one of them rural and four urban, were lost. Unhappily for the Republicans, part of their own base was now crumbling: one of the five districts they had lost was the Berkeley-Oakland district thought to be utterly safe for the GOP in 1961. That loss was multiplied in 1972, when two more previously safe GOP districts were lost, one in the San Fernando Valley and one running along the San Diego County beaches. Republicans lost a total of eight districts in 1972, dropping from 37 to 29 seats. Included in their losses were several rural seats, and this indicated a swing of the pendulum back to the Democrats among rural voters. A gain of two seats by special elections in 1973 brought the Republican total to 31 seats at the time the 1961 Assembly reapportionment expired.

Many reasons may be cited for the broad fluctuation in party fortunes during the life of the 1961 plan, not the least of which was the increasing lack of loyalty among both Republican and Democratic voters, resulting in an increasing number of "swing districts." Even taking this fact into account, however, the fluctuation in party representation was extreme. During the 1950s, the trend had been in one direction: a decline for the Republicans during the decade from 52 seats to 33 seats. The six elections under the 1961 redistricting, however, saw the ratio go from a 52-to-28 edge for the Democrats, to 41 to 39 for the Republicans, and back to 51 to 29 for the Democrats.

One thing that did remain constant throughout this time--and something that remains true even through 1978--was the failure of Republicans to win as many seats as they were entitled to by their percentage of the overall vote. This was partially a factor of the larger numbers of voters in Republican leaning districts, but was also very much a consequence of the 1961 Democratic tactic of concentrating Republican voters in heavily Republican districts. The following chart illustrates the trend:

	<u>GOP % of two-party vote</u>	<u>Number of seats won</u>	<u>% of seats won</u>
1962 election:	46%	28	35%
1964 election:	46%	31	39%
1966 election:	54%	38	48%
1968 election:	54%	41	51%
1970 election:	49%	37	46%
1972 election:	46%	29	36%

The 1961 reapportionment was an example of the rawest kind of political maneuvering, justified by the Democrats as a way of redressing the gerrymander perpetrated on them by the ruling Republicans ten years earlier. That neither party was able to perpetuate an indefinite majority under the two gerrymanders, however, is surely evidence that drawing district lines for partisan advantage does not always work. In 1965, and in later redistrictings, one tool used effectively in the 1951 and 1961 gerrymanders was gone: population variation. After the Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr, huge population differences among districts were no longer possible. Unfortunately, though, this Warren Court reform also ended the California constitutional provisions that counties could not be unnecessarily divided, and that Congressional districts in the major counties had to consist of whole Assembly districts. Some observers praised the ending of these "constitutional peculiarities," having blamed them for the population inequalities.¹⁵ But other observers, seeing the district maps developed in 1971 and 1973 when the constitutional restraints were long gone, were not so sure. As bad as some of the 1951 and 1961 districts were, in terms of geography and community of interest, they looked good when compared to many of the districts that came along later.

¹⁵Leroy Hardy, "Congressional Redistricting in California 1965-1967: The Quilting Bee and Crazy Quilts," San Diego Law Review, Vol. 10, 1973, p. 759.