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A SOLID CASE FOR PENTAGON REORGANIZATION

INTRODUCTION

When the Department of Defense was created in 1947, it had a budget of \$56.6 billion and 2.4 million employees and military personnel. Since then, the budget has grown five-fold and personnel two-fold. Yet the Department's organization has remained fundamentally unaltered. A growing consensus of experts and policy makers now feels that the time for reorganizing the Pentagon at last has come. Taking the lead in calls for change is Ronald Reagan's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, known as the Packard Commission after its chairman, David Packard. Its interim report this February stated: "There is a great need for improvement in the way we think through and tie together our security objectives, what we spend to achieve them, and what we decide to buy."¹ Legislation is pending in Congress to do just that. The task now is to decide how best to achieve effective military reform, or more precisely, how to reorganize the Pentagon in a manner consistent with the principles of good management and military effectiveness.²

1. President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, An Interim Report to the President, February 28, 1986, p. 5.

2. The literature on defense organization reform is immense. The more prominent material includes Stuart M. Butler, Michael Sanera, and W. Bruce Weinrod, eds., Mandate for Leadership II: Continuing the Conservative Revolution (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1984), pp. 431-448; Theodore J. Crackel, Reshaping the Joint Chiefs of Staff: A Roundtable of the Heritage Foundation Assessment Project (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1985); Archie D. Barrett, Reappraising Defense Organization (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1983); Staff Report to the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, Defense Organization: The Need for Change, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 16, 1985); Richard C. Steadman, Report to the Secretary of Defense on the National Military Command Structure (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978); William J. Lynn and Barry Blechman, Toward a More Effective Defense: The Report of the CSIS Defense Organization Project (Ballinger, 1985); William J. Lynn and Barry R. Posen, "The Case for JCS Reform," International Security Winter 1985/86, pp. 69-97; The Naval War College, JCS Reform: Proceedings of the Conference, Newport, Rhode Island, May 6-7, 1985; MacKubin Thomas Owens, "The Hollow Promise of JCS Reform," International Security Winter 1985-86, pp. 98-111.

The organization and structural weaknesses in the Department of Defense developed over a long period of time, and there are many of them. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), for example, lacks sufficient political authority to control the many divergent organizational forces inside the Pentagon. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) system, the nation's leading military committee, routinely seeks consensus of the three Services and thus is institutionally handicapped in offering the President objective and timely military advice. The so-called combatant commands, which cover forces dedicated to such diverse and broad military missions as the defense of the Pacific region or military airlift, are inadequately represented in the decision-making process. And the Defense Agencies, which were established to perform supply functions common to more than one military department, such as logistics, communications, and intelligence, are inadequately supervised, redundant, insufficiently responsive to their customers, including the combatant commands, and perform some functions that are only marginally important.

In view of this, Pentagon reorganization reforms should:

- 1) strengthen the political authority of the Secretary of Defense;
- 2) reduce excess personnel in the Defense Agencies and perhaps even the number of Agencies themselves;
- 3) enhance the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to reduce Service parochialism in strategic and operational planning and to make the JCS more accountable to the Secretary of Defense;
- 4) give the combatant commanders greater command authority and more influence on the structure of forces under their command;
- 5) minimize Service parochialism, streamline the Service staffs, and eliminate duplication in the bureaucratic functions of Military Departments;
- 6) improve the quality and management of joint officers.

These reforms will not eliminate all the Pentagon's organizational problems. But they will remove some obstacles to sound strategic planning and better coordinated military operations, and if the Pentagon's civilian and military leaders were willing, could pave the way for further reforms. The reforms will provide clearer policy guidance for the Services and will reduce the influence of Service

parochialism on policy planning and allocation of resources without diminishing the invaluable technical and operational advice that only the Services can provide.

AN EVALUATION OF VARIOUS DEFENSE REORGANIZATION PROPOSALS

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

A serious obstacle to effective management of the Pentagon is the lack of power and influence in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.³ While the Secretary has enormous legal power to manage and control the Pentagon bureaucracy, in reality he lacks sufficient political authority to control powerful internal and external organizational forces, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Departments (i.e., the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs), and Congress, all of whom have agendas of their own.⁴ This weakness can be addressed in a number of ways⁵

1) Reducing the number of officials reporting directly to the Secretary.

At last count, 42 officials were reporting directly to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Any student in Management 101 knows that this is far too many for him to oversee adequately. No chief executive, not even a super manager, can effectively supervise 42 principal assistants, who themselves oversee highly complex policy functions. Reducing the number of officials reporting directly to the Secretary would free the Secretary to concentrate primarily on major policy matters and would streamline the lines of authority inside OSD.

3. Barrett, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-66, 191-238; Donald B. Rice, Defense Resource Management Study, Final Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 5-34; and Senate Staff Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-137.

4. Mandate II, *op. cit.*, pp. 433-34; Senate Staff Report, p. 629.

5. The Senate Armed Services Committee has approved legislation containing a number of OSD and other organization reform provisions discussed in this paper; see United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, Press Release: "Goldwater and Nunn Announce Committee Approval of Defense Reorganization Bill," March 6, 1986. The House passed a JCS reform bill (H.R. 2265) in 1985. A new House bill (H.R. 4370) contains provisions reorganizing the combatant commands, the Defense Agencies, the joint officer corps, and the Military Departments.

2) Eliminating statutory titles for most Assistant Secretaries.

Proponents of this measure claim it will enhance the management flexibility of OSD by allowing the Secretary to organize OSD as he or she sees fit, to streamline OSD organization, and perhaps even to reduce the number of senior officials reporting directly to the Secretary. By and large these claims are valid. The law now requires that there be an Assistant Secretary for Health Affairs, another for Force Management and Personnel, and others for Reserves, command and control, and comptroller. The Secretary of Defense, however, should be permitted to assign the duties of his principal assistants as he wishes and as changing circumstances warrant.

3) Encouraging the Secretary of Defense to strengthen political control over OSD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Military Services.

This proposal involves mainly a change in the way the Secretary of Defense relates to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Departments of the Services. Any measure to reduce the influence of the Services on the allocation of resources would enhance the real authority of OSD. By the same token, increasing the prestige and authority of the JCS Chairman could ameliorate Service parochialism. For this proposal to work would depend on whether the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman cooperated closely. This can be guaranteed not by statutory reorganization, but by a tacit bureaucratic alliance between the Secretary and the Chairman to offset the influence of the Services in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Military Departments.

Some critics of military reform claim that strengthening the Office of the Secretary of Defense will centralize the OSD bureaucracy even more. But stronger authority is not the same as bureaucratic centralization. As defense organization expert Arch Barrett suggests, "The secretary/OSD must have unbounded power to give close scrutiny to areas of particular concern, but other activities should be delegated as much as possible."⁶ Barrett believes it is possible, and indeed even desirable, for the Secretary to decentralize program management without diluting the central political authority of OSD.

6. Barrett, op. cit., p. 222.

Nor is it correct, as some critics suggest, to assume that strengthening the Secretary's authority inexorably leads to more micromanagement of the Services by OSD.⁷ The Secretary can decide to reduce OSD's interference in the day-to-day military operations of the Services while simultaneously strengthening its hold over strategic planning and the allocation of resources.

4) Improving supervision and reducing personnel of Defense Agencies.

At the Department of Defense, fifteen agencies perform the common supply or service functions required by the civilian and military leaders of the Pentagon. These include the Defense Contract Audit Agency, Defense Investigative Service, Defense Legal Services Agency, the Defense Security Assistance Agency, and many others.

Since 1958 thirteen Defense Agencies have been added to the Pentagon bureaucracy.⁸ This proliferation has raised the question of whether all of them are needed. Is there really a pressing need, for example, for a separate Defense Legal Services Agency or a Defense Investigative Service?

There also is the problem of growing personnel. Since 1960 the Defense Agencies have added more than 65,000 employees.⁹ Between 1980 and 1983 alone, the Defense Agencies added 5,075 new employees to the Pentagon's payroll.¹⁰ At the very least, a cap should be put on the growth of Defense Agency personnel. In addition, the Pentagon should review its personnel requirements for the Defense Agencies, as very likely it will discover that significant reductions could be made without harming their basic functions.

Finally, because of their large number, the Defense Agencies are not adequately supervised or coordinated. Of the Secretary's 42 direct subordinates, 24 are senior OSD and Defense Agency officials. Supervision of the Defense Agencies can be improved by reducing the number of Defense Agency officials who report directly to the Secretary.

7. Barrett, op. cit., pp. 59, 61-2; see other OSD analyses in Paul R. Ignatius, Department of Defense Reorganization Study Project, Department Headquarters Study. A Report to the Secretary of Defense, 1 June 1978, pp. 5-72; and in Rice, op. cit., pp. 5-94.

8. Senate Staff Report, p. 56

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., Table 3-2, p. 58.

5) Consolidating the acquisition authority in an Under Secretary of Defense.

The Packard Commission recommends creating a new Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions. This is to streamline the procurement process by consolidating responsibility in one authority, a new and powerful Under Secretary only one level below the Defense Secretary. A secondary aim is to reduce the influence of the individual Services on the weapons procurement process.

An Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions would give OSD greater leverage in forcing the Services to adopt budget priorities. This could, in turn, strengthen the hand of the Secretary of Defense in the entire programming and budgeting process.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Joint Chiefs of Staff system is the weak link in the chain of military planning and command. Because the Joint Chiefs wear two hats--serving not only as a "joint" Chief but as the Chief of a parent Service--they lack the independent institutional basis for offering truly objective and timely "joint" military advice.¹¹ The JCS is in effect a committee of Service Chiefs representing relatively equal, independent and powerful bureaucratic interests--the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines. There is no firm institutional basis for making "joint" or all-service decisions. In fact, the very institutional nature of the JCS requires that the Services reach the lowest common denominator of agreement between them.¹² The result is often a forced unanimity between the Services that glosses over disagreements and dilutes the quality of military advice.¹³

While the JCS system allows the Services to funnel their substantial technical expertise into the programming and budgeting process, it has the disadvantage, some critics charge, of allowing the Services too much influence on the outcome of that process. The

11. Senate Staff Report, pp. 166-171; Steadman, op. cit., p. 53.

12. Senate Staff Report, pp. 173-74; Steadman, op. cit., p. 52.

13. For example, President John F. Kennedy was "appalled" at the sketchy nature of the advice he received from the Joint Chiefs on military operations in Laos. And General Bruce Palmer, a former Army Vice Chief of Staff, observed that during the Vietnam War the Joint Chiefs consistently told the president they supported the air war, even though they disagreed privately among themselves. In both instances the Commander-in-Chief, the President, lacked crucial military advice that could have made a critical difference in the way the U.S. fought the war in Southeast Asia. Speech by Senator Barry Goldwater, U.S. Senate, Congressional Record--Senate, October 3, 1985, S 12533. Ibid., S 12534.

consequence is patchwork strategic planning and programming for U.S. military forces. Because the JCS is essentially a captive of the Services, it lacks the requisite objectivity for providing unbiased military advice. Thus, instead of a coherent strategic framework governing the allocation of scarce resources, the Pentagon's civilian policy makers get JCS planning documents that are confused and even contradictory.

The lack of a strong civilian-military alliance between the Secretary of Defense and an independent JCS Chairman dilutes the authority of the President over defense policy. The JCS system deprives the Secretary of Defense, the President's principal defense executive, of the objective advice and information needed to maintain sufficient policy control over the the Services. It hinders the capability of the Secretary and his principal military advisors to bring a comprehensive strategic military viewpoint to bear on the formulation of strategic planning and weapons development.

One reason the JCS system is weak is that the joint aspects of serving on the Joint Staff or on some other unified command staff are held in relatively low regard by the Services. Since promotions are controlled by the Services, joint officers typically feel that it is in their interest to reflect the views of their parent Service. The incentive structure of the promotion system thus reinforces Service parochialism.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff system can be improved by:

1) Making the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the principal military advisor to the President.

Under the current JCS system, all three Joint Chiefs as a unit serve as the principal military advisory body to the President and the Secretary of Defense. A proposal approved by the House of Representatives would make the Chairman alone the principal military advisor to the President. This would provide the President with more robust and objective military advice than he has been receiving.

The military Services predictably oppose this proposal, arguing that it would reduce the diversity of military advice the President receives. This concern is exaggerated. The law making the Chairman principal military advisor could include measures ensuring independent access of the individual Service Chiefs to the President, thus preserving the diversity of military advice. Civilian control over the military, meanwhile, would be strengthened because the Secretary of Defense would have less interference from the Services. Planning would be centralized in the more powerful Chairman, but this is precisely what is needed. The specialized military advice of the three Services, on the other hand, would be preserved.

It is irresponsible to suggest, as some critics of JCS reform do, that a stronger JCS Chairman will breed an "American Caesar" or American warlord capable of overriding civilian control of the military.¹⁴ Nor will a strengthened JCS Chairman lead to a Prussian-style general staff.¹⁵ This would require giving the Chairman and joint officers far more authority and prestige than anyone has suggested.

It also is incorrect to suggest that the advantages of competition between the Services will be lost as a result of a strengthened Chairman. For one thing, the putative competition between the Services is submerged in the depths of JCS unanimity. For another, Service competition is most effective in developing new ideas at planning levels below the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And competition is best reserved for inputs not outputs. Once all the ideas have been collected by the Secretary of Defense and the JCS Chairman, clear choices can be made based on policy objectives and established priorities. The President, in any event, will receive competing views from other advisors, the National Security Council, members of Congress, and the Secretary of Defense.

Strengthening the Chairman will not overcentralize military planning or add new layers of bureaucracy.¹⁶ The Service Chiefs could have independent access to the President, while the staff of the JCS could be transferred from the corporate JCS to the Chairman without adding new personnel. In any event, the major bureaucratic problem in the Pentagon is not centralization but competition between decentralized bureaucracies--the Office of the Secretary of Defense, JCS, the Services, and the Defense Agencies--which degrades the central authority of the Secretary of Defense.

14. Letter from Air Force Secretary Russell A. Rourke to Senator Barry Goldwater, February 4, 1986. Rourke claims that making the JCS Chairman the principal military advisor to the President will ". . . move the operational military command and control apparatus towards a centralized general staff concept."

15. See the remarks by Congress Ronald V. Dellums, Joint Chiefs of Staff Reorganization Act of 1985: Report together with Dissenting Views, House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1st Session, Report 99-375, p. 33.

16. "Testimony of the Honorable John Lehman, Secretary of the Navy, before the Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Armed Services Committee, 26 June 1985," unpublished manuscript, pp. 2-3, 28-29. Also see Rep. James Courter, "For Real, Effective Military Reform," The Heritage Lectures, No. 48, 1986.

2) Creating a subspecialty in the U.S. officer corps of service on joint staffs:

Under the current system military officers from the individual Services are assigned temporarily to such joint duties as the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to the staff of the combatant commanders. They correctly view this as temporary duty so their primary loyalty remains with their Services. To create a new all-Service mentality among the officer corps, reformers propose establishing a joint subspecialty within the Services. An Army officer whose main specialty is in land warfare communications, for example, could acquire such a subspecialty in the communications requirements of the joint Army-Air Force AirLand Battle doctrine. To ensure that the careers of joint officers in their parent Service did not suffer, the military would have to give greater weight to joint service as a prerequisite for promotion. This need not lead automatically to a Prussian-style general staff. So long as individual joint subspecialists are not promoted faster than regular Service officers, the dangers of General Staff elitism can be avoided.

The JCS reform proposals are not perfect. There is no assurance, for instance, that a strengthened Chairman will be more energetic or take a broader view just because he is more independent of the Services and has his own staff. Nor is there a guarantee that the creation of joint subspecialties will not be circumvented by the Services. Moreover, unless the Secretary of Defense takes more control of the actual outputs of the the programming and budgeting process, the strengthened JCS Chairman will not have the proper guidance to centralize military planning.

Unified and Specified Commands

Unified and specified commands (or combatant commands) control forces dedicated to broad military missions. The forces at such unified commands as the U.S. Atlantic Command at Norfolk, Virginia, or the U.S. Pacific Command at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, are forces assigned from two or more Services. By contrast, specified commands, such as the Strategic Air Command headquartered at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska, consist of forces from a single Service dedicated to some highly specialized military mission such as strategic nuclear deterrence.

Six broad criticisms of the current combatant commands contend that:¹⁷ 1) the chain of command from the Commander-in-Chief or "CINC" to the operational commanders below him is confused; 2) the

17. See Senate Staff Report, op. cit., pp. 302-324; Barrett, op. cit., pp. 52-54, 123-145, 259-262; Steadman, op. cit., p. 33.

command authority of the unified commanders over the Service component commands is too weak; 3) the unified commanders have practically no organizational authority over the allocation of resources to the forces under their command; 4) the command structure below the level of the unified commander and his staff is fragmented along Service lines; 5) operation plans for the unified commanders do not receive adequate review by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense; and 6) civilian leaders unnecessarily micromanage tactical operations of the unified commanders during crises.

The critical weakness of the combatant commands, however, may be their meager influence over the forces and weapons directly under them. For example, combatant commanders are dependent on the Service component commands of their Services for resources. Moreover, they must exercise operational command through the Service component commanders. As the Chairman's Special Study Group concluded in 1982: "Today, the CINCs are at best only superficially involved in many things critical to their commands." They play almost no role in the programming and budgeting process (though they recently were invited by the Secretary to participate occasionally in meetings of the Defense Resources Board) and have little influence in the JCS force allocation process.

Proposals to remedy combatant commands' weaknesses include:

1) Strengthening and expanding the authority of the combatant commanders to exercise full operational command over the forces assigned to their command.

Under the present system the Service Chiefs interfere with the CINCs' command over military operations and dominate the process of resource allocation for forces assigned to the unified and specified commands.¹⁸ Proponents of this proposal believe that strengthening and expanding the authority of combatant commanders over military operations, joint training, and administrative and support functions of the combatant commands would give the CINCs, who, after all, are held responsible for the successful conduct of military operations, greater control over the structure and operation of forces under their command.

Overall, this is an excellent idea. It makes no organizational sense to divorce authority from responsibility, which is precisely what the current unified command system does. The CINCs should have greater authority to structure and operate the forces under their command. It is they who will command the forces in the field in time

18. See the testimonies of three unified commanders in the Conference Committee Report on the DOD Authorization Act, 1985, cited in Senate Staff Report, op. cit., pp. 310-311.

of war. They thus should have sufficient authority to structure and prepare those forces in time of peace.

2) Giving the unified commanders a budget.

Currently, the combatant commanders are invited to comment on the budget affecting the forces under their command, but they have no real authority to decide its outcome. This means the CINCs of the unified commands are held accountable for forces over which they have limited control.

To remedy this it is proposed that the CINCs have a separate budget to cover the expenses of combat forces under their command. Such a CINC budget would cover the cost of many functions now mainly controlled by the Services. Example: support and administrative functions; command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I); joint training; maintenance; military construction and training expenses for missions assigned to the CINCs' theater of operations.

The Services balk at this proposal. They charge that saddling the combatant commanders with administrative and budget duties would create new "mini Pentagons," which would duplicate the administrative and budgeting functions of the Secretary of Defense's office and the JCS.¹⁹

It is true that giving the CINCs a separate budget would complicate the budgeting process. But it should be possible to increase the CINC's contribution to the budgeting process without giving them a separate budget. They could share, for example, with the JCS Chairman the responsibility for reviewing the program objectives and budget proposals of each Military Department. The direct participation of the CINCs could be guaranteed without actually requiring them to submit a separate operating force budget.

Military Departments

The most critical organizational problem in the Pentagon is the predominance of the three Services or Military Departments in the decision-making process.²⁰ The Department of Defense lacks the political authority to control the parochial interests of the Services. The Service Chiefs dominate the JCS system, while the Service Secretaries can steamroll OSD. Powerful Service components, such as Army or Navy forces under the command of the unified commanders, constrain the latter's authority and independence. And the limited influence of the CINCs in the programming and budgeting

19. "Specific Comments on Certain Provisions of Locher Bill," op. cit.

20. Senate Staff Study, op. cit., pp. 414-450; Barrett, op. cit., pp. 63-66.

process gives the Services the upper hand in choosing the military's weapon systems.

To remedy the problems, some analysts suggest combining the staffs of the Service Chiefs and the Service Secretaries. Proponents of this argue that combining the staffs of the military Service Chiefs and the civilian Service Secretaries would reduce staff duplication. This raises objections from the Army and the Air Force, which fear that the changes would unduly restrict Service activities. Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles A. Gabriel charges that fusing the staffs would "result in the loss of institutional benefits of military leadership of the Service."²¹ Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham, Jr. claims that these proposals would strengthen "the role of the Service Secretary at the expense of the Service Chief" and "leave uncertain who within the Army would be responsible to give advice on operational matters such as warfighting doctrine or organization and missions of combatant commands."²²

These complaints are revealing. It is true that many Service reform proposals would restrict the Services somewhat. But this is precisely what is needed in strategic planning and the allocation of resources. While it is necessary to retain the input of Service technical and operational expertise into the program and budget process, it is not necessary to retain the contradictory positions or conflicting signals that the Services give when called upon to provide a budget for their forces.

Excessive Service influence on U.S. military planning has resulted in the neglect of vital military missions. Example: 1) the failure of the Navy to acquire sufficient sealift and of the Air Force to acquire sufficient airlift; 2) the failure of the Air Force to provide adequate close air support for the Army; 3) the neglect of special operation forces, demonstrated so clearly in the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt; and 4) the heavy reliance of the Army on the helicopter because of constraints on Army aviation.²³ In sum, many military missions have fallen through the cracks because of the lack of strategic guidance from the top.

Nevertheless, although reducing the size of the headquarters staff of the Military Departments may cut down on wasted energies and duplication, it will not have any significant impact on the Pentagon's most important force-planning problem: the lack of a central

21. Letter from General Charles A. Gabriel, USAF, to Senator Barry Goldwater, 4 February 1986.

22. Letter from General John A. Wickham, USA, to Senator Barry Goldwater, 4 February 1986.

23. Senate Report, op. cit., p. 445.

policy-making authority willing to establish force-planning priorities according to a coherent and practical strategic plan. And fusing the civilian and military staffs will not solve this problem. Only a conscious effort on the part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense to force the Services to adopt priorities in the early phases of the budgeting process would ensure that vital military missions such as airlift and sealift were not neglected.

CONCLUSION

The Packard Commission has a number of very good ideas for changing the military organization and command structure of the U.S. armed forces. Four Packard Commission proposals are particularly noteworthy: 1) consolidating the acquisition authority in an Under Secretary of Defense; 2) designating the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal uniformed military advisor to the President; 3) placing the Joint Staff under the exclusive direction of the JCS Chairman; and 4) channeling the reports and commands of the combatant commanders through the Chairman of the JCS.²⁴

In addition to these Packard Commission recommendations, it is imperative that the Pentagon, and whenever necessary, the Congress, take measures to reduce the number of subordinates reporting directly to the Secretary of Defense, provide the Secretary with more flexibility to organize his office as he sees fit, create a new joint subspecialty in the officer corps to improve the quality of the Joint Staffs, and strengthen the Secretary's and the JCS Chairman's control over the planning, programming, and budgeting process.

Service opposition to many of these proposals is unreasonable, but predictable. The current planning, programming, and budgeting process is the optimum bureaucratic environment for the Services because it enables them to exert enormous influence on its outcome. A combination of weak central authority in OSD and powerful Service staffs in the military departments practically guarantees that force-planning will not be made with priorities or a coherent strategic purpose in mind.

Reforms that strengthen the Secretary of Defense's authority over the planning and budgeting process are necessary to correct this problem. So are measures to improve the quality of military advice the President receives from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The technical and military input of the Services is invaluable, but it should not be allowed to confuse coherent force-planning.

24. Packard Commission Report, op. cit. p. 11.

Military reform in general, however, is no green light to cut defense spending. Change for its own sake or attacks by anti-military critics on weapon systems are not genuine military reform. Rather, military reform should be made with the express purpose of improving combat effectiveness and cultivating a tradition of excellence in the ranks of U.S. combat forces. In short, it should focus on the very purpose of combat forces, which is to fight and win U.S. wars.

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