


LOS ANGELES

2007

State of the City Report



Dear Readers

It gives us great pleasure to welcome you to our third edition of the *Los Angeles: State of the City Report*. As the title implies, the publication is an annual enterprise of the Pat Brown Institute of Public Affairs and California State University, Los Angeles.

Los Angeles is the nation's second most heavily populated city; it has a formidable economy that provides a financial base for the nation's largest state economy, helping California attain its status as one of the largest economies in the world. The city is arguably one of the most culturally diverse cities in the nation and, indeed, the world. This remarkable place can be analyzed and described in many ways and each perspective opens an exciting new window to its rich social, political, economic, and cultural dynamics. In this report, seven regional experts offer substantive discussions of various issues that affect the quality of life in Los Angeles. We have particularly moved away from the idea of a scorecard, since it leaves out the much needed discussions regarding how we come to know and evaluate our city.

In the 2007 edition of the State of the City Report, we have asked seven Los Angeles experts to offer their opinions on demographic dynamics and the state of the economy, political representation and public perception, housing, governance, environmental justice, and gang violence. Though not intended as a comprehensive coverage of every topic, this report attempts to initiate a dialogue around important challenges and opportunities that face our city and its residents.

We are proud and delighted to present you with this third issue. We hope that you find this and future reports informative and useful.

Sincerely,

Jaime Regalado
Executive Director

Ali Modarres
Associate Director

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THE CITY AND THE REGION: GEOGRAPHY, DEMOGRAPHY, AND DESTINY IN LOS ANGELES

DR. MANUEL PASTOR PROFESSOR OF GEOGRAPHY AND AMERICAN STUDIES AND ETHNICITY—UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

When I was growing up in Southern California, my mother was a big fan of Tom Bradley. He was, she insisted, “our” mayor—partly because she saw him as such a breakthrough for civil rights, partly because she associated him with the booming economy that helped our family rise from poverty to the working class, and partly because, as a displaced New Yorker, she appreciated the way he represented the City with elegance and grace.

Strange thing was that we didn’t actually live in Los Angeles; instead, we were laying our claim to the California Dream in the inner-ring suburb of La Puente. It was a mayoral affection I thus heard but never quite understood in my own linear (that’s not *our* city, is it?) and adolescent way (parents can never be quite right about anything...). It wasn’t until later that I realized that Bradley, in his actions and his vision, was never just the Mayor of L.A.: He was the mayor of the region, the center around which the forces of change and transformation would swirl.

In the later years of his 20-year reign, Bradley seemed to lose his central role. Both inner-city activists and suburbanites felt that he focused excessively on downtown development, his late 1980s attempt to forge a regional public-private partnership (L.A. 2000) produced a glossy report and little more, and when the City struggled with the aftermath of the 1992 civil unrest, he turned to an Orange County businessman to lead the rebuilding. Mayors Richard Riordan and James Hahn accelerated the inward-looking trend: Both focused on the nuts and bolts of city government and Hahn found himself fighting to keep L.A.’s own internal suburb, the San Fernando Valley, in the fold.

With the election of Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, some analysts have drawn parallels to the Bradley era, usually focusing on his patience at waiting for a second run or his skill at building multiracial coalitions. But the deeper parallel may be that Villaraigosa is seeking to be the region’s mayor: Even before taking office, he helped resolve a labor dispute in the region’s tourist industry; as soon as he came in, he jumped at the opportunity to head the board of the regional transportation agency, a role that Hahn had declined; he soon sought control of the Los Angeles Unified School District, a body that includes thirteen different cities; and he has vigorously sought to resolve environmental and other disputes that have stood in the way of the expansion of port-related goods movement, an industry many think of as key to the future of all of Southern California.

Looking More Like the Region

Should the Mayor seek to lead the region—and should the region listen?

Any answer to this question would have to start by noting that the region is actually a lot more like the City than it ever has been. This may seem surprising: The City of Los Angeles is often portrayed as being uniquely affected by immigration, globalization, and a steady slippage of more and more families into the ranks of the working poor. But the fact is that these trends are now pronounced throughout Southern California, particularly in Los Angeles County. Just as globalization and immigration have made national boundaries less relevant, the boundaries between the City and the County are blurring.

Since outpacing Chicago in the 1980s to become the second-largest city in the nation, the City of Los Angeles has continued to grow. Figure 1 uses the decadal census and the recent 2005 American Community Survey to compare the growth in the rest of the County and the rest of California with that of the City: With the starting point for all three normalized at 100 for the year 1980, one can see the slowdown in City growth, the consequent expansion in the rest of the county, and the significant growth in the rest of the state.

FIGURE 1. POPULATION GROWTH (1980=100)

Source: See the Data Appendix




FIGURE 2. CHANGING DEMOGRAPHIC IN CALIFORNIA AND LOS ANGELES

Source: See the Data Appendix




FIGURE 3. LOS ANGELES, 1990 AND 2005: DISSIMILARITY INDEX FOR NON-HISPANIC WHITES

Source: See the Data Appendix





FIGURE 4. LOS ANGELES COUNTY: "ETHNIC CHURNING"



What is striking, however, is how demographically similar the City and its surrounding County have become. Figure 2 shows the racial and ethnic mix from 1980 to 2005 for the City, the rest of Los Angeles County, and the rest of California (excluding L.A. County). Note that the rest of the County was much whiter in 1980, suggesting a classic role as a suburban escape; by 2005, the demographics were virtually identical. Part of the shift had to do with the suburbanization of immigrants: While the City held nearly half the County’s foreign-born population in 1980, by 2005, nearly 60 percent of the foreign-born were in the rest of the County. Meanwhile, the importance of the changing demographics in the City and the County in terms of the rest of the state is seen in the last set of bars: While headlines blasted that California had become a majority-minority state well before the 2000 census, the state’s demographic trend excluding the County suggests that the rest of California became majority-minority as recently as 2004.

It’s not just that the City and County demographics are more similar—living patterns are as well. One standard measure of residential segregation is something called the “dissimilarity” index—it essentially measures the percentage of any group that would need to move so that said group would be spread evenly across all neighborhoods. Using a broad geographic category called a Public Use Microdata Area (or PUMA—see the data appendix), we calculated the index of dissimilarity for non-Hispanic whites for 1990 and 2005 for both the City and the rest of the County. As can be seen in Figure 3, the City was much more segregated than the rest of the county in 1990—but the indices of dissimilarity were essentially identical in 2005.

Part of the reason why the dissimilarity indices have gotten more similar is that ethnic transition has become more common in multiple locations in Southern California. Much has been made, for example, of Black-Latino shift in South Central Los Angeles—but it is important to recall that South Central actually stretches past the city boundaries into unincorporated County territory, and there have been major changes in other areas as well. To get at this, we have developed a concept called “ethnic churning”—a measure that records the extent of demographic shift. Calculating this for the recent 1990-2005 period, and making use of the PUMA geography mentioned earlier, Figure 4 shows areas of major change: South Los Angeles shows up but so do parts of the San Fernando Valley as well as the inner-ring areas between Long Beach and Downey, Pomona at the edge of the County, and large parts of Orange, San Bernardino, and Riverside Counties.

Markets, Markets Everywhere

The economics of the rest of the County have also converged. In Figure 5, we take an emerging standard measure of well-being—the

percentage of the population that falls below 200 percent of the federally-defined poverty line, a marker just above that which would qualify a child for the free or reduced lunch program at public schools. As can be seen, this relative measure of deprivation has been on the rise in the City of Los Angeles—with the striking fact being that all of the years depicted are actually periods of relative economic growth. But even more interesting when looking within the region is that while the experience of the rest of the County was similar to that of the rest of the state over the 1980s—relative stability in the poverty rate—the increase for the rest of the County between 1989 and 2004 was much more like the City than the rest of the state.

Another way of looking at this income issue is to consider the distribution of wages for those who are working. In Figure 6, we consider the percentage of workers at each point on a wage distribution between \$5 and \$39 per hour and compare the results for the years 1989 and 2005. The pattern suggests two things. First, there has been a sharp rise in the share of the workforce in low-wage jobs—particularly for the rest of the County. Second, the resulting wage distribution is now nearly identical in the City and in the rest of the County.

The pattern suggests an increase in working poverty, and that has indeed been the case: Between 1989 and 2005, the percentage of working poor among the working-age population (25-64) has grown from 4.7 percent to 7.6 percent in the City and from 3.3 percent to 6 percent in the rest of the County. More significantly, while the share of all workers living in the rest of the County held at just above 60 percent from 1990 to 2005, the share of low-wage workers in the rest of the County (defined as those making less than a living wage) rose from 53 percent to 57 percent over the same period, underscoring the migration of low-wage work and/or workers from the City to the rest of the County.

Geographic spreading of low-wage work (and workers) out of the City and into the rest of the County can be observed in more detail through the two maps shown in Figure 7, which plot the percentage low-wage workers among all workers for 1990 and 2005 by 2000 PUMA. It can be seen that in 1990, the concentration of low-wage workers in the broad “neighborhood” areas as defined by the PUMA was far greater inside the City boundaries than outside. By 2005, the low-wage concentration spread most notably to the southeast (particularly Orange County), and it increased in the San Fernando Valley and Long Beach as well, resulting in an concentration of low-wage workers that is almost perfectly bisected by the City boundary.

In the multiracial landscape of Southern California, it is important for people to find commonalities—but between L.A. City and County, unfortunately these commonalities come in the form of increasing poverty rates and lower wages. While some may believe that they can sepa-

FIGURE 5. 200% POVERTY RATE, 1979-2005




FIGURE 6A. LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1989: DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES BY GEOGRAPHY





FIGURE 6B. LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 2005: DISTRIBUTION OF WAGES BY GEOGRAPHY



rate from the leakage of central-City problems, another road may lie in joining together to find solutions. Low-wage work is clearly a regionwide phenomenon—and the remedy, like the ailment, cannot lie in just one geographic area.

In this light, while it is heartening that the City of Los Angeles has long had a Living Wage Ordinance and a slew of pace-setting Community Benefits Agreements, the real strategy for raising incomes involves making sure that the regional economy works for everyone. Because of

this, the Mayor’s vigorous attempt to promote the goods movement industry has been significant. The industry faces severe environmental justice problems: both the ports and the truck and rail traffic tend to create significant pollution in already affected communities. These will need to be overcome; but if they are, the industry promises to create the sort of mid-skill, mid-wage jobs that were critical to economic advancement for working people in an earlier era.

What Will It Take?

What will it mean for the City to exercise a leadership role in the region? First, City leadership will have to fully recognize just how far behind it has lagged in this arena—and why. The California Center for Regional Leadership has sponsored a number of regional civic collaboratives in Los Angeles County (such as the Gateway Cities Partnership), but these have not included the City of L.A. Part of the reason has been the disinterest of past L.A. mayors, but another reason is that other cities have eschewed closer partnerships, fearing that Los Angeles is simply too powerful to listen. The City should be the anchor, but it will need to do this with humility and grace—the sort that Bradley had and Villaraigosa has demonstrated in other arenas.

Second, the City will need to choose issues carefully. Among the least attractive of these from a regional view is education. Although the Mayor is to be applauded for his willingness to spend political capital on such a thorny and critical issue, the sheer dominance of the City of Los Angeles in the L.A. school district nevertheless creates a wariness on the part of officials in other cities. Collaboration around environmental justice issues, however, is a potential winner. Pollution does not respect jurisdictional boundaries and clean-up attempts along the Alameda Corridor are essential to making the goods movement industry move forward. Tackling his problem is bound to bring close collaboration with the high-minority inner-ring suburbs that are L.A.’s closest neighbors.

Third, the City will need to recapture the region’s imagination. Los Angeles is a place where people come from all over the world to remake themselves, to forge families, to create communities—it is an idea as well as a location. And when you ask people from Southern California where they are from, they tend to answer Los Angeles—the city’s porous boundaries of opportunities seem to range from Malibu to Monrovia, from Palmdale to Pomona. We need to start thinking and acting like the great region that we are. Moving from Bradley’s vision of a “world-class city” to the contemporary vision of a “world-class region” means understanding exactly how much the County and City’s fates have become intertwined.

FIGURE 7A. LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1990: LOS-WAGE WORKERS





FIGURE 7B. LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 2005: LOW-WAGE WORKERS



Data Appendix

The tables and maps in this report were prepared by Manuel Pastor and Justin Scoggins of the Center for Justice, Tolerance, and Community at University of California, Santa Cruz. Much of the underlying data is from the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) and its successor, the American Community Survey (ACS), both of which were downloaded through IPUMS (<http://usa.ipums.org/usa/>), a project out of the University of Minnesota dedicated to the collection and distribution of U.S. census data. The exception to the source of these data is figures on total population and population by race/ethnicity and nativity, which are from the summary files of the decennial census.¹ For the 1990 and 2000 PUMS and the 2005 ACS, we make use of the fact that the data are divided into Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs)—a level of geography that contains roughly 100,000 people and can vary greatly in land area. Given that these areas coincide with Los Angeles City and County boundaries (perfectly in 2000/2005 and near perfectly in 1990²) and are compact enough in the L.A. area to arguably represent a broad “neighborhood” level of geography, they were useful both in generating City- and County-specific measures from the PUMS and for making the maps included in the report.

The specifics around calculations made using the PUMS include the following:

(1) The dissimilarity indices for non-Hispanic whites (D_w) for 1990 and 2005 for the City of Los Angeles and the rest of the County were calculated using the following standard formula:

$$D_w = (1/2) \sum_{i=1}^N \left| \frac{w_i}{W} - \frac{nw_i}{NW} \right|$$

where:

w_i is the total non-Hispanic white population of the i_{th} PUMA

W is the total non-Hispanic white population of the larger area being considered (either the City of LA or the rest of the County)

nw_i is the total population less non-Hispanic whites of the i_{th} PUMA

NW is the total population less non-Hispanic whites of the larger area being considered (either the City of LA or the rest of the County)

(2) The “ethnic churning” variable was first developed in research on environmental justice and has been used in several other settings.³ It is calculated by summing up for any particular area the absolute values of changes between two time periods in the percentage of five ethnic groupings (non-Hispanic whites, African Americans, Latinos, Asians/Pacific Islanders, and all others combined). Most demographic change variables such as the change in percentage white will not capture, say, a Black-Latino shift in a neighborhood with few whites; “ethnic churning” does and is more representative of the sorts of changes occurring in multiethnic Los Angeles.

(3) Wages were calculated only for persons who reported that they were currently working at the time of the survey and had positive wage and salary income for the calendar year prior to the year of the survey, with the exception of the 2005 ACS, for which wage and salary income is from the 12 months prior to the day of the survey, and since the survey runs throughout the calendar year, reported income may have been received over a period of 23 months (12 months prior to January 2005 through 12 months prior to December 2005). All reported values are adjusted to a 2005 average, using the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers—research series (CPI-U-RS). We restricted data to those who were currently working at the time of the survey so that the samples used for wage and employment calculations were the same. The actual calculation of wages was straightforward: Total wage and salary income was divided by total annual hours of work, derived by taking the product of the reported usual number of hours worked per week and weeks worked during the year prior to the survey (or in the case of the 2005 ACS, the 12 months prior to the day of the survey). All wages from 1979, 1989, and 1999 were adjusted for inflation to 2005 dollars, using the regional CPI for all urban consumers for the Los Angeles metropolitan area, which includes the cities of Los Angeles, Anaheim, and Riverside. For ease, we refer to wages from the 2005 ACS as being from 2005, despite the fact that they are actually some average of wages over the 2004-

¹ The 1980 data come from the 1980 Census Long Form as reported in the Geolytics product “CensusCD 1980” (http://www.geolytics.com/USCensus_1980_in_2000_Boundaries_Products.asp), while the 1990, 2000 and 2005 data are from the Census’ very own American Factfinder (<http://factfinder.census.gov>). All categories by race/ethnicity are non-Hispanic categories, such that anyone reporting as being of Hispanic descent is included in the “Latino” category, and the weighted sum of respondents by race/ethnicity matches the total population.

² The 2000 PUMA boundaries apply to both the 2000 PUMS and the 2005 ACS.

³ See Manuel Pastor, James L. Sadd, and John Hipp, Which Came First? Toxic Facilities, Minority Move-in, and Environmental Justice, *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 23(1), 2001.

2005 period. For the wage charts (Figure 6), we should also note that while the data points are labeled at discrete values (e.g., \$5/hr, \$7/hr, \$9/hr, etc.), they include workers earning \$1/hr above or below each point, and the samples for each chart are restricted to wage earners falling into the domain of wages shown, such that the sum of all the y-values of the data points in each chart is 100%.

(4) Working poverty status was calculated for all persons of working age (between 25 and 64 years). A person was considered working poor if his or her total family income from the calendar year prior to the year of the survey (or the 12 months prior to the day of the survey for the 2005 ACS) placed one below 150 percent of the federal poverty line and a person worked a total of at least 1,750 hours over the same period, as measured by the product of reported usual hours worked per week and weeks worked during the period.⁴ Thus, the working poor status pertains to the years 1989 and 1999 for the 1990 and 2000 PUMS, respectively, and some average of 2004-2005 for the 2005 ACS. For ease, as with wages, we refer to the measures of poverty and working poverty calculated on the 2005 ACS as being from 2005.

(5) All data on workers and low-wage workers are restricted to the working-age population (25-64 years). *Workers* are then defined as those who reported that they were employed at the time of the survey and had positive earnings over the period for which income information was collected, and *low-wage workers* are defined as those workers making less than the living wage for the City of Los Angeles that was instituted in 1997 (about

\$8.50/hr at that time), adjusted for inflation using the regional CPI for all urban consumers for the Los Angeles metropolitan area to the particular year for which wages are being considered. Because the year from which employment status comes (the survey year) is different than the year from which wages come, we refer to statistics on workers and low-wage workers as being from the survey year for ease.

(6) For the two maps displaying the geographic distribution of low-wage workers by 2000 PUMA (Figure 7), the variable mapped is the share of all workers who are low-wage workers (as previously defined) for 1990 and 2005. Some processing was required to shift data from the 1990 PUMS to the 2000 PUMA shape because there were different PUMA shapes in 1990. In brief, this processing involved a geographic intersection of the 1990 PUMAs, the 2000 PUMAs, and the 1990 Census block groups—the lowest level of geography for which income and employment information is available—and then shifting rates of employment (figured as total workers divided by total working age population) and low-wage employment (figures as total low-wage workers divided by total workers) from the 1990 PUMAs to the 2000 PUMAs by taking the weighted average of these rates for the 1990 PUMAs by 2000 PUMA, using the share of total employment by block group for the 2000 PUMA that is contained in the 1990 PUMA as the relevant weight. No such processing was necessary for the 2005 ACS data since they come with 2000 PUMA information. A similar process was used for shifting the ethnic populations from the 1990 PUMAs to the 2000 PUMAs for the calculation of ethnic churning.

⁴ The 1,750 annual hour cut-off was chosen because it is the annual hour equivalent of at least 35 hours per week and 50 weeks per year—a level of effort that we consider full-time work—without the restrictions around hours per week and weeks per year that can lead to the exclusion of some who would otherwise be considered full-time workers.

PLANNING ECONOMIC GROWTH: LOS ANGELES COMING OF AGE

DR. DANIEL FLAMING PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC ROUNDTABLE

As with individuals, communities that have come of age are able to make decisions that shape their own future and safeguard their own well-being. One critical measure of Los Angeles' standing in 2007 is whether it is yet capable of taking actions that influence the economy in ways that help residents earn sustaining livelihoods. There are at least three reasons why it has become important for LA to exert purposeful influence on its own economic trajectory:

1. The population has grown steadily but the number of jobs in the formal economy, where employers comply with labor law, is still below the level of 1990.
2. The underground economy, operating outside the reach of government regulation, has become LA's growth engine.
3. Incomes are deeply polarized—a quarter of the labor force are working poor.

The difficulty that many residents have earning sustaining livelihoods is illustrated by the fact that the typical Los Angeles renter is precariously housed. This has citywide impacts because nearly two thirds (61 percent) of LA households live in rental housing. In 2005, LA renters paid more of their income for rent than at any time in the past 25 years (Figure 1). This is because:

- Income in constant dollars has declined since 1989
- Rents have increased since 2000

As a result, the typical (median) LA renter is precariously housed, paying over 30 percent of income for rent.

Many of the workers whose energy and hope is driving LA's economic growth are surviving at the margins of the economy, struggling

FIGURE 1. INCOME AND RENT OF RENTER HOUSEHOLDS, CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 1980–2005 (2005 DOLLARS)

Source: US Census Bureau 1980, 1990, 2000; American Community Survey 2002–2005; Economic Roundtable





FIGURE 2. L.A. COUNTY RESIDENTS' TENURE IN U.S., DATA FOR FOUR TIME PERIODS: 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005

Source: US Census Bureau PUMS 1980, 1990, 2000 and ACS PUMS 2005



to pay rent, and trying to build better lives for their children. Most of these workers are immigrants, who together with their children make up over half (53 percent) of LA's residents (Figure 2).

Los Angeles is being transformed by immigrants, who have saved it from the downward economic spiral that would otherwise have resulted from the aging and out-migration of LA's native-born labor force. Most of LA's immigrant workers (53 percent) have been in the US over fifteen years, sinking deep roots into the community and making long-term contributions to building LA's economy. Yet over a third of immigrants (34 percent) are working poor, with incomes under 150 percent of the poverty threshold. One of the reasons for these low incomes is the proliferation of low-wage, routine service jobs in Los Angeles. Nearly two thirds (63 percent) of all children in Los Angeles have immigrant parents. The future of Los Angeles rides on the success of immigrant parents in providing adequate nurturing, health care and education for their children, and the abilities and aspirations of these children as they enter the labor market and become taxpayers and voters.

The industrial context for LA's yet-to-emerge economic strategy is a business base with growth concentrated in the service sector and polarized between high- and low-wage jobs. Growing industries paying living wages are in the upper right quadrant of Figure 3, where we see an absence of growing industries with average salaries in the \$45,000 to \$65,000 range. The durable manufacturing sector used to fill this middle ground between high-wage jobs in the finance, entertainment and information sectors and low-wage jobs in the food service and retail sectors, providing middle-class jobs for people with average levels of education, but this sector is in long-term decline. Much of LA's economic

growth is occurring in the upper left quadrant occupied by growing low-wage industries, notably the retail and food service sectors. Los Angeles does not have enough growing industries that pay living wages.

One-hundred-fifty-seven years after its municipal incorporation in 1850, Los Angeles needs, but does not have, an economic strategy. Nor is there a clear idea of what a strategy should look like, or even complete agreement that local government should be trusted to develop a strategy. The reality is that when we say that Los Angeles needs an economic strategy we are referring to something that nobody has seen. I would like to propose that we should envision an economic strategy as:

- A comprehensive plan to provide sustainable employment for residents
- A long-term, fact-based plan for community and regional industry growth
- Not just project-specific development, although this is important


Ten actions that Los Angeles might take as part of an economic strategy include:

1. Understanding industry strengths and monitoring trends in key industries.
2. Making land use decisions that support growth of key industries.
3. Fostering attentive, informed interaction with key industries.
4. Preserving a stable and competitive environment for key industries.
5. Intervening in measured ways to avert decline in key industries.
6. Using government purchasing power to support growth in key industries.
7. Prioritizing infrastructure improvements to help key industries.
8. Using strategic assets such as the ports to leverage local value-added activity and jobs.
9. Taking measured, efficient steps to make business capital available to targeted industries in targeted communities.
10. Helping residents get good jobs through training and employment initiatives.

How much impact can Los Angeles have on its economy with these tools? Will local government be picking losers and winners? The short answers are that at best Los Angeles will give gentle nudges to its economy. If these nudges are judiciously targeted and consistent they can have a modest long-term effect in helping steer the economy in the right direction. Los Angeles will never be in a position to pick industry winners and losers; its challenge is to achieve a discernable and constructive impact on the economy.

FIGURE 3. INDUSTRY CONTEXT FOR L.A.'S ECONOMIC STRATEGY, NUMBER OF JOBS REPRESENTED BY SIZE OF CIRCLE

Source: BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages—L.A. County 2004, Economic Roundtable



The resources of local government are not large enough to control or even have a near-term influence on LA's economy (Figure 4). Los Angeles County has roughly:

- \$1 trillion in assessed property
- \$750 billion in annual industry output
- \$450 billion in local value created annually
- \$250 billion in annual compensation to workers
- \$170 billion in annual business income

In contrast, less than \$1 billion is spent annually by all local governments in Los Angeles County for activities typically associated with economic development—job training, economic development and redevelopment. These direct outlays for economic development and revitalization are less than one tenth of one percent of LA's economic output. They are too small to be discernable in the overall economy. The most important tools of local government for shaping the economy are indirect but potentially powerful. Local government's authority over land use, education and the labor market can have a powerful long-term influence in shaping the largest components of the economy:

- Land value (\$1 trillion in assessed property)
- Worker productivity (\$450 billion in value added)
- Worker compensation (\$250,000 billion in wages and benefits)


A second factor constraining the ability of local government to intervene in the economy is the amount of time it takes to make public decisions and the probability that those decisions will be ambiguous and subject to revision. Five constraints that are likely to impact public economic planning initiatives include:¹

1. A continuously changing vision of the goals for and assumptions underlying an economic strategy
2. Incomplete and continuously changing information about the economy
3. Incomplete control over legal, administrative and financial decisions that impact economic planning
4. Long internal time lags for developing and approving economic strategies
5. Long external time lags before the impacts of economic strategies become evident

These constraints are inherent in economic planning, whether for LA or any other region. Any strategic economic planning initiative is at best likely to achieve incremental rather than definitive change and plans will probably need to be revised frequently to adapt to shifting informa-

FIGURE 4. SNAPSHOT OF L.A. COUNTY ECONOMY, 2006

Source: IMPLAN input-output model for Los Angeles County; Public budget data 2002–2006 adjusted to 2006 dollars; Economic Roundtable



tion and goals. Local economic planning is a humbling prospect because the problem is big, the tools are small, information is fragmentary and continuously changing, and even with very good work there is a long wait before results become apparent.

An economic strategy will not be a panacea, but without it Los Angeles will face increased risks of economic stagnation and growing poverty. One of the next steps for Los Angeles is to identify an institutional hub for collecting and analyzing economic information, integrating public authority and resources, and implementing long-term goals for shaping the economy. A second step is to begin a broadly inclusive civic dialogue about long-term economic goals for Los Angeles. A successful strategy will require a continuing flow of reliable local economic information, a broad-based public decision-making processes, a coherent long-term vision, and perseverance.

¹ This list of constraints draws on Andreas Faludi's distinctions between blueprint and process planning in *Planning Theory*, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 1973, pp. 138, 143.

STEPPING UP TO THE HOUSING CRISIS: STATE OF HOUSING 2006

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The Tensions in Housing

Housing insecurity exists in L.A. Tensions exist between those who argue that housing is a right and those who see it as a commodity from which a profit can be made. The housing squeeze in a hot real estate market, such as the City of Los Angeles, creates economic pressures and exposes competing ideas about the role of government in assuring public welfare. In the current situation, tenants fear that rents will be raised and because they cannot afford to pay more, they will have to move or face harassment in their daily life, eviction from their unit, and displacement from their community. Residents in rent-stabilized apartments are mostly frightened that their buildings are going to be converted into condominiums, although a few may be able to buy their units. Homeowners also harbor fears that they do not have enough equity built up in their housing. Their worries are due to overstretched budgets and inability to pay monthly mortgage payments. Property owners are fearful. They may agonize that existing rents create a negative cash flow and object to government programs because they fear rising taxes or new laws that will constrain how much they can charge tenants. Tensions accumulate over housing in Los Angeles, where real estate historically shaped the physical, social, and economic landscape. Typically, developers want to capitalize on the rising value of land and buildings and make a profit.

The November 2006 elections signified the tensions around housing and the way in which the public sector vacillates over intervention.

Public Vacillation

Heightened visibility about the affordable housing crisis and piecemeal responses by local government occurred in 2006. A citywide inclusionary zoning ordinance that was initially introduced into City Council in 2004 virtually disappeared from discussion by 2006 (Mukhija, Regus, & Slovin, 2006). Inclusionary zoning requires that a percentage of units in any development be set aside for “affordable” housing. Nine cities in

Los Angeles County have passed inclusionary zoning ordinances, seven of which are mandatory and the other two voluntary. An inclusionary zoning ordinance in Los Angeles had strong supporters and stronger opponents who recommended that the City Council send the proposal to neighborhood councils for a 90-day review. A revised plan languished,¹ replaced by Measure H, which seemed more palatable to opponents of a zoning change.

Measure H was designed to provide money for affordable housing through the city’s Housing Trust Fund.² Measure H needed two thirds of the vote to pass and fell short by a little less than 25,000 votes. At the same time, voters approved the statewide Proposition 1C—a Housing/Emergency Shelter Trust—that needed only a simple majority of 58 percent. A little more than 61 percent of the voters in Los Angeles County approved the proposition.

Without inclusionary zoning except in selected cases—the Central City West Specific Plan, Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA) redevelopment project areas, and new projects in the Coastal Zone (Mukhija, et al., 2006)—or a permanent source of money for the Housing Trust Fund, the City begs off that not enough money is available, that federal money has drastically decreased, that somehow people who are fearful about housing security should...do what? During 2006, the City Council offered piecemeal answers. Councilman Dennis Zine took up the cause when he thought it unfair that his son, a Los Angeles policeman, had difficulty in securing a home mortgage (Piasecki, 2006). As a result, developers in San Fernando Valley’s Warner Center will be required to set aside 25 percent of the units for those with an annual income lower than \$55,000. The then Councilman Alex Padilla “negotiated a 10 percent set aside of new affordable housing units developed near Sylmar’s Cascades Golf Club” (Piasecki, 2006). That will create 70 affordable units for “families with incomes much lower than the ones served by Warner Center, which is said to create ‘workforce’ housing” (Piasecki, 2006). Councilman Bill Rosenthal called for a moratorium on conver-

¹ See Gurwitt (2007) for an interpretation of Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa’s position.

² Measure H would have provided over 10,000 new and rental units over 10 years: (1) \$250,000,000 to help working families buy their first home; (2) \$350,000,000 to build rental housing affordable to low-income working families; (3) \$250,000,000 to build housing for homeless people, and (4) \$150,000,000 to be allocated for rental or homeless housing based on future needs. See League of Women Voters (2007) <http://www.smartvoter.org/2006/11/07/ca/la/meas/H/>; Los Angeles Housing Trust Fund Advisory Committee (Presented to Mayor James K. Hahn), 2002.

sions in his West Side District, where a few more than 4,100 units were lost between 2001 and the middle of 2006 (Pfeiffer, 2006). Councilman Ed Reyes identified the tensions underlying a case-by-case approach: “While we understand the need to protect property rights, we simply cannot ignore the fact that more and more middle-class and working-class Angelenos are being forced out of their homes” (Fixmer, 2006). But the pain affects more than the middle and working class.

Affordability for Whom

Affordability is a muddled term.³ Up until the 1980s, the rule-of-thumb of affordability for federally subsidized rental housing was 25 percent of income or one week’s paycheck out of a month’s employment. In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration raised the percentage to 30 percent, a standard that the private market typically adopted. For decades, a household could calculate whether buying a house was affordable by using the multiple of 3 times its household income.⁴ Both guidelines are no longer true. This situation exists in other places around the United States, but Angelenos face severe problems.

Los Angeles ranks as the least affordable major urban housing market based on median house prices to median household income in 159 markets in the United States, Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom (Wendell Cox, 2007).⁵ The California Building Association found Los Angeles County was the least affordable in the United States in 2006; only 2 percent of the homes sold were affordable to families earning an Area Median Income of \$56,200. This is not surprising when the median home price in 2006 was \$521,000 (Christie, 2006).

Renters who hold minimum wage jobs are strapped for cash and need to work back-to-back jobs during the daytime from 9 to 4:30, pick up children, feed them, go to a second job at 9 pm, and return home at 4:30 am the next morning only to wake up at 6 am to get the children ready for school. This still may be insufficient to afford the median rent in Los Angeles. The housing wage is “the amount a full-time (40 hours per week) worker must earn per hour in order to afford the average two-bedroom unit, and is more than three times (339%) the minimum

wage (\$6.75 per hour)” (California Department of Housing and Community Development, 2007). The housing wage for that illusive two-bedroom unit in the Los Angeles-Long Beach HFMA (HUD Fair Market Rent Area) was \$24.40 an hour in 2006 (NLIHC, 2006) and was higher than California’s housing wage of \$22.86 (NLIHC, 2006). Using the old rule of thumb of 30 percent income to rent, someone who earns \$16,860 a year can afford to pay only \$422, far below the fair market rent (FMR) projected at \$1,269 for a two-bedroom apartment (NLIHC, 2006). At the minimum wage, the number of hours per week required to afford that apartment is 145 hours. The state’s raising the minimum wage from \$6.75 to \$7.50 in 2007 and \$8.00 an hour in 2008 is necessary but insufficient to meet housing costs. The living wage is also not enough unless linked to other programs that may raise people’s future earnings, for example, providing well-paying jobs with benefits for local residents, upgrading skills through apprenticeships that lead to union membership, and offering other forms of workforce development (Leavitt, 2006).⁶

The housing wage gap is deep and broad for renters and owners. Rental housing is unaffordable for waiters, sewing machine operators, food preparation workers, maids, childcare workers, janitors, security guards, and others whose annual wages range from a little more than \$17,000 to less than \$22,000 (SCANPH, 2006). Those earning in the \$30,000 to \$40,000 range—receptionists, retail salespeople, office clerks, and secretaries—are also priced out of the rental market. Los Angeles is mainly a city of renters.⁷ Only 39 percent of people are homeowners compared with 68.9 percent nationwide (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2006). Expectations of homeownership are out of reach for Angelenos earning less than \$147,018 and who want to pay no more than 33 1/3 percent for housing. This excludes people who are librarians, high school teachers, patrol officers, fire fighters, architects, pharmacists, and judges (SCANPH, 2006).

The housing squeeze, for some a permanent hardship, is exacerbated by the snail-like pace of production. A housing supply gap exists. In 2006, the city fell far short of the 4,000 units that it needs to produce annually to meet demand and the growth in population (SCANPH, 2006).

³ The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issues guidelines by income level according to Area Median Incomes or AMI. See Sara Slovin (2006) for an unpublished UCLA client project on the history and development of the AMI. Michael Stone (1993) challenged the concept of affordability and suggested to use a measure called “shelter poverty.”

⁴ Different conventions are used that may range from 29 percent to 35 percent.

⁵ The multiple of 3 still exists in parts of the United States and other world urban markets. “The least affordable market is Los Angeles & Orange County, with a Median Multiple of 11.4, far above the ‘severely unaffordable’ threshold of 5.1 and approaching four times the 3.0 ‘affordability’ standard” (Wendell Cox, 2007, p. 1).

⁶ A Community Benefits Agreement (CBA), linked to the living wage ordinance, is one way in which comprehensive programs can be linked.

⁷ The 2005 American Community Survey for the City of Los Angeles reported a median household income adjusted for inflation of \$42,667; the median monthly rent was \$883. (Leobard Estrada, personal communication, May 2, 2007).

Increases in affordable units in some Council Districts (1, 9, 13) did not make up for units lost in others (Districts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11), especially if existing housing fell prey to condo conversions (SCANPH, 2006). Close to 12,400 rent-stabilized units were lost citywide between 2001 and 2006. The numbers continue to rise, and this does not include evictions from units that are unprotected by the Rent Stabilization Ordinance (RSO) (Larry Gross, personal communication, April 26, 2007).

Extremely low-income and very low-income people are at high risk of housing insecurity. The poor frequently depend on residential hotels.⁸ As of November 2005, the L.A. Department of Housing identified 212 buildings in the city with 13,513 units, the majority of which are located in downtown (L.A. City Planning Department, 2006). People on General Relief (GR) alone receive \$66 a month if they qualify. This makes it impossible to afford rents in hotels that in 2005 ranged from \$290 to \$350 (City of L.A. Chief Legislative Analyst, 2005). The result is that people may be forced to spend alternate weeks living on the street or in a shelter, unable to afford a unit. Conditions worsened when developers discovered that deteriorating, but once appealing, buildings can be rehabilitated and converted into high-end condominiums and rentals. "From 1995 through 2003 the City lost ten SRO hotels with a net loss of 1,087 units, including five properties with 105 units between 1995-1999, and five properties with 982 units from 2000-2003" (L.A. City Planning Department, 2006). Even when units are saved, as in the Frontier Hotel, apartheid exists with the poor tenants segregated to their own elevator and floors (LA CAN, 2006). Conversions, as in other parts of the city, have intensified the struggles over gentrification and displacement and made transparent the competing visions over the city's future; in turn, this has led to questioning the role that local government is playing in shaping the physical and demographic profile of L.A.

Recognition Isn't Enough

The Mayor, City Council members, the Department of Housing, the Department of City Planning, sectors of the business community, and so on acknowledge that a housing crisis exists. Numerous city reports in the past 10 years repeatedly recognize the magnitude of need. The tensions are apparent as they cite accomplishments that frequently take years to move from an idea to an available unit and require creative cobbling together of different funding streams. Housing policy at the local level mimics the longstanding fight at the federal level among those

who believe that the market will provide, if enough persuasive factors are included, the benefits of more parking, greater density, more units, and the like. That the market has historically failed is forgotten; many who now circle the wagons and are antagonistic toward government subsidies have lapsed memories about the role that government subsidies played in their lives, for example, in the form of interest free loans and income tax deductions. The single largest federal housing subsidy is deduction of mortgage interest for homeowners. In 2005, the projected foregone revenue for all tax expenditures for owner-occupied housing was \$139 billion. Pamela Jackson wrote, "The amount of revenue foregone by the federal government to promote homeownership greatly exceeds government spending on housing," \$31.5 billion in 2005 (Jackson, 2005).

The idea needs to be reclaimed of an active, intervening public sector that can protect people who are unable to work or earn too little to afford market prices or, like the growing increased number of seniors, are on fixed incomes. Hurricane Katrina has been the most blatant example of public neglect since the federal government's HOPE VI program. Over 100,000 units of permanent, affordable housing units were slated for demolition without one-for-one replacement (National Housing Law Project, et al., 2002).⁹ The public sector abandoned its prior investments in public housing even when an absolute need for the demolished housing remained, including a loss in public housing units in the City of Los Angeles at the former Pico Gardens and Aliso Village.

Stepping Up? Creating Transparency and a Learning City

In many ways, public dialogues are happening, thanks to the diligent work of nonprofit organizations and dedicated people within government bureaucracies who are stepping up to the challenges. This includes research centers and foundations. They are pioneering innovations from the bottom up, offering information, and providing technical assistance. Many have been in existence for a long time. The Coalition for Economic Survival (CES) led the fight against rising housing costs in the late 1970s and was successful in seeing the Rent Stabilization Ordinance established in 1979. CES and the City Attorney's office are setting precedents in campaigns to make slumlords accountable. Rent stabilization and just cause eviction policies mean that more tenants in gentrifying neighborhoods have some protections. The lack of

⁸ The City of Los Angeles refers to residential hotels as SRO (Single Room Occupancy) housing units, defined as having six or more guest rooms in which 30 percent or more have no private bath and toilet within the room.

⁹ See Susan J. Popkin et al. 2004. For support of Hope VI, see Henry Cisneros and Jack Kemp (2004).

shelter beds for rising numbers of homeless in the 1970s led to an increase in beds and other services as advocates made known the magnitude and pressured for government and private resources. Shelter beds alone are an inadequate response to address the almost 50,000 homeless persons in the city and the almost 90,000 in the county, prompting activist researchers to put forward a broad array of recommendations (Flaming & Tepper, 2004) and urging a public airing of the results.¹⁰ Los Angeles Community Action Network (LA CAN) is in the forefront of preventing demolition and conversions of residential hotels. LA CAN successfully led the fight for an Interim Control Ordinance (ICO) to last for one year, with two sequential 6-month extensions; in 2007, they received an extension to November, pending permanent protective legislation. A Systematic Code Enforcement Program (SCEP) was established in 1998 after in the Inner City Law Center, the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, the then Chancellor of Loyola focused public attention on the abject conditions under which people lived. Slum conditions have not faded away and a collaborative made up of health and economic justice organizations, including LA CAN and SAJE (Strategic Actions for a Just Economy), are educating us on the costs that tenants and their children have to endure as a result of slum landlords who are making a profit on people's backs (St James, 2007). Two organizations both named Housing L.A. were influential. In the 1980s, Housing L.A. brought together housing and health groups to fight for affordable housing in the downtown area. The more recent Housing L.A., through which the Southern California Association of Non-Profit Housing (SCANPH) built a broad coalition, worked for three years to achieve the establishment of a housing trust fund. ACORN (Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, Inc.) organized tenants to meet with janitors and address jointly the need for increases in wages tied to housing costs; they organize tenants in buildings and are active in statewide lobbying. In September 2006, ACORN along with the Western Center on Law and Poverty, as well as advocates from the disabled community and seniors won a victory in the State Assembly to extend from 30 to 60 days the amount of time that renters will have to move if landlords issue a no-fault eviction notice.

Each win is a struggle, each victory needs to be monitored. The tensions exist. What might be done?

A start would be if leaders acknowledge publicly the full parameters of the housing crisis and a vision about addressing the housing wage gap. This means accounting for the entire formal housing stock—public housing, existing private housing, subsidized housing, mobile homes—and the informal shelters that people erect in sidewalk encampments. What are the costs—not only on the public side but also in terms of the daily investments people and organizations make to house themselves? Many figures are difficult to obtain when trying to calculate the real need, for example, the number of evictions in private units that are not protected under the Rent Stabilization Ordinance. A public audit is necessary for everyone to have access to reliable information and to “inform” action. If daily consumption of hamburgers can be publicized, why not inform the public every time a new or rehabilitated housing unit is available and which income group is served. Public conversations, all inclusive, should be started. Initially a day can be set aside when local leaders, school teachers, health professionals, organizers, restaurant workers, business executives, food service workers, building contractors, firefighters, clerks, the unemployed and employed, disabled—all are part of housing study groups. Dialogue among people at the Department of Motor Vehicles, clinics, at train stations, and at bus stops could occur. Public service announcements could be made on radio and television stations. A huge shout, not a whisper or a whimper, is needed. Follow-up could include exchanges among people with different views and might lead to a better understanding of the fears and needs in each other's communities. Translation in many languages should be available.

Some scholars argue that the root of the problem is poverty and affordable housing is not the solution. Some argue that housing has to be genuinely linked to economic and workforce development if people are to afford rising housing prices. Others argue for an end to speculation and creating housing as an entitlement. The housing wage is connected to the types of jobs that people qualify for, the quality of their education, the status of their health, and the support of family and household connections to the community. Existing programs are segregated and ad hoc when they should be interrelated and nesting. This does not mean that a program in one area should have to wait for the other, but it should never be forgotten that people do not lead their lives

¹⁰ See Flaming and Tepper (2006) for an example of the ways in which the full story is often hard to learn: they wrote: “The expectation was that the Roundtable/Institute strategy contained in this document would be tested and refined through public dialogue about its guiding principles and strategic actions. This strategy was completed in June of 2004, but remained out of the public domain until LAHSA concurred with a Freedom of Information Act request for its release in July 2006. The authors believe this strategy remains timely and important because it is the only **comprehensive and coordinated plan that identifies the organizations accountable for each action with specific benchmarks for outcomes** to be achieved by each action” (p. 7). The comprehensive approach to actions, accompanied by dollar amounts, is one example for the type of materials that are a precondition for the type of public conversation being suggested here.

in discrete pieces that they separate into neat piles. This mind shift may seem too daunting, too expensive, too unrealistic, too radical, too... In the many visioning meetings that go on, why isn't the vision of the city one of caring, of the city taking the moral high road as mayors in France and Italy have done, declaring eviction free zones and citywide moratoriums (International Alliance of Inhabitants, 2005)? How unrealistic is it to foresee a time when the military budget can be redirected to the housing problem, including "deploying" service people to rebuild and rehabilitate housing in the United States, rather than relying on them when a civil disturbance occurs? Why not marshal the support of others in localities across the region and the state? And why couldn't such an alliance exert influence at the federal level? Why not work out a systematic partnership with organized labor and worker centers, the former with its vast resource of pension funds and the latter with its pulse on the communities in which they work (Planning Report, 2006)? Of course, the infrastructure requires rebuilding, but the real infrastructure lies with the people. Why should so many live in fear of losing their housing? A local government that balances interests may be just another way of sidestepping sticky complex issues or allocating reduced resources while putting forth a message that people should be "somewhat" satisfied. A local government that takes the moral high road, that could replace people's fear of their housing situation with some hope, is surely worth a try.

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IS THERE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN LOS ANGELES?

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Environmental justice is a term that means different things to different people. The City of Los Angeles has codified it into the General Plan, which characterizes environmental justice as a commitment to “Assure the fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, incomes and education levels with respect to the development, implementation and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations and policies, including affirmative efforts to inform and involve environmental groups, especially environmental justice groups, in early planning stages through notification and two-way communication.”¹ However, to the many thousands of Southern California residents living in highly polluted industrial and working-class neighborhoods and who bear most of the burden of environmental hazard and associated health risk, environmental justice is an unfulfilled promise. People of color dominate these neighborhoods, and in some cases, environmental health and social justice community organizations have fought to give the people a voice in addressing the injustice of this burden, often leading where City, regional, and State policy makers and regulators have hesitated, underdelivered, or failed to act.

Is there environmental injustice in Los Angeles? For over a decade, I have worked with fellow researchers, principally Dr. Manuel Pastor, Jr. of the Geography Department and Department of American Studies and Ethnicity, University of Southern California, and Dr. Rachel Morello-Frosch, Professor of Community Health in the School of Public Health and Department of Environmental Science, Policy and Management, University of California, Berkeley, to address questions related to environmental justice and its implications to public health and policy. The weight of the evidence shows clear and disturbing inequalities in exposure to a number of environmental hazards, with real consequences for people’s health and lives. Most of this burden falls upon communities of color and the poor, although some disparities persist across income strata. These differences appear to be related to larger social and political forces that can be addressed by enlightened public policy.

TABLE 1. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL RESULTS FOR ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TSDF LOCATION AND RACE/ETHNICITY, ECONOMIC AND LAND USE VARIABLES IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY

Source: Department of Geology, Occidental College

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	DIRECTION OF EFFECT	STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
% Residents of Color	+	***
Population Density	+	ns
% Employment in Manufacturing	+	**
Per Capita Income	+	***
Per Capita Income ²	(-)	***
% Industrial Land Use	+	***

*** Highly significant (at the 1% level)

** Very significant (at the 5% level)

ns Not significant

N=1636 Tracts

Environmental Injustice in Exposure to Potential Hazards

The first studies of environmental justice and inequality focused on the spatial relationship between stationary hazards and residential populations (Bullard, 1983; U.S. GAO, 1983; United Church of Christ, 1987; Bryant & Mohai, 1992). For example, environmental justice advocates have long claimed that the pattern of location of hazardous waste facilities, such as State-permitted Treatment Storage and Disposal facilities (TSDFs), and businesses that discharge dangerous air pollutants, such as those facilities reporting to the EPA toxic release inventory facilities (TRI’s), place a greater burden of exposure on low-income communities of color. Our research has shown that this is clearly the case in Los Angeles (Boer, T., Pastor, M., Sadd, J., and Snyder, L., 1997). Significant differences exist in neighborhood demographics between areas near TSDFs versus those located at distance from these potential hazards. In particular, census tracts that contain or are located within a one-mile

¹ City of Los Angeles General Plan, Adopted December 11, 1996

² This result remained consistent even when the percentages of African American and Latino residents were entered as separate variables in the regression (results not shown in the table).

radius of a TSDF have significantly higher percentages of residents of color (particularly Latinos), lower levels of income, and a lower percentage of registered voters.


Multivariate statistical analyses (logistic regressions) allow us to ask whether these relationships are statistically significant when controlling for other variables—that is, does race/ethnicity still matter once one controls for, say, zoning or neighborhood income? The variables that most significantly control this relationship are existing land use and percentage residents of color (see Table 1).² Income is also a significant predictor of TSDF proximity, but this relationship is complex—extremely poor, as well as high-income, census tracts have fewer facilities than neighborhoods with working-class incomes. Complementary evidence suggests that this pattern arises because poorer areas have little economic and industrial activity, including the types of linkage industries that would support a hazardous waste facility. Tracts with greater wealth are associated with higher property values and less land zoned for industrial and manufacturing activity; it may also be true that residents in these areas have better options to influence the political processes that can act to resist siting of such hazards. The neighborhoods most affected by TSDF exposure in Los Angeles County are working-class communities of color, the same types of communities from which Los Angeles area environmental justice community organizations have emerged over the past three decades.

Environmental Injustice in Exposure to Toxic Air Emissions

Our research has also addressed the question of disproportionate exposure as it relates to major stationary sources of toxic air pollution, by examining the distribution of facilities that report air emissions to U.S. EPA's toxic release inventory (TRI), and found a similar pattern of disproportionate exposure (see Figure 1) (Sadd, J., Pastor, M., Boer, T., and Snyder, L 1999). We considered all TRI facilities in the South Coast Air Quality Management District³ as well as just those facilities releasing pollutants that are classified by U.S. EPA as high priority for reduction and, therefore, included in the agency's 33/50 program.⁴ Study results for both the 1992 and 2000 versions of the TRI indicate that Latinos are twice as likely as Anglo residents to live in a tract with a TRI facility with 33/50 releases; African Americans suffer disproportionate exposure to

FIGURE 1. TRI AIR RELEASES AND RACE/ETHNICITY IN THE METROPOLITAN LOS ANGELES AREA

Source: 1990 U.S. Census; 1992 TRI



these facilities, as well. Similar to the results of the distribution of TSDFs, multivariate analysis that controls for income, land use, and other factors found that the proportion of residents of color was significantly associated with proximity to a TRI facility, with income in a similar inverted u-shaped relationship.

Environmental Injustice in Estimated Cancer Risk From Outdoor Air Toxics Exposure

Although research on exposure inequity demonstrates one aspect of environmental injustice, many have asked whether this pattern of disproportionate exposure to potentially hazardous facilities also poses a disparate threat to health. We sought to address this question by quantitatively assessing the effect of outdoor air pollution exposure on estimated individual lifetime cancer risks and respiratory hazard (Morello-Frosch, R., Pastor, M., and Sadd, J. 2001). There is little available epidemiological data that allows this question to be examined at the local or individual level (see Institute of Medicine, 1999), so we employed an approach to cumulative exposure based upon established techniques

³ Includes Ventura, Los Angeles, Orange, San Bernardino, and Riverside counties.

⁴ The 33/50 program was designed to target 17 priority chemicals, most of them carcinogens, and set as its goal a 33% reduction in releases and transfers of these chemicals by 1992 and a 50% reduction by 1995 (using a 1988 baseline).

FIGURE 2. ESTIMATED LIFETIME CANCER RISKS FROM AMBIENT AIR TOXICS EXPOSURES BY RACE/ETHNICITY AND INCOME

Source: South Coast Air Basin




TABLE 2. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL RESULTS ON ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CANCER RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH AIR TOXICS AND RACE/ETHNICITY, ECONOMIC AND LAND USE VARIABLES

Source: Department of Geology, Occidental College

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	MODEL 1		MODEL 2	
	DIRECTION OF EFFECT	STAT. SIG.	DIRECTION OF EFFECT	STAT. SIG.
% Residents of Color	+	***		
Population Density	+	***	+	***
% of Home Ownership	(-)	ns	(-)	ns
Median Housing Value	+	***	+	***
Median Household Income	+	***	+	***
Median Household Income ²	(-)	***	(-)	***
% Transportation Land Use	+	***	+	***
% Industrial Land Use	+	***	+	***
% Commerical Land Use	+	***	+	***
% African American			+	***
% Latino			+	***
% Asian			+	***

*** Highly significant (at the 1% level)

** Very significant (at the 5% level)

ns Not significant

N=1636 Tracts

of health risk assessment from the U.S. EPA's Cumulative Exposure Project (Morello-Frosch, R., Woodruff, T., Axelrad, D. and Caldwell, J. 2000), which models the long-term annual average outdoor concentrations of 148 hazardous air pollutants, or air toxics, listed under the 1990 Clean Air Act and Amendments. This provides a much more inclusive way to evaluate the health impact of air pollutants than facility location studies and includes pollutants originating from mobile sources in addition to those from point and area emitters (e.g., industrial and manufacturing facilities, municipal waste combustors, and small service industries). Modeled ambient pollutant concentrations are combined with cancer toxicity information to derive estimates of lifetime cancer risks associated with outdoor air toxics exposure at the census tract level, allowing us to analyze their distribution among residential populations.

Three facts are important to understanding this data. First, these lifetime cancer risk estimates are additive across all 148 pollutants and represent cumulative risk associated with a place, assuming chronic exposure over a lifetime. They do not, however, correspond to actual health impacts upon individuals. Second, these cancer risk values are ubiquitously high throughout the South Coast Air Basin, often exceeding the Clean Air Act Goal of one excess cancer death in a million by between one and three orders of magnitude.⁵ Third, emissions from stationary facilities account for over 90% of total estimated pollutant concentrations, but mobile sourced emissions are the primary driver of health risk, accounting for about 70% of the estimated excess cancer incidence, the majority of this from diesel particulate pollution. Although much of the Los Angeles region is bathed in a cloud of air-pollution cancer risk associated with our transportation network, there are several neighborhoods where stationary source contributions dominate, suggesting that an environmentally unjust geographic pattern might still be present.

As with TSDf and TRI location, estimated cancer risk is also distributed throughout the Los Angeles region in an environmentally unjust pattern, and race/ethnicity and income continue to be significant predictive factors of location of high cancer risk in our multivariate statistical tests. Figure 2 summarizes these relationships by plotting the disparity in estimated cancer risk as it varies with both race/ethnicity and income at the census tract level. The vertical axis shows population-weighted individual excess cancer risk for each racial/ethnic group category, and the horizontal axis indicates nine categories of annual household income from less than \$5,000 to over \$100,000. For all groups, esti-

⁵ In 1990, Congress established a health-based goal for the Clean Air Act: to reduce lifetime cancer risks from major sources of hazardous air pollutants to one in one million. The Act required that over time, EPA regulations for major sources should "provide an ample margin of safety to protect public health" [Clean Air Act § 112(f)(2)].

mated cancer risk from air toxics exposure tends to be lower as income increases, but people of color have the population-weighted cancer risk estimates that are consistently about 50% higher than for Anglos at every level of income. Just as disturbing is the fact that many of the highest-income residents of color have an equivalent cancer risk value to the lowest-income groups of Anglos.


Part of what drives these differences is location: African American, Latino, and Asian residents are concentrated in the urban core neighborhoods where pollution levels and attendant health risks tend to be higher, while Anglos live primarily in less urban areas where risks are lower. However, multivariate regression results (Table 2) indicate that even after controlling for location-based causes of air pollution, such as land use (industrial, commercial, and transportation), income, and proxies for wealth and political power (home values and home ownership), race/ethnicity is consistently positively associated with higher cancer risk.

Demographic Transition and the Siting of Environmental Hazards

Both location-based and health-risk analyses offer strong evidence of environmental injustice – environmental hazards disproportionately impact communities of color in the Los Angeles area. However, some have argued that we do not know if this pattern arises because facilities were originally sited in communities of color or because people of color moved into neighborhoods after the facilities were in place and led to depressed property values. We refer to the latter explanation as the “field of bad dreams” argument: build it and they will come. Others have suggested that this sequence of events does not matter; after all, the existing pattern places an inequitable burden of hazard and risk on low-income communities of color. However, it does matter to policy makers, as a prudent policy response requires an understanding of how such a pattern develops and what the forcing factors are.

To try to understand this pattern, we conducted a detailed study of timing and temporal trends on the siting and location of Los Angeles County TSDFs from 1970-1990 (Pastor, Sadd, et al., 2001). The results showed that the proportion of residents of color living within a one-mile radius of a TSDF increased from less than 9% in 1970 to nearly 22% in 1990, while the percentage of Anglo residents living in the same radius went from around 4% in 1970 to 7.6% in 1990; the latter increase is smaller both as a percentage of the population and as a growth rate. As this difference in population exposure by race/ethnicity could be consistent with either discriminatory siting or “minority move-in,” we examined only those census tracts that received TSDFs between 1970-1990 and tracked the demographic change that occurred after facilities were sited. These neighborhoods had a higher proportion of residents

FIGURE 3. HIGH CAPACITY HAZARDOUS WASTE TSDFS AND ETHNIC CHURNING, 1970–1990



of color, were poorer and more blue-collar, had lower initial home values and rental values, and had significantly fewer homeowners than L.A. County overall. The percentage residents of color in these neighborhoods also increased after they received a TSDF, but the rate was no faster than for other Los Angeles area neighborhoods during this rapidly changing period. Multivariate analysis controlling for income and other measures confirmed that there was little evidence of minority move-in into neighborhoods where TSDFs had previously been sited, instead indicating disproportionate siting in communities of color.

What factors might contribute to this pattern of siting hazardous facilities in neighborhoods of color? We hypothesized that neighborhoods undergoing rapid transitions in their ethnic and racial composition might be more vulnerable to siting of an undesirable facility such as a TSDF because rapid demographic change could weaken the social and political networks that support a community's capacity to organize and influence such siting decisions. Our subsequent analysis of this question considered both the transition from Anglo to non-Anglo neighborhoods, as well as changes among people of color. This recognizes that a neighborhood with a high percentage of people of color over time might, in fact, mask a rapidly changing mix of African Americans, Latinos, and Asians. For example, South Central Los Angeles has undergone a rapid black-to-Latino transition over the past three decades. Our analysis developed a measure of “ethnic churning” that tracks the absolute sum of racial demographic change between 1970 and 1990; Figure 3 compares ethnic churning with TSDF siting in Los Angeles during the 1970s and 1980s.

The map pattern suggests that TSDFs tended to be sited in areas of high demographic transition during this period. We confirmed this with a simultaneous multivariate regression approach that revealed that this type of demographic transition significantly predicted the subsequent siting of a TSDF even after controlling for other economic and demographic indicators (Pastor, Sadd, et al., 2001). It appears that siting was less likely to occur in areas with one dominant racial/ethnic group, regardless of the particular race, perhaps because residents have common bonds of culture, language, and experience, than in locations where the proportion of residents of color is high but changing between African American and Latino groups. Our results suggest that a peak level of vulnerability occurred when the mix was 44% African-American and 48% Latino over this time period in Los Angeles County.

Discussion

The evidence from our research in Southern California yields a consistent picture of disproportionate environmental and health risk burdens borne by communities of color across income strata. The disproportionate pattern of TSDF location is not simply a market-induced move-in of poor residents of color seeking lower property values and rent in areas that are already impacted by these and similar undesirable land uses, and communities undergoing rapid demographic transition seem more vulnerable to the siting of these hazards.

Not everyone recognizes the significance of race/ethnicity in this pattern of environmental injustice. One frequent criticism is that an observed pattern of association between minority residents and environmental hazards does not necessarily suggest discrimination *per se* (Been, 1995; Szasz & Meuser, 1997). If the underlying factor in hazard location is land value, and this is correlated with income and therefore minority presence, the disproportionate exposure of communities of color and the poor to hazards may not be the result of discriminatory action but could simply reflect market dynamics (Been, 1995; Hamilton, 1995). A similar explanation is that hazardous land uses tend to concentrate where income and property values are at the lower end of the regional scale, reflecting the market system at work. Others hold the premise that hazards tend to be located in places where zoning has allowed industrial land facilities to cluster and, subsequently, people of color will tend to live in these areas as they are drawn by nearby industrial employment opportunities. These points of view explain the correlation with race/ethnicity as an unfortunate consequence of economic geography. However, our multivariate tests demonstrate in study after study that race/ethnicity is highly statistically significant as a predictor of hazard location and health risk, even after controlling for these other factors. This suggests that a power dynamic operates in a manner that does not

allow communities of color to significantly affect regional politics or participate in the zoning and permitting decisions that control where these hazards are eventually located.

As Los Angeles area environmental justice community organizations have led the way in addressing the pattern of environmental inequity, some government agencies have increasingly looked to them for help in identifying issues and solutions. Insuring meaningful community participation in these efforts requires extensive preparatory work on the part of government, including assessing language and scientific literacy needs and conducting extensive outreach via existing social networks, schools, churches, and civic organizations.

While empowering communities to engage in this process is critical, improved standards are required to protect those who may not be in a position, due to lack of political power or organization, to effectively defend their own interests. At minimum, any development project that would worsen existing environmental inequities should at least trigger a more comprehensive review that could be incorporated into an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). In addition to assessing the existing cumulative pollution exposures and associated health risks in an impacted area, such an EIS analysis would also require consideration of the demographic composition and linguistic capabilities of the surrounding community as well as data on land use patterns and proximity of schools, hospitals, and other facilities used by populations that are particularly vulnerable to environmental pollution.

Finally, our goal should not simply be to protect those who are currently overexposed. Preliminary research in California and elsewhere suggests that disparities in political power and residential segregation affect not only who bears the net costs and benefits of environmentally degrading activities but also the overall magnitude of environmental degradation and health risks (Morello-Frosch, 1997; Boyce, J., Klemer, A., Templet, P. and Willis, C. 1999). It seems that when a hazard cannot be placed in South Los Angeles, new efforts suddenly emerge to reduce emissions at the source. Ultimately, achieving environmental justice should not be simple reallocation of environmental hazards to higher-income white neighborhoods. Instead, industry, government, and society at large should adopt strategies for pollution prevention that benefit everyone.

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LOS ANGELES AND GANG VIOLENCE

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In 2007, the City of Los Angeles and its policy makers rediscovered “the gang crisis.” For those who have been involved in addressing this enduring social problem over the long term, the most recent rhetoric from City Hall is at times frustrating, ironic, and laughable. A *crisis* is by definition acute and demarcated. The gang problem of Los Angeles is chronic and ambiguous. It involves shifting populations, ages, ethnicities, and even genders. Despite political and law enforcement claims, the problem has not altered substantially. However, one thing has changed dramatically in the past year—finally, public agreement reflects an urgent need for a new approach to this problem and understands that additional law enforcement is not the solution.

Gangs: The Twenty-Year “Crisis”

The public and policy interest in gang violence is the result of the interplay of several events. Previously, policy makers had focused almost entirely on two issues—homeland security and emergency preparedness. However, this emphasis began to give way in 2005. In the spring of 2005, Councilmember Martin Ludlow, chair of the City Council Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development, convened a series of public hearings on the “gang problem” in Los Angeles. These hearings brought to light what many in the City already knew; despite falling crime rates, gang violence and youth involvement in gang activities continued to rise unabated. The hearings also highlighted that solutions to the gang problem required long-term strategies rather than short-term responses. The Committee heard testimony that the City’s effort at gang reduction was fragmented, uncoordinated, and disorganized. There was money being spent, but little to no accountability as to either process or outcome. The organization chart that portrayed the City’s gang prevention and intervention efforts looked more like the map of a war zone and less like a coordinated action. It was clear that something had to be done to rein in inefficiencies if the City was to protect the lives of at-risk youth.

With the departure of Martin Ludlow, the Ad Hoc Committee proceeded with recommendations for a detailed study of the City’s efforts to reduce gang violence and gang activity. In late 2005, the Committee issued a request for qualifications to conduct a comprehensive review of the City’s antigang programs. In March 2006, City Council appropri-

ated \$500,000 for the Advancement Project (AP), led by Constance Rice, to conduct a comprehensive review of the City’s antigang programs. The AP was also charged with making recommendations regarding future gang and violence reduction strategies. It was clear that a change was under way. Whether or not there would be political will to propel this beyond a white paper still remained unclear.

The final element in this change occurred in late 2006 with the disturbing report that, despite the fact that the overall crime rate in Los Angeles was continuing to descend, gang violence was on the rise.

The work of the AP was met with much anticipation. These expectations were coupled with lack of understanding of what this report would or could do. Ultimately, there were many things the report was not. It was not a scientific evaluation. It was not an exhaustive survey of gang programs in Los Angeles. It was not a document guided by research methodology. And finally, it was not the answer so desperately and naively sought. However, what the report so importantly did was to capture the elements of the problem and to illustrate how past efforts had fallen dismally short of ongoing need. Significantly, with a series of 100 recommendations, the AP put the concept of a comprehensive, citywide strategy front and center. The report was both a call to arms and a demand for answers and action.

The Current State of Affairs

In developing what has been written, one must first paint an accurate picture of gang reduction activity in the City of Los Angeles. There is general agreement from the AP experts, gang prevention and intervention specialists, policy makers, and academics alike that gang reduction efforts in the City can be characterized by the following:

- Fragmentation and lack of coordination point to the need for centralized coordination of antigang and antiviolenace programs. Political agendas and frequent changes in leadership further thwart coordination. “Coordination remains one of the greatest challenges,” the AP report offered—reinforcement for the oft-repeated calls for a gang czar.
- The lack of stabilized and consistent funding streams hinders the development of a comprehensive approach to gang violence. Funding is neither adequate nor ongoing. With the constant competition for funds, agencies cannot focus programs on antigang strategies or their implementation.

- The absence of accountability and effective, scientific, and empirically based evaluation is a chronic problem and liability. There is an utter lack of rigorous evaluation and no way to adequately chart program process, outcomes, or community change.
- Neighborhood gang activity is overrepresented in the more impoverished areas of both the City and County of Los Angeles, pointing to a need for ongoing community development. Investment in community infrastructure is woefully lacking in these areas, and there is little to no private investment that would provide employment and engender youth development.
- There is an absence of a clear, standardized definition of terms, particularly, *gangs*, *gang membership*, and *gang crime*. There is also a lack of a value-free vocabulary with which to communicate about efforts. The debate over the wording of documents to describe street peace versus antigang programs is emblematic of the struggle to build a positive identity for these programs and the populations they serve.

Suppression remains the major, almost “default,” mode of response to gang activity with little to no support for prevention and intervention efforts.

These general statements pose more questions that must be answered. In considering gang reduction efforts in Los Angeles, experts and policy makers—ranging from the Mayor’s office to the AP, from the LAPD to academic researchers and evaluators—have focused on certain key ideas. What follows are some of the major themes—and their implications—that must be considered as Los Angeles commits to following a new path to reduce gang violence.

1. GOALS

There must be clearly delineated goals and objectives for each program and City-funded gang-reduction or antiviolence efforts. However, while goals are essential, they are meaningless without adequate design and accountability. Thus far, there has been no discussion of how viable goals and objectives can be identified. To further complicate matters, accountability remains the proverbial “elephant in the room.” There is still little to no discussion of how accountability will be tied to goals and mission statements. Additionally, no real plan or methodology has addressed how stakeholders will be motivated to “buy into” any gang-reduction or antiviolence program goals.

2. MEASURES AND DEFINITIONS

It is essential that there be accurate measures of both the scale and distribution of the problem. In addition, while it is logical to measure the scale of the problem, this cannot occur before *gang activity* as a problem is clearly defined and accepted by the entire collection of stakeholders. Universal definitions will enable the City to begin the process of determining the scope of the problem.

3. COORDINATION

Coordination of all City-funded antigang programs is clearly an idea that virtually every involved group agrees upon. However, there is currently little development of this theme. Any coordination that occurs must also involve a discussion of the funding, responsibilities, and independence (politically) of a gang coordinator. It will be important to specify governance and the role of the (unfortunately) titled gang “czar” and his or her accountability.

4. ACCOUNTABILITY

Strategies to increase accountability are necessary, but up to this point little has been done to move accountability beyond the discussion stage. What are the lines of accountability? Who is accountable and to whom? To the Mayor’s office? To funding sources? To law enforcement agencies? If all of these entities are involved, what is the hierarchy? Once the lines of accountability are specified, practical strategies can be devised. Thus far, what exists is lip service to accountability with no discussion of viable models and no development of oversight. In fact, oversight appears to be a topic virtually forgotten in discussions of gang-reduction activity.

5. DATA COLLECTION

There is a need for mandated data collection using uniform agreed-upon terms and definitions. Although data collection is necessary, it should be approached with caution. Statistical findings are often easily manipulated. Additionally, there is no consensus for what type of data should be gathered. In work involving gang prevention and intervention, a discussion of quantitative as well as qualitative measures, longitudinal outcome measures, as well short-term process assessment is needed. And, with the scarcity of resources, how much funding should be allocated for data collection and analysis? What entity should undertake this responsibility? These are all important areas that merit further discussion.

6. RESOURCE ALLOCATION BASED ON NEED

Resource allocation and fund awards must be based upon ongoing needs assessments. As gang-reduction and youth violence resources become more scarce, whose needs take priority—the community’s needs? Political need? Law enforcement’s? The time frame of needs—the present versus the future—also must be considered as well as who will determine the needs. Aside from the definition of *gangs*, *needs assessment* and other terminology used so casually in discussion must be made rigorous and systematic.

7. RESEARCH AND EVALUATION

Gang-reduction and antiviolenace programs need to be guided by rigorous research, evaluation, and evidence-based practice. Evidence-based practice is the gold standard in terms of community intervention and organization. However, it is crucial to insure the reliability of the evidence and its applicability to specific situations. There must be uniformity in both the understanding and implementation of evidence-based practice.

8. MULTIDISCIPLINARY COLLABORATION

It is vital to the long-term success of any program that training and technical assistance are available and that there is productive collaboration between agency insiders and outsiders. But it is difficult to achieve the balance between inside practitioners and outside experts, focusing on how to enhance their working together when possible as well as acknowledging when both entities cannot collaborate. Collaboration needs to move beyond a kind of political “kumbayah” that does not offer any guidance as to how to integrate outsiders and insiders.

9. FUNDING

Funding must be considered within the context of a dynamic political environment. It may be more realistic to consider how to respond to the fluidity of funding at the local, state, and federal level. For the first time in City history, there must be active engagement in public and private partnerships that generate funding and community-building opportunities. Gang reduction and community development cannot be two separate endeavors. Instead, they must be interconnected and systematically interrelated.

10. INDEPENDENCE

The operation and funding of gang-reduction programs must be separated from politics and patronage. The fluidity of politics is a fact of life, yet to address any issue for the long term, we will need consistency and a strategy. Limiting the political play in this situation can be achieved through the specifics of governance. Any individual or entity overseeing antigang and antiviolenace programs in Los Angeles must be akin to Caesar’s wife—above reproach, or at the very least, far removed from it.

Ideas about gang-reduction strategies in the City need to be critically reviewed, not indiscriminately accepted. Any of the major ideas discussed must receive serious consideration. These must offer specifics, not feel-good quick fixes with no real meaning.

Good News

Overall there is good news on the gang front. While frustrations abound, there is much to be optimistic about and new developments to integrate almost daily.

First and foremost, one can finally see sustained recognition and public discussion of this problem. Media coverage has extended beyond reporting recent shootings and chronicling lives pierced by gang violence. These accounts, while essential to understanding the consequences of gang violence, do little to shed light upon potential strategies and solutions.

Second, there is agreement that this is not simply a crime problem to be solved by law enforcement. Very few people believe police officers are the best gang interventionists or most effective gang prevention resource. We must acknowledge their importance, but also recognize their limitations. Furthermore, we must recognize the other powerful forces that are important in solving this problem: families, schools, the faith-based community, and community-based organizations. It is not enough to say we cannot arrest our way out of the problem; we are beginning to understand that we need to prevent and intervene our way out of the problem.

Third, a new appreciation exists for the fact that we must further address reentry populations. The work of individuals such as Father Greg Boyle in dealing with individuals who are trying to leave “the life” and return from prison or from the streets to a responsible existence needs public policy support and enhanced funding. Reentry is slowly being conceptualized as separate but equal to prevention, intervention, and suppression.

Fourth, there is a sense that real funding *may* be brought to bear on this problem. Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa has already announced a \$3 million program to fund gang-reduction zones. His administration openly acknowledges and others agree that this is a veritable down payment on the problem. Nevertheless, it would be a substantial improvement over the \$500,000 allocated by the previous Mayor’s administration to develop an antiviolenace strategy. If this Mayor is truly ready to invest money into solving the problem, this signals the beginning of a new approach. Additionally, a concerted effort is underway on the part of the Mayor’s office to search for and ultimately appoint, with the approval of City Council, a gang director who will build a “lean and mean” administrative structure both to coordinate the fragmented programs and to implement citywide accountability.

Fifth, at long last, we have recognition of the need for coordination between City and County entities. Gangs do not respect city boundaries. It is well known that gang territory in Los Angeles cuts through the City and the County, so much so that oftentimes where a homicide is reported is dependent upon which side of the street the body is dragged onto. Most recently, this recognition of the interrelatedness of the gang problem was recognized by the County of Los Angeles. The Board of Supervisors charged its CAO, David Janssen, with constructing a plan for a program to coordinate all County services for gang prevention and intervention.

Challenges

Despite all the new and promising developments in the City's response to gang violence and its strategies for youth development, these must be tempered with both healthy intellectual skepticism and caution.

It is sad to say that the City has been down this road before. In 1996, with the start of the L.A. Bridges program, there was tremendous optimism about the ability of school-based prevention programs as well as street intervention to end the scourge of gang violence in Los Angeles. Ten years later, with the Bridges program mired in controversy, this example serves as a telling reminder of what can happen when the best efforts of policy makers and practitioners go awry. We cannot have collective amnesia for what has gone on in the past. As difficult as it is for all involved, particularly those who are devoted practitioners, programs must be examined carefully and submitted to the constraints of rigorous research and evaluation.

Attention must also be paid to the hopes pinned to the appointment of a gang "czar," an unfortunate term for the imagery it conjures. It is very clear on the basis of experts, the AP report, and conventional wisdom that we will need one individual to say where the collective gang "buck" stops. Simply stated, there must be a skilled director who can insure not only that the right hand knows what the left hand is doing but also that those hands are intertwined and integrated together. Despite this profound need for a central coordinating figure, we cannot

place unrealistic expectations upon such an individual. He or she is going to be inheriting a web of complex City and County entanglements. Reasonableness dictates that because the gang problem has taken a considerable period of time to evolve, the individual charged with addressing this agency must be given reasonable time to understand what is transpiring in gang prevention, intervention, and reentry efforts in the Greater Los Angeles Region.

In 2005, when Martin Ludlow held his initial hearings, considerable discussion took place about the dangers of adding another layer of bureaucracy. This too remains a concern. The City's response to gang violence is not an invitation to administrative "add-on". It takes neither an army of bureaucrats nor an additional layer of city government to confront this seemingly intractable problem. Instead, it will take individuals who are skilled, experienced, political, and more than anything else, sensitive to the fact this is a serious problem that emerges from poverty and family disarray. Probably the most important outcome of the discussion around gang violence in Los Angeles is that we can work to save all the talent and life that could so tragically go to waste. The challenge is not to lose the urgency, or the knowledge, or the innovation—all required to ultimately resolve this issue.

Public discussion of gang violence and the need for comprehensive response are not enough. There must be specifics; a road map alone is not enough. Rather, we need a detailed itinerary, which translates to a strategic plan and a realistic guide to governance and accountability. There is already sentiment among many in the gang-prevention and intervention community that the report will emerge and it will only be business as usual.

Policy makers and practitioners will not and cannot revert to business as usual. Our communities have changed. What now remains to be accomplished, once the dust of public discourse and media attention has settled, is the building of a truly innovative response to a pernicious, ongoing problem. Without that, there is no strategy. Without that, there is no hope.

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND RESIDENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES

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In 2007, Los Angeles marked its fifteenth year since the 1992 riots, which followed the acquittal of four Los Angeles Police Department officers for the beating of Rodney King. Two major fault lines that preceded the 1992 riots in Los Angeles are worth monitoring as the city continues its transformation to an international metropolis: institutional neglect of the growing demographic and economic shifts in the city and the racial discord that grew as a result. This report addresses the demographic shifts in the city's leadership since the riots; Angelenos' attitudes toward the city, race relations, and the reappointment of the Chief of Police; and how participation in civic activities may minimize Angelenos' outlook on the city. It is based largely on survey data collected by The Leavey Center for the Study of Los Angeles in 1997 (Guerra, 1997), 2002 (Guerra & Marks, 2002; Marks, Baretto, & Woods, 2004), and 2007 (Guerra, Marks, Barreto, Nuño, Magnabosco, & Woods, 2007) that (a) follow up on perceptions of the city and the likelihood of another riot in Los Angeles and (b) provide some of the only longitudinally tracked perceptions of the city by residents of Los Angeles. Although this report describes great progress in the pre-riot indicators we mentioned, it also takes a cautious look at new fault lines that are shifting toward other issues, such as immigration, that may be just as destabilizing to the future of Los Angeles.

City Leadership

Although substantive representation is the central component of our democracy, it is important that leaders reflect a city's constituents in a manner in which the residents feel, with some level of confidence, that their needs are being effectively communicated and taken into account in policy making and the governance of everyday life. One measure of this is the ethnic composition of city leadership relative to its constituency. Since the 1992 riots, city leadership has undergone a transformation that reflects much of the demographic reality that has also transpired in Los Angeles. Los Angeles' top positions in government—mayor, controller, city attorney, and city council—are now represented by a new guard of leadership.

Latinos have had the most gains in positions of power, with Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa and City Attorney Rocky Delgadillo at the top of the leadership pyramid. Latinos make up one third of the Los Angeles City Council, roughly equivalent to the percentage of adult Latino citizens living in Los Angeles. Most notably, Latino leadership gains have so far not been the result of African American losses. Not one seat gained by a Latino was the result of a seat lost by an African American but, instead, seats lost by Jewish and other non-Hispanic white representatives.

FIGURE 1. ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF LOS ANGELES MAYOR, CONTROLLER, CITY ATTORNEY, AND CITY COUNCIL 1991–2007

Source: The Leavey Center for the Study of Los Angeles





FIGURE 2. DIRECTION OF LOS ANGELES: 1997, 2002 AND 2007

Source: The Leavey Center for the Study of Los Angeles: 1997, 2002 and 2007 L.A. Riots Resident Surveys



Sentiment About Los Angeles

The growing diversity of Los Angeles' leadership may help maintain a greater pulse on the sentiment of the city as a whole and help address issues before they become problems. For now, however, Angelenos have demonstrated a pattern of growing optimism about the city. Four notable questions on The Leavey Center for the Study of Los Angeles' follow-up surveys to the Los Angeles Riots in 1992 asked respondents to provide their assessment of the state of the city: direction of Los Angeles, direction of their neighborhood, race relations in the city, and the likelihood of another riot occurring in Los Angeles within the next 5 years.

Optimism about the city has grown significantly since 1997, from 32 percent to 42 percent. However, data also suggest that optimism has not grown since 2002, dropping from 47 percent in 2002 to 42 percent in 2007. Here, 39 percent of Angelenos showed some pessimism about the city; however, while that number is much lower than 48 percent measured in 1997, pessimism about the city seems to have grown appreciably since 2002.

In contrast to respondents' view of the city, their view of their own neighborhood remains on a positive trajectory. This is consistent with the unique characteristic of Los Angeles being a city of cities. The vast geography of Los Angeles allows its residents greater flexibility to choose a neighborhood that suits them best. Although there are obstacles to choosing the right neighborhood, such as housing market barriers, the variety of neighborhoods in Los Angeles gives residents some degree of choice. Not surprisingly, Angelenos are more positive about their neighborhoods than they are of the city in general.

Angelenos also feel there has been progress in race relations in the city since the riots. However, the percentage of respondents who felt that no progress has been made since 1992 is the same as it was in 1997, 5 years after the riots.

Consistent with these feelings, almost half of Angelenos believe that riots are likely within the next 5 years, and while this pessimism continues to decline, the pattern of greater pessimism over the last two surveys remains consistent in the 2007 survey.

In a multicultural society with such a high-profile contrast between different socioeconomic groups, Angelenos seem to be cautiously optimistic about the city. The vast opportunities Los Angeles provides are both a source for promise and for concern. The contrast between respondents' feelings about the City of Los Angeles and their own neighborhoods suggests that while people are more at ease with their immediate surroundings, the "Big City" is a source of looming anxiety. Consistent with this image of Los Angeles, often promoted in movies such as *Crash*, Angelenos can appreciate the difficulty of maintaining the peace. As the memory of the riots in 1992 drifts further away from our collec-

FIGURE 3. DIRECTION OF NEIGHBORHOOD: 1997, 2002 AND 2007

Source: The Leavey Center for the Study of Los Angeles: 1997, 2002 and 2007 L.A. Riots Resident Surveys




FIGURE 4. PROGRESS IN RACE RELATIONS IN LOS ANGELES BY ADULT ANGELENOS: 1997, 2002 AND 2007

Source: The Leavey Center for the Study of Los Angeles: 1997, 2002 and 2007 L.A. Riots Resident




FIGURE 5. LIKELIHOOD OF RIOTS IN NEXT 5 YEARS: 1997, 2002 AND 2007

Source: The Leavey Center for the Study of Los Angeles: 1997, 2002 and 2007 L.A. Riots Resident Surveys





FIGURE 6. SUPPORT FOR POLICE CHIEF REAPPOINTMENT/REHIRING BY ADULT ANGELENOS: 1997, 2002 AND 2007

Source: The Leavey Center for the Study of Los Angeles: 1997, 2002 and 2007 L.A. Riots Resident Surveys



tive conscience and the anxiety over the “Big City” remains, Angelenos are showing greater support for the Chief of Police.¹ Because of the recent absence of any large disruptions in the city at-large and the relative insulation Angelenos are able to provide for themselves, Chief William Bratton has enjoyed majority support through April 2007.


By historical comparison, Chief Bratton has received more support than both Chief Willie Williams in 1997 and Chief Bernard Parks in 2002. Most notably, there is considerably lower percentage of respondents who feel that Chief Bratton should not be reappointed. One area of concern, however, is that Chief Bratton’s support among African Americans and Latinos is much lower than white support for Bratton. However, even with lower support among minorities relative to non-Hispanic whites, a plurality of African Americans and Latinos support the reappointment of Chief Bratton (Guerra et al., 2007; McGreevy, April 13, 2007).

Civic Participation and the Future of Los Angeles

In general, Los Angeles seems to have made a remarkable recovery from the days of recession and riots in the early 1990s, but this is not to say that the state of Los Angeles is entirely without its pitfalls or challenges. There is greater need to promote civic participation, as demonstrated by the consistently low voter turnout in city elections and Angelenos’ dissatisfaction with the neighborhood council system established in 2002 (Guerra et al., 2007; Bartholomew, 2007). One example of the importance civic participation has for Los Angeles is in the area of neighborhood councils. Neighborhood councils were instated

FIGURE 7. FEELINGS ABOUT NEIGHBORHOOD COUNCILS AND LIKELIHOOD OF RIOTS IN 5 YEARS

Source: The Leavey Center for the Study of Los Angeles: 2007 L.A. Riots Resident Surveys



into the City Charter in 2002 as a system of deliberative bodies set up throughout Los Angeles to communicate the needs of the residents to their representatives. The Leavey Center’s 2007 L.A. Riots Survey (Guerra et al., 2007) suggested that the respondents’ outlook on Los Angeles is influenced by the perceptions they have on the effectiveness of their neighborhood council. Respondents’ answers to the question about the likelihood of riots in the next 5 years were cross-tabulated with their beliefs about whether the councils improved quality of life in their neighborhoods. In general, those who said that neighborhood councils improved the quality of life felt both less pessimistic and more optimistic about the likelihood of riots occurring in Los Angeles within the next 5 years.

Greater attention to ensuring the success of neighborhood councils could be a valuable source of civic connectedness that can both encourage a greater feeling of civic responsibility and help promote a better future of Los Angeles.

Even so, the future fault lines of Los Angeles may be more connected to an international concern rather than local ones. Immigration continues to dominate the political realm in the United States, and both proponents and opponents of an immigration policy seem to gain more from discussing what to do about the current system rather than taking action to do anything about it. Any compromise on immigration reform is likely to anger more constituents than please both sides. For now, Los Angeles must continue to absorb the demographic shifts and continue to wait for local, state, and federal governments to address the public policy issues at hand. This unfortunately places Los Angeles in the same precarious position it found itself in before the Rodney King

¹ It should be noted that the data that support this trend were collected by The Leavey Center as part of its 2007 L.A. Riots Resident Survey (Guerra et al., 2007) March-April 2007, before the MacArthur Park immigration demonstration incident on May 1, 2007.


incident in 1992. With a growing number of residents feeling as pessimistic about race relations today as they were 5 years after the riots in 1992, immigration may be the greatest concern of the near future. Most notably, while 60 percent of Angeleno adults desire an immigration policy that encourages a path to citizenship, a breakdown of this policy choice by ethnicity paints a concerning picture. In particular, a third of African Americans and a quarter of non-Hispanic whites responded that they prefer the strictest immigration policy that was offered to them in the survey—fencing the border (Guerra et al., 2007).

Conclusion

As debates over immigration rage on, and the public policy options that are available to deal with immigration drag behind with little institutional response, the large percentage of African Americans and non-Hispanic whites who desire a strict immigration policy is not likely to decrease in significance. This casts the leadership of Los Angeles into the role of addressing anxiety over immigration before it becomes a greater problem. Painstakingly, the May 1, 2007, immigration march incident at MacArthur Park—which ended with demonstrators, Latino families, and the media being dispersed by paramilitary officers armed with batons and the discharging of over a hundred rounds of rubber bullets—is not a good start. Such heavy responses by the LAPD can potentially lead to increased resentment between Latinos and the immigrant community and the city at large. The leadership of Los Angeles, now more diverse than ever, is presumably in a better position to understand the diverse feelings Angelenos have over this issue than the leadership that existed before the 1992 riots. Our leaders must work together to address the issue of immigration from a local standpoint instead of posturing over the issue from a national perspective. Los Angeles' ethnic leadership cannot afford to ignore the grievances of the African American community and the demands of those affected in the May 1, MacArthur Park incident. City Hall can also not afford to ignore the calls for strategies that can continue to reform the community policing practices of the Los Angeles Police Department. In his April 2007 address to the Los Angeles City Council regarding the decision to continue dialogue regarding the minority community's lower support for Police Chief Bratton, Councilmember Bernard Parks said, "If things should erupt in the city, we don't want people to say, we didn't know. I wasn't aware" (McGreevy, May 2, 2007). With the depth of city leadership now coming from multiple ethnic communities, ignorance of the issues will not be a valid excuse should another traumatic event, such as the 1992 riots, occur.

FIGURE 8. IMMIGRATION POLICY CHOICE OF LOS ANGELES ADULTS AND BY ETHNICITY

Source: The Leavey Center for the Study of Los Angeles: 2007 L.A. Riots Resident Surveys



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CITY OF THE ANGELS 2007: A POLITICAL SIDE

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As we took political stock of Los Angeles last year, several themes and issues emerged: the aftermath of the June primary elections in California and Los Angeles, the huge immigration marches in Los Angeles and other U.S. cities, continuing friction between Latinos and African Americans, and the then one-year incumbency of Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa.

This article, at mid-year 2007, explores several policy themes and issues relevant at the moment: recent immigration rights marches in the city, an overreaction by the Los Angeles Police Department that brings use of force policy and internal reform into question, the struggle over political control of the Los Angeles Unified School District and its schools, public safety largely in the context of gang violence, black-brown political competition and mayoral-city council dynamics.

Immigration Marches— The 2007 Version

Immigration rights marches again took place in the city, most recently on May 1, with far fewer people participating in this year's twin marches (organized by different leadership groups at different time periods of that day). The seemingly dwindling enthusiasm for the mega marches of last year in Los Angeles and other cities was the likely result of the great difficulty of keeping heightened states of enthusiasm and activism alive in a fledgling movement, lack of a specific enemy to focus on (Republicans lost control of both the House and Senate in the 2006 elections), absence of the immigration reform bill debated last year, which was widely perceived as draconian, and escalating immigration sweeps across the United States that have inspired fear in immigrant communities.

At other levels, high expectations by some observers and activists that last year's street mobilizations would translate into massive naturalization drives and related massive voter registration rolls were met with disappointment. This failure to act perhaps diminished the lure of "from the streets to the ballot" fervor associated with the demonstrations.

LAPD Actions and Fallout

What did prove most newsworthy about the 2007 immigrant rights marches in L.A., however, was the hostile, militarized reaction to the afternoon march by the elite Metro unit of the Los Angeles Police Department as the demonstration was winding down in MacArthur Park. The resulting firestorm of political unrest, multiple investigations, and metamorphosis of an immigration rights rally into an escalating civil rights rallying cry is only part of the political repercussion still unfolding.

Still, LAPD chief William Bratton easily attained a second 5-year appointment. Along with other top-tiered command personnel, including assistant chief Earl Paysinger, Bratton appeared to be successfully, if slowly, structurally distancing the LAPD from a long-troubled and overbearing community past. Civil rights lawyer and activist Connie Rice and hosts of stakeholders from different communities have been largely supportive of Bratton and the department's efforts over the previous few years of turning the historically militaristic and frequently abusive and unfriendly department of yore into a more community-friendly, collaborative public safety force. But as Rice has publicly stated, a titanic struggle continues to take place in the LAPD between the reformers, who are now in charge, and long-entrenched resisters, who are intent to wait them out.

The LAPD's handling of both the 2000 Democratic National Convention, particularly of peaceful protestors and gatherers, and the May 1, 2007, action against marchers and the media (harmed and trampled in a seemingly indiscriminate manner) threw into question the political timing of Bratton's reappointment and the degree to which the LAPD has changed and reformed its behavior. Furthermore, we cannot forget that the department remains under an extension of a 1999 federally mandated consent decree and federal oversight role coming out of the Rampart scandal of several years ago.

Bratton handled most of the social and political fallout resulting from the May 1 episode well, for example, by calling the use of police force unjustified and, apparently, in violation of LAPD policy, removing the top commander in charge while demoting the second in charge, launching internal investigations while publicly supporting an FBI investigation, initiating additional training/community oriented policing

sessions for his command structure, and appearing across the city at press conferences with the mayor and in community meetings and forums. He has taken hits, but they did not jeopardize his obtaining a second 5-year stint as chief, although the issue of LAPD's recent conduct has not yet run its course.

What impact has all this had on Mayor Villaraigosa? Although the timing of his highly publicized trip to El Salvador and Mexico (for public safety and economic development talks) was widely criticized after the May 1 fiasco for his being missing in action, he soothed over much of that emerging criticism by abruptly returning to L.A. in the midst of beginning talks with Mexican President Felipe Calderon and appearing to take charge of the controversy from the moment he landed at LAX. Of course, this was not the only issue to dominate much of the public discourse over the past 12 months. There has also been the battle over the control, accountability, and quality of the Los Angeles Unified School District.

Battles Over L.A.'s Schools

As many Angelenos well know, the mayor had made mayoral control, accountability, and better performance (read "reform") of schools in the Los Angeles Unified School District his primary policy mantra and mandate over his first 2 years. Although his effort to take direct control of the schools failed to pass state constitutional court muster in the form of AB 1381, he was wise not to further challenge decisions of lower and intermediate appellate courts against the bill. In fact, in light of the May 15th LAUSD Board runoff election victories for his candidates, the mayor, although not unscathed, is the primary winner in this political battle, albeit not to the degree he had originally envisioned.

Mayor Villaraigosa is broadly perceived to have "fought the good fight" over direct efforts to reform the massive school district, being denied direct control of the schools/district only by the courts. That is, he has a 4-3 majority of his backed candidates now on the school board; Superintendent Brewer has not had the time in his position to come into his own, let alone become a political force; and because the mayor is the major political force in the city and region, all political components of the district—the board, the superintendent, and the union (United Teachers of Los Angeles)—will try as never before to work with him over what he defines as a reform agenda. Of course, charter schools are an added dimension that works in the mayor's favor—smaller schools and classrooms, virtually no district control, diminished capacity of the union, and self-defined "reform" mantras. However, it is still too early to tell what all of this will mean in terms of "shared responsibilities," improved schools, and improved classroom performances in lowly performing schools.

The mayor and the city council are also hot on the trail of providing enhanced public safety for the many neighborhoods and communities most in need of such. Here policing and gang and youth violence intertwine with an austere city budget. What voters and residents of the city best like about the mayor, aside from his enormous energy and charisma, is that he appears to be everywhere, on every issue, and perpetually optimistic—all the time! Affordable housing, horrific traffic, air quality, economic development, green growth, schools, policing, and crime—whatever the issue, the mayor seems to always be in control and on top of it in typical "can do" style. However, there is another reality to consider.

Public Safety and Gangs— The Newer Policy Mantra

While the political honeymoon is still on with a large majority of voting Angelenos, to retain such a healthy majority, many feel the mayor must start achieving concrete results to make and rest his case, now and for the next stages of his political future. Perhaps this will come from improving performances in an expected cluster, or series thereof, of low-performing schools; perhaps it will also come through hiring and placing on the streets the 1000 additional cops, thereby reaching the 10,000 goal he has promised by 2009; and perhaps it will come through registering numerical drops in gang membership and gang and youth crimes and violence. He has defined gangs and youth violence as public enemy number one and, by extension, their reduction as his top policy priority for 2007. Thus, there is much at stake here for the community's, and the mayor's, well-being.

Gang injunctions, highly publicized listings of L.A.'s top gangs and gangsters, and proposed police and community service sweeps of gang-infested neighborhoods and communities seem to be the emerging recipe from City Hall. Nevertheless, these are also controversial and of dubious distinction of truly making a dent in gangs and making inner-city neighborhoods safer for the long haul. The Advancement Project's report on gangs, youth violence, and healthy communities, which was publicly unveiled this year under the leadership of Connie Rice and a number of well-qualified experts, underscored the structural, financial, and mental shifts that must take place to truly get at the problems of gangs and associated patterns of crime and violence in our midst.

Political will? Especially in an era of term limits, it is a precious commodity in rare supply. The report focuses on a system's challenge and approach—economic opportunity, jobs, more social services, better schools, more and better intervention services and, yes, better and more community-oriented policing. However, prevention, servicing, interven-

tion, and policing must take place in a unified policy and articulated environment—none alone and without the others.

Latinos and African Americans— Rising Tensions

Although there is little new to add about the relationship between these two racial-ethnic communities, it does seem that tensions and conflict have escalated between many Latinos and African Americans over the past year. There has been much media and community attention to a spate of violence in schools, senseless killings of innocent children, and hardened conflict among gangs in the streets, in jails and prisons, and perhaps elsewhere. This situation has also played out politically, on some occasions more than others.

The recent death of Representative Juanita Millender-McDonald threatened to be just such a case regarding the June special election to choose her successor in the 37th Congressional District. The front-runners were State Senator Jenny Oropeza (a Latina) and State Assembly member Laura Richardson (an African American). Although the district contains only a sliver of Los Angeles (Long Beach, Carson, and Compton, primarily), it was viewed as a harbinger of increasing black-brown political contests.

Leaders in both African American and Latino southland communities, and beyond, are breathing more easily in the wake of Richardson's primary victory. (In a strongly Democratic district, the winner of the primary is a shoo-in for the August runoff election.) Labor and Latino leadership played a role in Richardson's win. Maria Elena Durazo, the leader of the LA County Federation of Labor and California Assembly Speaker Fabian Nuñez were among the high profile Latinos supporting Richardson. Labor's efforts—in dollar, man/woman power, and endorsement support—proved huge.

The larger context is the changing demographic of political districts that have been long represented by African American elected officials, at all levels in and around Los Angeles, in which African Americans have been the predominant residential and voting population. Latinos now represent the majority resident population of many of these districts and are nearing parity in voter registration numbers with African Americans. This concern and, perhaps, fear played a strong role in the 2001 L.A. mayoral race, although not as strongly as in the 2005 race.

In Brief—The Mayor, His Personal Life, and the City Council

The city council recently approved the mayor's third consecutive budget without major changes or objections, after having unanimously passed a trash tax on consumers that had been favored by the mayor last year. Although there have been increasing notes and displays of Council frustration and anger with the mayor over the past year—over such issues as “sky-zoning,” economic development agreements and the vetoing of a settlement reached with an African American firefighter, among others—much of this is harnessed, given that Villaraigosa continues to be the predominant political figure in the city and region. Although few would refer to his standing with the council in the beginning of his third year as a honeymoon, wise politicians seldom choose to squabble with this powerful mayor, especially publicly, unless they are leaving office.

But to what degree has the mayor been politically wounded by his highly public separation from and impending divorce by his wife Corina and his equally high profile extramarital affair, remains to be seen. If damage does result, will various members of the council feel more emboldened to go against mayoral policy priorities? Only a bit of time will tell. Does the mayor still have a majority of consistent council votes for his most valued policy goals? Yes, but, as implied, not necessarily because he is beloved. It is more out of strategic political circumstance and, perhaps, necessity that make this a winning coalescence around the mayor's policy priorities. This is not the Tom Bradley coalition of support during that mayor's first three terms. Bradley, a humble public servant who had spent many years as a police officer and city council member before being elected as mayor in 1973, was truly liked by his council supporters. That he, like Villaraigosa, was also held in high esteem by large numbers of voters and residents, was a huge political value add on. But as long as Mayor Villaraigosa resuscitates his image and holds his strong public support, more intently directs his expected sights on the Sacramento Governor's office (before the White House), and as long as his political endorsement and fund-raising prowess are coveted, he'll have his majority coalescence on the city council, and beyond.

And election season is just around the corner. Really!

BIOGRAPHY

DR. DANIEL FLAMING has been president of the Economic Roundtable since 1991, when the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors unanimously endorsed converting the Roundtable into an independent research organization. Under his leadership the Roundtable has built a reputation for reliable, innovative research that is operationally relevant for the public sector. Dan has led more than 40 major research projects at the Roundtable that have illuminated critical changes in the regional economy and documented conditions of the working poor.

Dan received his Ph.D. in Urban Studies from USC, his Masters Degree in Urban Planning from UCLA, and his Bachelors Degree in Philosophy from Pomona College.

Dan has extensive practical experience in community social and economic analysis and urban social policy. He worked for Los Angeles County for over 20 years, beginning in delinquency prevention programs, then managing housing and community development programs, and concluding his county career directing job training and economic research programs.

DR. FERNANDO GUERRA serves as director for The Leavey Center and Associate Professor of Political Science and Chicano/a Studies at Loyola Marymount University. Dr. Guerra is a tenured Associate Professor of Political Science and has served as Chairman of the Chicano Studies Department, Director of the American Cultures program and Director of the Summer in Mexico program. He has been on the faculty at Loyola Marymount University since 1984 and served as Assistant to the President for Faculty Resources from 1992-96.

Dr. Guerra earned his Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Michigan, and his B.A. in International Relations, with a University Certificate in Latin American Studies, from the University of Southern California in 1980. Dr. Guerra was born and raised in the Northeast section of Los Angeles where he attended Franklin High School. He is currently a resident of Westchester, a community in the City of Los Angeles.

Dr. Guerra has written numerous scholarly articles and has also contributed to popular publications. His area of scholarly work is in state and local governance and urban and ethnic politics. He is currently working on a book on the political empowerment of Latinos in California.

Dr. Guerra has also served as a source for the mass media. He has been quoted in approximately 500 news stories by over twenty publications including the *Los Angeles Times*, *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *La Opinión*, *Chicago Tribune*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Time Magazine*, *Newsweek*, *Business Week*, *The Economist* and media outlets in Eu-

rope, Latin America, and Asia. He has appeared on CNN, NBC's *Today Show*, *CBS Evening News with Dan Rather*, Fox National News and numerous local television news/public affairs shows, including *Life and Times*, where he also served as an occasional co-host.

Dr. Guerra serves as a Gubernatorial appointee to the California Historical Resources Commission and previously served on the Blue Ribbon Committee on the Marine Life Protection Act. Locally, he served as a Mayoral appointee to the Board of Transportation Commission and on the Board of Rent Adjustment Commission for the City of Los Angeles. He served on the Racial Harmony and Ethnic Discourse Committee for a "Rebuild L.A." Task Force and on advisory committees for community and governmental organizations such as the Air Quality Management District's Ethnic Community Advisory Committee and a similar committee for the Los Angeles County Transportation Commission. He was also selected as a stakeholder for the Latino community in the State's Growth Management Consensus Project. Dr. Guerra has served as a board member of various non-profit organizations in Los Angeles and has been an active member of professional organizations, such as the American Political Science Association, the Western Political Science Association, and the National Association for Chicano Studies. He has served on the Executive Council of the WPSA and the Executive Council of the Urban Section of the APSA as well as serving on other APSA committees. Dr. Guerra has delivered public lectures at Harvard University, Stanford University, U.C. Berkeley, USC, UCLA and other universities.

DR. JORJA LEAP has been a member of the faculty of the Department of Social Welfare since 1992. She also currently teaches in the UCLA Graduate School of Education and Information Science. In addition to her university endeavors, Dr. Leap has served as a lecturer and consultant in both the private and public sectors, including ongoing work with the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services, the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health, the Los Angeles Mayor's Criminal Justice Office, the Los Angeles Unified School District, and the Los Angeles Police Department. As a recognized expert in crisis intervention and trauma response, she has worked nationally and internationally in violent and post-war settings, focusing on issues of change, conflict, attachment and loss. Dr. Leap serves as an expert reviewer for the National Institute of Justice. In addition, she is part of a team selected by the Los Angeles City Council Ad Hoc Committee on Gangs to recommend policy and program changes in gang prevention and intervention. Dr. Leap is involved with training and research for the United

Nations/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe focusing on post-war development, change management and conflict resolution. She also continues to work with the families of victims of the 9/11 WTC disaster. Her current research and teaching focuses on Gang Violence and Youth Development; the Planning, Implementation and Evaluation of Gang Prevention and Intervention Programs. She is completing an evaluation of the Community in Schools Gang Intervention Project in conjunction with LA Bridges. In addition, Dr. Leap is currently the Co-PI on a three year grant from the Department of Justice evaluating a Safe Schools and Healthy Students Program in the ABC Unified School District. Dr. Leap is the author of "No One Knows Their Names: Screenwriters in Hollywood" and is currently at work on her second book.

Jorja Leap was born and raised in Los Angeles. She completed her B.A. in Sociology, her M.S.W., and her Ph.D. in Psychological Anthropology, all at UCLA. After three years on the faculty of the University of Southern California School of Social Work, she moved to the UCLA faculty. Dr. Leap is married to LAPD Deputy Chief Mark Leap. They have a daughter, Shannon.

Dr. Leap currently serves as the policy advisor on gangs and youth violence for Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa.

DR. JACQUELINE LEAVITT is Professor in the School of Public Affairs, the UCLA Department of Urban Planning where she is also Director of the UCLA Community Scholars Program. She writes, lectures, and teaches about housing and community development. Among her recent work is an article on community benefits agreements in Los Angeles and the origins and history of the Community Scholars Program. She is co-author of *From Abandonment to Hope: Community-Households in Harlem* and co-editor of *The Hidden History of Housing Cooperatives*. Dr. Leavitt was a pioneer in research about gender and community development. Her earliest work looked at the intersection of design and housing; more recently her research focuses on labor and community development; she is co-author of the first study on taxi workers in the City of Los Angeles.

MR. STEPHEN A. NUÑO serves as research associate for The Leavey Center and is a Doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of California at Irvine. Prior to joining the Leavey Center in December 2006 as Research Associate, Mr. Nuño was Research Consultant and Scholar with the Leavey Center for almost two years. He was co-researcher and project director for the Center's 2005 Los Angeles Mayoral Election Exit Poll, participated in the development of the Latino Coalition's surveys, was co-researcher on the 2006 New American Exit Poll in Los Angeles (a three-city project between academic institutions and community or-

ganizations) and conducted secondary analyses using Center data. As Research Associate, Mr. Nuño continues to conduct data analyses using Center data, and collaborate with other colleagues, to write peer-reviewed published articles. He is co-researcher for the Center's Los Angeles Riots: A 15 Year Retrospective and Leadership Initiative projects. Mr. Nuño has served as a private consultant on several research projects focusing on Latino political behavior for several organizations.

Mr. Nuño is also a Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, finishing his dissertation. In this project he is using a multi-method approach to examine the interactive effect between partisanship and ethnicity on partisan efforts to mobilize Latinos. He conducted his own 2006 Congressional Election Exit Poll in Orange County as part of this project. Mr. Nuño has published several articles, including "Controversies in Exit Polling: Implementing a Racially Stratified Homogenous Precinct Approach", in *Political Science & Politics*. His article in *American Politics Research*, "Latino Mobilization and Vote Choice in the 2000 Presidential Election", uses multivariate statistical analysis to determine whether or not Latinos who were contacted by Democrats and Republicans were more likely to vote for Al Gore and George W. Bush. He is a member of several academic and professional groups that focus on ethnic politics, including the American Political Science Association's Latino Caucus, the Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity and Race, and the Politics of Race, Immigration and Ethnicity Colloquium. A proud native of Los Angeles, Mr. Nuño is a graduate of Loyola High School and UCLA where he earned a B.A. in Political Science.

DR. MANUEL PASTOR is Professor of Geography and American Studies and Ethnicity at the University of Southern California. Founding Director of the Center for Justice, Tolerance, and Community at the University of California, Santa Cruz, he has received grants and fellowships from the Irvine Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the National Science Foundation, the Hewlett Foundation, the Kellogg Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, and many others.

Dr. Pastor's most recent book, co-authored with Chris Benner, and Laura Leete entitled *Staircases or Treadmills: Labor Market Intermediaries and Economic Opportunity in a Changing Economy* (Russell Sage, 2007). He co-authored with Angela Glover Blackwell and Stewart Kwoh, a book entitled *Searching for the Uncommon Common Ground: New Dimensions on Race in America* (W.W. Norton, 2002). He also co-authored with Peter Dreier, Eugene Grigsby, and Marta Lopez-Garza *Regions That Work: How Cities and Suburbs Can Grow Together* (University of Minnesota Press, 2000), a book that has become a reference for those seeking to better link community and regional development.

Dr. Pastor speaks frequently on issues of demographic change, economic inequality, and community empowerment and has contributed opinion pieces to such outlets as the Los Angeles Times, the San Jose Mercury News, and the Christian Science Monitor. He served as a member of the Commission on Regions appointed by California's Speaker of the State Assembly, and in January 2002 was awarded a Civic Entrepreneur of the Year award from the California Center for Regional Leadership.

DR. JAIME A. REGALADO has served as Executive Director of the Edmund G. "Pat" Brown Institute of Public Affairs since 1991.

Under Dr. Regalado's leadership and guidance the Pat Brown Institute (PBI) has become a widely recognized non-partisan public policy center committed to organizing and participating in policy debates, collaborating on community driven issues, conducting timely public policy research, and facilitating educational opportunities for diverse communities. The PBI is located at California State University, Los Angeles, where Dr. Regalado is also Professor of Political Science.

Born and raised in Los Angeles, he received undergraduate and master degrees in political science from California State University, Los Angeles, in 1971 and 1973 respectively. He received a doctorate in political science from the University of California, Riverside, in 1980.


Dr. Regalado has fashioned an impressive array of interactive and multi-sector relationships in the projects and programs he has created, directed, and overseen. These relations include collaborations and part-

nerships with state and local governments, universities and K-12 schools, non-profit and community organizations, businesses and foundations, law enforcement agencies, and organized labor.

Dr. Regalado frequently serves as a featured speaker and conference panelist. The media regularly interview him for his views on a variety of public policy issues as well as on the actual or potential impact of such issues on the region, state, and nation. He has published in the areas of inter-community coalition building, political incorporation, multi-sector collaboration, economic development policymaking, and voting rights/political access.

He is founding editor of the annual policy journal, *California Politics & Policy*, co-editor of *California Policy Issues Annual*, and previously served as associate editor of *Urban Affairs Review*.

DR. JAMES L. SADD is Professor of Environmental Science at Occidental College in Los Angeles. His research interests include using Geographic Information Systems and spatial analysis to address questions of environmental justice. Over the past decade, he has coauthored numerous studies related to environmental and health in California, primarily with research collaborators Dr. Manuel Pastor, Jr. of University of Southern California and Dr. Rachel Morello-Frosch of University of California, Berkeley. This work has received financial support from The California Endowment, Liberty Hill Foundation, California Air Resources Board and California Energy Commission, San Francisco Foundation, and California Wellness Foundation.



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