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## MOSCOW'S U.N. OUTPOST

While Washington seems unable to make the United Nations serve its own interests, the USSR has no such problem. Moscow has turned the U.N. into a valuable outpost. The Soviet Union counts on majority support for almost all of its policies, since some one hundred so-called nonaligned nations vote alongside the Soviets 84.9 percent of the time in the General Assembly. It can veto unpleasant Security Council Resolutions and intimidate the General Assembly from condemning such Soviet acts as the invasion of Afghanistan. And it can stuff the U.N. Secretariat with Soviet KGB spies, most of whom are known to the FBI, in violation of Article 100 of the U.N. Charter.<sup>1</sup>

Soviet-bloc nationals in the U.N. Secretariat, assisted by communist-bloc<sup>2</sup> nations, and by Third World Secretariat employees, have long been undermining the impartiality of the U.N. civil service, on occasion in open defiance of U.N. personnel policies. Former U.N. Under-Secretary-General Arkady Shevchenko, until his defection to the U.S. in 1978 the highest ranking Soviet civil servant at the U.N., reports that the Soviets scoff at the very idea that international civil servants could be impartial. He reveals that over a third of all communist-bloc nationals in the Secretariat are officers of their respective secret police under the direct guidance of the KGB. Their activities range from recruitment of Secretariat employees, and gathering political

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<sup>1</sup> "In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization" (Article 100, U.N. Charter).

<sup>2</sup> This also includes Romania, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, and Yemen.

information from U.N. employees and diplomats, to using the U.N. as a base for espionage activities throughout the U.S. by exploiting the exemption granted U.N. personnel from the requirement of a U.S. government travel permit.

The Soviet Union's hearty support from the developing nations (radical and even moderate) of the Third World at the U.N. belies Moscow's stinginess in the U.N. Counting assessed and voluntary contributions, the USSR--including the Ukrainian and Byelorussian shares<sup>3</sup>--in 1981 paid only 4.21 percent of the costs of the U.N. system.<sup>4</sup> Of assessed and peacekeeping outlays, the Soviet Union paid only 10.66 percent in 1980; in contrast, the U.S. paid 31.42 percent. To make matters worse, the Soviet Union is about \$200 million in arrears in its payments to the U.N.

Yet the Soviet Union enjoys much greater support from the underdeveloped majority of U.N. members than does the far more generous United States. Among the reasons for this Soviet success, particularly since 1960, are skillful "conference diplomacy," effective use--and abuse--of the U.N. machinery, as well as extensive contact with U.N. affiliated nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the media. Many NGOs are Soviet fronts or manipulated by the Soviets. To recruit backers, moreover, the USSR apparently resorts to techniques routinely used by the KGB, including payment of hard cash and a variety of in-kind inducements to U.N. employees and U.N. diplomats.

The U.N. thus has become an important tool for the USSR, an effective part of the Soviet "active measures"<sup>5</sup> program of disinformation coordinated from the highest levels of the International Department of the Communist Party. As a former Soviet U.N. employee told The Heritage Foundation, the Soviet Mission is mobilized into about a dozen sections or referentura, which vigorously coordinate the activities of all Soviet U.N. personnel. Secretariat personnel are even asked to write speeches for the Soviet Mission. "We cannot say no," the defector told Heritage. "If Secretariat work doesn't get done, you get at most a reprimand from the Secretary-General; but if you disobey the Executive of a referentura, you are a dead man."

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<sup>3</sup> Stalin succeeded in obtaining three U.N. votes for the Soviet Union. This highly controversial matter, which may well be seen as a defeat for the U.S., has been widely discussed. For example, see John C. Etridge, Library of Congress Congressional Research Service study, "Ukraine and Byelorussia in the U.N. Background and Arguments For and Against Expulsion," November 5, 1971.

<sup>4</sup> A/37/445, September 28, 1982, p. 79

<sup>5</sup> "Active measures," according to the FBI, include: manipulation or control of the media, written or oral disinformation; use of foreign communist parties and front organizations; clandestine broadcasting; economic activities; military operations; other political influence activities.

Today the USSR can count on support for most of its political agenda in the General Assembly--an agenda that spills over into the entire U.N. system. The U.N. fulfills Stalin's intention that it become a useful tool of Soviet foreign policy.

## ESPIONAGE

The FBI long has referred to U.N. headquarters in New York as "the spy factory." R. Jean Gray, head of the FBI's New York division, which keeps an eye on the Soviet-bloc nationals in the U.N., told The Heritage Foundation that there are about 1,100 communist-bloc officials in New York. More than 260 Soviets work at the Missions to the U.N., and about 250 work in the Secretariat. Says Gray: "The Soviets seem to prize quantity."

They also prize quality. The FBI estimates conservatively that about 30 percent of Soviet U.N. employees are skilled KGB officers. The "heavies" are in the Missions, particularly since 1978, all their work being coordinated by Vladimir Kazakov, a Deputy to USSR's Permanent Representative, U.S. educated Oleg Troyanovsky.

Whether KGB officers or not, however, Soviet and other communist-bloc Secretariat employees are widely believed to be involved in intelligence related activities. Dr. Igor S. Glagolev, staff director of the anti-communist Association for Cooperation of Democratic Countries, reported in a confidential bulletin to the Association in March 1982:

When I lectured at the Soviet Mission at the U.N. as a Soviet representative in the 1960s, and later attended secret reports of the Soviet members of the U.N. staff, I learned that the main job of these staff members was espionage and subversion of the U.S. A medium-rank KGB officer (usually a colonel) who occupies the post of an assistant to the U.N. Secretary-General practically controls the whole staff of the U.N.

The work of all U.N. connected diplomats and U.N. civil servants from the communist-bloc countries is coordinated regularly in the Mission's "cells"--meetings where Mission diplomats and Secretariat employees receive specific instructions regarding their activities, behavior, and role in the overall plan of ideological warfare. Intelligence activities are the highest priority.

One of the main aspects of Soviet espionage activities in New York, according to Arkady Shevchenko, is the electronic monitoring of Americans' telephone conversations. This is directed primarily from the Soviet mansion in Glen Cove, New York, which is full of electronic spying equipment. Key targets are the defense related firms on Long Island.

Since U.N. Secretariat employees can travel freely anywhere in the U.S.--in cars bearing U.S. license plates--FBI officials confess that it is practically impossible to monitor all their activities. Shevchenko explains that Soviet KGB agents in the Secretariat take advantage of this privilege to conduct high-technology espionage operations very frequently. The FBI is also aware of extensive contacts with "illegals"--Soviet or communist-bloc nationals who are in the U.S. with false documents or under false pretenses. Senior U.N. Secretariat officials have told The Heritage Foundation that many of the Russian "translators" and "interpreters" call in "sick" (with certificates from Soviet doctors) and thus come and go without supervision. It is assumed that during these absences they are engaged in espionage activities.

According to FBI officials, the main role of "diplomat spies" is not direct spying but recruitment, which involves--besides traditional KGB techniques<sup>6</sup>--a whole spectrum of methods designed to identify individuals in the U.N. system willing to offer information and help in exchange for money, jobs, promotions, and other services, such as health care in the Soviet Union, gifts, vacations, even political influence. Shevchenko laughingly reports that he was approached on several occasions by individuals from Third World countries asking for "loans" in return for cooperation with the KGB. Some of these people, he says, are still in the U.N. Secretariat.

A significant tool in the USSR's recruitment efforts is access to the files of all U.N. employees through the U.N. Personnel Department. "The Department is heavily infiltrated by the KGB, at the highest levels," says Shevchenko. The files are supplemented by personal data collected through well-coordinated activities supervised by the Soviet Mission.

## PROPAGANDA

From the outset, the USSR understood the potential propaganda significance of the U.N.<sup>7</sup> When the U.N. was being organized, Josef Stalin told a large secret Communist Party meeting: "We do not need the U.N. What we need is a stage from which we can express any opinion we want." This view appears more prevalent today than ever. Now, as U.S. Permanent Representative Jeane Kirkpatrick notes, the Soviets virtually "shape the international political agenda."

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<sup>6</sup> See John Barron, KGB Today: The Hidden Hand (New York, New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1983).

<sup>7</sup> See the "Top Secret" Report by the National Security Council of March 30, 1948, since published in Foreign Relations of the United States 1948, Volume I, General; The United Nations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 545-550; also pp. 551-564 and *passim*.

## Colonialism, Racism, and Aggression

The picture the Soviet Union is trying to create in the U.N. is seductively simple: "The struggle in the international arena between the forces of socialism and democracy and the forces of aggression and imperialist reaction is also taking place at the U.N."<sup>8</sup>

Among the most effective propaganda tools for the USSR is the "Committee of 24" (now 25), established in 1961 to implement the Soviet sponsored declaration on the "Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" of 1960. Although by 1960 some 1,500 million of the roughly 1,600 million colonial peoples from the end of World War II had already won their freedom, the Soviets seized the opportunity to create for themselves a pro-freedom image.

Under the label of "colonialism," the U.S., South Africa, and Israel have ever since been routinely castigated by the USSR at the U.N.--even though the U.S., itself a former colony, has always supported decolonization, as has Israel. As for South Africa, its role in Namibia pales beside the USSR's genocide in Ukraine or its annexation of the Baltic States--yet the label of "colonialism" is never applied in these contexts.<sup>9</sup>

Generally, the Soviet engineered campaign against "racism" is part of an elaborate, and successful, effort to legitimize support for Soviet backed insurgents in South Africa.<sup>10</sup> Thus the Special Committee Against Apartheid is virtually run by the Soviets.<sup>11</sup> According to Arkady Shevchenko, during his tenure as Under-Secretary-General, many speeches of the Committee's

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<sup>8</sup> Great Soviet Encyclopedia (New York: Macmillan, Inc., 1981), vol. 18, p. 707.

<sup>9</sup> To recognize once again the colonialist nature of the Soviet Union, on July 26, 1983, President Reagan sent a statement to U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar charging that the Soviet Union violates these nations' right to self-determination. In the Memorandum Concerning the Decolonization of the USSR submitted to the 35th General Assembly by the Ad Hoc Committee Consisting of the World Councils of Byelorussians, Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Turkestanians, and Ukrainians in October 1980, there is an excellent summary of the Soviet policy of Russification and colonization.

<sup>10</sup> See the entire hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate on "The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa," March 22, 24, 25, 29, and 31, 1982, Volumes 1 & 2 (Serial No. J-97-101).

<sup>11</sup> Its 18 members are: Algeria, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian SSR.

Nigerian Chairman were written by the Soviet front organization, the World Peace Council. Vladimir Kravetz, currently a Vice-Chairman of the Committee, is a Ukrainian national who, according to knowledgeable U.N. diplomats, orchestrates the Committee's anti-apartheid activities and pro-SWAPO propaganda.

The U.N. offers an excellent forum for the Soviet Union's well-organized support for the "national liberation movements" in general. In order to bestow legitimacy upon that support, the concept of "aggression" has been molded for selective use in referring to Western opposition to national liberation movements, as defined by the Soviet Union. Polish or Hungarian freedom fighters never are mentioned, nor is there ever reference to communist military intervention. A KGB "journalist" M. Lvov (a pseudonym) wrote in the Soviet publication New Times that "the USSR acted in full conformity with the decisions of the U.N. when over many years it gave moral and material support to the Angolan people." But he condemned Western nations who "joined efforts in an onslaught against the newly-emerged African state." He accused the West of "aggression in the precise sense of the definition of aggression adopted by the U.N."<sup>12</sup>

Indeed, the concept of "aggression" is used to emphasize the dichotomy between the peace-loving socialist states and the imperialist "colonialist and racist" nations within the U.N. system. In these efforts, the USSR does not even shirk from comparing Israel to Hitler's Germany--as did Aleksei Kosygin on June 13, 1967.<sup>13</sup> Then in August 1983, the Soviet Union was the loudest U.N. voice in condemning Israel at a conference on "The Unholy Alliance between South Africa and Israel" for its alleged "racism" in the occupied territories.<sup>14</sup> In fact, sponsoring the Conference were three Soviet-front organizations, including the World Peace Council. It seemed apparent to those present that the USSR was seeking a Western walkout from the Conference so that it could appear as the only friend of the Arab-African bloc. Yet members of that bloc complain in private that the Soviet Union's campaign against Israel detracts from other Third World problems, and they question Moscow's motives in the anti-Israeli campaign.

#### Disarmament, Peaceful Coexistence, and Development

The Soviet Union has long proclaimed its commitment to disarmament, but many scholars have doubted Moscow's motives.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>12</sup> New Times, January 1976, p. 5.

<sup>13</sup> U.N.G.A. Official Records, Fifth Emergency Special Session, Plen. 1526.

<sup>14</sup> For an excellent analysis of the history, and the context of the Soviet role in the U.N.'s campaign against Israel, see Moses Moskowitz, The Roots and Reaches of United Nations Actions and Decisions, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sitjthoff & Noordhoff, 1980), in particular Chap. VI, "The Racial Equation," pp. 131-153.

<sup>15</sup> Stanford political scientist Alexander Dallin, for example, points to Moscow's "uncanny ability to make sweeping and appealing proposals while

Despite a well-known record of opposition to meaningful disarmament measures,<sup>16</sup> as well as repeated violations of arms control agreements, the Soviet Union continues to capitalize on its allegedly strong commitment to disarmament as part of its propaganda campaign.

The concept of "peaceful coexistence" is a well-honed Soviet code word. According to a recent monograph on the U.N. by G. K. Shakhnazarov, president of the Soviet Political Science Association, "peaceful coexistence must not be confused with the simple concept of peace." It is rather a tool which "creates the prerequisites for the freer development of the class struggle."<sup>17</sup> The U.N. is seen as a crucial forum from which the Soviets can create these prerequisites. For example, an interesting aspect of the Soviet disarmament campaign, with special appeal to the Third World, is the notion that world economic development is impeded by the money diverted in the West to arms production. The impression is that the West must be blamed for Third World poverty and must, implicitly, make amends--in particular, by endorsing the New International Economic Order (NIEO), which is shorthand for global redistribution of wealth along Marxist lines.<sup>18</sup>

In its effort to support NIEO the Soviet Union resorts on occasion to tampering with statistics. In 1976, for example, two Brandeis University economists, Anne P. Carter and Peter A. Petri, found their study on The Future of the World Economy altered by the Soviet assistant director of the Economic and Social Affairs Department of the U.N. Secretariat, Stanislav Menshikov. The Americans charged that Menshikov changed the statistics of their study to show much higher potential growth rates and a rosier economic situation, should an International Economic Order be implemented, than their data originally indicated.<sup>19</sup> Menshikov has since returned to the USSR.

#### THE USSR, THE U.N., AND RADICAL MOVEMENTS

At the U.N., radical Third World nations do much of the Soviet Union's work. The main Soviet proxies are Vietnam, Laos, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba, and others whose allegiance to

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resisting the type of specific controls or inspection arrangements that other powers have deemed essential." Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the U.N. (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 70.

<sup>16</sup> For a brief yet comprehensive history, see A Chronology of U.S. Arms Reduction Initiatives, USICA, April 1982.

<sup>17</sup> Cited in Intelligence Digest, January 20, 1982.

<sup>18</sup> For insights into the history of NIEO, see USA, vol. XIX, Sept. 30, 1975, No. 14 by U.N. scholar Alice Widener. For a critique of NIEO, see William L. Scully, "The Brandt Commission: Deluding the Third World," Heritage Foundation Background No. 182, April 30, 1982.

<sup>19</sup> Business Week, July 20, 1981.

the Soviet Union is automatic. The Congo, India, Iraq, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia and Tanzania also can usually be counted upon to support the Soviet Union in U.N. committees. In general, the strikingly pro-Soviet voting pattern at the U.N. confirms Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko's boast that Soviet "proposals invariably get extensive support in the U.N."<sup>20</sup>

Through some of the U.N.'s regional organizations, such as the Organization for African Unity, the Islamic Conference, and especially the Nonaligned Movement, the Soviet Union has been able to mold the U.N.'s international agenda.

Singapore's Second Deputy Prime Minister S. Rajaratnam, for example, charged on March 10, 1983, that the nonaligned movement was witnessing its own slow-motion hijacking by the Soviet Union. He cited Afghanistan and Cambodia as examples of how Moscow's friends, although a minority in the movement, had thwarted the wishes of the majority. Arie Eilan, recently retired as ambassador extraordinary at Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, explains that the nonaligned movement in turn influences the U.N.: "the U.N.'s agenda is determined, to a considerable extent, by that movement, whose nearly one hundred members command an automatic majority."<sup>21</sup>

The Soviet Union's influence among the nonaligned nations--which Soviet President L. I. Brezhnev declared, on September 5, 1973, to be the "natural allies" of the socialist countries--reached a peak in 1979 when its proxy, Cuba, gained leadership. Yet only Burma was moved to resign because of Cuba's ruthless attempt to radicalize the nonaligned movement.<sup>22</sup>

Besides the nonaligned, the Soviet Union works closely with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), particularly since 1965 when the General Assembly invited the Secretary General of the OAU to attend sessions of the U.N. as an observer. In 1974, the General Assembly extended a "blanket invitation to observer status...to all national liberation movements recognized by the OAU" (Res. 3280[XXIX]), which solidified the cooperation between the OAU and the Soviet dominated Committee of 24, especially in

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<sup>20</sup> Report by Andrei Gromyko, "On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," June 17, 1983, OVP - 1617, p. 4. A table of the voting pattern of nonaligned nations illustrating percentage of agreement with the USSR at the 36th session of the General Assembly, 1981, appears in Juliana Geron Pilon, "Through the Looking Glass: The Political Culture of the U.N.," Heritage Foundation Background No. 206, August 30, 1982, pp. 18-19.

<sup>21</sup> See also Arie Eilan, "[The Soviet Union and] Conference Diplomacy," Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1981, p. 27.

<sup>22</sup> K. P. Misra, "Burma's Farewell to the Non-Aligned Movement," Asian Affairs, February 1981, p. 53.



activities related to South Africa and Namibia. In May 1977, for example, the Committee of 24 sent N. Neytchev, a representative from Bulgaria, to address a "World Assembly of Peace Builders in Warsaw" on the need to support national liberation movements (A/AC. 109/ PV. 1078).

The intimate relationship between the Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has recently been documented.<sup>23</sup> In the U.N., the PLO helps Soviet efforts to paint a cohesive picture of imperialism and colonialism by including Israel with the U.S. in its attacks on Western "aggression."<sup>24</sup>

### Secretariat

The U.N. Secretariat employs a large number of Third World nationals apparently recruited by the KGB. According to former Under-Secretary-General Shevchenko, KGB agents offer various inducements in exchange for cooperation. Usually, however, recruitment is not necessary in the case of radical Third World nations. The Soviet Mission, he says, simply asks the respective government to "intervene" with its national(s) to "cooperate" with a Soviet employee in the gathering of information or sabotaging a report to suit the Soviet Union's purposes.

Perhaps the most notable recent example of a sabotaged report is the U.N. investigation, started in 1981, of Soviet biochemical warfare activities in Afghanistan and surrounding regions. It was overseen by U.N. Under-Secretary General Ustinov, who used bureaucratic inertia and delaying tactics to stall and smother the investigation for many months. In February 1982, the U.N. group of experts finally obtained some eyewitness testimony, medical findings, and physical evidence of biological warfare. This information had been quietly shelved (some say, suppressed) by Ustinov until it was leaked to the Wall Street Journal on June 7, 1982. To date, the U.N. has done little to analyze the use of chemical warfare in Afghanistan by the Soviet Union despite ample evidence uncovered by reliable sources.<sup>25</sup>

### THE USSR AND MODERATE THIRD WORLD AND WESTERN NATIONS

Marxist ideology suits the USSR well in its efforts to win over moderate Third World and liberal or left-wing Western sup-

<sup>23</sup> Raphael Israeli, ed., PLO in Lebanon, Ch. V, "The Communist Bloc Connection" (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983).

<sup>24</sup> See Jeane J. Kirkpatrick's speech on October 18, 1982, in Toronto, Canada, before the International Meeting of B'nai B'rith and her speech on October 16, 1983, addressing the Washington Hebrew Congregation, for analyses of the U.N.'s campaign against both the U.S. and Israel.

<sup>25</sup> See James R. Phillips, "Moscow's Poison War--Update," The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 208, September 3, 1982.

port.<sup>26</sup> An Indian diplomat told The Heritage Foundation that the Soviet success in gaining Third World support at the U.N. is not due to diplomatic skill but to the intrinsic seductiveness of Marxist ideology (particularly its opposition to bourgeois exploitation, which translates into "colonialist oppression") and--perhaps even more important--to "military realities," meaning Soviet military coercion. Other diplomats concur, but believe the recently improved diplomatic style of Soviets in both the Missions and the Secretariat enhances their efforts to fraternize with representatives of moderate nations. To those efforts are added lavish entertainment at the Soviet Mission, and persistent "cultivation" of friendly diplomats. Soviet Under-Secretary-General Viacheslav Ustinov told The Heritage Foundation that he has more contact with Third World nationals than he does with the Soviet Mission.

The sheer barrage of Soviet inspired propaganda disseminated through the U.N. has caused Western nations to become exhausted, exasperated, or possibly intimidated into silence. The result is, in the words of John Lenczowsky, Director of Eastern European and Russian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council, "dynamic Finlandization," illustrated by the poor record of Western support for the U.S. in the General Assembly--a mere 60 percent average for 1982.

#### SUBVERSION OF THE SECRETARIAT

##### Department of Public Information (DPI)

The DPI's functions have grown significantly in the past decade. Despite the provision in General Assembly resolution 13 (I) of February 13, 1946, Annex I that DPI "should not engage in 'propaganda,'" it has on occasion done just that. Former Under-Secretary-General Shevchenko stresses that the DPI plays a crucial role in the Soviet Union's disinformation campaign: "The whole Department is mobilized."

The principal Soviet national in the DPI is Anatoly Mkrtchyan, head of the External Relations Division. Shevchenko identifies Mkrtchyan as a KGB colonel; in fact, the post has been held by a KGB colonel ever since a Soviet national was placed there in 1968. Among the division's main functions is the dissemination of U.N. material to the 63 U.N. Information Centers throughout the world.

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<sup>26</sup> According to Dr. Devendra Kaushik, Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, "the Leninist assumption of interdependence and complementarity of socialism and anti-imperialist struggles for national liberation forms the core of the overall Soviet view of the Third World." Devendra Kaushik, in The Non-Aligned World, Jan.-Mar. 1983, p. 76.

A new function of the External Relations Division is following developments in member states that are "relevant to the work of the U.N." This could be of considerable use for the Soviet Union in its efforts to gather political intelligence, particularly from distant or small Third World nations where Soviet presence might be limited. Although U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar is trying to restrict the circulation of such information, there seems little chance of preventing the Soviets from obtaining it.

Arkady Shevchenko, as well as some DPI staff members, point out that the Soviet Union is skillful in using Third World nationals in DPI. Notable among them is Mkrtchyan's Principal Officer, Samir Sambad, who is also Chief of Information Services. A "Lebanese" Director of the U.N. Information Center in Beirut until about a year ago, Sambad has been identified as a covert member of the PLO.

Among the DPI's chief functions is its radio broadcasting service. The Soviets are strategically placed there, with Arkady Chapayev heading the European Unit, and Gleb Kossov as Chief of the Pamphlets Unit. According to a high DPI official, Soviet attempts to slant some DPI material require "constant vigilance." Some DPI publications, notably United Nations Today - 1981 (Suggestions for Speakers)--produced by the External Relations Division--show a clear Soviet tilt. That issue refers to Afghanistan without mentioning either the Soviet invasion or the General Assembly's censure. Kampuchea is dealt with in three paragraphs without even mentioning the Vietnam assault. On the other hand, ten pages are devoted to the Middle East and seventeen to South Africa and Namibia. DPI head Akashi reportedly had "conveyed his dissatisfaction at the lack of balance in some of the contents" of that booklet and has ordered it to be rewritten but no recall is on record.

#### Office of the Under-Secretary-General for the Security Council and Political Affairs

This is the title of the highest-ranking Soviet employee in the U.N. Secretariat, currently Viacheslav Ustinov, a seasoned diplomat with extensive experience in Africa. When asked whether he considers himself to be a truly impartial civil servant, he told The Heritage Foundation: "Well, of course, we bring with us our ideology, our friends, our beliefs."

The Soviet Under-Secretary-General has gone to great lengths to block the advancement of people who fail to cooperate with the USSR. In 1981, for example, Martin Robinson, an experienced employee next in line to the directorship of the Outer Space Division was denied promotion by his Soviet superior, then Under-Secretary-General Mikhail Systemko. Although a U.N. panel on personnel practices found in Robinson's favor, he was not promoted until the U.S. threatened not to participate in the 1982 UNISPACE conference in Vienna. Now retired, Robinson told The Heritage

Foundation that standing up to his Soviet superior was no easy task. "I can understand how many cannot do it. For me it was a matter of principle to push my case," adding that "it is scandalous that the U.N. permits this kind of thing to go on."

A Nepalese employee in Ustinov's department, Shail Kumar Upadhyaya, has been denied promotion for several years on political grounds. Flouting U.N. recommendations and rules, Ustinov continues to engage in remarkably elaborate maneuvers designed to keep Upadhyaya in "Siberia" (a term used by U.N. employees to describe a position of little or no meaning, reserved for employees who do not cooperate politically with their communist-bloc bosses).

Under Ustinov's direction is the Center Against Apartheid, one of the principal organs of hardcore Communist propaganda against South Africa and its Western trade partners. Arkady Shevchenko notes that, while Under-Secretary-General, he objected to the Soviet orchestration of the Center's activities. Shevchenko also accused the Center's Chairman, Enuga Reddy, of working in consort with the KGB. Currently the principal Soviet hand at the Center is Alexander Baichorov of the Center's Publicity, Assistance, and Promotion section of the International Branch.

The Center engages in a vigorous disinformation campaign, elements of which were recently exposed in a succinct booklet produced by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled Fact v. Fiction. The booklet charges that one U.N. report, Document A/AC 15/L.491 of May 22, 1978, contains about two dozen false allegations, among them that 88 branches of German firms supply conventional military goods to South Africa. According to the Federal Republic of Germany, the list of companies originated in the Soviet bloc, and is fraudulent; it includes, for example, a perfume factory, an insurance company, and other nonmilitary enterprises.

But Western efforts at refuting misinformation are expensive, especially considering the barrage of "fiction" produced by the Center at a cost of over \$3 million a year. Included in that budget, according to one Under-Secretary-General, is a heavy "subsidy" of the World Peace Council (WPC). The WPC, a Soviet front, awarded its highest honor on March 30, 1983, to Center Chairman Reddy and to the Chairman of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, A. Y. Maitama-Sule.

### Office of Personnel Services

The Soviet Union always opposes the concept of a genuine professional civil service by blocking permanent appointments in favor of temporary assignments--not in keeping with the U.N. Charter. A high level U.N. official admitted that he felt "you cannot trust the Soviets with confidential information." Yet the Soviets have constant access to the files of all U.N. employees.

One of the crucial functions of the Soviets in the Personnel Department, according to Arkady Shevchenko, is to secure employment in exchange for cooperation with the KGB for people in disfavor with their own governments, who therefore have difficulty getting jobs at home. A former head of the Personnel Department told The Heritage Foundation that recruitment of Third World nationals in the Secretariat probably goes on all the time, but "not in a systematic manner." When asked whether the U.N. investigates cases of illegal influence of Secretariat personnel, he answered: "The Disciplinary Committee is very lax. You have to kill someone before they even look into a problem." Although the official felt that the Soviets have a limited influence on the Secretariat itself, he did not discount the importance of Secretariat personnel to the Soviet Union for its own broader political purposes.

#### INFILTRATION

An analysis of Soviet and communist-bloc posts in the Secretariat reveals a pattern of strategically located personnel. Among the most significant is the post of Special Assistant to the U.N. Secretary-General, "traditionally KGB" according to Shevchenko. The current incumbent, Gennadi Yevstaf'iev, is well situated to intercept even confidential letters to the Secretary-General, which he can then pass on to the Soviet Mission. Although described by one Western diplomat as "thick and clumsy," Yevstaf'iev is known to former colleagues as a seasoned KGB officer with extensive experience in Japan.

Another crucial Soviet post in the Secretary-General's Executive Office is the Deputy Chief of Protocol, currently Alexander S. Taranenko. In his function, Taranenko handles matters of ceremonial symbolism, has access to information regarding visits of diplomats, and is privy to sensitive U.S. security arrangements.

Although Senior Adviser to the USSR Mission Sergey Nikolayevich Smirnov denied to The Heritage Foundation that Soviet Secretariat employees pay any part of their salaries to the USSR, the practice is well known. Besides providing the USSR with additional cash for espionage and assorted active measures, this illegal practice renders the Soviet employees of the Secretariat more dependent upon their home government than are their Western colleagues. Arkady Shevchenko, for example, received only \$1,000 a month--a mere fraction of his actual salary--supplemented by various "perks."

A division of the Secretariat that has recently been a focus of controversy is the U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations (TNCs), because of blatantly illegal activities by the highest Soviet functionary there, Assistant Director of the Information Analysis Division Ralph Tsvilev. On July 20, 1983, Tsvilev suppressed the Annex of a Center report, which proved the cooperation of several communist-bloc countries with the West, hence

supporting to the inclusion of communist commercial enterprises among the TNCs. By opposing inclusion of that report, the USSR insured that the restrictive and punitive TNC code of conduct is applied only to Western TNCs.<sup>27</sup>

Another significant Secretariat department from the perspective of the Soviet Union is the Office of Legal Affairs. Its Codification Division is headed by Valentin Romanov of the USSR who, according to Shabtai Rosenne, former Israeli representative to the U.N., manipulates rules during sessions of the U.N. communist dominated Legal Committee, thereby ignoring speakers, instructing selected diplomats on how to use procedure to their advantage, and intimidating some diplomats when politically desirable.

## RELATIONSHIP WITH U.N. CONNECTED GROUPS

### NGOs

Early in the history of the U.N., the Soviet Union understood and manipulated the rules governing the U.N.'s relationship with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).<sup>28</sup> At present, several Soviet-front groups routinely "sponsor" NGO conferences in cooperation with such U.N. units as the Center Against Apartheid, and their proceedings are subsequently adopted by the U.N. and widely disseminated by the DPI.

Among the hundreds of NGOs affiliated with the U.N., several are recognized Soviet fronts:

#### \* The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO)

Though the NGO list cites AAPSO's headquarters in Geneva, it is actually based in Cairo. Officially coordinator of the "national struggle of the peoples of Africa and Asia," AAPSO is closely connected with the World Peace Council and totally controlled by the Soviets. One of its Deputy Chairmen is Mirza Ibragimov of the USSR. Its New York Representative is Laura Pasternak.

#### \* The Christian Peace Conference (CPC)

The FBI is aware of the close connection between the CPC, headquartered in Prague, and the World Peace Council. Its political

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<sup>27</sup> Press Release USUN 57-(83), July 25, 1983.

<sup>28</sup> For an incisive analysis of the USSR's attempts to gain special status for nongovernmental organizations, particularly the World Federation of Trade Unions and other left-leaning or communist controlled groups, see Harold Karan Jacobson, The USSR and the U.N.'s Economic and Social Activities (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), especially pp. 22-31.

guidelines are mainly provided by Moscow. CPC delegations are actively involved in meetings of the Special U.N. Committees on disarmament and racism. Its New York representative is Dr. Philip Oke, who is located at 777 U.N. Plaza--a building that houses a number of religious NGOs.

\* International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)

The IADL was founded in 1946 through Soviet fronts in Europe. Igor Blishchenko, one of the IADL's Secretaries, is closely associated with the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee. Its President is a French communist, Joe Nordmann. Moscow also has other high-level positions in IADL. Its New York representative is Lennox S. Hinds.

\* International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)

Headquartered in Prague, the IOJ is profoundly influenced by the Soviets. Out of eight Secretaries, six are from the Soviet Union or a communist-bloc country. Its Secretary-General, Jiri Kubka, is from Czechoslovakia. New York representative: Joe Wacker.

\* Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)

Headquartered in Berlin, WIDF is one of the most active Soviet fronts. Most of its leaders are Soviet or communist-bloc nationals. Its New York representative is Vinnie Burrows.

\* World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

Headquartered in Hungary, the WFDY supports Soviet policy, including Soviet presence in Afghanistan. The International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party has direct links to most of the leaders of the WFDY. Its New York representative is Daniel Rosenberg.

\* World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)

Its President, Sandor Gaspar, is a member of the Hungarian politburo. Headquartered in Prague, the WFTU is totally controlled by the International Department of the Central Committee. New York representative is Ernest de Maio.

\* Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)

Headquartered in Switzerland, WILPF cannot be considered to be a direct Soviet front organization. It does, however, collaborate actively with the WPC. Its New York representative is Dr. Elizabeth Fehrer.

\* World Peace Council (WPC)

WPC is the main Soviet front at the U.N. Its policy guidelines are provided directly by the International Department and its

president, Romesh Chandra, an Indian communist, is an important agent of influence. WPC representatives are active in a large number of U.N. conferences, where they have the opportunity to disseminate Soviet propaganda material. Its New York representative is philosophy professor Howard Parsons.

### Press

According to a knowledgeable Western correspondent, the number of communist media personnel at U.N. headquarters is about two dozen. Little of what they do is coverage of U.N. activities for dissemination in media at home; rather, their material is sent to the home countries to provide political briefings to the leaders.

One of the principal attractions of the U.N.'s location in New York, however, is Soviet access to Western journalists, publishers, and other media personnel. Although American journalists are by no means considered easy prey to sophisticated Soviet disinformation agents, active measures<sup>29</sup> are nevertheless promoted with some success.

### CONCLUSION

The Soviet Union's use of U.N. headquarters in New York violates both the spirit and the letter of the U.N. Charter. Aside from the high proportion of secret service agents it places in the Secretariat (about one-third of U.N. employees are from the communist bloc) who are reportedly involved in recruitment of Third World U.N. personnel through financial and in-kind inducements, the Soviet Union also attempts to manipulate the U.N. machinery by exploiting the DPI for propaganda purposes, using access to the personnel files as well as the promotion mechanism to manipulate individuals for Soviet political ends, turning sections of the Secretariat such as the Center Against Apartheid into Soviet bases of operation, suppressing information that does not suit its propaganda purposes, even "doctoring" economic statistics.

What can be done about Soviet misuse and abuse of the U.N.?

\* The U.S. and its allies should oppose in the strongest terms every Soviet attempt to compromise the impartiality of the Secretariat. They should insist, for example, that permanent Secretariat assignments replace temporary ones whenever possible.

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<sup>29</sup> Curiously, the sole public use by the Soviets of the term "active measures"--which refers to broad Soviet attempts to influence public opinion--ever found by the FBI appeared in a Soviet report to the U.N. of May 5, 1981, distributed by the DPI.



\* Reports of cooperation with governments by Secretariat employees--in violation of Article 100 of the U.N. Charter--should be investigated and punished.

\* All cases of employee harassment and discrimination on political grounds should be vigorously opposed by Western members.

\* Soviet violations of U.N. procedures--misuse of rules, altering documents, stalling reports, manufacturing statistics--should be condemned.

\* The FBI should be reinforced to enable it to cope with the large number of Soviet-bloc diplomats. The U.S. should attempt to reduce the size of the Eastern bloc and other communist missions in New York.

\* The U.S. should press for U.N. recognition of the independence of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine.

Were the U.N.'s level of integrity higher, the Soviet Union might have been ousted from the General Assembly long before South Africa. Instead, the USSR has coopted the U.N. and turned it into an outpost for its campaign of "active measures" against the West. Consistent and effective exposure of Soviet tactics perhaps can salvage some of the principles originally lauded as U.N. and international standards.

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