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SALT I REVISITED: OLD ARGUMENTS RAISED ANEW

INTRODUCTION

At a time when public interest in SALT is beginning to build in intensity in anticipation of the formal signing of the new American-Soviet arms limitation agreements, it is worthwhile to place SALT II into some perspective by recalling some pertinent aspects of the SALT I campaign. Many of the arguments used by the Nixon Administration to sell SALT I to the Senate are being used again by the Carter Administration, now that a new set of agreements is ready for signing. Recalling some of these SALT I arguments is thus not a mere exercise in history, but instead a method by which one can attempt to make some order out of the mass of contradictory claims for and against SALT II. Indeed, one does not have to believe Santayana's oft-quoted dictum about the past in order to realize that the confidence one places in familiar arguments should, in part, be contingent upon how accurately these arguments were borne out the last time they were used.

During the summer of 1972, Nixon Administration spokesmen such as Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and presidential National Security Affairs adviser Henry Kissinger furnished a sizeable number of reasons why the first SALT agreements were beneficial to the United States and therefore worthy of ratification. Enough time has passed in the seven years since that summer to enable one to judge the reliability of those pro-SALT arguments. Unfortunately, the intervening years have not been kind to them. Far too many of these arguments have been shown to have been nothing more than optimistic sentiments. There is no doubt that these Nixon

Administration spokesmen wanted the SALT I agreements to curtail the dangerous Soviet strategic buildup. They may even have expected the agreements to have this effect, but such designs did not determine subsequent events. It is now apparent that far from being constrained by SALT I, the Soviet Union used the agreements as instruments for legitimizing the strategic buildup already initiated.

Now that the culmination of the SALT II negotiations is at hand and the Carter Administration is attempting to encourage ratification of the new agreements using many of the very same arguments used seven years ago, it is only proper to recall how accurate these arguments were the first time around. Four major arguments, common to both the SALT I campaign of 1972 and the SALT II campaign of 1979, are worthy of being discussed here. These arguments are: 1) that because both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have a mutual understanding of the dangers of nuclear war, they also share a similar desire to uphold the provisions of the SALT agreements; 2) that the SALT agreements will have the effect of slowing Soviet strategic weapons momentum; 3) that even though the SALT agreements do not solve all the United States' strategic problems they should be ratified, because other things will serve to alleviate these problems; and 4) that the Soviets will not dare to violate the agreements because this would damage detente. They are by no means all of the arguments that were used then and are being used now, but they are certainly representative of the gamut of the arguments used by both the Nixon and Carter Administrations.

SOVIET AND AMERICAN MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON SALT

Those who supported the initial SALT agreements argued that they were indicative of a mutual understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union that the threat of nuclear war endangers the survival of both countries. Therefore, they noted, the two countries had a similar desire to uphold the provisions of the agreements.

This argument goes to the bedrock of the strategic arms limitation philosophy: the spectre of nuclear war is equally threatening to both sides. In 1972, Administration spokesmen were convinced that the legal documents of SALT I were expressive of a deeper understanding between the two powers that mutual restraint in both strategic deployment and international conduct was beneficial. Secretary of State William Rogers expressed it in this way to a Senate committee in June 1972:

> This "Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" signed at the Moscow Summit expresses important objectives

> and attitudes shared by the two sides. The SALT agreements are concrete measures reflecting such common objectives and attitudes. It is fair to say that one effect of the former document is to symbolize the intent of both parties to carry out the SALT agreement in good faith.[1]

Earlier, at a White House congressional briefing, presidential adviser Henry Kissinger had said: "/T/he SALT agreement does not stand alone, isolated and incongruous in the relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any moment to the shock of some sudden crisis. It stands, rather, linked organically, to a chain of agreements and to a broad understanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age."[2]

This argument is being heard again seven years later. President Carter pays homage to it in his public speeches on SALT II. For example, in March of this year the President said: "SALT II is not based on sentiment; it's based on self-interest--of the United States and of the Soviet Union. Both nations share a powerful common interest in reducing the threat of nuclear war."[3] And again, in April, he noted: "It is clear that the United States of America and the Soviet Union will be in competition as far ahead as we can imagine or see. Yet we have a common interest in survival and we share a common recognition that our survival depends in a real sense on each other."[4]

The President's argument is echoed by his Defense Secretary, Harold Brown, who noted in January 1979: "Both sides understand that restraint is especially important where nuclear forces are concerned."[5] These statements all affirm the ideas that the

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1. Answer for the record from Secretary of State William Rogers; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Treaty Between The United States of America And The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Limitation of AntiBallistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) And The Interim Agreement Between The United States of America And The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics On Certain Measures With Respect To The Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), Including An Associated Protocol, Signed in Moscow On May 26, 1972, And S. J. Res. 241 And S.J. Res. 242.: Hearings, 1972; p. 52.

2. Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, White House congressional briefing on SALT I, June 15, 1972; reprinted in Senate Committee on Armed Services, Military Implications Of The Interim Agreement on Limitations Of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems And The Interim Agreement on Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms: Hearing, 1972; p. 118.

3. President Jimmy Carter, State of the Union Address, January 23, 1979; reprinted in Selected Statements (Department of Defense), March 1, 1979, p. 2.

4. President Jimmy Carter, speech to the American Newspaper Publishers Association, April 25, 1979; reprinted in the New York Times, April 26, 1979, p. 16.

5. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Report to the Congress on the FY 1980 Budget, FY 1981 Authorization Request and FY 1980-84 Defense Programs; reprinted in Selected Statements (Department of Defense), March 1, 1979, p. 3.

Soviet Union sees the dangers of nuclear war exactly as the United States does and that, as a result, the U.S.S.R. will show restraint in its strategic deployment decisions.

Such was certainly not the case following the ratification of SALT I. Just how little the Soviets shared the U.S. conception of necessary strategic restraint was shown in 1974. At the time of the signing in 1972, one of the issues that the United States' negotiators had believed to be settled was the question of what were light and heavy ICBM's. Article II of the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Offensive Arms had been drafted in an attempt to prohibit the substitution in existing silos of heavy /large volume/ ICBM's for light /small volume/ ICBM's.[6] Kissinger commented on this point in his June 15, 1972, White House briefing on SALT. He said: "There is also a prohibition on conversion of light ICBM's into heavy missiles. These provisions are buttressed by verifiable provisions and criteria, specifically the prohibition against any significant enlargement of missile silos."[7]

Unfortunately, the prohibition against any significant enlargement of missile silos did not protect against significant enlargement of missile volume--the real crux of the matter. The U.S. SALT delegation had proposed during the negotiations that the dividing line between light and heavy missiles be set at a volume of 79 cubic meters. This proposal was rejected by the Soviets, who argued that there was no need to provide such a definition, since both sides "knew what was meant by 'heavy' and 'light' and could distinguish between these two classes."[8]

Eventually the United States delegation issued a unilateral statement that it would consider any ICBM significantly greater in volume than the largest current light ICBM then operational on either side (then the SS-11 for the Soviets) to be a heavy ICBM. At the time of the signing, American negotiators believed that both sides accepted this general definition. After all, any significant upgrading from light to heavy missiles would constitute a direct refutation of the intentions behind the negotiations on heavy ICBM's and would therefore violate the spirit of SALT I. In 1974, however, the Soviet Union began deploying a new missile as a replacement for the SS-11 ICBM. This

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6. For discussion of the American negotiating position on heavy missiles, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart And Winston, 1973), pp. 177-178.

7. National Security Affairs Adviser Henry Kissinger, White House briefing on SALT I, June 15, 1972; reprinted in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, SALT Hearings, p. 399.

8. Chief SALT negotiator Gerard Smith; Senate Armed Services Committee, SALT Hearings, p. 363.

new missile--the SS-19--proved to be significantly greater in size than the missile it was replacing--more than sixty percent larger in volume, vastly in excess of the light ICBM category. American hopes of Soviet strategic restraint were dashed. Ironically, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's new SALT II Glossary of Terms defines the SS-19 ICBM as the heaviest of the existing light ICBM's. Meanwhile, in regard to the SALT II agreements, concern has shifted to the issue of "significant" cheating.

SLOWING THE SOVIET STRATEGIC BUILDUP

Supporters of SALT I argued the SALT agreements would have the effect of slowing down the momentum of the Soviet strategic weapons buildup.

This argument is one of the more potent arguments for the SALT agreements since it promises a decrease in Soviet strategic weapons activity. Its main weakness, however, is that its proof is based entirely on American supposition. In June 1972, John S. Foster, Jr., the Defense Department's Director of Research and Engineering (DDR&E), used this argument in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. He remarked: "We believe that the limit on force size will probably slow or interrupt their rate of capability development because further advances in capability must now await completion of development of more technologically advanced hardware."[9] Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird told the same committee: "We have applied brakes to the momentum of Soviet strategic missile deployments...."[10]

Nixon Administration spokesmen were certain in 1972 that the projected Soviet slowdown would keep the U.S.S.R. from rapidly MIRVing their missile forces. In an interesting exchange with Senator Henry Jackson, Lieutenant General Royal Allison, a member of the SALT I delegation, predicted: "It would be my estimate, however, my speculation, that they would not develop and deploy MIRV's on all their SS-9's and deploy new systems with the precise accuracies I think are inherent in your question, sir."[11] And chief SALT negotiator Gerard Smith, speaking about future Soviet ICBM capabilities, noted: "I do not see there is any possibility [in the next five years--the life of the Interim

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9. DDR&E Director John Foster; Ibid., p. 232

10. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird; Ibid., p. 4.

11. Lieutenant General Royal Allison; Ibid., p. 333.

Agreement on Offensive Strategic Weapons that they are going to have anything like 95-percent kill capability of U.S. ICBM's."[12]

Now, in 1979, the Carter Administration is claiming that the SALT II agreements will have the effect of slowing Soviet weapons development momentum. As President Carter told the American Newspaper Publishers Association in April of this year: "The SALT II agreement will slow the growth of Soviet arms and limit the strategic competition...."[13] Similarly, Defense Secretary Brown informed the Council on Foreign Relations: "We have broken significant new ground in the qualitative area by limits on numbers of re-entry vehicles on each type of ICBM (and SLBM) and by allowing each side only one new type of ICBM."[14]

This second argument, used so effectively in the 1972 Senate hearings on SALT I, was shown to be inaccurate only two years later. Soviet strategic weapons momentum was apparently slowed not a bit by SALT I, since in 1974 the U.S.S.R. began deploying the first of a series of four fourth-generation ICBM's, three of this series equipped with MIRV. And the Soviet momentum has continued to this day. Secretary Brown was forced to conclude in his FY 1980 Report to Congress: "The Soviets have a fifth generation of ICBM's, consisting of four missiles--some of which are probably modifications of existing ones--in development."[15]

SALT AND THE U.S. STRATEGIC PROBLEM

In 1972, Administration spokesmen argued that even though the SALT agreements did not solve certain major strategic problems for the United States (i.e., the increasing vulnerability of U.S. ICBM's), the agreements were acceptable because: 1) the United States would continue to develop and deploy new strategic forces which would maintain deterrence with the Soviet Union despite the SALT agreements' shortcomings; and 2) the present set of agreements would be followed by a new set of agreements which would solve the strategic disparities left unresolved by the last SALT agreements.

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12. Chief SALT Negotiator Gerard Smith; Ibid., p. 417.

13. President Jimmy Carter; the New York Times, April 26, 1979, p. 16.

14. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, "SALT II and the National Defense," speech to the Council on Foreign Relations and the Foreign Policy Association, April 5, 1979; reprinted in "SALT II: Two Views," Current Policy (Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State), No. 62 (April 1979), p. 10.

15. Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown To The Congress On The FY 1980 Budget, FY 1981 Authorization Request And FY 1980-1984 Defense Programs, January 25, 1979, p. 72.

This argument gathers its force through promising compensatory activity outside of the SALT agreements themselves. Its weaknesss lies in the fact that the delivery of the promised compensatory activity is contingent upon factors that lie outside of the Administration's control. For example, the compensatory weapons programs supported by a particular Administration may not receive congressional approval or may be dropped by a new Administration. In addition, the promised new SALT agreements may not materialize or may not correct the previous agreements' flaws.

Despite this inherent weakness, the Nixon Administration used this argument in selling SALT I to the Senate. In regard to the first point of the argument, Secretary Laird informed the Senate Armed Services Committee:

> I believe that we will have an adequate deterrent at the end of the 5-year /Interim Agreement/ period if the programs that we have recommended to this committee, which have been approved by the President, are approved by the Congress.
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> ...
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> But I want to emphasize that under the agreements, we can and we must continue those prudent development measures, such as the Trident, formerly the ULMS program; the B-1; and Site Defense. Such measures are necessary to maintain a realistic strategic deterrent.[16]

Addressing the second point of this argument, DDR&E Director John Foster told the Senate Armed Services Committee: "While we can defer immediate action on a solution to the Minuteman survivability problem, it must not be ignored. First, we will, in the follow-on negotiations, seek a solution to this and other issues that SALT I did not resolve."[17] And SALT negotiator Paul Nitze remarked: "/There should be opportunities in the negotiation of the follow-on treaty on offensive weapons to reduce the threat to Minuteman survivability..../The major thing to negotiate with the Soviets would be/...a reduction in the throw weight of fixed, land-based missiles, particularly--... a phased reduction...of large throw weight missiles because those are the ones that are destabilizing."[18]

Now that SALT II is ready to be signed, this same argument arises from the Carter Administration. The President addressed the first point of this argument in February of this year, in a speech at the Georgia Institute of Technology: "The agreement will also permit us and our allies to pursue all the defense

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16. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird; Senate Armed Services Committee, SALT Hearings, pp. 171 and 4, respectively.

17. DDR&E Director John Foster; Ibid., p. 221

18. SALT Negotiator Paul Nitze, extracted from a question and answer exchange with Senator Henry Jackson; Ibid., p. 393.

programs that we believe might eventually be needed...."[19] And in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations in April, Secretary Brown remarked: "SALT will not solve all our problems. Even with SALT we will need, and we will be permitted, to expand our strategic nuclear efforts above their present levels....We can develop, test and deploy each of our planned programs--cruise missiles, Trident, MX--in the fashion, and on the schedule, that we have planned." [20]

In regard to the second point of the argument, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance informed members of the Royal Institute for International Affairs last December: "The emerging SALT Two agreement will not solve all our problems. It will not, for example, reverse the trend toward increased vulnerability of fixed, land-based missiles, a problem in the long run for both sides....In SALT Three we will work for further reductions and qualitative limits."[21] This point was reaffirmed by Secretary Brown in a statement in the FY 1980 Report to Congress. It read: "In the Joint Statement of Principles to guide SALT III, the two sides have agreed to seek further reductions in the ceilings of SALT II, further qualitative limitations on strategic systems, stengthened verification, and resolution of the issues temporarily covered by the Protocol." [22]

In the years following ratification of SALT I, the hollowness of this third argument was revealed. When Defense Secretary Laird had pledged in 1972 that the United States would be able to maintain an adequate deterrent under SALT I, he was counting on the new strategic weapons programs to continue. But by the time that the Interim Agreement ran out in 1977, only one of the three programs that he had specifically mentioned in his testimony (Trident) was still viable. Interestingly, it was the Carter Administration that killed the B-1 bomber program.

The second point of the argument was proven equally inaccurate during the course of the SALT II negotiations. The reduction in threat to Minuteman that was so urgently hoped for in 1972 did not develop out of the second set of strategic arms limitation talks. In vain, the United States attempted over the course of the SALT II negotiations to convince the Soviet Union to cut back

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19. President Jimmy Carter, Remarks at a Special Convocation of the Georgia Institute of Technology, February 20, 1979; reprinted in Selected Statements (Department of Defense), March 1, 1979, p. 10.

20. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, "SALT II and the National Defense," p. 10.

21. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Address before the Royal Institute for International Affairs,London,December 9, 1978; reprinted in Selected Statements (Department of Defense), March 1, 1979, p. 1.

22. Report of Secretary Brown to Congress on The FY 1980 Budget, p. 40.

on its force of heavy ICBM's, which threatened the survivability of Minuteman. Eventually, the U.S. dropped its attempts, as the Soviets continued to reject any such proposals.

LINKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND DETENTE

Those who supported the first SALT agreements argued that the Soviet Union would not attempt to violate the agreements, because if its violations were detected, the United States would be forced to withdraw from the agreements and that would produce an effect that could possibly even damage the whole range of Soviet-American political relationships.

Essentially, this argument rests upon the assumption that SALT and detente itself are of far more importance to the Soviet Union than they are to the United States--that the threat of American withdrawal from its special relationship with the Soviet Union has the necessary leverage to keep the Soviets "honest." Even if this were true (and one can assume for the purposes of argument that such is the case), the credibility of the threat is contingent upon the Soviets' perception of the strength of our commitment to it. No doubt they understand that an American Administration interested enough in strategic arms limitation to make the negotiating initiatives (as both the Nixon Administration in the early 1970s and the Carter Administration today have done), is an Administration little inclined to overturn an established SALT treaty for what can be rationalized as "minor violations."

In 1972, Henry Kissinger was the Nixon Administration spokesman who most eloquently postulated this particular argument. During the course of the White House press briefing on SALT in June 1972, Dr. Kissinger proclaimed:

> If it turns out that through legalistic interpretations of provisions of the agreement or through failing to specify numbers about which we have left absolutely no doubt as to our interpretation..., if it should turn out that those numbers are being challenged in any significant way at all, then this would cast a doubt. It would not only threaten disagreement but it would threaten the whole basis of this new relationship I have described.[23]

This was echoed by his statement at the White House congressional briefing that same day. He noted: "/I/t can be said with some

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23. National Security Affairs Adviser Henry Kissinger, White House press briefing on SALT I, June 15, 1972; reprinted in Senate Armed Services Committee, SALT Hearings, p. 128.

assurance that any country which contemplates a rupture of the agreement or a circumvention of its letter and spirit must now face the fact that it will be placing in jeopardy not only a limited arms control agreement, but a broad political relationship." [24]

Seven years after this strongly-proclaimed argument was enunciated by Henry Kissinger, we hear it being resurrected by President Carter. Carter remarked at his April 30, 1979 press conference:

> But there is an element of rationality and stability because the Soviets know that if we ever detect any violation of the SALT agreement, that that would be a basis on which to reject the treaty in its entirety. There would be a possible termination of the good relationship between our country and the Soviet Union on which detente is based, and it might very well escalate into a nuclear confrontation. So the consequences would be very severe.... [25]

Strong assertions have a way of being mellowed by time and circumstance into weak rejoinders. Such was the case with this fourth argument in the months that followed Senate ratification of SALT I. At the time of the Senate hearings on SALT I, the Nixon Administration spokesmen were putting forth several circumstances which would be possible grounds for U.S. withdrawal from one or all of the SALT agreements: 1) if the Soviets violated the letter (numerical limits) of the agreements; 2) if the Soviets, while maintaining the strict letter of the agreements, seriously violated the spirit of the agreements; and 3) if a new SALT agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms was not secured during the five-year period of the Interim Agreement.

It is now publicly known that the Soviets violated both the letter and the spirit of the SALT I agreements on a number of occasions between 1973 and 1978. Among other things, the Soviets: 1) deliberately concealed strategic weapons activity (a violation of Article V of the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms); 2) deployed ICBM's significantly larger in volume than the largest light ICBM's, as replacements for light ICBM's (a violation of the spirit of Article II of the Interim Agreement and a direct refutation of the American unilateral statement on heavy missiles); 3) tested an air defense system radar in an ABM mode (a violation of Article VI of the Treaty on

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24. Ibid., p. 118.

25. "Transcript of President's News Conference," The New York Times, May 1, 1979, p. 18.

Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems); and 4) inaccurately reported that they had dismantled excess ABM launchers in accordance with the provisions of agreed procedures, when such procedures had not been fully followed (a violation of Article VIII of the ABM Treaty). [26]

Although the United States did raise questions about these violations with the Standing Consultative Commission (established under Article XIII of the ABM Treaty to consider questions of compliance with the SALT agreements), in every case it subsequently acted to downplay or ignore the consequences of these Soviet violations. As just one example, after the United States monitored the increased Soviet strategic weapons program concealment activity in 1974, it merely discussed the matter with Soviets in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and then decided to consider the matter closed for the time being.

In regard to this particular series of violations, the State Department report on SALT I compliance, given to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, implied that because these Soviet concealment activities did not prevent U.S. verification of compliance with the SALT agreements, they did not constitute a violation of the agreements. Since Article V of the Interim Agreement clearly states that both parties undertake "not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement," the implication that because a deliberate attempt at concealment was foiled by the other party it did not constitute a violation is nothing but a legal fiction. An armed robber is not declared innocent just because he was apprehended by the police during the commission of the crime.

This same State Department report ended its discussion of this matter by noting: "In early 1975, careful analysis of intelligence information on activities in the U.S.S.R. led the U.S. to conclude that there no longer appeared to be an expanding pattern of concealment activities associated with strategic weapons programs. We continue to monitor Soviet activity in this area closely." [27] Because of their ability to make selective interpretations of exactly what constituted violations of the SALT agreements, the Nixon and Ford Administrations were able to avoid openly declaring that the Soviets had violated SALT I. This, in turn enabled them to avoid the threatened withdrawal from SALT.

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26. See "Compliance With The Salt I Agreements," Department of State, February 21, 1978; printed in the Congressional Record, February 28, 1978, pp. S2553-S2556; and John G. Behuncik, "Examining SALT Violations and the Problems of Verification," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 60, June 6, 1978.

27. "Compliance With The SALT I Agreements," p. S2554.

Interestingly enough, the Carter Administration has continued to support the fiction of Soviet compliance with SALT, arguing that any violations were either ambiguous in nature or unproven. So, for example, Defense Secretary Brown could say in his FY 1980 Annual Report to Congress:

> In the years since SALT I was signed, the United States has raised with the Soviets in the SCC a number of unusual or ambiguous activities that were, or could become, grounds for more serious concern....in every case we raised, either the activity ceased or we obtained an acceptable explanation of it from the Soviets.[28]

And Matthew Nimetz, Counselor for the State Department, could claim in a speech:

> The fact is the United States has never had occasion to determine that the Soviet Union was not in compliance with the provisions of SALT ONE. A joint U.S.-Soviet commission--the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)--was established in Geneva to deal with questions affecting SALT. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have raised matters in the SCC of concern about the operation of the agreement, but these issues have been resolved to our satisfaction.[29]

If the American yardstick used to measure Soviet violations of SALT continues to remain as flexible as it was in SALT I, it is going to be hard to imagine the Carter Administration being able to verify a significant violation of the SALT II agreements.

CONCLUSION

The above arguments are only a portion of the ones currently being used by Carter Administration spokesmen to justify ratification of the SALT II agreements. The value of singling out these four arguments for discussion is that it enables one to put much of the SALT discussion into perspective. The fact remains that these arguments were used in 1972 to sell SALT I to the Senate and, having been used, were proven in time to be inaccurate.

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28. Report Of Secretary Brown To Congress On The FY 1980 Budget, p. 42.

29. Matthew Nimetz, "American Security and SALT," speech at Franklin College, Franklin, Indiana, November 29, 1978; reprinted in Current Policy (Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State), No. 50 (December 1978), p. 3.

Of course, many elements must be considered in making a fruitful evaluation of the present SALT agreements, and the foregoing study of the historical legacy of the SALT I arguments is but one of these. Calm and careful consideration is vitally necessary in the process of determining the worth of such a lengthy and complex set of agreements. No one element should be allowed to hold an inordinate sway over one's judgement on SALT II. Yet it can be safely said that the perspective provided by the history of SALT I has a distinct value in the current debate. This time around, one's faith in the SALT agreements should be based on more than just the vague hope that the Administration's arguments will be proven reliable.

Jeffrey G. Barlow
Policy Analyst