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## **RHETORIC VS. REALITY: HOW THE STATE DEPARTMENT BETRAYS THE REAGAN VISION**

### **INTRODUCTION**

President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz have articulated a welcome and long overdue foreign policy doctrine. They have said that the goal of freedom loving people should be to roll back Soviet gains, not merely "contain them." They have denied the validity of the doctrine enunciated by the late Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev that once a country becomes communist it can never leave the Soviet camp. The liberation of Grenada was vitally important to this new Reagan Doctrine because it was the first step in discrediting the Brezhnev Doctrine.

There are today a number of national liberation movements attempting to overthrow Marxist regimes in countries of key strategic interest to the U.S. As with most indigenous revolutions, these are anti-colonialist in nature. They seek to oust rulers installed by an outside power. Unlike insurgent uprisings of the past two decades, today's national liberation movements are anti-communist and threaten to topple Soviet colonial governments. This is an historic turn of events for the Free World, one that may mark the first stage in the unraveling of Moscow's empire.

Both Reagan and Shultz have said consistently that free people have a moral obligation to support indigenous and nationalist anti-communist resistance movements wherever they occur. Both have said that freedom and autonomy are not privileges limited to the West.

After five years, however, the Reagan Administration's liberation rhetoric still bears little relationship to actual U.S. foreign policy. It is not easy to identify exactly where the blame lies for

this distressing--and embarrassing--gap between the rhetoric and the reality. But it is increasingly apparent that the objectives stated by Ronald Reagan and George Shultz are not being furthered by the Administration's foreign policy. And it is also clear that the major problem is at the State Department where a persistent effort is made to derail and betray the Reagan Doctrine.

Global conditions currently favor turning the new Reagan foreign policy doctrine into reality. There are at least eight pro-Western, anti-communist revolutionary movements now operating inside Soviet-controlled countries. Yet the U.S. is actively supporting only one, the freedom fighters in Nicaragua. Even there, while the Administration's endorsement of the anti-communist movement is strong, the practical follow-through is less so.

In Mozambique, the pro-Western insurgent group, RENAMO, actually seems on the verge of defeating the Soviet-backed regime of Samora Machel. Yet the U.S. State Department is now asking Congress to appropriate \$27 million in aid to prop up the failing Marxist government.

In Angola, Jonas Savimbi's pro-Western UNITA movement has 60,000 well-trained guerrillas battling the Soviet-installed Angolan government propped up by 35,000 Cuban troops. Savimbi now controls one-third of the country, and with U.S. moral and material support could win and install a pro-Western, or at least anti-communist government, thus diminishing Soviet influence in the region. But the U.S. State Department did nothing to help those congressmen who succeeded in overturning the 1976 Clark Amendment, which had prohibited the U.S. from supporting Savimbi. The State Department, in fact, seems to view UNITA, the forces fighting Soviet and Cuban colonialism, as more of an impediment than a help to U.S. interests in the region.

Nor is the the U.S. giving solid support to the Solidarity movement in Poland,<sup>1</sup> or the anti-communist fighters in Ethiopia. In Afghanistan, the limited U.S. support for the Mujahideen freedom fighters is the result of congressional, not State Department, initiative. For years, the State Department has, in fact, been dragging its heels on providing aid to Afghans fighting the Soviet invasion and occupation of their country.

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1. While U.S. policy in Eastern Europe is not treated explicitly in the Reagan Doctrine--as it is strictly defined--the eventual weakening and elimination of Soviet domination over the East bloc nations is certainly implied, and, in fact, has been explicitly stated as a goal of U.S. foreign policy by both President Reagan and Secretary Shultz on numerous occasions.

Liberal Congressman Stephen Solarz, the New York Democrat, successfully pushed through Congress legislation to send assistance to the Cambodian Freedom Fighters over the objections of the State Department.

Reagan and Shultz have denounced repeatedly the activities of the communist governments of Eastern Europe. There is Bulgaria's implication in the plot to assassinate Pope John Paul II, General Wojciech Jaruzelski's brutal crackdown on the trade unions led by Solidarity in Poland, the murder of Major Arthur Nicholson, Jr., in East Germany, the killing and imprisonment of religious leaders in Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and the involvement in a worldwide terrorist network on the part of all these countries. Yet the U.S. is trying to improve relations with these regimes by offering them favorable trade and credit arrangements--in effect, subsidizing such aggression against Western interests.

Both Reagan and Shultz have declared war on terrorism, implicating at various times (and selectively) Iran, Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Libya, Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and North Korea. Terrorist acts have been directed almost exclusively against Western interests. Despite the deaths of more than 300 Americans at the hands of terrorists in the 1980s, the U.S. almost entirely has failed to launch "swift and effective retaliation," as the President promised. The Administration has responded effectively to the killing of only one American--Leon Klinghoffer. Meanwhile, it has been demonstrated that for the price of two truck bomb fanatics anyone can drive the U.S. out of a particular area and diminish American prestige. Some 39 Americans were held hostage by terrorists on TWA flight 847, one was tortured, and another murdered. The U.S. was humiliated on worldwide television for three weeks. There has yet to be an effective U.S. response to this incident.

Then there was the disgraceful handling of the episode involving the Ukrainian sailor, Miroslav Medvid, who tried twice to defect in October 1985 by jumping ship when it was docked in New Orleans. Yet the State Department acquiesced when Medvid--kicking and screaming--was handed back to the Soviet authorities, evidently in an effort to avoid an "incident" before the Geneva summit. This was in clear violation of the stated commitment on the part of Reagan and Shultz to welcome refugees fleeing communist tyranny.

Ultimately, of course, responsibility for the Administration's failure to carry out the Reagan Doctrine leads to the Oval Office. But the President has made his views clear on the most critical foreign policy matters. As such, he is not being well served by those who are supposed to execute his policies. The State Department continues to pursue its own agenda, seemingly independently of the White House's stated goals.

Most of the Foreign Service is still in the old mind-set, apparently remembering the days when Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara led revolutions. In the minds of the vast majority in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, the main goal of the West should be the preservation of the status quo, even when this means accommodating, and at times defending, existing Soviet-installed governments. Support for pro-Western insurgencies goes against this don't-rock-the-boat approach. The result is that Reagan Administration foreign policy rhetoric and reality diverge dramatically--and needlessly.

## AFGHANISTAN

**RHETORIC:** Ronald Reagan on the Afghans in an ABC News interview on March 9, 1981: "Those are freedom fighters. Those are people fighting for their own country and not wanting to become a satellite state of the Soviet Union, which came in and established a government of its own choosing there, without regard to the feelings of the Afghans."

On February 16, 1983, six Afghan freedom fighters met privately with Reagan in the Oval Office. He was moved by stories of Soviet atrocities in the country and, according to U.S. News and World Report, phoned Soviet leader Yuri Andropov the next day and urged him to change Soviet policies in Afghanistan, stressing that this would be a precondition to improved relations.

George Shultz to the Commonwealth Club of California on February 22, 1985: "Our moral principles compel us to give material assistance to those struggling against the imposition of Communist tyranny. We have a legal right to do so. The charters of the United Nations and the OAS reaffirm the inherent right of collective self-defense against aggression of the kind committed by the Soviets in Afghanistan....How can we as a country say to a young Afghan...learn to live with oppression. Only we, who already have freedom, deserve to pass it on to our children."

George Shultz to Afghans at a refugee camp in Pakistan in 1984: "We are with you, we are beside you, we are behind you. America will never let you down."

**POLICY REALITY:** When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, Jimmy Carter expressed outrage and imposed 13 sanctions, some very strong, including a grain embargo, tighter controls on high technology exports to the Soviet Union, revocation of Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters, the recall of the U.S. Ambassador from Moscow, suspension of all U.S.-Soviet official exchanges, and the U.S. boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics.

With the possible exception of controls on high technology exports to the Soviet Union, the Reagan Administration has lifted all of these sanctions. The U.S. government still has an embassy in the Afghan capital of Kabul and deals with the Soviet-backed rulers there. During the last several months, both Secretary of Agriculture John Block and Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige visited Moscow to secure more U.S.-Soviet agreements, enhance trade, and expand agricultural cooperation.

The Soviet-installed regime in Afghanistan, in fact, still enjoys Most Favored Nation trade status with the United States despite the fact that Congress passed legislation in 1985 giving the State Department authority to revoke it. MFN means lower tariffs and favorable credit arrangements with the U.S., and is a privilege ordinarily reserved for friendly nations with good human rights records. The State Department has been reluctant to revoke Afghanistan's MFN status, apparently for fear of displeasing the Kremlin.

Far from providing adequate military, or even humanitarian, assistance to the Mujahideen freedom fighters, the State Department actually has opposed congressional legislation calling for increased aid to the Afghans. When aid at last was authorized for 1985, it took the Department of State seven months to allocate a mere \$6 million to the relief agencies.

"The State Department has been cruelly slow in making funds available that were intended to be made available by Congress for humanitarian aid," complains Senator Gordon Humphrey, the New Hampshire Republican, "We pounded on their door and rang their phones week after week, just to get them to spend the paltry amount we appropriated, and even with that kind of pressure the footdragging and heel digging continue."

Congress recently appropriated an additional \$15 million under the Foreign Relations Bill and \$10 million under the Defense Authorization Bill of 1986 for humanitarian aid, with no help from the State Department. Without congressional initiative there would have been no new money at all. Much of this aid is supposed to go to private volunteer medical and charitable organizations that have been working with the wounded Afghan freedom fighters and refugees. Many of these groups say that either they are not getting the funds promised them by State Department officials or they are not getting them in a timely way.

One example: Dr. Robert Simon, a physician at UCLA, founded the International Medical Corps to treat wounded Afghans, mostly villagers. Simon recruited more than two hundred volunteer doctors to staff the field clinics in Afghanistan. Congress appropriated \$2 million specifically for medical work performed by the IMC in

Afghanistan. Of the \$2 million earmarked by Congress for Simon's organization, State granted the IMC only \$650,000. State then refused to release any money at all until Simon promised not to send American personnel inside Afghanistan. Said one State Department official: "If an American were captured, it would feed Soviet propoganda that it's Americans who are causing all the trouble in Afghanistan."

But Congress had specifically mandated that the funds be granted to the IMC for their medical work inside Afghanistan. Getting humanitarian aid to the Mujahideen and the villagers in Afghanistan, not only Pakistan, is now official U.S. policy. The State Department is deliberately obstructing the will of Congress and stated Reagan policy.

The Carter Administration required Moscow to meet four conditions for peaceful settlement of the Afghan war: 1) withdrawal of Soviet troops; 2) a guarantee that refugees could return to Afghanistan in a safe and honorable fashion; 3) a guarantee of Afghanistan's neutrality; and 4) a recognition of the right of the Afghan people to self-determination.

The Shultz State Department, however, softened the Carter conditions of Soviet withdrawal of its troops. Beginning to slip into State Department policy statements are such phrases as "We recognize that the Soviets have a right to a non-hostile Afghanistan on their southern border," and "We recognize that Afghanistan is in the Soviet sphere of influence," and "The United States and the Soviet Union will guarantee Afghanistan's neutrality."

But the Soviets already had a peaceful southern border before they attacked their neighbor. Afghanistan was a threat to no one and, in fact, had treaties with Moscow of mutual assistance and peaceful co-existence. It is puzzling, moreover, that the State Department apparently has begun assigning nonaligned and neutral nations to the Soviet "sphere of influence." Ronald Reagan repeatedly has denounced the 1945 Yalta conference for doing, among other things, just that. Ignoring Reagan's dictates, the State Department consistently inserts conciliatory language into what previously had been tough statements of U.S. policy.

## ANGOLA

RHETORIC: Ronald Reagan in June 1985 sent a letter to Lewis Lehrman, president of Citizens for America, praising him for organizing a conference in Angola of anti-communist resistance movements. The letter, in part, stated: "Around the world we see people joining together to get control of their own affairs and to free their nations from outside domination and ideology....Those of us lucky enough to live in democratic lands have to be moved by the

example of men and women who struggle every day, at great personal risk, for rights that we have enjoyed from birth. Their goals are our goals."

George Shultz to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on February 22, 1985: "We must, in short, stand firmly with the forces of democracy around the world. To abandon them would be a shameful betrayal--a betrayal not only of brave men and women, but of our highest ideals."

POLICY REALITY: The U.S. Congress has now repealed the Clark Amendment. Passed in 1976, this measure prevented the U.S. from providing assistance of any kind to UNITA, the anti-communist guerrilla movement, which is trying to overthrow the Soviet-installed regime in Luanda, Angola's capital.

Led by Jonas Savimbi, UNITA's 60,000 well-trained troops are the most potent anti-communist nationalist movement in the world. At one point, they controlled an area in Angola approximately the size of Texas and have operated fully over 95 percent of the territory. UNITA has suffered setbacks in 1985 only because the Soviets, sensing a possible overthrow of their puppet regime in Luanda, recently provided \$2 billion in military assistance, including advanced weapons, helicopter gun ships, and advisors to back up the Cuban and Angolan government forces. Despite this latest Soviet offensive, UNITA still controls one-third of Angola and is self-sufficient in food; Luanda imports 70 percent of its food needs, and constantly seeks humanitarian aid to alleviate hunger. At least 8,000 Cubans have been killed in Angola by UNITA forces since 1975.

U.S. policy encourages American firms to invest in Angola. The U.S. Export-Import Bank, for example, has given more than \$200 million in concessionary loans for projects that the Gulf Oil Company, a subsidiary of Chevron, and the Luanda government are jointly undertaking in Angola's Cabinda oil fields. Angola also purchases airplanes, food, and other products made in the U.S. The U.S., in fact, is Angola's largest trading partner.

When a Cuban-backed faction, known as the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola), grabbed power in 1975, President Ford severed informal relations that existed between the U.S. and Angola.

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2. The Clark Amendment was particularly devastating to Western interests because, not only did it prevent the U.S. government from assisting the anti-communists in Angola overthrow the Moscow-backed government in Luanda, it made it almost impossible for other Western, African and Arab governments to help UNITA, since the U.S. was perceived as being opposed to the anti-communist effort. Thus, repeal of the Clark Amendment by Congress opens the way, not only for U.S. support of the Angolan freedom fighters, but also support from other pro-Western nations.

The Cuban presence in the country continued to escalate, with 13,000 troops arriving in 1975, increasing to 35,000 over the next several years, thus filling a power vacuum left by the departing Portuguese colonists. President Carter maintained President Ford's policy of refusing to carry on formal or informal relations with the new Marxist regime in Luanda on the grounds that Cuba's installation of the MPLA as the government of Angola was in clear violation of the Alvor agreement promising free and open elections.

As with Afghanistan, however, the Reagan Administration has taken the teeth out of the Carter policy.

The Shultz State Department has reestablished informal relations with the MPLA. What is more surprising, the State Department failed to actively support congressional repeal of the Clark Amendment that would permit the U.S. to aid UNITA. Indeed, congressional observers feel that the State Department actually opposed the successful attempt to repeal the Amendment. Since then, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker has stressed that "there are no plans" to aid Savimbi, adding that "we intend to maintain our diplomatic efforts" to achieve a Cuban withdrawal.<sup>3</sup> These efforts have been a dismal failure despite five years of trying.

Meanwhile, efforts are under way in the U.S. Congress to aid UNITA. Congressman Mark Siljander, the Michigan Republican who is the ranking minority member of the African subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, submitted a bill calling for \$27 million in military aid to UNITA. Congressman Bill McCollum, the Florida Republican, introduced legislation that would impose economic sanctions against the Marxist regime in Angola if it did not open discussions with UNITA aimed at creating a coalition government leading to democratic elections in Angola by November 1986.

Even liberal Democrat Congressman Claude Pepper of Florida, the Chairman of the House Rules committee, introduced legislation calling for \$27 million in humanitarian aid to UNITA. He immediately picked up Republican cosponsors Jack Kemp of New York and Jim Courter of New Jersey. Following the repeal of the Clark Amendment, it was clear that there was a bipartisan consensus in the Congress on the need to aid UNITA.

Aid to UNITA rose to the top of the agenda in the executive branch as well. According to published reports, the National Security Council, CIA, and the Pentagon all favored providing military and humanitarian support to UNITA. In fact, they were preparing this October to push for a \$200 to \$300 million covert military assistance program. Recent reports say that as much as \$5 million in military

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3. The New York Times, July 14, 1985.



assistance could be flowing to UNITA through CIA channels as early as February, despite opposition from the State Department.

"State is pretty well isolated in the Administration. Patience [with negotiations] is running out," said one congressional source.<sup>4</sup>

In addition, private assurances were given by the White House that the President would support Pepper's bill. In Reagan's October 24, 1985, address to the United Nations General Assembly, he called for negotiations in Angola between the communist government and the UNITA freedom fighters, and said that "Of course, until such time as these negotiations result in definite progress, America's support for struggling democratic resistance forces must not and shall not cease."

The State Department apparently was not listening to the President. The State Department has made it clear that it is dead set against aid to UNITA. On October 12, Shultz wrote a "for your eyes only" letter to House Republican Minority Leader Robert Michel asking him to use his influence to "discourage" the proposed legislation that would help UNITA. The Shultz letter argued that talks with the MPLA regime had reached a delicate stage. Shultz's private letter seemed to contradict his public statements that to abandon democratic anti-communist forces would be "a shameful betrayal." Michel rejected Shultz's plea, calling aid to UNITA "not only a geostrategic, but a moral necessity."

Three weeks later the State Department backtracked slightly and released a statement declaring that "we want to be supportive of UNITA." The statement, however, was vaguely worded and did not commit the State Department to any specific position. More recently, though, Shultz has indicated that he opposes the efforts of Democrat Pepper, Republican Siljander, and the White House to provide funds, overtly or covertly, to UNITA.

The Angolan government apparently hopes that the State Department will succeed in holding off congressional efforts to aid UNITA and succeed in convincing South Africa to pull its army out of neighboring Namibia. This would set the stage for a victory in Namibia by the South West African People's Organization, or SWAPO, which is backed by Cuba and the Marxist MPLA regime in Angola. According to an agreement arranged by the State Department, in return for South Africa giving up control of Namibia and ending its support of UNITA, Luanda would ask the Cubans to agree to a phased withdrawal from Angola. This State Department deal would be a great gain for Moscow. The Soviets would have a secure puppet government in Angola, recognized in the

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4. The Washington Times, December 23, 1985.

diplomatic community as legitimate, with friendly Marxist-Leninist neighbors.

To date, U.S. diplomats have not involved Savimbi in any negotiations with the Communists in Luanda. "U.S. officials have made it clear that they consider UNITA to be an internal Angolan problem and not part of the equation in seeking a southern African peace settlement," reported The Washington Post.<sup>5</sup> If the State Department, by undercutting the public statements of Reagan and Shultz, succeeds in its plans for a negotiated settlement for the region, Moscow will have legitimized its hold on another satellite in an area of key strategic importance.

#### MOZAMBIQUE

**RHETORIC:** Ronald Reagan on February 16, 1985: "Time and again we've aided those around the world struggling for freedom, democracy, independence and liberation from tyranny....In the 19th century we supported Simon Bolivar, the great liberator. We supported the Polish patriots, the French resistance and others seeking freedom. It's not in the American tradition to turn away. And lucky for us that those who loved democracy 200 years ago didn't turn away from us."

George Shultz in his Commonwealth Club speech on February 22, 1985: "America has a moral responsibility" to support the freedom fighters. "The lesson of the post-war era is that America must be the leader of the free world. There is no one else to take our place."

**POLICY REALITY:** Despite the noble rhetoric, the State Department in January 1985 moved to help the Soviet-installed government of Mozambique, asking Congress initially to appropriate \$40 million in aid, including \$1.1 million in military assistance. The State Department ran up against opposition in the Senate, however, and scaled back its request to \$27 million in humanitarian aid for 1986. The State Department also pressed the British government to commit \$650,000 for training Mozambique's government troops, by British officers, to combat Mozambique's anti-communist resistance movement, RENAMO. Moreover, in September 1985 the State Department brought Samora Machel, Mozambique's Marxist dictator, to Washington in order to make a personal appeal to President Reagan for U.S. financial, diplomatic, and even military support. This reverses Jimmy Carter's policy of banning all assistance to Mozambique on the grounds that, following the exit of the Portuguese colonialists, the country had become a Soviet puppet, had an abysmal human rights record, and that such aid would contribute to terrorism and increased oppression.

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5. The Washington Post February 22, 1985.

When news of the State Department's policy reversal reached Afonso Dhlakama, leader of RENAMO, he told Jack Wheeler of the Freedom Research Foundation: "My own opinion is that there is a clique in your State Department that has a fantasy of wooing away a Communist dictator from the Soviets through their greatest diplomatic skills and foreign aid bribes."

Dhlakama's RENAMO forces have grown steadily in strength since the movement was founded in 1977, two years after Samora Machel, supported by the Soviets, Cubans, and East Germans, seized control of Mozambique. With its 20,000-man guerrilla army, RENAMO is now fighting Machel's forces in all ten of Mozambique's provinces.

In Mozambique, as in Angola, the communist regime is weak and under siege. Like Angola, Mozambique is a country in which the U.S. has a chance to fulfill Reagan's vow to help nationalist, anti-colonialist movements, while simultaneously pursuing an anti-communist foreign policy. According to The New York Times, Machel is "an avowed Marxist-Leninist whose country's voting record at the United Nations is, from the American point of view, one of the worst."<sup>6</sup>

Mozambique's human rights record in the past decade ranks with the world's worst as well. Two years ago, for example, the Machel government began evacuating the cities, herding people into the countryside to work in the fields. To many observers, this was reminiscent of Pol Pot's evacuation of Phnom Penh after the Khmer Rouge took control of Cambodia in 1975. Reported The Washington Post: "50,000 Mozambicans have been forcibly evicted from major cities during the past three months and resettled in drought stricken areas hundreds of miles to the north in a government crackdown on 'unproductive individuals.'" Because of Mozambique's Marxist economic policy, the country, once a food exporter, now suffers severe shortages; one to two million inhabitants face starvation.

In view of the nature of the Machel regime and of the Reagan Doctrine, the State Department should be working to help RENAMO. Instead the Department wants to aid Machel. The State Department also has upgraded what was informal U.S. diplomatic representation in Mozambique to that of official ambassadorial level. The State Department's current request for \$27 million for Machel equals the support the U.S. is giving the Freedom Fighters in Nicaragua. The two policies seem contradictory: that Marxist Mozambique can be weaned away from the Soviets, but that Marxist Nicaragua cannot.

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6. December 3, 1984.

7. October 9, 1983.

In addition, the State Department is asking American corporations to invest in Mozambique. "It is indeed our policy to encourage trade and investment in Mozambique," says James Laird of the State Department's Bureau of African Affairs.

This too contradicts U.S. policy in view of the trade embargo on Nicaragua. While Sandinista human rights abuses are reprehensible, they are no worse and possibly not as bad as the repression in Mozambique. Furthermore, the drive by some in the West to impose economic sanctions on South Africa is based upon the idea that investment by U.S. corporations lends legitimacy to a regime guilty of gross human rights violations. Yet that same concept is not applied to Angola or Mozambique, where Chevron and other U.S. multinational companies provide income that keeps Marxist regimes in power.

The New York Times reported from Mozambique: "There are few Westerners here who would argue that the improved relationship signifies a lessening of Mozambique's fundamental commitment to a Marxism that defines Moscow as a 'natural ally.'"<sup>8</sup>

Mozambique is of key strategic importance to the Soviet Union. It boasts one of Africa's longest coastlines, three deep water ports, and large mineral deposits. Mozambique is also crucial to the Soviet Union's strategic objective of destabilizing South Africa. If all this works according to Moscow's plan--which the State Department seems to be facilitating--the Soviet Union could end up dominating southern Africa.

#### CAMBODIA

RHETORIC: Ronald Reagan in his January 24, 1984, State of the Union Address: "We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives on every continent...to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth. Support for freedom fighters is self-defense."

President Reagan in his May 5, 1985, address at the Bitburg Air Force Base, West Germany: "Twenty-two years ago, President John F. Kennedy went to the Berlin Wall and proclaimed that he, too, was a Berliner. Today, freedom loving people around world must say, I am a Berliner, I am a Jew in a world still threatened by anti-Semitism, I am an Afghan and I am a prisoner of the Gulag. I am a refugee in a crowded boat off the coast of Vietnam. I am a Laotian, a Cambodian, a Cuban, and a Miskito Indian in Nicaragua. I, too, am a potential victim of totalitarianism."

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8. June 3, 1984

Secretary Shultz, in his February 22, 1985, Commonwealth Club speech: "Six years after its invasion, Vietnam does not control Cambodia....The Vietnamese still need an occupation army of 170,000 to keep order in the country. They even had to bring in two new divisions to mount the recent offensive....How can we as a country say to a young...Cambodian: 'Learn to live with oppression: only those who have freedom deserve to pass it on to our children?'"

In a speech on February 20, 1985, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Michael Armacost identifies "failure to redress the imbalance within the Cambodian resistance" as one of the future challenges for U.S. policy toward Asia.

POLICY REALITY: U.S. policy toward Cambodia provides another graphic example of the glaring gap between the Reagan rhetoric and the State Department reality. So great is this gap that even liberal Democrat Congressman Stephen Solarz of New York was prompted to lead the fight to provide support for the Cambodian anti-Soviet resistance movements over State Department objections.

It has been seven years since the Soviet-backed Hanoi regime put its puppet Heng Samrin regime in power in Cambodia. He is kept in power by Vietnamese troops. Moscow subsidizes Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia with about \$1 billion a year in military and economic aid. In October 1979, Son Sann, a former Prime Minister of Cambodia, pulled together several guerrilla bands to form the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPLNF). Today it numbers 14,000 fighters and about 160,000 refugees. By 1981, Prince Sihanouk had established base camps for his Armee Nationaliste Sihanoukiste (ANS), which today claims about 10,000 troops in addition to 35,000 in refugee camps. The Khmer Rouge, in 1979, reverted to its former existence as a guerrilla movement. They are the largest group, with about 30,000 troops.

As this resistance mounted, Hanoi responded with a brutal dry season offensive in December, 1984. All three resistance groups were attacked and forced into Thailand. Throughout last year, the Vietnamese built a barrier along the Thai-Cambodian border using forced Cambodian labor. In response to the Vietnamese offensive, the ASEAN countries issued a joint communique on February 7, 1985, calling for international assistance to the Cambodian resistance. The U.S. refused.

Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz told Solarz's House Foreign Affairs Asia-Pacific Subcommittee on February 20, 1985: "We do not believe it is right to get into a position where this is our conflict." With regard to possible U.S. military assistance, he said, "Their most immediate need now, in the wake of this fighting on the border, is not additional weapons." Earlier, a Press Guidance Page from Wolfowitz's Office for January 22, 1985, declared: "A negotiated settlement would not be any easier if the U.S. were involved militarily in the hostilities."

Despite the State Department's efforts, Solarz's subcommittee on March 8 voted for up to \$5 million in economic and military support to the KPNLF and ANS--but not to the communist Khmer Rouge. This measure was passed by the full Foreign Affairs Committee on April 3, 1985.

Son Sann and Sihanouk were in Washington that week to seek support. At this point, the State Department changed its position slightly, announcing on April 9 that it would not categorically rule out supplying assistance to the non-communist resistance forces.

Congressional support mounted. On May 16 the Senate approved \$5 million in aid to the Cambodian resistance. The House passed the measure in June. This did not please the State Department. To emphasize its pique, it said that it was not going to carry out any program until the authorized aid became appropriated--a minor point.

In response to congressional pressure, State finally sent a team to Thailand to investigate the needs of the KPNLF and ANS. The result was a list of aid options, which, in addition to paramedical, vocational and secondary education to refugee camps, also included political warfare training. With the passage of the congressional appropriation on December 18, 1985, which specifically earmarked up to \$5 million for the KPNLF and ANS, State is now compelled to formulate a program that fulfills the Reagan Doctrine by assisting Cambodia's freedom fighters.

It is doing so reluctantly.

## NICARAGUA

RHETORIC: Ronald Reagan to the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce in Tampa, Florida, on August 12, 1983: "Today, our nation is confronted with a challenge of supreme importance. A faraway, totalitarian power has set its sights on our friends and our neighbors in Central America and the Caribbean. If we don't meet our responsibilities there, we will pay dearly for it."

Reagan's Address to the nation, May 9, 1984: "The Sandinistas, who rule Nicaragua, are communists whose relationship and ties to Fidel Castro of Cuba go back a quarter of a century....Nicaragua's unelected government is trying to overthrow the duly elected government of a neighboring country....Let us show the world that we want no hostile communist colonies here in the Americas--South, Central or North."

George Shultz to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on February 22, 1985: "The Sandinistas have...a new brutal tyranny that respects no frontiers. Basing themselves on strong military ties to

the Soviet Union, the Sandinistas are attempting, as rapidly as they can, to force Nicaragua into a totalitarian mold whose pattern is all too familiar. They are suppressing internal dissent, clamping down on the press, persecuting the Church, linking up with the terrorists in Iran, Libya, and the PLO, and seeking to undermine the legitimate and increasingly democratic governments of their neighbors."

**POLICY REALITY:** There is no foreign policy issue that Ronald Reagan considers more important than a Soviet-backed incursion in the American hemisphere, as has happened in Nicaragua. Indeed, the views expressed by State Department officials, up until recently, have been nearly as tough as the President's on the issue. U.S. diplomats have criticized the Sandinistas for breaking their 1979 promise, formally written to the Organization of America States, to have free and open elections. The State Department has denounced strongly Nicaragua's enormous military build-up, its publicly proclaimed alliance with Moscow, and its abuse of fundamental human rights. Furthermore, the State Department consistently has made the case for supporting Nicaragua's anti-communist insurgency.

But, as the November Reagan-Gorbachev summit approached, there was a noticeable relaxation in the tone of State Department spokesmen regarding the Sandinistas. On October 30, 1985, for example, The Washington Post reported: "Harry W. Shlaudeman, U.S. Special envoy for Central America, met with Nicaraguan Ambassador Carlos Tunnerman here yesterday in the two nations' first senior-level contact since early this year....State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb said....'the meeting reflects our wish to maintain regular diplomatic contact'" with the Sandinistas.

While Ronald Reagan refers to the Sandinista government as "a communist reign of terror," State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb insists that U.S. strategy in Nicaragua is almost purely "diplomatic" in nature. Though tougher than in other areas of the world, State still fails to press for direct military assistance to the Freedom Fighters, thus contradicting Reagan's public statements.

The State Department also unwisely has given blanket endorsement to the Contadora process.<sup>9</sup> The weakness of the Contadora process has been its failure to recognize the nature of the Nicaraguan regime. The Sandinistas, for example, publicly proclaim themselves a launching pad for a "revolution without frontiers." Sandinista leader Daniel

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9. The ongoing Central American negotiations have been called the Contadora process since Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela first met in January 1983 on Contadora Island to draft a regional peace settlement.

Ortega was quoted by La Prensa as saying, "Never again will the power of the people be defeated by either bullets or votes."<sup>10</sup> Adds Tomas Borge, the country's Interior Minister: "To disarm for us is impossible now."<sup>11</sup> Borge has also said that the Sandinistas view the negotiations as a way to give them needed time to consolidate power and squelch the few private, potentially democratic institutions that still remain. "Contadora is a retaining wall and a pathway," said Borge.<sup>12</sup>

Another factor working against the U.S. and democratic forces within Central America is the State Department's acquiescence in the exclusion of Nicaragua's freedom fighters from the talks. Both Reagan and Shultz have insisted that the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) is fighting for freedom against an illegitimate tyranny. But the State Department continues to deny the FDN a voice in the talks, and treats the freedom movement as if it were merely an internal problem for the communist Sandinistas.

Such a policy violates the President's stated intentions. For by relaxing pressure against the Ortega junta, the Contadora process as currently conceived,<sup>13</sup> and with State Department approval, is far more likely to entrench the Sandinistas and legitimize another Soviet satellite than to serve the cause of freedom and democracy.

#### SOVIET-CONTROLLED EASTERN EUROPE

**RHETORIC:** Ronald Reagan in Bonn, West Germany, on June 10, 1982: "Since World War II, the record of tyranny has included Soviet violation of Yalta agreements leading to the domination of Eastern Europe, symbolized by the Berlin Wall--a grim gray monument to repression that I visited just a week ago. It includes the takeovers of Czechoslovakia, Hungary...and the ruthless repression of the proud people of Poland."

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10. December 5, 1983.

11. The Washington Post, June 25, 1984.

12. Christopher Dickey, "Quagmire to Caldron," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 3, Winter 1983.

13. In early September 1985, Contadora foreign ministers set for themselves a 45-day deadline to get a signed treaty. When the November 20 deadline arrived, the Sandinistas refused to sign. The foreign ministers allowed themselves another month, but still could not put together an agreement. The talks have since been suspended for several months--but the Contadora process is not yet dead.



Reagan in Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983: "Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all those who live in that totalitarian darkness--pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the state, declare its omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all peoples on earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world."

George Shultz to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 15, 1983: "One of the most important recent achievements in East-West relations was the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act, with its pledges concerning human rights and national independence in Europe. Poland's experience in the past two years can be considered a major test of the Soviet Union's respect--or lack of it--for these commitments. Moscow clearly remains unwilling to countenance meaningful national autonomy for its satellites, let alone real independence.

"The policy of detente, of course, represented an effort to induce Soviet restraint. While in some versions it recognized the need to resist Soviet geopolitical encroachments, it also hoped that the anticipation of benefits from expanding economic relations and arms control agreements would restrain Soviet behavior.

"Unfortunately, experience has proved otherwise. The economic relationship may have eased some of the domestic Soviet economic constraints that might have at least marginally inhibited Moscow's behavior. It also raised the specter of a future Western dependence on Soviet bloc trade that would inhibit Western freedom of action toward the East more than it would dictate prudence to the USSR. Similarly, the SALT I and SALT II processes did not curb the Soviet strategic arms buildup, while encouraging many in the West to imagine that security concerns could now be placed lower on the agenda."

**POLICY REALITY:** U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe is called "Differentiation." By this the U.S. tries to reward the "good" Warsaw Pact nations that are attempting to become more "independent" of Moscow, while penalizing the more repressive East bloc regimes which display intense animosity toward the U.S. This policy has led to Most Favored Nation trading status for Hungary and Romania, but not for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, or East Germany. Most Favored Nation status is worth hundreds of millions of dollars in exports annually to Romania and Hungary.<sup>14</sup>

The awarding of Most Favored Nation Status to a communist country means the U.S. must waive the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974

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14. Juliana Geran Pilon, "Why Romania No Longer Deserves to be a Most Favored Nation," Heritage Foundation Background No. 441, June 26, 1985.

Trade Act, which prohibits the use of government credits and lower tariffs on imports from "non-market" (communist) countries unless they demonstrate progress in human rights. Hungary was awarded Most Favored Nation Status despite the fact that it shows no signs of becoming more independent of the Soviet Union. More serious is the case of Romania, which is one of the most repressive dictatorships in the Soviet Bloc, according to the State Department's own published reports.

When David Funderburk resigned in early 1985 as U.S. Ambassador to Romania, he outlined how State Department officials glossed over Romania's human rights record and its close relationship with Moscow to justify continuing Most Favored Nation status. The State Department "network," charges Funderburk, "works frantically to denigrate the latest information from the field regarding human rights violations and technology transfers. For example, every piece of sensitive technology that came up for review for sale to Romania, was supported blindly by the State Department." Romania has a formal agreement with the Soviet Union to turn over to Moscow any technology obtained from the U.S. and Western Europe.

The U.S. government, encouraged by the State Department, continues to subsidize bank loans to the Warsaw Pact, particularly Hungary and Romania, through the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. And the State Department has encouraged huge new commercial bank loans to the repressive East German regime, which has, in turn, loaned millions to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. The State Department is also advocating the admission of Poland to the IMF even though there have been no substantive changes in the policy of the Jaruzelski regime.

The State Department opposes enforcing the Tariff Act of 1930 that prohibits the importing of goods produced by slave labor. The evidence indicates that as much as half of the imports from the USSR have been manufactured through use of slave labor. To force the State Department to abide by the law, Senator William Armstrong, the Colorado Republican, has introduced legislation that would require the U.S. to enforce the Tariff Act against countries who use slave labor.

The State Department consistently has opposed requiring the reduction in the number of Soviet bloc personnel assigned to the United Nations Secretariat in New York, and limiting their movements within the U.S. Again, it took congressional action (the Roth Amendment in 1985) to finally force the State Department to restrict travel by Soviet bloc personnel. Yet there is overwhelming evidence that these employees are heavily involved in espionage, in violation of not only U.S. law, but also the U.N. Charter.

The State Department consistently has undermined Ronald Reagan's attempts to focus on the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime. Each year, on the November 7 anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution,

the State Department sends a letter of congratulations to the Soviet people. On October 24, 1985, Senator James McClure, the Republican from Idaho, introduced an amendment to forbid the State Department to send such a letter. Explained McClure to the Senate: "Because the captive Soviet people have little to celebrate, it is totally inappropriate for the State Department to congratulate them or to help celebrate the Bolshevik Revolution." McClure's amendment would also require that the State Department prepare a report "describing [the Secretary's] plan for proclaiming the sympathy of the American people for the bondage of the enslaved peoples of the Soviet empire and the hope that they will soon recover their freedom and national integrity." This would be in line with the President's policy. McClure's amendment passed in the Senate with no dissenting vote.

## TERRORISM

**RHETORIC:** Ronald Reagan welcoming the hostages back from Iran in January 1981: "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retaliation."

George Shultz on June 24, 1984: "When the Soviet Union and its clients provide financial, logistic and training support for terrorists worldwide...they hope to shake the West's self-confidence and sap its will to resist aggression and intimidation."

George Shultz on October 26, 1984: "We must be willing to use military force...to combat international terrorism. The public must understand before the fact that there is potential loss of life of some of our fighting men and the loss of life of some innocent people."

**POLICY REALITY:** Following the murder of Robert Stethem, the torture of another passenger, and the eventual release of the 39 other hostages kidnapped on June 14, 1985, aboard TWA flight 847, four masked terrorists appeared in front of Western newsmen. They declared that the U.S. had been adequately "humiliated," and that the hijacking was a demonstration of how the world's "oppressed" can succeed in its small wars of "liberation against the Great Satan." Indeed, in the face of terrorism, the U.S. has wavered.

The U.S. did win one modest victory against terrorism, apprehending some of those involved in the murder of Leon Klinghoffer after their hijacking of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro. Yet the diplomatic effort to get the hijackers extradited to the U.S. was a failure. More important, the State Department has failed to emphasize that the Klinghoffer killing was not a random act of violence. He was selected for execution because he was an American and a Jew. Jewish Americans have become the preferred targets of

Middle East terrorists, in large part because terrorists apparently feel that they need not fear retaliation if they pick on Americans.

Indeed, the U.S. has yet to respond to the April 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, the October 1983 bombing of the Marine compound at the Beirut airport, the December 1983 bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, the September 1984 bombing of the embassy annex in Beirut, the December 1984 murder of two American officials aboard a Kuwait airliner hijacked to Iran, and the June 1985 murder of Navy diver Robert Stethem aboard hijacked TWA flight 847.

Until the State Department stops equivocating in its response to the murder of U.S. citizens by hostile powers, the President's stated foreign policy agenda will be ill-served.

#### POLITICAL ASYLUM

RHETORIC: Ronald Reagan on July 19, 1984: "We have a moral responsibility to support those who aspire to live in a true democracy."

Ronald Reagan at naturalization ceremonies for new United States citizens on October 1, 1984: "Some of you came from places that, sadly, have not known freedom and liberty. Some of you have come from places that don't offer opportunity. Some of you are probably here because you are, by nature, adventurous. And some of you no doubt came here for a new start, to wipe the slate clean and begin your life anew. These strike me as all good reasons. In fact, they're the very same reasons that our forefathers came here. And they did pretty well--so well, in fact, that two centuries after they invented this country it is still what they intended it to be: a place where the oppressed, the lost, the adventurous can come for sanctuary and comfort and chance."

George Shultz to the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, September 11, 1984: "We can all take justifiable pride that the United States is recognized throughout the world for its leadership in humanitarian assistance to and the protection of refugees. We have given much to help the refugees of the world, but we have also benefited from the talents and hard work of the many refugees whom we have accepted for resettlement in the United States. Beyond the contributions of such well-known figures as Solzhenitsyn and Rostropovich, thousands of other refugees from persecution have greatly enriched our national life with their talents and hard work."

POLICY REALITY: The U.S. has a longstanding commitment to welcome those fleeing communist oppression. The granting of political asylum to anyone who requests it--especially defectors from the Soviet Union--by U.S. law and custom is virtually automatic. It was thus

inexplicable when the State Department refused to give sanctuary to Miroslav Medvid, the Ukrainian sailor who twice jumped off a Soviet freighter near New Orleans on October 24, 1985. He was returned to Soviet officials handcuffed, kicking and screaming. Puzzled and angered by this, Senators Gordon Humphrey, the New Hampshire Republican, and Alan Dixon, the Illinois Democrat, have introduced legislation co-sponsored by 50 other Senators to investigate the State Department's handling of the incident.

A statement issued on October 29 by the State Department concerning its involvement in the incident said the U.S. government had concluded that Medvid wished to return to the Soviet Union, even though he appeared to be heavily sedated. The fact that he twice leaped into the water and swam to shore to escape Soviet authorities was ignored by the State Department.

The Medvid case is not an isolated incident. Vladislav Krasnov, a professor of Russian Studies at Monterey Institute in Monterey, California, says "there has been in the past a pattern of mistreatment or inept handling of defectors by American bureaucrats."<sup>15</sup> Professor Krasnov also questions the requirement that Soviets be present when U.S. officials interrogate the would-be defector. Such a rule seems more calculated to avoid displeasing the Moscow government than at finding out if the Soviet citizen in question genuinely seeks his freedom and truly wants to be admitted to the United States.

The Medvid case regrettably typifies the State Department's modus operandi, which appears designed more to accommodate hostile powers than defend the rights of those unlucky enough to have to live under repressive governments. This mocks the state policy of Reagan and Shultz and the pledge implied in the Reagan Doctrine to help those who want to reject communist rule.

## CONCLUSION

Ronald Reagan won two enormous landslide elections. The American people assume that they were voting for policies that the President (and his cabinet Secretaries) have articulated. If the President and his Secretary of State say that it is U.S. policy to support freedom fighters battling communist tyranny in their native lands, most Americans would think such a policy was being executed by those in government paid to execute it. The same is true for the Administration's repeatedly stated commitments to wage war against terrorism; to support the oppressed people of Eastern Europe and to

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15. Juliana Geran Pilon, "It's Time for a Senate Probe of U.S. Handling of Political Asylum," Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum No. 104, December 13, 1985.

demonstrate U.S. unwillingness to recognize Soviet control there as legitimate; and to welcome to America's shores those who are fleeing communist repression.

In almost every area, however, these noble objectives, which Ronald Reagan has espoused throughout his political life, bear little resemblance to the policies being carried out by his State Department. Instead, his policies and goals often are being betrayed by the foreign policy establishment.

George Shultz articulated the Reagan Doctrine well when he said in February 1985 that "When the United States supports those resisting totalitarianism...we do so not only out of our historical sympathy for democracy and freedom, but also, in many cases, in the interests of national security." And Ronald Reagan told the nation in his second Inaugural Address: "America must remain freedom's staunchest friend, for freedom is our best ally and it's the world's only hope to conquer poverty and preserve peace."

It is time for this lofty rhetoric by the President and his Secretary of State to be reflected in the actual foreign policy of the United States.

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