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EIGHT STEPS FOR FAIRER U.S.-SOVIET PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES

INTRODUCTION

Moscow's imprisonment and harassment of American journalist Nicholas Daniloff casts a dark shadow over U.S.-Soviet people-to-people contacts. Such contacts have been high on the agenda of both nations, and since last November's summit meeting, the number of contacts has increased dramatically. The Kremlin's mistreatment of Daniloff raises the very serious question of whether any American is safe in the USSR if he or she meets unauthorized Soviet citizens. Indeed, the Soviet secret police, the KGB, has just threatened seven Latvian-American participants in the Chautauqua Institution conference in the USSR that it "cannot guarantee their safety" if they persist in meeting unauthorized Soviets. If Americans are not safe in meeting Soviet citizens, there is no point in arranging U.S.-Soviet "people-to-people" contacts.

Even before Moscow's mistreatment of Daniloff, reasons existed for questioning the wisdom of rapidly expanding these contacts. The reason: Moscow gains great advantage because its ability to influence U.S. public and official opinion is vastly greater than Washington's ability to use exchanges to affect Soviet opinion. Equally troubling is the Kremlin's new strategy for the exchanges. Instead of focusing almost solely, as it did until recently, on influencing U.S. leftist organizations, Moscow now courts groups in the mainstream of American life. In so doing, Moscow is trying to gain islands of influence in American public opinion by creating modern day Potemkin villages, false images of the Soviet Union.

Moscow's agenda seems to be to isolate in the American mind arms control issues from the larger political context of Soviet-U.S. relations, so that the Soviet political system and its implications for Soviet international conduct are not discussed in relation to arms control.

Soviet methods in this campaign are:

- o to convince members of various American social and professional groups that they have genuine counterparts in numerous Soviet organizations, which in reality are propaganda bases and have no autonomy from the Soviet government;

- o to engage American social and professional groups in formal exchange programs;

- o to convince members of such American groups that they can influence the Kremlin if they go along with Soviet policies;

- o to prevent discussion of any issue, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and violations of human rights, which the Soviets find embarrassing; and,

- o to prevent contact between members of American groups and domestic critics of the Soviet regime.

The Reagan Administration's policy rightly is to facilitate mutual understanding between Soviet and American individuals by encouraging various exchange programs. But this important goal cannot be reached if the exchanges are arranged in a way that serves the USSR but not the U.S. The goal of mutual understanding also cannot be achieved if American visitors to the Soviet Union are afraid to make casual and unofficial contact with Soviet citizens. If Americans meet only with authorized Soviets, then the Kremlin can control most of what Americans will learn about the USSR. In light of Moscow's imprisonment of Daniloff, Americans understandably are going to shy away from meeting or even chatting with nonofficial Soviets. Scaring Americans in this way may be one of the reasons for the Soviet mistreatment of Daniloff.

To restore balance to U.S.-Soviet exchanges, the Reagan Administration and the U.S. Congress should consider eight steps that could prevent increased U.S.-Soviet exchanges from advancing Soviet objectives at the expense of the U.S. They are:

- 1) In the light of the case of Nicholas Daniloff, Congress should establish a mechanism that automatically halts U.S.-Soviet exchanges so long as there is a chance that Americans in the Soviet Union would be harassed and endangered.

- 2) The President should issue a "travel advisory" warning all travelers to the Soviet Union about potential harassment and imprisonment there for as long as Daniloff is kept hostage.

- 3) The U.S. Congress should establish a bipartisan Advisory Committee for Soviet-American Exchanges. This Committee, composed of

representatives of the public and the private sectors, could advise professional and social groups about the best way to conduct exchanges with the Soviets.

4) The Advisory Committee should establish a reference library on Soviet affairs, institutions, and personalities: proposed exchanges should be researched thoroughly to avoid later embarrassment.

5) The Advisory Committee should publish information booklets to help those who want to engage in Soviet-American exchanges.

6) The U.S. Congress should set an example of a realistic approach to Soviet-American exchanges by refusing to engage in any "parliamentary" exchanges with the rubber-stamp Supreme Soviet, which is the Communist Party-controlled assembly that makes a mockery of the concept of representative institutions.

7) Public and private groups should shift the emphasis from short-term group visits in the Soviet Union to visits of six months to a year by individual Americans, who could practice their professions in the Soviet Union. This would give the Americans and the Soviets a better chance to become acquainted with each other.

8) Instead of organizing short-term visits in the framework of formal exchanges, the U.S. should insist on sending individual Americans, especially great numbers of high school and college students, for long visits to the Soviet Union. This would ensure that they see the real life of the Soviet people, and not the Potemkin villages constructed especially for them by Soviet propaganda. In turn, great numbers of Soviet high school and college students should come to the U.S. for extended visits.

It is obvious that U.S.-Soviet exchanges can benefit the American public. It is also obvious that the Soviets will always try to take

1. For the role the Advisory Committee could play in protecting American national security in Soviet-American scientific exchanges, see Mikhail Tsympkin, "U.S.-Soviet Academic Exchanges No Longer Should Favor Moscow," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 478, January 9, 1986, p. 12.

2. Rushing into formal exchanges can lead to implicit endorsement of Soviet human rights violations. For instance, Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) recently praised the idea of establishing "sister university" programs between American and Soviet universities, including the University of Moscow. But the Admissions Board of Moscow University systematically practices racial discrimination against Jews, even going as far as demanding a genealogical tree from an applicant to prove absence of "Jewish blood." See Senator Paul Simon, An Agenda for U.S.-Soviet Exchanges (Senate Chamber: May 21, 1986), p. 3; "Discrimination against Jews Enrolling at Moscow University, 1979," Arkhir Samizdata, No. 4695, pp. 1-3.

advantage of such exchanges for manipulating American public opinion, while preventing democratic ideas from reaching their people. It is up to the U.S. public and government to ensure that exchanges are conducted in a way that minimizes Soviet manipulation and increases the opportunities for genuine contact between the two peoples.

NEW SOVIET TACTICS

Since the days of the Communist International in the early 1920s, the Kremlin has attempted to go over the heads of democratically elected governments to influence public opinion in the West to advance Soviet interests. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, for instance, the Soviets used the "peace movement" in the West to weaken the response of democracies to the Soviet seizure of Eastern Europe and to Soviet-sponsored aggression in Korea. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Moscow used the same tactic to offset Western reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to the buildup of the Soviet nuclear threat against Western Europe.

Today, Moscow apparently is trying to undercut the belated American response to the two-decade-long explosive growth of Soviet military power, to slow the rebuilding of the U.S. arsenal and gain a breathing spell for retooling the Soviet defense industry, and to improve the image of the Soviet Union, badly tarnished by their human rights violations and the invasion of Afghanistan. A crucial tool for achieving these policy goals is shaping public opinion in democratic nations. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev told the 27th Communist Party Congress this February that his arms control proposals were directed at "world public opinion," and not just Western governments.³

From the Soviet standpoint, the most important legacy of the mass "peace movement" of the early 1980s has been the involvement of many "politically unsophisticated" people, as well as of "prominent political and public figures."⁴ Most of these "unsophisticateds," particularly in the United States, are not Marxists. Thus they would not be susceptible to the traditional approach of such Kremlin propaganda arms as the "Soviet Peace Committee," which appeals overtly

3. Kommunist, 1986, No. 4, p. 53.

4. See the article by the leading Communist Party theoretician Pyotr Fedoseev, "Sovremennoe antivoennoe dvizhenie i perspektivy ego razvitiya," Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1985, No. 2, p. 11, and by the Chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee and commentator for the Communist Party daily Pravda Yuri Zhukov, "Sovremennaya mezhdunarodnaya obstanovka i dvizhenie storonnikov mira," Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn', 1985, No. 6, p. 42.

to pro-Soviet sympathies. As such, the Soviets devised new methods for reaching the "politically unsophisticated."

SOVIET USE OF PSEUDO-ORGANIZATIONS

There are no public and professional organizations (in the U.S. sense) in the Soviet Union because all political life is strictly controlled by the Communist Party. But to convince American professional and social groups that they can improve Soviet-American relations by dealing with their "counterparts" in the Soviet Union, the Soviets create bogus groups with descriptions similar to those of U.S. groups and use existing Soviet bodies that have superficial similarities with American groups.

Soviet "Physicians For the Prevention of Nuclear War"

Typical of the new style of Soviet operations is Moscow's use of the 135,000-member International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. Its U.S. chapter contains 28,000 members. The parent group was established specifically in 1980 in cooperation with Soviet officials to publicize the dangers of nuclear war. While this goal enjoys near universal backing, the International Physicians' pursuit of it serves Soviet purposes exclusively. The International Physicians, for instance, strongly supports such Soviet arms control tactics as a nuclear freeze, the ban on research and development of defenses against ballistic missiles, and a moratorium on testing of nuclear weapons.⁵ Such a ban, if imposed, would restrict U.S. activities but not Moscow's because of difficulties in verifying compliance.

Ostensibly, the Soviet chapter of the International Physicians has 60,000 members.⁶ This figure, however, is meaningless. Even the Soviet press acknowledges that various kinds of "voluntary associations" in the Soviet Union, numbering thousands of members, exist only on paper and are a form of "spiritual cheating."⁷ The real membership of the Soviet chapter consists of a small group of trusted Soviet medical bureaucrats who have demonstrated propaganda skills in dealing with well-intentioned Western physicians.

The Co-chairman of International Physicians is Dr. Yevgeniy Chazov, Soviet Deputy Minister of Health. As a member of the Central

5. Ye. Chazov, "Mediki govoryat 'net' yadernoy ugroze," Pravda, October 1, 1985.

6. William Broad, "Two Doctors Who Fear the Bomb," The New York Times, October 12, 1985.

7. Aleksandr Vasinskiy, "Ni sebe, ni potomkam," Izvestiya, July 29, 1986.

Committee of the Communist Party, he shares symbolic responsibility for all Soviet policies, including the atrocities committed by Soviet troops in Afghanistan. As the Chief of the Fourth Directorate of the Ministry of Health, Dr. Chazov oversees, among other things, an institution that dramatically symbolizes the unbridgable gap between the Soviet people and the Communist Party elite: the so-called "Kremlin hospitals." These provide superior health care, complete with Western equipment and medication, unavailable under any conditions to ordinary Soviet citizens.

In 1973, Dr. Chazov signed a letter to the government newspaper Izvestiya denouncing Andrei Sakharov. As Deputy Minister of Health, Dr. Chazov bears responsibility for the Ministry's longstanding indifference to the health of children in the Central Asian Soviet republic of Uzbekistan. There, according to official Soviet sources, they permitted for more than twenty years, the use of a highly toxic defoliant on cotton fields where children were working.⁸

Another Soviet medical bureaucrat deeply involved with the International Physicians is Dr. Marat Vartanyan, a psychiatrist. He has served as the chief spokesman justifying Soviet use of harsh psychiatric methods and chemicals to punish political dissenters. Despite the mounting evidence of Soviet abuse of psychiatry, Dr. Vartanyan has lied for a decade about the issue to the World Psychiatrists' Association and has tried to get Western psychiatrists to approve the Soviet practices.⁹

Soviet Scientists: Propaganda and Military Connections

The Soviets use the most "politically reliable" members of their scientific community to influence Western scientists. All contact with their Western colleagues by scientists working at the Soviet Academy of Sciences is controlled by the Academy's Directorate of Foreign Relations, which is subordinate to the KGB, the Soviet secret police. Every Soviet scientist leaving for a trip to the West is obligated, by official Academy instructions, to adhere to Soviet policies in their entirety in his private conversations with foreign colleagues.¹⁰

8. Ann Sheehy, "Cotton at Any Price or a Fair Price?" Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, 1986, No. 326.

9. Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway, Russia's Political Hospitals: the Abuse of Psychiatry in the Soviet Union (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1977), pp. 227, 299, 300, 314-317. In 1983, the Soviets, rather than face expulsion as a result of accumulating evidence of their abuses of psychiatry, quit the World Psychiatrists' Association.

10. "Taksar Tells How Soviets Control Profs Visiting U.S.," Campus Report, March 16, 1983, pp. 1-2.

Scientists representing the Soviet Union in "peace" discussions with their Western colleagues are frequently leading personalities in the Soviet military-industrial complex. Soviet nuclear physicist V. Yemel'yanov, the former chairman of the Academy's Commission on Scientific Problems of Disarmament, is a frequent participant in Pugwash meetings.¹¹ He is prominent in the Soviet defense industry and was once a major opponent of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty on nuclear weapons.¹²

Today, a key contact in the Soviet science establishment for scientists of democratic countries is Academician Yevgeniy Velikhov. Though a prominent Soviet opponent of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, he is a leader in the research and development of the Soviet strategic defense program. In a recent speech, Velikhov, on behalf of Soviet scientists, promised the Communist Party to develop the best possible weapons for the Soviet military.¹³

The Academy of Sciences as a whole is heavily involved in weapons research and development. Individually, the most influential Soviet scientists do work for the military.¹⁴

Association of Soviet Lawyers

In 1985, the American Bar Association concluded an exchange agreement with the Association of Soviet Lawyers. Despite its misleading name, the Association of Soviet Lawyers is not an organization of working legal professionals. It is a group specifically created by the Soviet government for conducting disinformation and propaganda. The Association of Soviet lawyers

11. Pugwash conferences serve as a forum for regular meetings between scientists from democratic societies and government-appointed academics from communist countries, primarily the Soviet Union, where issues of disarmament are discussed.

12. Igor S. Glagolev, "The Soviet Decision-Making Process in Arms-Control Negotiations," Orbis, Winter 1978, p. 770

13. Soviet Strategic Defense Programs (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense and Department of State, October 1985), p. 22; "Rech' deputata Ye. P. Velikhova," Izvestiya, November 28, 1985.

14. Arthur J. Alexander, Soviet Science and Weapons Acquisition (Santa Monica, California: Rand, 1982), pp. vi, vii, 18; John R. Thomas, "Militarization of the Soviet Academy of Sciences," Survey, Spring 1985, pp. 33-39.

publishes anti-Semitic tracts and attacks defenders of human rights in the Soviet Union.¹⁵

"Think Tanks"

As part of their strategy to fool the West by depicting Soviet institutions in terms familiar to the West, the Soviets affix the "think-tank" label to such Soviet organizations as the "Institute of USA and Canada" and the "Institute of World Economy and International Relations." In reality, these institutes are subordinate to the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and are engaged mainly in propaganda and intelligence activities.

Rather than to influence Soviet policy making,¹⁶ says a former staff member of the Institute of USA and Canada, the main job of the Institute's "scholars" is to "persuade [Americans] in the right course of Soviet politics." As such, she continues, the Institute has become "a real propagandistic tool aimed at the West."¹⁷ Georgiy Arbatov, the Director of the Institute of USA and Canada, frequently presents a sophisticated and "reasonable" image on American television and at many scholarly and political meetings with Americans. But back at home, Arbatov specializes in slandering American society. Example: writing in the Communist Party daily Pravda earlier this month, Arbatov charged that there is a "secret police" in the United States, to which Americans write "denunciations" of each other. In the same article, Arbatov said that President Reagan used bogus quotes, manufactured by Nazi propagandists from the writings of Lenin, in his August 1986 interview to Fortune magazine. In fact, the President did not quote Lenin at all in this interview, but rather stated his desire for peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union.¹⁸

The Institute of World Economy and International Relations plays a similar role. Its director, Yevgeniy Primakov, who made his name in the Soviet Union by publishing virulently anti-Israel tracts, has been a fixture in Soviet delegations to international conferences of

15. For details on the Association of Soviet Lawyers, see Mikhail Tsympkin, "The American Bar Association: Duped by the Soviets?" Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 510, May 19, 1986.

16. Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985), p. 210; Barbara Dash, A Defector Reports: The Institute of USA and Canada (Falls Church, Virginia: Delphic Associates, Inc., 1982), pp. 217-220.

17. Dash, op.cit., pp. 222, 223.

18. G. Arbatov, "Kto komu bol'she nuzhen?" Pravda, September 13, 1986.

scientists. The Institute also provides "experts" such as Sergei Plekhanov to appear on American television.

The Institute of USA and Canada has close links with the KGB. Its Deputy Director, Radomir Bogdanov, is a high-ranking KGB officer. The Institute's research papers are used by the KGB in their disinformation campaign against the United States. The Institute's staffers help the KGB collect information on visiting Americans and use their Institute affiliation to visit the U.S., where they perform similar tasks.¹⁹

The Church

Speaking this February at the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev noted the importance of foreign religious organizations for the Soviet "peace offensive." The Russian Orthodox Church is a key Soviet link to foreign religious groups. Devastated by Lenin's and Stalin's terror, the Russian Orthodox Church now is completely controlled by the Soviet state. The price paid by its hierarchy for the Church's survival is slavish and vocal support for the Kremlin's foreign policy. Example: The Publishing Department of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church is going to produce film "documentaries" about the thriving Russian Church. In truth, religious education of children is prohibited in the USSR. The films, a kind of Potemkin Cinema, are to be sent to the West to blunt the accusations that the USSR represses religion. While the Russian Orthodox Church of course never criticizes Kremlin policies, it is used to denounce American arms control policies.²⁰

The affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church are run by the government's Council of Religious Affairs, whose main task is to control and undermine religion in the Soviet Union. A secret report by this Council, smuggled to the West, reveals that the Council runs a network of spies to collect derogatory information about Russian churchmen. The Council boasts about the declining number of priests in the Soviet Union. And in the opinion of the Council, the best priests are those who are trusted "to contact foreigners" and to rebut

19. Stanislav Levchenko, "Unmasking Moscow's 'Institute of the USA,'" Heritage Foundation Background No. 234, December 17, 1982, p. 5.

20. Oxana Antic, "The Activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, 1983-1985," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin, 1986, No. 71, pp. 2-5; Pimen, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, "Otkrytoe Pis'mo Prezidentu Soedinennykh Shtatov Ameriki g-nu Ronal'du Reyganu," Izvestiya, June 14, 1986; Charlotte Astor, "The War against Religion," USIA Wireless File, Addendum #34, August 22, 1986, p. 1.

"slanderous" questions from them, who show the minimum interest in their pastoral duties, and who are corrupt and immoral.²¹

THE GENUINE PEACE GROUP

There is one genuine Soviet peace organization:²² the Group to Establish Trust Between the U.S. and USSR. Established by private citizens in 1982, it seeks to promote contact between citizens of the two nations without government interference. Unlike the official "peace groups," which blame all the world's troubles on the democracies, the Trust Group does not endorse Soviet policies, although they do not criticize them publicly out of fear of even more KGB persecution.

The Trust Group strives to provide an opportunity for individuals to state their own opinions on important political matters. The latest action of this kind was a public appeal to the Soviet authorities to review all the Soviet nuclear power projects in the aftermath of Chernobyl. The Trust Group also serves as a conduit for informal meetings between visitors from democratic nations and Soviet citizens who have not been "cleared" by the KGB for such meetings.

The KGB has been trying to destroy the Trust Group. Many members of it have been imprisoned, confined to psychiatric hospitals, or exiled from the Soviet Union. This April, Trust Group member Larisa Chukaeva was stripped of her parental rights; her three-year-old son was put into a state-run orphanage, whose location is kept secret from her. The court made it clear to Chukaeva, who has been sentenced to two years in prison, that she would get her child back only if she stopped participating in the Trust Group peace movement.

FALSE AMERICAN PRESUMPTIONS IN DEALING WITH SOVIETS

In the past, Americans have held a number of false, and thus dangerous, assumptions when they have pursued contacts with the Soviets. Among them:

21. "Tserkovnye kadry i mery po ogranicheniyu ikh deyatel'nosti ramkami zakona," Vestnik RSKhD, No. 130, 1979, pp. 304-308.

22. Several other unofficial peace groups already have been destroyed by the KGB.

"Influencing" the Kremlin

Often, Americans feel that they will be able to influence Kremlin policy by their contacts with Soviets. Moscow encourages this assumption to attract prominent and prestigious American groups to the USSR. But such Soviet individuals as Dr. Chazov and Dr. Vartanyan whom the Americans meet have built their careers carefully and achieved high positions in Soviet society because of their absolute conformism and their refusal to argue with the Communist Party leaders. They are not about to be a conduit for American views. Their opinions on matters of peace or national security, moreover, are not sought by the Soviet leaders. Soviet decision making is strictly compartmentalized: foreign and defense policies are the sole province of several Politburo members, the most powerful members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and their immediate staff, and the top officials in the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs.

Members of the Association of Soviet Lawyers have no say in the treatment of political dissenters. Such issues are decided by the Fifth Chief Directorate of the KGB, the Department of the Administrative Organs of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and finally, by the Politburo. Soviet legal bureaucrats are only following orders.

The leaders of Soviet science, in particular, with their deep involvement in defense work, will not advocate policies (to the very modest degree that even prominent personalities outside the Politburo can engage in national security debates) inimical to the growth of their main source of support, the Soviet defense establishment.

"Influencing" Soviet "Public Opinion"

Another false American assumption is that the Soviets, to some degree, are a mirror image of the U.S. Americans thus may bite at Soviet bait offered to Americans that they can "influence" Soviet "public opinion." Example: Members of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War have lectured to groups of Soviet physicians on the horrors of nuclear war and even appeared on a TV broadcast in the Soviet Union with the same message. The mistake is that U.S. backers of the International Physicians are drawing on their experience of grassroots political activism in the United States when they assume that such programs will have impact in the USSR. This experience simply is not applicable to the closed Soviet society, which lacks a mechanism for translating the sentiments of the people

into political decisions. In fact, the Soviet physicians have not engaged in any anti-nuclear activities at home.²³

Taking Soviet Statements at Face Value

American groups visiting the Soviet Union often are told something as if it were a solid fact, and they then transmit it widely on returning home. The trouble is that the "fact" is a lie. Example: After a visit to the USSR this spring by an American Bar Association delegation, its spokesman announced that, subsequent to his delegation's discussions with Soviet officials, "the Soviet government has...announced a relaxation in their current emigration policy."²⁴ The truth is that there was no such announcement by the Soviet government, and the number of Jews allowed to leave the Soviet Union in July fell to 31 from 50 in June, the second lowest number in a year.

Example: The National Council of Churches reported, after its delegation visited the Soviet Union this summer and met with officials of the Council for Religious Affairs, that "the Jewish community" in the city of Tbilisi was going to "supervise the restoration of the synagogue" there.²⁵ But Jewish communities exist only on paper in the Soviet Union; Jews in that country have no power to protect their culture and religion from destruction carried out by the government.

PREVENTING REAL HUMAN CONTRACTS

Gorbachev's leadership is determined to make Soviet-U.S. exchanges a one-way street, where the Soviets, through the use of their modern day Potemkin villages, play on public opinion in the United States, while Americans are denied effective access to Soviet society. Gorbachev is trying to use exchanges for stirring anti-defense sentiment in the United States, while molding the new Soviet generation in the spirit of militarism and hostility to the United States.

The Soviets are not opening up their society to democratic ideas. KGB boss Viktor Chebrikov declared at the 27th Party Congress

23. Sergei Batovrin, "Dissidents Deserve Dr. Chazov's Nobel," The New York Times, December 31, 1985.

24. ABA Officers Talk Human Rights with Soviet Leaders (Chicago, Illinois: American Bar Association, June 13, 1986).

25. "U.S. Christians Investigate Alleged Destruction of Soviet Synagogue," National Council Of Churches News, July 9, 1986.

that ideas not acceptable to the Communist Party should not and would not reach the Soviet people.²⁶

Soviet officialdom is interested not in understanding Americans and being understood by them, but only in winning a public relations battle. Thus, the Communist Party daily Pravda, commenting on a TV link between audiences in Leningrad and Seattle, Washington, compared the Soviet audience to a "national team," defending "the flag," and emphasized "the readiness and ability of every Soviet patriot to give a fight to those unfriendly to socialism."²⁷

The young Soviet generation is being brought up in the spirit of militarism and intolerance. The "Lessons of Peace," conducted annually in Soviet schools, take children to "museums of military glory" and monuments to the Soviet Armed Forces victories. Soviet children are encouraged to establish memorials in their schools to Private Nikolai Chepik, a soldier in the Soviet invasion army in Afghanistan, killed there by the freedom fighters. All young Soviet men are drafted for two to three years of military service; there they have to take part in "Lessons of Hate" toward the West.²⁸

CONCLUSION

The Soviets seek to influence U.S. public opinion by engaging various American professional and social groups involved in exchange and cooperation programs with fake Soviet "counterparts." The Soviets are trying in their contacts with these American groups to isolate the issues of arms control from political realities and to coax Americans to ignore the critical differences between the Soviet and U.S. political systems and foreign policies.

The Soviets are trying to convince the Americans that "exchanges" and "dialogue" can influence the Soviet leadership to be more "reasonable" and "peaceful"--especially when handled on the Soviet terms that issues embarrassing the Soviets, such as Afghanistan or human rights, are not raised. Whenever they can, the Soviets use the exchanges to whitewash their violations of human rights.

26. Pravda, March 1, 1986.

27. N. Potapov, "Pri svete sovesti i pravdy," Pravda, April 14, 1986.

28. O. S. Kharkhardin, Sovetskaya obshchestvennost' v mirovom antivoennom dvizhenii (Moscow: Nauka, 1985), p. 63; Norman Naimark and David Powell, "Moscow's Cult of Militarism," The National Interest, No. 4, Summer 1986, p. 63; Rear Admiral S. Rybak, "Vospitanie politicheskoy bditel'nosti v dal'nem pokhode," Morskoy sbornik, 1986, No. 4, p. 13.

At the same time, the Soviets use their contact with American groups to foster U.S. public criticism of Reagan policies. Yet the Soviets are more committed than at any time since Stalin to prevent criticism of their foreign policy by the Soviet public and to use all methods of intimidation to stop contact between Americans and unauthorized Soviets.

The U.S. should not allow Moscow's strategy to succeed. While mutual exchanges can be mutually beneficial, they will not be so unless Washington takes specific steps to restore the balance in U.S.-Soviet exchanges.

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