

“Sephardic and Oriental” Jews in Israel and Western Countries: Migration, Social Change, and Identification

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In the course of the 20th century, the longstanding presence of Jews in North Africa and the Middle East came virtually to an end.¹ In an extraordinary exodus, sometimes under very stressful circumstances, more than one million Jews left countries in which they had resided for hundreds (if not thousands) of years and emigrated to countries whose Jewish community was often of much more recent origin, and whose members came from very different ethnic backgrounds. This essay assesses the changing profile of “Sephardic and Oriental” Jews since the Second World War, outlining the overall volume and major directions of Jewish international migrations, and examining patterns of demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural change in the context of absorption and integration processes both in Israel and in several western countries. Of particular interest are changes in the composition of immigrants to Israel from Asia and Africa, and their integration into and role in the shaping of Israeli society, as compared with parallel processes among Jewish migrants from those regions in France, the United States, and Latin America.

Analytic Issues and Definitional Problems

Large-scale international migration has long been a key feature of Jewish social and demographic history. It was responsible for major shifts in the global and regional geographical distribution of Jewish populations and for the varied contexts in which Jews conducted their social and cultural life and interacted with the surrounding society. Central to the Jewish historical experience was the degree of social justice, political equality, freedom of expression, and socioeconomic opportunities enjoyed by Jews, both collectively and individually. Once a sizable Jewish community developed in Palestine, and especially after the establishment of the state of Israel, the question of relationships and interactions of different groups within the Jewish majority became increasingly salient.

Issues relating to population and social change are worthy of analysis not only in their own right, but also for their impact on politics and public policy. In the case of Sephardic migration, we are dealing not only with quantifiable demographic and sociological data, but also with questions of personal identity that sometimes lie outside the rational realm and are difficult to measure and assess—yet are critical elements in academic and public discourse. With this in mind, there are several key issues that must be addressed in constructing a socio-demographic profile of Sephardic and Oriental Jewish migrants:

1. How do we define Sephardic and Oriental Jewish communities?
2. How do we assess their changing size, geographical distribution, and other socio-demographic characteristics and trends?
3. What were (and are) the distinctive socio-demographic characteristics and trends among Sephardic and Oriental Jewry as compared with those of other Jewish communities and the surrounding non-Jewish populations?
4. In assessing socio-demographic change among immigrants and their descendants in Israel and elsewhere, how should characteristics acquired variously at birth, in country of origin, and country of absorption be weighted?
5. What, if anything, was distinctive about migration to Israel as compared with Jewish migration to other countries, and what, beyond human capital, did Sephardic and Oriental migrants contribute to the new Jewish state?
6. Which model—convergence or divergence, homogenization or pluralism, harmony or conflict—best describes the demographic, socioeconomic, cultural, and identificational changes affecting immigrant groups in Israel and elsewhere?
7. How do we explain differences revealed by such comparative analysis of Sephardic/Oriental Jews versus other migrant Jews in Israel and elsewhere, and what are their broader international implications?
8. When does continuity in group identity give way to identificational change? More specifically, under which conditions and for how long does a “Sephardic and Oriental Jew” remain Sephardic and Oriental?²

The terminology of “Sephardic and Oriental” Jews, which derives from the Hebrew “sepharadim ve’edot hamizrah” (lit. [Jews] from Spanish and Oriental or eastern communities), is used to define a segment of world Jewry with supposed historical and sociocultural commonalities and distinct socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. It is problematic, however, for a variety of reasons. First, and most obviously, it combines two groups of different geographic origin. Second, even if the “Sephardic” component is removed, the “Oriental” component remains difficult to define objectively. In both scientific literature and public discourse, “eastern Jewish communities” does not reflect a straightforward geographical concept or other objective criterion. Instead, this term is used increasingly in a subjective manner to refer to issues of individual and group identity and collective memory. Moreover, there is no agreement about geographical boundaries between “East” and “West.” Whereas scholars of European modernization often cite an imaginary boundary running from Leningrad in the north to Trieste in the south,³ Jewish communities in the Maghreb (lit., the Occident)—which is geographically located at the west-




Figure 1. Age at marriage of Jewish brides and grooms in countries of origin among migrants to Israel—marriages until 1945 and from 1946–1961

Each point represents the combined average ages of Jewish brides and grooms in a given country at a given period of time. For each country, arrows go from the earlier to the later period of time.

Source: Created from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing* (Jerusalem: 1961).

ernmost end of the Mediterranean area—are typically associated with the “East,” whereas those of Eastern Europe are usually located in the “West.” Another approach views “Oriental” versus “western” in terms of differing rates and patterns of modernization, the assumption being that eastern cultures experienced modernization at a much later and slower pace. While this may be the case, historical-demographic data indicate that, whereas the *timing* and speed may have differed, the *nature* of socio-demographic change was essentially the same in both the East and the West.

Consider, for example, marriage patterns before 1961 among diaspora Jews who subsequently migrated to Israel.⁴ The data in figure 1 depict ages of brides and grooms in marriages performed up to 1945, versus those performed between 1946 and 1961. Each point in figure 1 combines the age at marriage of Jewish brides and grooms in a given country (for instance, in Yemen up to 1945, the average age for brides was a bit younger than 17 and for grooms about 20.5; by 1961, the average age had risen to a bit more than 18 and 21.5, respectively). The data indicate that, during the first half of the 20th century, Jewish brides and grooms in Asian and African countries generally married younger than those in Central and Eastern Europe. At the same time, a widespread trend toward later marriage is apparent

among both groups. Indeed, Jewish communities in Egypt, Turkey, and even Iraq do not appear to be distinctly different in this regard from those in Bulgaria and Greece, or even the U.S.S.R. (in the earlier period). All in all, Jewish marriage patterns reveal a sharp modernization gradient across countries of residence, with no clear dividing line between communities “of the East” and “of the West.”

Similarly, intriguing evidence based on DNA samples and an analysis of the human genome substantiates a long-held assumption of conventional Jewish historiography—namely, that most Jewish communities have substantially similar origins. Research on male-transmitted genetic characteristics tends to confirm a Middle Eastern origin for most contemporary Jews.⁵ It appears that prolonged segregation and homogamy reinforced the coherence of Jewish genotypes, notwithstanding the Jews’ substantial geographical mobility and their exposure over the centuries to different environments. Keeping in mind the focus on patrilineal origins in these population genetic studies, there appears to be no clear distinction between “eastern” and “western” communities. Jews are more “Oriental” compared with non-Jewish European populations and more “Occidental” compared with non-Jewish North African populations.

A more recent problem relating to the definitional boundaries of Oriental Jews has arisen due to the consequences of intensive international migration during the 20th century. In the wake of large-scale intercontinental mobility, especially since the Second World War, contemporary Oriental Jewish identity no longer reflects the actual *residential location* of Jewish communities but rather *global diffusion*—in Israel, France, and other western countries. With the passage of time and the birth of new generations geographically removed from the group’s place of origin, Oriental Jewish identity has tended increasingly to become the product of cultural transmission in a physically, religiously, and institutionally different context from that of the original culture. Thus, the question of “who is an Oriental Jew?” becomes ever more removed from its actual environmental roots.

The growing frequency of marriage between persons of different geographic origins has also complicated the meaning of “Sephardic and Oriental.” For a rapidly increasing proportion of the Jewish population both in Israel and elsewhere, ancestry and sub-ethnic identity are linked to more than one origin.⁶ Consequently, the determination and role of ancestry among Jews has tended to become similar analytically to the familiar and value-laden process of ancestry attribution in the United States and other major countries of immigration.⁷

All in all, somewhat echoing more general contentions about the concept of “Orientalism,”⁸ it appears that “eastern,” in the Jewish sense, is most commonly defined not in *objective*, but rather in *symbolic* terms. “Eastern” often appears in the context of value-laden assumptions about *difference*—or more precisely, *hierarchical inequality*. In such statements, the paradigm of *’edot hamizrah*, or “Oriental communities,” while expressed in the plural, is not posited against any similar paradigm of *’edot hama’arav*, or “western communities.” Instead, Oriental Jews are consistently contrasted with an aggregate of “Ashkenazim” who are assumed to form a coherent alternative paradigm. So, too, “eastern” and “Sephardim” commonly go together even though the history of Jews from Spain has little in common with that of Jews from Oriental communities. What this means is that all those who are not

“western” (actually Ashkenazic) constitute a single group. Put somewhat differently, “eastern-ness” is defined not by the *existence* of a given property, but rather by the *absence* of another property: “western-ness.” Furthermore, “West” and “western” are commonly (whether explicitly or implicitly) associated with modernization, progressiveness, and rationality—all of which are endowed with positive connotations and deemed desirable both for individuals and groups. In contrast, “East” and “eastern” represent the alternative—perhaps more expressive and colorful, probably less orderly and efficient, maybe good for *them*, but surely less desirable for *ourselves* or for *us all*.

To be sure, the East/West dichotomy may and has been employed by scholars of Jewish life without negative intent and pejorative assumptions, although the latter are also to be found, both above and below the surface, and implicit value judgments are difficult to avoid. A more neutral definitional criterion is the one long followed by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, which classifies Jews, for analytic purposes, by continents of origin (Africa, Asia, Europe, America) while explicitly avoiding the popular Ashkenazic-Sephardic dichotomy.⁹ From a cultural-historical perspective, it is useful to distinguish between Jewish communities (past or present) by location in a Christian versus a Muslim environment.¹⁰ There has also been a recent attempt to characterize the cultural background of Jewish cuisine by means of a dichotomy between the use of olive oil—predominant around Mediterranean shores—and goose fat, which was the norm in continental Europe as well as along Italy’s eastern coast.¹¹ Jewish culinary preferences appear to be intriguingly intertwined with the diffusion of Sephardic and Ashkenazic communities, but also illustrate the dependency of subgroup Jewish identities on environmental factors such as climate and food supply.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the “North-South” typology frequently used in contemporary studies of global development and modernization might more correctly capture both the straightforward geographical and cultural derivatives of the Jewish sociohistorical experience. This, of course, assumes the validity of using dichotomous typologies to describe world Jewry. In fact, the Jewish historical experience exhibits far greater variation, nuance, and identificational fluidity. Nevertheless, as do others, we adopt such a typology here as an operational device for handling a vast mass of detail and reducing complex phenomena to their essentials, albeit at the price of oversimplification.

Defining and Characterizing Jewish Ethnic and Sub-ethnic Identities

In attempting an evaluation of the thicker and more binding identificational components of Jews of Sephardic and Asian-African ancestry today, one must first consider how group identity shaped itself (or became reshaped) in the course of migration and absorption in new societies. In the process, certain aspects of ethnic identity were presumably eroded, whereas others were either created or reinforced. In the specific cases examined here, “Sephardic,” “Oriental,” or “Asian-African” are all used to define sub-ethnic identities within the broader framework of Jewish ethnic identity (see fig. 2).

Sub-ethnic identity among Sephardic and Oriental Jews, both in Israel and elsewhere, reflects a number of factors, including the pre-migration background of migrants, the modalities of the migration and absorption processes, and the nature of the receiving society. A further question is to what extent preexisting ethnocultural characteristics affected the socio-demographic patterns of immigrant absorption, and to what extent the consequences of immigrant absorption affected the patterns of group identity. On the one hand, the possibility existed that narrower particularistic identities could become integrated into broader, more encompassing, and possibly less specific identities. On the other hand, the cultural residue of the absorption process could have the opposite effect—of reviving or even generating new forms of more specific, communal sub-identities. The speed of these processes varied. In France, for instance, a strong assimilationist ethos promoted the immigrants' acquisition of French national identity, whereas in Mexico, which was characterized by deep socioeconomic cleavages and where an exclusive approach to national identity prevailed, the formation of ethnic enclaves was legitimated.¹²

Sub-ethnic identities may be portrayed, as in figure 2, as rungs on an imaginary ladder, with its bottom rungs representing very narrowly defined particular identities, and those at the top, broad and encompassing pan-ethnic identities. The following discussion reflects identificational changes that may occur in the context of international migration. Referring to the examples in figure 2, the initial situation is one in which a Jew in a given place experiences his or her Jewish identity vis-à-vis the non-Jewish environment, regardless of the existence of other Jews. The awareness of being of a particular geographic origin usually emerges only after such a Jew, following migration, comes into contact with other Jews of different geographical origins.




Figure 2. Hierarchic levels of ethnic and sub-ethnic identification

Source: Adapted from Sergio DellaPergola, Georges Sabagh, Mehdi Bozorgmehr, Claudia Der-Martirosian, and Susana Lerner, "Hierarchic Levels of Subethnicity: Near Eastern Jews in the U.S., France and Mexico," *Sociological Papers* 5, no. 2 (1996), 1–42.

Thus, during the process of absorption, integration, and acculturation of the immigrants, sub-ethnic identities may evolve and broaden geographically—for instance, from “Halabi” (Aleppan), to “Syrian,” to “Sephardic” or “Mizrahi,” before giving way to a generically inclusive ethnic category. (In Israel or in the United States, for instance, “Jewish” is the product of a merger of different Jewish sub-ethnic identities, and yet remains distinguished from other ethnic identities. Similarly, pan-ethnic identities tend to develop in both countries. The term “Israeli” encompasses Jews, Arabs, Druze, and other subgroups, whereas in the United States, the term “white” still leaves room for meaningful distinctions prior to a hypothetical grand merger into “American.”)¹³ Moreover, awareness of association with a given subgroup often increases when members of a given group meet those of other groups similarly located on the ethnic hierarchy. Among Jewish migrants from Syria, for example, the feeling of being “Halabi” may increase when those belonging to that community meet others of Shami (Damascene) origin. In a similar fashion, the feeling of being “Syrian” may increase when Syrian Jews come into proximity with Turkish Jews. In a broader sense, “Sephardic” identity (which contains many particularistic sub-ethnic identities such as “Iraqi” or “Moroccan”) is highlighted by contrast with the “Ashkenazic” community, which is also the product of many distinct sub-ethnicities. “White”—itself the merger of many ladders of distinct and even conflicting sub-ethnic identities such as “Italian,” “Polish,” “British,” and “Irish”—retains its distinctive identity as against “black” or “Asian,” which encompass their own powerful and often competing subgroups.

In other words, identifying as a “Sephardic,” “Oriental,” or “Mizrahi” Jew may represent a shorter or longer transitional stage between, say, a limited and local Halabi identity and a more encompassing national Israeli identity. Or else it may be part of a simultaneous identification with different levels of the sub-ethnic/ethnic ladder—the same person sometimes feeling more “Sephardic,” sometimes more “Halabi,” sometimes more “Israeli,” depending on context. This “Sephardic,” “Oriental,” or “Mizrahi” property, in spite of its transitional or shared character, can nonetheless represent a very important component in one’s identity and outlook, as well as in public perceptions regarding the fundamental sociocultural structure of society.

Another feature of immigrant absorption (particularly of Jews) is a phenomenon we may define as “identity translation” by members of the absorbing society. Thus, for example, the popular perception of all recent immigrants from the former Soviet Union (FSU) to Israel as “Russians,” even though many of them came from Ukraine, Belarus, or even Moldova or Kazakhstan. By the same token, North American, British, South African, and Australian immigrants in Israel are all called “Anglo-Saxons,” Mexicans are “Argentinians,” and the significantly different groups of immigrants from Gondar, Tigris, Addis Abeba, and Quara all become “Ethiopians.” In Latin America and in some West European countries, Jewish immigrants from the Middle East became known as “Arabs.” Significantly, although artificially and externally imposed—and lacking in depth or even plausibility—these societal perceptions have tended over time to have an impact on the bearers of these sub-ethnic identities, whether in rejecting or internalizing them.

As shown in table 1, the same identity (Sephardic/Asian/African) can encompass smaller or larger groups of people in a given country at a given time, depending on

Table 1. Jews of Sephardic/Asian-African Origin in Selected Countries, by Various Definitions, 1960–2002 (percent of total Jewish population)

| Definition | Argentina 1960 | Italy 1965 | France 1970s | Israel 1983–1984 | USSR 1989 | Brazil 1990 | U.S. 1990 | Canada 1991 | Mexico 1991 | South Africa 1991 | Venezuela 1998–1999 | Israel 1998–1999 | France 2002 |
|---|-------------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|----------------|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| Birthplace Asia-Africa | 3 | 10 | 49 | 19 | | 5 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 10 | 12 | 44 |
| Same as above, plus Balkans | 3 | 14 | | 20 | | | | | 5 | | | 12 | |
| Father's birthplace Asia-Africa | | | 61 | 44 | | | | | | | | 33 | |
| Same as above, plus Balkans | | | | 46 | | | | | | | | 34 | |
| Asian-African origin after allocating Israeli-born with Israeli-born father | | | | 52 | | | | | | | | 45 | |
| Same as above, plus Balkans | | | | 54 | | | | | | | | 47 | |
| Self-identified Sephardic Jew | | | | | | | 8 | | 32 | | 39 | | 70 |
| Member of Sephardic organization | | | | | | | 9 | | 39 | | 42 | | |
| Birthplace Asia-Africa and/or self-identified Sephardic Jew | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Self-identified "special" ethnic Jew | | | | | 7 | | | | | | | | |
| Resident of Asian republic | | | | | 14 | | | | | | | | |
| Knows Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Español | | | 15 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Voted for Shas party | | | | 3 | | | | | | | | | 13 |

Sources: U.O. Schmelz and Sergio DellaPergola, *Hademografiyah shel hayehudim beargentinah uvearazot alterot shel amerikah halanitit* (Tel Aviv: 1972); Sergio DellaPergola, *Anatomia dell'ebraismo italiano* (Rome/Assisi: 1976); Doris Bensimon and Sergio DellaPergola, *La popolazione juive de France: sociodémographie et identité* (Jerusalem-Paris: 1984); Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel* (Jerusalem: 1984); Mark Tolls, "Trends in Soviet Jewish Demography since the Second World War," in *Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union*, ed. Ya'acov Ro'i (London: 1995), 365–382; René Decol, "Judeus no Brasil: explorando os dados censitários," *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais* 16, no. 46 (2001), 147–160; Sergio DellaPergola and Uzi Rebbun, "Hebeitim sozio-demografiyim udfusei hizdahut shel yehudim veashkenazim bearazot habrit bishnat 1990," in *Hevrah vetarbut—yehudei sefarad leahar haerusha*, ed. Michel Abitbol, Galit Hazan-Rokem, and Yom-Tov Assis (Jerusalem: 1997), 105–135; Leo Davids, "The Jewish Population of Canada, 1991," in *Papers in Jewish Demography 1993 in Memory of U.O. Schmelz*, ed. Sergio DellaPergola and Judith Even (Jerusalem: 1997), 311–323; Sergio DellaPergola and Susana Lerner, *La comunidad judía de México: perfil demográfico, social y cultural* (Jerusalem: 1995); Sergio DellaPergola and Alie A. Dubb, "South African Jewry: A Sociodemographic Profile," *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 88 (New York: 1988), 59–140; Sergio DellaPergola, Salomon Benzaquen, and Tony Bekker de Weintraub, *Perfil sociodemográfico y cultural de la comunidad judía de Caracas* (Caracas: 2000); Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel* (1999); Erik H. Cohen with Maurice Hergan, *Les Juifs de France: valeurs et identité* (Paris: 2002).

its previous definition. In Israel of the late 1990s, for example, the percentage of Jews of Sephardic/Asian/African origin ranged from 12 to 47 percent, depending in large part on whether it included only first-generation immigrants or members of the second and third generation as well (or was further extended to Jews of Balkan origin). In France of the 1970s, 49 percent of the Jewish population was born in Asia or Africa (mostly in Algeria, Morocco, or Tunisia) but their proportion rose to 61 percent when the second generation was included. Both in Mexico (in 1991) and in Venezuela (1998–1999), the proportion of Sephardim was larger when defined in terms of membership in a Sephardic or Middle Eastern organization than when based on self-identification. In France, where Jewish organizational reach is quite limited, self-identification along sub-ethnic lines is particularly high: in 2002, 70 percent of the total Jewish population identified as Sephardic.

A further distinction emerges from Soviet and post-Soviet censuses that, based on criteria of ethnicity, distinguish between “mainstream” and relatively small numbers of “special” ethnic Jews such as Georgian Jews, Bukharan Jews, and Tats. Knowledge of a native language offers another criterion for sub-ethnic distinctions. In this regard, there is clear erosion over time. For instance, in France of the 1970s, only 14 percent of French Jewry still knew Judeo-Arabic or Judeo-Español.

Yet another definitional option is based on political party preferences. In Israel, there are a number of political parties aimed explicitly at sub-ethnic constituencies. Although such parties had hitherto been short-lived, Shas, a religious Sephardic political party, has been represented in the Knesset since 1984. In the elections of 1999, Shas gained more than one fourth of its theoretical total vote—that is, of those with an Asian-African background extending back three generations.

Changes in the Geographic Dispersion of World Jewry

Having come to terms with the complexities, uncertainties, and contradictions of identificational definitions, we may now turn to some descriptive data on Jewish population change.¹⁴ Table 2 outlines the changes in the regional distribution of world Jewry between 1948 and 2005, showing in particular the implications for the size and distribution of Jewish communities in Asia and Africa. The main determinant of change was mass emigration of Jewish communities from Asia, Africa, and the Balkans (as well as Eastern Europe) and their relocation to Israel and to several countries in Western Europe, North America, and Latin America. The continuing shift of the major centers of world Jewry brought about a greater Jewish population concentration in the more developed areas of the globe. Of the estimated 1.3 million Jews living in 1948 in Asia (including parts of the former Soviet Union) and North Africa, only about 44,000 remained in 2005—a decline of some 90 percent. During this same period, the immigration of more than one million Jews from Asia and Africa was a major determinant of rapid Jewish population growth in Israel.¹⁵

As shown in table 3, the world Jewish migration system over the last 50 years consisted of two main supply areas (Eastern Europe, and the region comprising North Africa and the Middle East) and two major reception areas (the western countries, and Israel).¹⁶ Although annual migration numbers varied greatly, between

Table 2. Jewish Population by Major Regions, 1948–2005

| Region | Number (thousands) ^a | | | Percent ^a | | | Percent change | | |
|---|---------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|---------------|---------------|
| | 1948 ^b | 1970 ^c | 2005 ^d | 1948 ^b | 1970 ^c | 2005 ^d | 1948 ^b – 1970 | 1970– 2005 | 1948– 2005 |
| <i>World total</i> | 11,500 | 12,662 | 13,034 | 100.0 | 100.0 | 100.0 | +10 | +3 | +13 |
| <i>Israel</i> | 650 | 2,582 | 5,238 | 5.7 | 20.4 | 40.2 | +297 | +103 | +706 |
| <i>Asia-Africa</i> | 1,325 | 569 | 118 | 11.5 | 5.5 | 0.9 | –57 | –79 | –91 |
| Former USSR in Asia | 350 | 262 | 20 | 3.0 | 3.1 | 0.2 | –25 | –92 | –94 |
| Other Asia ^e | 275 | 100 | 19 | 2.4 | 0.8 | 0.1 | –64 | –81 | –93 |
| North Africa ^f | 595 | 83 | 5 | 5.2 | 0.6 | 0.0 | –86 | –94 | –99 |
| South Africa ^g | 105 | 124 | 74 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.6 | +18 | –40 | –30 |
| <i>Europe-America- Oceania</i> | 9,525 | 9,511 | 7,678 | 82.8 | 74.1 | 58.9 | –0 | –19 | –19 |
| Europe, West ^h | 1,035 | 1,119 | 1,066 | 9.0 | 8.9 | 8.2 | +8 | –5 | +3 |
| Europe, East and Balkan ^h | 765 | 216 | 94 | 6.7 | 1.7 | 0.7 | –72 | –56 | –88 |
| Former USSR in Europe ⁱ | 1,950 | 1,906 | 360 | 17.0 | 13.9 | 2.8 | –2 | –81 | –82 |
| North America ^j | 5,215 | 5,686 | 5,652 | 45.3 | 45.0 | 43.4 | +9 | –1 | +8 |
| Latin America | 520 | 514 | 397 | 4.5 | 4.1 | 3.0 | –1 | –23 | –24 |
| Oceania ^k | 40 | 70 | 109 | 0.3 | 0.5 | 0.8 | +75 | +56 | +173 |

^a Minor discrepancies due to rounding.

^b May 15 (Israel independence day).

^c December 31.

^d January 1.

^e Asian parts of Turkey included in Europe.

^f Including Ethiopia.

^g South Africa, Zimbabwe, and other sub-Saharan countries.

^h East European countries that joined the European Union included in Eastern Europe.

ⁱ Including Asian parts of Russian Republic.

^j U.S., Canada.

^k Australia, New Zealand.

Sources: Adapted from Sergio DellaPergola, “World Jewish Population 2005,” in *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 105 (New York: 2005), 103–146; Sergio DellaPergola, Uzi Rebhun, and Mark Tolts, “Prospecting the Jewish Future: Population Projections 2000–2080,” in *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 100 (New York: 2000), 103–146.

1948 and 2002, an average of nearly 90,000 Jews moved each year. Overall, nearly two thirds of total Jewish migration after 1948 was to Israel, with the propensity to choose it over a western destination higher in Asia-Africa than in Eastern Europe. The rate of emigration per 1,000 Jews at origin (which reflects the weight of the push factors) was also much higher in Asia-Africa than in Eastern Europe. Emigration propensities were extremely low in the western countries and also quite low in Israel. In the exchange between Israel and the western countries, the net balance tended to be in favor of the latter.

World Jewish migration needs to be assessed in a comprehensive rational framework. While the idealistic aliyah motives should not be underestimated, global

Table 3. Estimated Jewish International Migration, by Major Areas of Origin and Destination, 1948–2002

| Areas of origin and destination | 1948 ^a –1968 | 1969–2002 | Total |
|---|-------------------------|--------------|-------------|
| <i>Total (thousands)</i> | 1,880 | 2,815 | 4695 |
| Yearly average (thousands) | 91 | 83 | 86 |
| <i>Percent, total</i> | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| <i>From Eastern Europe^b</i> | 33 | 55 | 46 |
| To Western countries | 6 | 22 | 16 |
| To Israel | 27 | 33 | 30 |
| <i>From Asia-Africa^b</i> | 52 | 16 | 30 |
| To Western countries | 15 | 3 | 8 |
| To Israel | 37 | 13 | 22 |
| <i>From Israel to Western countries^c</i> | 10 | 16 | 14 |
| <i>From Western countries to Israel</i> | 5 | 13 | 10 |
| <i>% to Israel</i> | | | |
| Of world total ^d | 69 | 59 | 63 |
| Of total from Eastern Europe | 82 | 60 | 65 |
| Of total from Asia-Africa | 71 | 81 | 73 |
| <i>Rate per 1000 Jews, total</i> | 8 | 6 | 7 |
| <i>From Eastern Europe^b</i> | 12 | 51 | 37 |
| To Western countries | 3 | 20 | 14 |
| To Israel | 10 | 31 | 23 |
| <i>From Asia-Africa^b</i> | 83 | 97 | 92 |
| To Western countries | 28 | 27 | 27 |
| To Israel | 55 | 70 | 65 |
| <i>From Israel to Western countries^c</i> | 5 | 4 | 4 |
| <i>From Western countries to Israel</i> | 1 | 1 | 1 |

^a May 15 (Israel independence day).

^b Since 1990, Asian regions of FSU included in Asia-Africa.

^c All emigration attributed to Western countries.

^d Including emigration from Israel.

Source: Sergio DellaPergola, "Israel: Demographic and Economic Dimension of International Migration," in Euro-Mediterranean Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration—CARIM, *Annual Report 2005* (Fiesole: 2005), 123–130, 137–140.

Jewish migration flows generally reflected levels of socioeconomic development and political stability. Thus, whenever possible, Jews tended to move upward, from places that ranked lower on these scales to those that ranked higher. Consequently, the geography of world Jewry came to mirror that of the leading industrialized, developed—and also democratic—countries.¹⁷ In the process, the vast majority of Jews of Sephardic and Oriental origin left their historical areas of settlement and created a new type of diaspora.

Table 4 provides an estimate of the total number and geographical distribution of Jews of Sephardic and Asian-African origin around the year 2000.¹⁸ The estimates are based on rough evaluations of objective indicators such as countries of origin in Asia, Africa, and the Balkans, as well as on subjective indicators such as self-identification or membership in Jewish community organizations that are linked in some way with Sephardic culture. Within these limits, we suggest a world Sephardic/

Oriental population estimate of 3.4 million, out of a total world Jewish population of slightly more than 13 million (amounting to 26 percent of the total). In Israel, Jews of Asian-African origin, including both foreign- and Israeli-born, constituted about 47 percent of the total Jewish population in 2000, in contrast with a total of about 25 percent some fifty years earlier, growing to about half by 1990, before again declining somewhat due to the massive influx of immigrants (mainly Ashkenazim) from the FSU.¹⁹ In the diaspora, Sephardic and Asian-African Jews were estimated to constitute less than 15 percent of total Jewish population, with shares varying according to region. While small communities remained in the historical areas of origin, those in Western Europe and Central and South America were much larger. In fact, in some countries, especially France, Mexico, and Venezuela, higher rates of natural increase or lower levels of loss due to assimilation or aging has resulted in Sephardic and Asian-African Jews—once a tiny minority—attaining parity or forming the majority among the younger age groups. These trends are also manifest within the emerging cadre of younger Jewish communal leaders.

Of the estimated global total, about two thirds of Sephardic and Asian-African Jews live nowadays in Israel, with two other significant concentrations located in North America and Western Europe. Jews of Sephardic or Asian-African origin actually living “in the East” (Asia, apart from Israel, and Africa), today account for no more than 1–2 percent of the total, and this figure continues to decline.

What are the overall results of such migration for Israeli society and for world Jewry more generally? In order to answer this question, it is useful first to compute a ratio between the number of Israeli Jews originating from a given country and the Jewish population currently living in the country of origin (see fig. 3, displaying a logarithm scale). The results provide a measure of the cumulated historical odds of staying in the country of origin versus permanently moving to Israel—an indication of relative attractiveness within each pair of countries. The shorter the bars in the diagram, the greater the propensity of Jews from a given country to remain in that country. The longer bars indicate that more of them live in Israel than in the country of origin. The pattern is highly differentiated, reflecting mass movement mostly from countries in North Africa, the Middle East and, to some extent, the Balkans and Eastern Europe to Israel, as against resilience and sometimes attraction of new migrants in countries in North America and Western Europe. The “crossover point” between a larger number living in the original country versus living in Israel (appearing on the diagram as 1.00) passes between Germany-Austria and the Czech Republic-Slovakia-Hungary.

In examining the ranking of aliyah propensities by country and comparing it with indicators of a given country’s quality of life such as the UN Human Development Index (HDI),²⁰ there is a clear reverse correlation between propensity to move to Israel and quality of life in the respective countries. In other words, aliyah is a selective form of immigration that strongly reflects the negative quality of life in the countries where Jews previously lived. One may try to draw a rough balance of the overall impact of immigration on the nature of Israeli society, and vice versa, by first keeping in mind Israel’s population composition by countries of origin, and then attributing to each subpopulation the appropriately weighted HDI of its respective country. The resulting average HDI might be considered a predictor of Israel’s expected ranking worldwide.

Table 4. Total Jewish Population and Estimated Jews of Sephardic/Asian-African Origin, 2000

| Region | Total Jewish population (thousands) | Sephardic/Asian-African origin ^a | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|---|
| | | Number (thousands) | Percent of total Jews in region | Percent of worldwide Jews of Sephardic/Asian-African origin |
| World total | 13,192 | 3,403 | 26 | 100.0 |
| Israel | 4,882 | 2,295 | 47 | 67.4 |
| Diaspora total | 8,310 | 1,108 | 13b | 32.6 |
| <i>Asia</i> | 51 | 37 | 73 | 1.1 |
| FSU | 30 | 18 | 60 | 0.5 |
| Other ^b | 21 | 19 | 90 | 0.6 |
| <i>Africa</i> | 90 | 13 | 14 | 0.4 |
| North ^c | 8 | 8 | 100 | 0.2 |
| South ^d | 82 | 5 | 4 | 0.2 |
| <i>Europe</i> | 1,583 | 449 | 28 | 13.2 |
| European Union | 1,027 | 411 | 40 | 12.1 |
| Other West | 20 | 4 | 20 | 0.1 |
| FSU ^e | 438 | 5 | 1 | 0.1 |
| Other East and Balkans ^f | 98 | 29 | 30 | 0.9 |
| <i>America</i> | 6,484 | 604 | 9 | 17.7 |
| North ^g | 6,062 | 546 | 9 | 16.0 |
| Central | 53 | 21 | 40 | 0.6 |
| South | 369 | 37 | 10 | 1.1 |
| <i>Oceania</i> ^h | 102 | 5 | 5 | 0.2 |

^a Highest estimate based on various available criteria.

^b Asian parts of Turkey included in Europe.

^c Including Ethiopia.

^d South Africa, Zimbabwe, and other sub-Saharan countries.

^e Including Asian parts of Russian Republic.

^f Including Turkey.

^g U.S., Canada.

^h Australia, New Zealand.

Source: Sergio DellaPergola, "He'arot 'al hamehkar hasozio-demografi shel 'kehilot yisrael bamizrah'," *Pe'amim* 93 (2002), 149-156.

In making such a calculation, Israel's predicted HDI ranking comes out between the 60th and 70th place, out of a total ranking of 170 countries. In reality, however, Israel was ranked 23rd in 2005—substantially better than would have been predicted.

What accounts for this striking inconsistency? Two explanations may be offered. First, one should take into account the *sociocultural and socioeconomic selectivity* of migrants, who in general might not reflect the typical human capabilities of their societies of origin. More specifically, and significantly, those making aliyah were overwhelmingly Jewish,²¹ and evidently the social structure of Jewish diaspora populations, and of the migrants among them, was not representative of the general




Figure 3. Ratios of Jewish population in Israel of given country of origin, to Jewish population in same country, 2000.

The horizontal bars are presented in logarithmic scale.

Source: Computed from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel* (2001), Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population 2000," *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 101 (New York: 2001), 484–495.

society in each country of origin—for instance, they tended to be overrepresented at the higher levels of educational attainment and professional capabilities.

There is also, however, a further explanation that is specific to Israel, one that has to do with the societal “added value ” produced by social trends connected with the longer-term process of immigrant absorption. Israeli society succeeded in enabling its immigrants to attain upward social and economic mobility, and in consequence, most of the immigrants to Israel improved their socioeconomic standing relative to that which they might have been expected to achieve in their countries of origin. Put somewhat differently, Israel’s significant socioeconomic achievements and institutional growth cannot be attributed solely to the import of human resources via immigration, but reflect as well the success of a collective project that involved the participation of many sectors of the society.

Immigrant Absorption: Failures and Achievements

I now turn to a more problematic aspect of immigrant absorption, examining in greater detail the occupational characteristics of migrants and the modalities of their

economic absorption. As noted, Jewish international migration was quite selective in terms of both the countries of origin and the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the migrants. What follows is an analysis of immigrant absorption patterns in Israel as compared with those in other countries.²²

Table 5 shows the basic occupational patterns of Jews of Asian and African origin in different countries, as compared with the general Jewish population in each country. In general, Jewish communities display a relatively high proportion of better-educated professionals and managers and a visible concentration in commerce and sales, alongside a relatively low presence among lower-status service and manual workers. The proportion of Jews in academic and liberal professions is significantly and positively correlated with the general level of economic development of a given country; in the United States, it is significantly higher than in any other country. In countries with a comparatively lower level of economic development, such as Mexico or Turkey,²³ Jews are overrepresented in the sales sector (often in management roles) and in manufacturing (as owners and managers). Often they have benefited from protectionist trade policies, but recently they have been hurt significantly by liberalization and globalization of international trade.

These occupational characteristics often reflect the dynamics of a relatively small minority within the general economic context.²⁴ The situation is somewhat different in Israel, where in the context of a Jewish majority, the share of Jews employed in services, manufacturing, and agriculture is significantly larger than in the diaspora. Public employment is much more predominant in Israel, whereas the proportion of self-employed is higher in diaspora communities. At the same time, Israel has undergone significant economic modernization and industrialization and hence the proportion in professional, academic, and technical occupations is similar to that in other western countries.

While conforming generally to the occupational pattern of Jews as a whole, the data pertaining to Sephardic and Asian-African Jews points to certain differences between them and Jews of European and American origin. Among Sephardic and Asian-African Jews, the share of professionals and academicians—which is tied directly to higher levels of educational attainment—is somewhat lower. This was particularly true of the Algerian-born in France in the 1970s, who were highly visible among lower-rank administrative and clerical positions, and of the Damascus-origin group in Mexico in the 1990s. However, the generally lower share of professionals and academicians was often balanced by a comparatively higher proportion of managers—frequently an indication of self-employment. Overall, Jews from Asia and Africa were slightly more concentrated in sales and blue-collar positions than Jews from other origins. In France in 2002, following a prolonged and successful process of upward social mobility, Jews of North African origin had a higher proportion of professionals than Jews from other origins, alongside a slightly lower than average proportion in managerial and clerical positions, while differentials in sales and blue-collar employment were virtually non-existent.²⁵

This contrasts starkly with the situation in Israel, where immigrants from Asia and Africa have not closed the negative occupational gaps, remaining underrepresented in high-status positions and overrepresented in low-status positions. This finding calls for an in-depth examination of the process of economic absorption of the masses

Table 5. Occupational Distributions among Total Jewish Adults and Those of Sephardic/Asian-African Origin in Selected Places, 1970s–1990s (percent)

| Place and population | Professional | Managerial | Clerical | Sales | Blue-collar |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------|-----------------|-------------|
| <i>Greater Paris, 1970s</i> | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population | 25 ^a | 43 ^b | | 21 ^c | 10 |
| Born Morocco-Tunisia (gap) | -3 | +6 | | -10 | +7 |
| Born Algeria (gap) | -11 | +12 | | -2 | +1 |
| <i>U.S., 1990</i> | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population | 37 | 16 | 20 | 15 | 12 |
| Sephardim (gap) | +4 | +2 | -5 | -3 | +2 |
| <i>Mexico City, 1991</i> | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population | 27 | 53 | 11 | 5 | 4 |
| Aleppo Jews (gap) | -11 | +5 | +4 | 0 | +2 |
| Damascus Jews (gap) | -20 | +14 | +2 | +3 | +1 |
| Turkish-Balkan Jews (gap) | -1 | +4 | -4 | +1 | 0 |
| <i>Istanbul, 1988</i> | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population ^d | 11 | 15 | 7 | 61 | 6 |
| <i>Caracas, 1998–1999</i> | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population | 17 | 28 | 31 | 21 | 3 |
| Sephardim (gap) | -6 | 0 | +3 | +2 | +1 |
| <i>Israel, 1998</i> | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population | 29 | 6 | 19 | 18 | 28 |
| Born Asia-Africa (gap) | -12 | -1 | -2 | +5 | +10 |
| Israeli-born, father | -9 | -1 | +5 | +2 | +3 |
| b. Asia-Africa (gap) | | | | | |
| Intergenerational difference | +3 | 0 | +7 | -3 | -7 |
| <i>France, 2002</i> | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population | 13 | 30 | 42 | 9 | 6 |
| Born North Africa (gap) | +6 | -4 | -3 | +1 | +1 |

^a Including higher-ranking managers.

^b Including lower-ranking managers.

^c Including artisans.

^d Overwhelmingly of Sephardic origin.

Sources: Bensimon and DellaPergola, *La population juive de France*; DellaPergola and Rebhun, “Hebeitim sozio-demografiyim udfusei hizdahut”; DellaPergola and Lerner, *La comunidad judía de Mexico*; Shaul Tuval, *The Jewish Community in Istanbul 1948–1992* (Jerusalem: 2004); DellaPergola, Benzaquen, and Beker de Weintraub, *Perfil sociodemográfico y cultural de la comunidad judía de Caracas*; Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel* (1999); Cohen with Ifergan, *Les Juifs de France*.

of Jewish immigrants to Israel in the early years after independence. One way of doing so is to compare Jewish immigration to Israel with that to other countries during the same period.

The two columns in bold characters in table 6 provide a simplified representation of the occupational characteristics of Jewish migrants to Israel (until 1961) and France (until the early 1970s). These two time frames cover the major migration waves following Israel’s independence and the process of French decolonization in North Africa. While France drew primarily from North Africa and from Central and Eastern Europe, Israel’s migrants came from a wider range of countries in Asia and

Africa (particularly North Africa) and Eastern Europe, with smaller numbers from Western and Central Europe.

Occupational differences in these countries of origin before emigration are striking. Among those who went to Israel, the differences might not at first seem significant. A somewhat higher proportion of professionals and administrators (managers and other white-collar workers) were to be found among Jewish immigrants from Europe (23 percent) than among those from the Asian and African countries (15 percent). While initially not remarkable, the difference later had a significant impact. At the same time, there was a significant difference between Jews from Muslim countries who immigrated to France and those who went to Israel. The bulk of North African Jewry's social, cultural, and political elites chose to move to France rather than to Israel. As a result, in France there were four times as many professionals and administrators among them (61 percent) as in Israel (15 percent). The initial selectiveness of these migrants' choice of overseas destination may be dubbed, the original "sin."

But there was a second and worse "sin" relating to the early absorption of immigrants in the new countries. Table 6 shows the percentages in the same occupational category after immigration. Of particular note is occupational retention for those in the professional and administrative categories, for whom presumably the post-migration adaptation was less traumatic. The differences in retention rates between migrants born in Asia or Africa and those born in Europe or America are striking: the latter were much more likely to retain their positions, both in Israel (61 percent versus 49 percent) and in France (59 percent versus 43 percent). The same pattern appears for migrants previously employed in sales. Of the European-American migrants to Israel, 25 percent retained a position in sales, compared with 15 percent of the Asian-Africans; in France, the figures were 41 and 29 percent, respectively. The lower retention figures in Israel of those engaged in sales (among both Asian-Africans and European-Americans) clearly reflect the greater difficulties of migrant absorption into a normal national economy, as compared with the economic advantages and opportunities enjoyed by specialized economic minorities.

The pattern of occupational retention within the administrative (managerial and clerical) sector is mixed: in Israel, 48 percent of the migrants of European origin versus 42 percent of those from Asia-Africa retained their positions compared with 35 percent and 49 percent, respectively, in France. There the higher rate of retention for Asian-Africans—in this case, mainly North Africans—may be explained both by the significant number of Jews in the French colonial administration in North Africa and the reintegration into their posts after their repatriation to France (this applied in particular to Algerian Jews, who had been granted French citizenship in 1870).

Clearly, immigrants from Asia and Africa paid a much higher price in the post-migration process of occupational absorption than immigrants from Europe or North America. The large majority of Asian-African immigrants underwent downward socioeconomic mobility. For instance, of the immigrants who had been professionals in Asia-Africa and moved to a different occupation in Israel, 69 percent went to blue-collar, or to "no or unknown" occupations, compared with 44 percent of professional immigrants from Europe-America. In France, in contrast, 72 percent of North African professionals moved to administrative jobs and 28 percent to blue-collar or to "no or unknown" occupations, while some two thirds of European immigrant professionals

Table 6. Patterns of Occupational Mobility among Jewish Immigrants to Israel and to France, Asian-African vs. European-American Origin, 1960s and 1970s

| Occupational status | Born Asia-Africa | | | | Born Europe-America | | | | | |
|---|---|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|---|------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
| | Of all occupationally mobile, % moved to: | | | | Of all occupationally mobile, % moved to: | | | | | |
| | % distribution abroad | % retention after migration | Professional, administrative | Trade and sales | Blue-collar, none, unkn. | % abroad | % retention after migration | Professional, administrative | Trade and sales | Blue-collar, none, unkn. |
| <i>Israel, 1961^a</i> | 100 | | | | | 100 | | | | |
| Professional | 5 | 49 | 23 | 8 | 69 | 10 | 61 | 50 | 6 | 44 |
| Administrative | 10 | 42 | 9 | 11 | 80 | 13 | 48 | 8 | 16 | 76 |
| Sales | 30 | 15 | 9 | ^e | 91 | 23 | 25 | 25 | ^e | 75 |
| Blue-collar | 44 | 79 | 16 | 17 | 67 | 36 | 75 | 41 | 25 | 34 |
| None, unknown | 11 | 40 | 15 | 8 | 77 | 18 | 19 | 39 | 10 | 51 |
| <i>Greater Paris, 1970s^b</i> | 100 | | | | | 100 | | | | |
| Professional ^c | 29 | 43 | 72 | 0 | 28 | 32 | 59 | 35 | 65 | 0 |
| Administrative | 32 | 49 | 31 | 64 | 5 | 17 | 35 | 16 | 49 | 35 |
| Sales ^d | 24 | 29 | 86 | ^e | 14 | 24 | 41 | 88 | ^e | 12 |
| Blue-collar | 15 | 38 | 75 | 25 | ^e | 27 | 18 | 87 | 13 | ^e |

^a Occupational mobility of immigrants.

^b Occupation abroad of immigrants to France before 1961. The data on occupational mobility were computed from occupation abroad of fathers of heads of households, and occupation in France of heads of households.

^c Including higher-ranking managers.

^d Including artisans.

^e Same occupational status before and after migration.

Source: Computed from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing* (1961), vol. 9 (1963); vol. 27 (1965); Bensimon and DellaPergola, *La population juive de France*, Table 9.7 (p. 214); Table 17.4 (p. 370).

took up employment in trade rather than in blue-collar jobs. Similar patterns are apparent for migrants who had held administrative positions in their countries of origin. With regard to those in sales, 91 percent of the Asian-African immigrants to Israel moved down to blue-collar or “none or unknown” jobs, as did 75 percent of those from Europe-America. But in France, the experience was totally different—the vast majority of sales personnel moved up into professional and administrative positions (86 percent of those born in Asia/Africa and 88 percent of those born in Europe -America).

Most likely, the individual characteristics of immigrants turned to be somewhat subordinate to perceptions (whether positive or negative) regarding the overall global prestige ranking of their countries of origin. Further country-by country evidence of the process of occupational change soon after the large immigration before 1961 shows that many immigrants from English-speaking and other West European countries with relatively little education rapidly moved from blue-collar occupations abroad to white-collar in Israel, while the opposite occurred to relatively better-educated immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East.²⁶

In sum, there were both commonalities and sharp contrasts in the immigrant absorption processes affecting Jews born in Asia-Africa and those born in Europe-America. Both population subgroups experienced a general downward mobility in their new countries, though those coming from Europe-America usually fared better than those from Muslim countries. Among the former, much of the post-migration mobility was lateral (that is, to a different occupation with similar socioeconomic status). In contrast, many of the Asian-African immigrants to Israel—particularly those with a background in the professions and sales—were forced to move to blue-collar jobs. Thus, they paid a much higher socioeconomic price than did European-American immigrants. On the whole, the mostly North African Jewish immigrants to France benefited from a smoother absorption process.

Sub-ethnic Convergence, Divergence, and “Catch-up”

As a consequence of the mass waves of immigration in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Israel became a highly heterogeneous society. As has been seen, there was an initial gap between immigrants from Muslim countries versus those from Europe or North America, with the former group experiencing a greater drop in socioeconomic status. The question is whether this gap persisted over time, or whether socio-demographic trends that developed in the wake of mass immigration worked in the direction of promoting greater equality among the different Jewish subgroups. The following data focus on variables pointing to increasing convergence/integration versus increasing divergence/segregation among the Israeli Jewish population.²⁷

Residential Distributions

A primary concern of multiethnic and multicultural societies is the allocation of residential space to different groups, whether more clustered or diffused. Previous analyses have shown a clear trend toward greater residential diffusion and declining

segregation among different origin groups in Israel.²⁸ This is true with regard to both regions and cities, and to the more specific level of urban neighborhoods and smaller territorial units. A model of the countrywide and regional geographical location of different origin groups in Israel is shown in figure 4. This Smallest Space Analysis of the 1995 Israeli census data synthesizes a matrix of 26 groups of countries of birth, subdivided by 16 sub-district territorial divisions. The closer the points representing two given origin groups, the more similar their respective regional distributions. A more central position on the map means greater diffusion over Israel's territory; less central positions indicate peculiar patterns of regional clustering. Eight regional residential clusters of immigrants from geographically proximate countries—presumably sharing similar cultural backgrounds—appear for Western Europe and North America, Central and Eastern Europe (predominant among veteran immigrants), the different republics of the FSU (predominant among more recent immigrants), and the Balkans, Asia, and different areas in North Africa. The significant distances between the clusters formed by the last three groups of countries further underlines the previously noted analytic deficiencies of the single overall Asia-Africa aggregate category for the study of ethnicity and identity.

The salience of countries of origin as a factor in creating proximate communities and social networks, and in reinforcing particularistic identities, is confirmed by these data. Four major factors explain the varying residential distribution of different groups of origin: the timing of immigration to Israel and the availability of housing in each period; Israel's policies concerning national population dispersion; the socioeconomic status of members of each group and their ability to negotiate housing in convenient locations; and the ideological orientation of different groups toward living in the territories occupied by Israel after the Six-Day War of June 1967. At the same time, no clearly hierarchical residential patterns based on the geography of origin are apparent, as would be the case if all countries-of-origin groups in Asia-Africa appeared on one part of the diagram, with all those in Europe-America located elsewhere. Differences in the geographical distribution of immigrant groups in Israel are not necessarily related only to inequality but also to residential preferences that reflect a voluntary search for proximity with persons of similar background in a culturally diverse society. One significant exception seems to be the peculiar clustering of Jews from India and Ethiopia. The only rationale for the residential closeness of two groups from different continents that immigrated at very different times would seem to be their nearly total dependence on the settling authorities—which would explain their being directed to similar peripheral and semi-rural areas in accordance with a rigid interpretation of national population dispersal goals.

In the case of Jewish communities outside Israel, residential differences are apparent at the neighborhood level. In France, for instance, North African Jews who had immigrated more recently than the veteran (mostly Ashkenazic) population and who, as in the case of the Algerians, could rely partly on public assistance in relocating, were initially more dispersed residentially. Over time, however, the residential spread of the two groups became narrower as the North African immigrants and their descendants came increasingly to reside in more central locations—the Paris metropolitan area rather than provincial towns—or else, like the more veteran Jewish population, gradually moved to the suburbs of the capital city. Similarly, in




Figure 4. Smallest space analysis of Jewish population distribution in Israel, by countries of birth and sub-districts, 1995

Each point on the Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) synthesizes the distribution of a given origin group across Israel's 16 sub-district divisions. Closeness or distance between points indicates more or less similar distributions of two populations across sub-districts. The Israeli-born group was not included. The polygons were drawn to stress the proximity between groups with some geographical similarity, such as Western countries, the FSU, Northwest Africa, and Northeast Africa.

Source: Created from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing 1995*, Public Use Sample.

Mexico City and Caracas, Sephardic Jews initially displayed distinctive patterns of residential concentration that differed markedly from those found among the European-origin Jews. However, over time, heightened socioeconomic status and mobility within the Jewish population gradually led to greater residential proximity and similarity as all moved to newer urban and suburban locations.

Health and Marriage

From the early stages of Israel's statehood, active public intervention brought about improvements in public health and increased life expectancy. Over time, Asian-African immigrants succeeded in erasing their initial disadvantages in these regards.

As more similar lifestyles developed, the frequency of interethnic marriages between Jews from Asia-Africa and from Europe-America increased. Figure 5 illustrates the historical decline in the propensity of Jewish brides and grooms in Israel to marry within their own geographic origin group. During Israel's early years, very high—indeed nearly exclusive—sub-ethnic homogamy prevailed, since the cultural patterns of each immigrant group were reinforced by the great similarity in length of time in the country, socioeconomic status, and residential proximity. Over time, however, sub-ethnic homogamy declined, such that by the end of the 1990s, the frequency of heterogamic marriages (that is, those occurring between members of different sub-ethnic groups) was more than half as likely as it would have been had marriages occurred randomly across the main origin groups.²⁹ Sub-ethnic intermarriage tends to dilute or even to alter partly the cultural bases of group-of-origin identities, thereby accelerating the process of cultural integration. A further study based on data from the 1983 and 1995 censuses confirms that, when social class is controlled, the statistical overrepresentation of marriages among Jews sharing the same continental origin tends to diminish.³⁰

At the same time, figure 5 indicates a cessation or even a reversal of these converging trends, beginning in the year 2000. Part of the explanation may be related to the inherent limitations of the data: the continental origin of a growing proportion of Jewish brides and grooms is not specified, as they and their parents were born in Israel. Thus, although marriage across sub-ethnic boundaries is presumably quite widespread within this group, it does not register in the data. One must also consider the large number of immigrants during the 1990s from the FSU and Ethiopia, many of whose children married in the following decade. As immigrants from the FSU constitute a very large group, in-marriage will in all likelihood be enhanced temporarily, as was clearly the case during the years 1948–1953. The Ethiopians, while a much smaller group, are still frequently homogamous—and this, too, contributes to a heightening of overall rates of in-marriage. While the possibility cannot be ruled out that the data in figure 5 reflect the beginning of a reversal of the historic trend toward sub-ethnic convergence in marriage, longer-term evidence is required before it can be substantiated or disproven.

In France, too, intermarriage between North African and European Jews became increasingly frequent, indeed even more so than in Israel. At the same time, marriage with non-Jewish partners (outmarriage) also tended to increase over time. In contrast, Jewish marriage patterns in Mexico were singularly homogamic. Until the 1970s, for instance, more than 90 percent of Ashkenazic spouses in Mexico married within the same sub-ethnic group; among Sephardim, sub-ethnic endogamy was well over 80 percent even in the 1990s. In addition, among the Halabi (Aleppo) and Shami (Damascus) communities in Mexico, 65–70 percent of marriages involved partners from the same community group within the sub-ethnicity.³¹ Similar mar-

riage patterns obtain for the Iranian immigrant community in Los Angeles.³² It is only since the 1990s that some of these trends have begun to weaken.

Fertility

Fertility patterns in Israel indicate a growing convergence between Asian-African and European-American origin groups. Jewish total fertility rates (TFR)³³ were comparatively stable in Israel, diminishing from 3.6 children in the 1950s to 2.6–2.7 in the 1980s, and remaining steady thereafter into the early 2000s. However, the initial gap between different origin groups was quite large. As figure 6 shows, by the mid-1950s an immigrant woman from Asia-Africa had, on average, over three more children than her immigrant peer from Europe-America. This marked gap in family-size decreased steadily throughout the 1960s and 1970s, and by the early 1980s, it had been reduced to a minimum. The subsequent reappearance of a fertility gap between these two groups reflects recent immigration of Jewish women from the low-fertility FSU and from high-fertility Ethiopia. Thus, by 1992, the TFR gap again reached 1.5 children, but within a few years, immigrant women once again began to conform to the established norm of Israeli society. A decline of fertility among the higher-fertility group of immigrants concurred with some increase of fertility among the lower-fertility group. The stability attained in Israeli fertility patterns is manifest in the data for the second, Israeli-born generation of women, where the initial differences between immigrant groups have long since disappeared.

In other countries—for instance, France and Mexico—similar processes of Jewish sub-ethnic fertility convergence have also occurred. Generally, their levels of fertility were significantly lower than that in Israel, and at no time did fertility increase among Jews of European origin. In the 1970s, the fertility level of French Jewry fell below replacement level and subsequently remained fairly stable. In Mexico, it was somewhat higher—possibly because of the community's comparatively high level of income and the ready availability of household help, but still somewhat lower than in Israel.³⁴

Educational Attainment

Especially during the initial period of mass immigration to Israel, the educational levels of immigrants were far from uniform. Many immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa had little or no education and relatively few had any university training, as compared with immigrants from Europe and America. One of the priorities of the newly established state was to reduce gaps in educational attainment; to that end, it invested considerable resources.³⁵ By the 1950s, nearly universal literacy had been attained, and by the 1980s, a vast majority of Israeli schoolchildren were completing at least 12 years of schooling.

The extent of the educational gaps between the two main origin groups can be assessed over time at various levels, from entrance into the system at age 6 to completion of a college or university degree. Figure 7 examines the gap by means of three measures: median years of study completed; successful completion of high-school matriculation examinations; and enrollment in an institution of post-secondary



Figure 5. Indexes of marriage attraction within main origin groups in Israel, Asian-African vs. European-American Origin, 1948–2001.

For explanations, see note 29 to the text.

Source: Computed from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel* (Jerusalem: various issues).

education among individuals aged 20–29. By positing the respective percentages achieved by the European-American origin group at a level of 100, a measure of relative disadvantage may be obtained for the Asian-African origin group. Thus, by the early 2000s, the gap in years of schooling between Israeli-born children of Asian-African origin and those of European-American origin stood at 13 percent, as against about 30 percent in the 1960s.

Convergence of levels of educational attainment was incomplete in at least two other respects. More youngsters of Asian-African origin were enrolled in vocational high schools, where the chances of attaining a matriculation certificate (*te'udat bagrut*)—a prerequisite for admission to an Israeli university—were considerably lower than at academic high schools. Nevertheless, the gap between youngsters of Asian-African origin and those of European-American origin in reaching that level was reduced significantly over the years—from 70 percent in the 1960s to 12 percent by the early 2000s.³⁶ However, further analysis of these data indicates that the closing of this educational gap is proceeding more slowly than earlier anticipated, and has emphasized the need for affirmative action so as to provide equal educational opportunities for all, irrespective of group origins.³⁷




Figure 6. Total fertility rate gaps in Israel between Jewish women of Asian-African vs. European-American origin, 1949–2005.

Source: Computed from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel* (Jerusalem: various issues).

Closely related to the latter is the underrepresentation of Israelis of Asian-African origin among university and college students. In the early 2000s, among both Israeli-born and immigrants, enrollment in higher education among those of Asian-African origin was 40 percentage points lower than among those of European-American origin. While this gap had diminished over time—from 85 percent for both immigrant- and Israeli-born Asian-African and European-American origin in the 1960s, to 60 percent for Israeli-born Asian-Africans and European-Americans in the 1990s—the remaining 40 percent gap is highly significant, given the rapidly increasing educational attainments among all sections of Israel’s population. The rate of exposure of the whole Israeli population (including Arabs) to at least some post-secondary education rose from 9 percent in 1961 to 39 percent in 2001. Among Jews aged 25–34, the figure was 58 percent, compared with 29 percent among those aged 65 and over. Moreover, access to post-secondary education was eased considerably by the establishment, in the 1990s, of colleges with lower admission standards and academic requirements than the research universities. This, in turn, led to greatly increased college enrollment among the younger generation, a situation that augurs well for the further narrowing of the gap between those of Asian-African and European-American origin, with regard to higher educational achievements.

Occupation

The pattern of occupational stratification within Israel’s Jewish population—a direct outcome of educational attainment—has changed considerably since the 1960s, as is




Figure 7. Educational gaps in Israel between Jews of Asian-African vs. European-American origin, 1960s–2000s.

Source: Computed from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel* (Jerusalem: various issues).

clearly evident from the data reported in table 7. Between 1966 and 2004, the proportions of professionals, managers, and clerical personnel among Jews of Asian-African origin were consistently lower than among those of European-American origin, although within both groups those proportions rose during that period. Thus, among Jews of Asian-African origin (including Israeli-born), the total of those in academic, technical, managerial, or clerical positions increased from 16 percent in 1966 to 49 percent in 2004, whereas among persons of European-American origin, the figures were 38 percent and 58 percent, respectively. This rise was counterbalanced by higher (albeit steadily declining) proportions of workers in industry, construction, transport, and agriculture among those of Asian-African origin: 60 percent in 1966 and 28 percent in 2004, as compared with 40 percent and 24 percent, respectively, among those of European-American origin.

The general direction of change in Israel's social stratification involved a growing predominance of white-collar over blue-collar occupations. On the one hand, the state as the primary employer facilitated the large-scale access of those of Asian-African origin to lower level white-collar jobs. On the other hand, following the Six-Day War, Jewish employees in lower-level occupations became upwardly mobile as Palestinian laborers from the West Bank and Gaza replaced them.

An assessment of the relative occupational disadvantage of those of Asian-African origin as compared with those of European-American origin can be attained through an index of dissimilarity that measures the hypothetical percentage of individuals in a given group who should change their occupation in order to match the occupational distribution of some other group. The (+) or (–) sign reflects the greater or lesser frequency of academic, technical, managerial, and clerical occu-

Table 7. Occupational Gaps in Israel between Jews of Asian-African vs. European-American Origin, 1966–2004

| Occupation | 1966 | | 1992 | | 2004 | |
|---|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| | Asian-African Origin ^a | European-American Origin ^a | Asian-African Origin ^a | European-American Origin ^a | Asian-African Origin ^a | European-American Origin ^a |
| Total (thousands) | 291.9 | 371.1 | 627.3 | 681.2 | 749.6 | 916.3 |
| Total % | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Academic and technical | 6 | 17 | 17 | 36 | 21.5 | 36 |
| Managerial, clerical | 10 | 21 | 24 | 22 | 27.5 | 22 |
| Trade, services | 24 | 22 | 26 | 19 | 23 | 18 |
| Workers | 47 | 33 | 31 | 20 | 26 | 23 |
| Agriculture | 13 | 7 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 |
| Asia-Africa relative disadvantage index: ^b | | | | | | |
| vs. European-American same year | | –22% | | –18.5% | | –14.5% |
| vs. European-American 1966 | | –22% | | +7% | | +12% |

^a Country of birth (foreign-born) or father's country of birth (Israeli-born).

^b Indexes of dissimilarity of percent distributions. The positive or negative sign of the index reflects the direction of the different incidence of academic, technical, managerial, and clerical positions among the Asian-African group in a given year versus the matching group.

Source: Computed from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel* (Jerusalem: various issues).

pations among Jews of Asian-African origin relative to those of European-American origin. The index of dissimilarity shown in table 7 indicates that the occupational gap diminished, from –22 percent in 1966 to –18.5 percent in 1992 and –14.5 percent in 2004. To put this admittedly slow improvement in relative stratification into perspective, it should be noted that it occurred within a general Israeli context of significant upward mobility. Thus, in 1992, the occupational profile of the Asian-African origin group was only slightly better than that of the European-American origin group in 1966 (26 years earlier), with an index of dissimilarity/relative gap of +7 percent, and by 2004 that gap (versus the Europeans-Americans in 1966) was +12 percent. In other words, while both groups have undergone significant upward social mobility, the manifest differences in socioeconomic achievements between Jews of Asian-African origin (including both first- and second-generation Israelis) and those of European-American origin currently amount to a 20–25 year lag, although this time lag is diminishing.

Income

A final indicator of socioeconomic inequality is income distribution. Figure 8 shows the relative income gap between urban employees of Asian-African and European-American origin at four different points of time, between 1975 and 2003. Income gaps are measured for each decile of income among Jewish households of urban

employees, that is, not including the self-employed. Group 1 represents the highest level of income, and group 10 represents the lowest. For each point, the graph indicates the overrepresentation or underrepresentation of Asian-African households as compared with their share of total Jewish households in Israel. Under a theoretical situation of equal income distribution, the share of Asian-African households would be identical for each income decile.

The comparisons for 1975–1976 and 1986 show that Asian-African origin households were strikingly overrepresented at the lowest level, and underrepresented at the highest levels of income distribution. In 1975–1976, the gap amounted to 35 percent—more at the bottom level, less at the top level—versus what might have been expected, had income been equally distributed across the different origin groups. The more recent data indicate virtually equal distribution by origin in the middle-income deciles, with the continued presence of inequality (albeit considerably reduced) at the top and bottom income levels. However, the pace of change in income distribution equalization has considerably slowed down during the 2000s as compared to the 1990s.

Several caveats should be noted: the data do not include the urban self-employed, the rural sector, or the Israeli-born. The last are significantly more concentrated at higher income levels, even allowing for the fact that income inequality tends to be transmitted from generation to generation across all origin groups. Neither do the data take into account the even greater income inequality between Jews and non-Jews. Significantly, the recent immigration from the FSU created a large group of European-origin individuals at the bottom of the income scale that served to dilute somewhat the concentration of Asian-African households at those lower levels. But overall




Figure 8. Income distribution in Israel of Jewish urban employees born in Asia-Africa: actual vs. expected representation by income deciles, 1975–2003.

Source: Computed from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, various issues.

it seems that persisting sub-ethnic educational and occupational differences do not preclude the attainment of greater income equality among the various sub-ethnic groups within the Jewish population. In spite of the continuing impact of education and occupation on income, the Israeli socioeconomic system evidently allows for alternative paths to comparatively similar income attainment.

Patterns of Jewish Identification

Social, demographic, and economic change are bound to leave their mark on identity and culture. Frequencies of adherence to selected indicators of Jewish identification among Jews of Sephardic and Asian-African origins in France, the United States, Mexico, Venezuela, and Israel between the 1970s and the early 2000s are presented in table 8. The data show the levels of Jewish identification of the selected origin groups and the total Jewish population in each place. The indicators cover a wide variety of elements relating to individual and family religious practice, choice of marital partner, activity in Jewish organizations, Jewish educational background, and attitudes toward Jewishness.³⁸

It should be recalled that, in each country, Jewish migrants came from a number of different places of origin. In France, for instance, the “Asian and African” Jews were predominantly from the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia). The United States countrywide data on “Asian and African” Jews refer to a heterogeneous group, including a veteran component that arrived in the United States during the 19th century alongside more recent arrivals from Israel and other Middle Eastern countries—not to mention the tiny remnants of the original Sephardim who were the earliest Jews who settled in North America during the 17th century. The more visible recent addition included several thousand Iranian immigrants living in the Los Angeles area. In Mexico, the predominant “Asian and African” groups came from Syria (Aleppo and Damascus) and Turkey. In Venezuela, the single largest group was from Morocco, with a strong representation from the former Spanish territories in Morocco. The heterogeneity of the Sephardic and Asian-Africans was at its highest in Israel, whose immigrants came from all of the above-mentioned countries as well as from Iraq, Yemen, Ethiopia, Libya, and Egypt.

Remarkably, in spite of the varying levels of Jewish identification of the different Jewish populations surveyed here, the popularity and frequency of performance rankings of different Jewish rituals and traditions are quite similar among all Jews regardless of origin. This would suggest that Jews nearly everywhere display a similar understanding of the relevance of Jewish practices and values—whether or not they are personally involved with them. Apart from the high frequency of in-marriage in the observed period, the highest frequencies pertain to Passover observance and synagogue attendance at least once a year. The frequencies of choice of a sub-ethnic spouse, membership in Jewish organizations, and attaching importance to being Jewish are generally somewhat lower, with consistent observance of Jewish rituals such as kashruth and weekly synagogue attendance much lower.

In most cases, Jews of Asian-African origin display higher levels of Jewish commitment and community cohesiveness on a range of attitudinal and behavioral

Table 8. Jewish Identification Gaps, Total Jewish Adults and Selected Sephardic/Asian-African Origin Jews, Various Places (percent), 1970s–2000s

| Place and population | Attend synagogue | | | | Observe Pesach | Jewish spouse | Sub-ethnic spouse ^{2d} | Member of Jewish organization | Ever received Jewish education | Important to be Jewish |
|--|----------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|------------------|---------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------|
| | At least once a year | At least once a week | At least once a month | At least once a year | | | | | | |
| <i>Greater Paris, 1970s</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population | 60 | 9 | 82 | 80 | 57 | 42 | 35 | 86 ^b | | |
| Born Morocco-Tunisia (gap) | +30 | +2 | +12 | +15 | +22 | -4 | +23 | +7 | | |
| Born Algeria (gap) | +25 | +5 | +11 | +6 | +25 | +4 | +24 | +4 | | |
| <i>Los Angeles, 1987–1988</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population | 61 | 7 | n.a. | 74 | n.a. | 24 | n.a. | n.a. | | |
| Iranian Jews (gap) | +33 | +16 | n.a. | +22 | ^c | +17 | n.a. | n.a. | | |
| <i>U.S., 1990</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population | 83 | 11 | 70 | 71 | n.a. | 39 | 76 | 53 ^d | | |
| Sephardim (gap) ^e | -3 | -4 | n.a. | -5 | n.a. | = | = | +11 | | |
| <i>Mexico City, 1991</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population | 89 | 17 | 93 | 97 | 88 | 97 | 69 | 76 ^f | | |
| Aleppo Jews (gap) ^g | +10 | +7 | +6 | +3 | +8 | +3 | -8 | +8 | | |
| Damascus Jews (gap) ^h | +9 | +9 | +6 | +3 | +8 | +2 | +7 | +4 | | |
| Turkish-Balkan Jews (gap) ⁱ | +1 | -10 | -4 | +1 | -19 | +1 | -5 | -7 | | |
| <i>Caracas, 1998–1999</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population | 97 | 38 | 91 | 98 | 88 | 97 | 74 | 66 ^f | | |
| Sephardim (gap) ^j | +2 | +11 | +5 | +1 | -2 | +2 | +5 | +8 | | |
| <i>Israel, 1991</i> | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population | 81 | 24 | 89 | X | 68 ^k | X | 92 ^l | 65 ^m | | |
| Born Asia-Africa (gap) | +8 | +13 | +4 | X | +7 ^k | X | +4 ^l | +17 | | |
| Israeli-born, father Asian-African (gap) | +6 | +4 | +5 | X | +12 ^k | X | +4 ^l | = | | |
| Intergenerational difference | -2 | -9 | +1 | X | +5 ^k | X | = | -17 | | |

Israel, 1999

| | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|-----------------|-----|-----------------|
| Total Jewish population | 58 | 23 | 77 | X | n.a | X | n.a | 63 ⁿ |
| Born Asia-Africa (gap) | +23 | +15 | +16 | X | n.a | X | n.a | +16 |
| Israeli-born, father Asian-African (gap) | +11 | +3 | +16 | X | n.a | X | n.a | +12 |
| Intergenerational difference | -12 | -12 | = | X | n.a | X | n.a | -4 |
| <i>France, 2002</i> | | | | | | | | |
| Total Jewish population | | 22 | | 70 | | 48 ^o | | 28 ^o |
| Born North Africa (gap) | | | | +5 | | | | |

^a Married to Jew of same origin.

^b Interested in Judaism.

^c 96 percent of cases.

^d Very important to be Jewish.

^e Self-defined Sephardic Jew and/or born in Asia-Africa.

^f Very important to be part of Jewish people.

^g Maguen David community.

^h Monte Sinai community.

ⁱ Sephardic community.

^j Asociación Israelita Caracas (AIC) community.

^k As reported for "close family."

^l "Important to have Bar Mitzvah."

^m "Definitely" proud to be Jewish.

ⁿ "Feel part of a world Jewish people."

^o Donates to Jewish organizations several times a year.

^p Day school only. If part-time Jewish education is included, the figure would be higher than in the 1970s.

Source: Bensimon and DellaPergola, *La población juive de France*; DellaPergola, Sabagh, Bozorgmehr, Der-Martirosian, and Lerner, "Hierarchic Levels of Subethnicity," 1-42; DellaPergola and Rebbun, "Hebretim sozio-demografijim udfusei hizdahut; DellaPergola and Lerner, *La comunidad judía de Mexico*; DellaPergola, Benzaquen, and Bekker de Weintraub, *Perfil socio-demográfico y cultural de la comunidad judía de Caracas*; Shlomit Levy, Hanna Levinsohn, and Elihu Katz, *Beliefs, Observances and Social Interactions among Israeli Jews* (Jerusalem: 1993); Shlomit Levy, Hanna Levinsohn, and Elihu Katz, *A Portrait of Israeli Jewry: Beliefs, Observances and Values among Israeli Jews 2000* (Jerusalem: 2002); Cohen with Ifergan, *Les Juifs de France*.

indicators. For instance, the data on France for 2002 indicate that the percentage of Jews of Asian-African origin married to non-Jews is somewhat lower than that of the total Jewish population.³⁹ The exception to the general pattern of higher observance and affiliation is the Sephardic and Asia-Africa born community in the United States, whose measures of Jewish identification are marginally lower than those among the overall Jewish community (except for the importance attached to Jewishness, where it is significantly higher).⁴⁰

In Israel, significant weakening in Jewish attitudes and practices is apparent in the second generation of Asian-African immigrants.⁴¹ This accords with a common pattern among migrants, whereby traditional attitudes, patterns of behavior, and communal structures maintained in the first generation after migration become attenuated as the migrants—and especially their children—adapt to the host society.

A further issue relating to identificational patterns and immigrant absorption concerns the mutual perceptions of different sub-ethnic groups. One long-term follow-up study indicates that Israeli Jews of European-American origin tended to have more positive perceptions of Asian-African Jews during periods of economic or security crisis, whereas periods of normalcy were marked by more critical attitudes on the part of both groups.⁴² Between the 1970s and the late 1990s, Jews from Asia-Africa (including the second, Israeli-born generation) had relatively more favorable perceptions of Jews from Europe or America, than the latter had of them. Interestingly, they also appear to have internalized some of the negative stereotyping of their group by persons of European-American origin, for example concerning mutual perceptions of consistency and reliability.⁴³

Changing Perceptions of Sub-ethnic Identities

What weight should be given to ethnic and sub-ethnic identity in evaluating the consequences of large-scale international migration of “Sephardic and Oriental” Jews to Israel and to the main western countries? Among Israeli scholars, there are several schools of thought on the matter. Historically, the emphasis on nation-building meant that ethnicity was perceived mainly along cultural lines. As part of the process of immigrant integration, the salience of cultural diversity—hence sub-ethnic identity—would decline and the structural assimilation into society would occur over time.⁴⁴ An opposite view holds that sub-ethnic cleavages in Israeli society overlap fundamentally and permanently with divisions and conflicts of class.⁴⁵ In an extreme formulation of this view, it is argued that ongoing ethnocultural inequalities in Israel are the outcome of the conscious exploitation of the immigrants from Asia and Africa by the earlier European Jewish immigrants.⁴⁶ A third school of thought recognizes the existence of various forms of sub-ethnic stratification but regards these not as the result of exploitation, but rather as a constituent (if not inevitable) feature of Israeli society.⁴⁷

In fact, the data pertaining to educational attainment, occupational status, and income suggest that persisting gaps between the two major origin groups might better be described as time-related evolutionary lags rather than as insurmountable obstacles inherent in Israel’s social structure. If this is the case, the main cause for

concern should not be the absence of a trend toward closing these gaps, but rather its relatively slow pace. As has been shown, social gaps between the two main origin groups continue to be significant at the higher levels of the Israeli educational ladder, which implies that the acquisition of higher levels of training required for upward mobility continues to be affected by imbalances of the past. At the same time, the gradual closure of sub-ethnic demographic gaps provides a more egalitarian starting point for the younger, Israeli-born generation. Thus, the frequency of interethnic marriages, the gradual disappearance of family-size differentials, and growing residential integration of members of different origin groups are all indicators of continuing reduction in the extant socioeconomic gaps. Such gaps, however, will not be eliminated in the foreseeable future without preferential policies and incentives aimed at improving the educational achievements of the weaker social groups, which are still disproportionately of Asian and African origin.

Among Jewish communities in the diaspora, the observed patterns of Jewish immigrant integration from Asia and Africa share many commonalities with those in Israel. However, since their initial social resources and skills tended to be higher than those of their peers who went to Israel, the period of recovery after the initial shock of absorption was much shorter. Their successful socioeconomic mobility is manifested, for example, in the growing involvement of immigrants and their children in the highest levels of Jewish communal leadership. In France, since the 1980s the chief rabbis have been of North African origin, as are many influential lay leaders, professionals, academics, intellectuals, and politicians prominent in French society and culture. Similarly, in a number of Latin American communities—in Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil, for instance—a growing number of individuals of Middle Eastern ancestry (in particular, from Aleppo) serve as Jewish communal leaders. Such growing involvement reflects a commitment to Jewish communal life that is characteristic of many Asian-African Jews. On the whole, these migrants remain more strongly attached to Jewish community life in comparison both with members of the veteran Jewish communities that absorbed them and with other Jewish migrants who arrived at the same time. Finally, in countries as different as France, Mexico, and Venezuela, there is an emerging demographic predominance of Jews of Asian and African origin in place of Jews of Central-Eastern European background. A true *Sephardization* of the community is thus underway, starting from the younger age groups and moving up to encompass the entire community.

All in all, the basic trend is one of a gradual convergence among Jewish immigrants from different continents, and especially among their children, in terms of residential dispersion, family size, and socioeconomic status. In Israel, however, there is a possible major obstacle to continued convergence, namely, the growing influence of ethnic political parties – in particular, Shas. The question is whether sub-ethnic political entrepreneurs enhance or hinder the long-term process of assimilation into the Jewish mainstream. On the one hand, vested political interests tend to stress ethnic and sub-ethnic cleavages and in this way actually reinforce them. On the other hand, in Israel (not unlike certain Jewish communities in Latin America), Jewish sub-ethnic separatism has worked to mobilize Jews of Sephardic and Asian-African origins to greater political involvement and has resulted in a more equal distribution of power and resources. Thus, by promoting sub-ethnic separatism and

particularistic interests—in part, by stressing sub-ethnic tensions—attaining the ultimate goal of more equitable representation actually may be accelerated.

When assessing social inequality and its relationship to sociocultural origins, it is not enough simply to read the story conveyed by measurable data. It is also essential to evaluate the actors' subjective perceptions and expectations. What counts is not only what actually happened but also what people wanted to happen and what they thought actually did happen. Thus, the overall evaluation of sub-ethnic convergence versus divergence must consider more subjective changes in identity as well as quantitative data regarding sociodemographic change. In light of the convergent trends described above—albeit occurring more slowly in Israel than in other Jewish communities—I would suggest that, in the long run, sub-ethnic identities are likely to be largely subsumed within a more broadly defined ethnic identity. In the past, to be sure, varying intensities of sub-ethnic identity coexisted with a broader Jewish identity, and these may continue to coexist, both in Israel and in western societies that have absorbed significant numbers of Jewish migrants. For a relatively small minority, homogeneity or even segregated cultural and socioeconomic environments may continue to reinforce strong and nearly all-encompassing sub-ethnic bonds. For many more individuals, the consciousness of ethnic origin may persist as an enriching frame of reference within broader societal orientations toward universal socioeconomic goals and cultural expressions. For others, any cultural residue of sub-ethnic (or, for that matter, Jewish) identity may eventually be lost. These approaches correspond, respectively, to a cohesive self-contained community, a distinctive social group, and a segment of the population whose ethnic origin can no longer be traced.

While the effects of time and generational changes in Israel and abroad have operated in the direction of strengthening the second and third approaches, sub-ethnic identities are not likely to vanish completely, in part because of the activities of various political and communal sub-ethnic entrepreneurs. Shas, for instance, has created a network of religious educational institutions that attempt, among other things, to strengthen Mizrahi identity among the younger generation. Moreover, past accomplishments in the realm of closing socioeconomic gaps have led to legitimate demands for even greater parity. As noted, ethnic origin stereotypes are often associated with social status. The socially mobile Israeli-born of Asian-African origin (or, more significantly, the upwardly mobile children of sub-ethnic intermarriages) can both identify with and be identified by a broader Israeli Jewish ethnic identity or even a neutral Israeli pan-ethnic identity; they may no longer feel the need for the protective shell of a strong sub-ethnic frame of reference. In contrast, those located on the lower socioeconomic rungs are more likely to identify, or be identified by others, with a Mizrahi sub-ethnic identity and to become the focus of sub-ethnic political lobbying.

Such pockets of social marginality and disadvantage, existing at the margins of successful absorption and integration, can become fertile ground for the preservation or even revival of sub-ethnic identities that militate against convergence between the two main origin groups. Yet as already noted, even at the peak of its success, Shas never garnered more than a fourth of the potential Mizrahi vote. The party's fluctuating degrees of electoral success can be explained by the periodic widening or

narrowing of that part of the constituency which feels excluded from the mainstream of Israeli development and personal achievement.

As against the interplay between socioeconomic and cultural identificational trends among the two main origin groups in Israel, the maintenance of sub-ethnic identities in the diaspora has been manifested mainly by certain cultural traits, such as familiarity with specific languages and customs, that are gradually disappearing. Of greater significance is the generally stronger adherence to various patterns of Jewish identification among diaspora sub-ethnic groups originating in Asia and Africa. In a context in which Jews constitute a small minority of the general population and are primarily struggling for their own role as a collective vis-à-vis the majority, Jews from Asian and African countries have become the principal element in ensuring the overall continuity of the community. In other words, the sub-ethnic identity of Jews of Asian-African origin tends to become a proxy for Jewish identity at large, whereas Jews of European origin, who are more likely to assimilate, exhibit declining interest in Judaism. From the point of view of socioeconomic stratification, unlike in Israel, where another Jew is the typical “competitor” in terms of economic resources (and all the more so if he or she belongs to a different sub-ethnic group) the “competitor” in diaspora communities is typically a member of the majority group. Therefore, among diaspora communities, any feelings of frustration or sense of personal discrimination tend to relate to the society at large vis-à-vis Jews, whereas in Israel the same feelings may be channeled toward Jews of a relatively more upwardly mobile sub-ethnic group.

In some countries, sub-ethnic identification is strengthened by organizations that can encompass—as is the case in Mexico—the entire gamut of Jewish community services, including primary and secondary schools. Given the virtual disappearance of Jewish communities in most Asian and African countries of origin and the wide diasporization of the original communities across many countries of destination, it was not possible to maintain or reconstitute an inspiring cultural center in a single place. If any, such a central place of resonance for communities located elsewhere tended to be represented by Israel, its phenomenology, and its religious and political leadership. It thus appeared that Jewish communities of Middle Eastern and North African origin in Western Europe and in Latin America were increasingly importing religious services, ideas, identificational traits (including some of Shas patterns) and also ideological cleavages from their Middle Eastern and North African peers in Israel. The long-term effects of this export of Israeli cultural patterns to Jewish diaspora communities remain to be seen.

France, the country of destination for nearly a quarter of a million North African Jews in the late 1950s and early 1960s, represents a success story with regard to immigrant absorption. As has been seen, the initial stages of absorption were less traumatic than in Israel, and the immigrants’ long-term socioeconomic integration has been quite impressive. The immigrants and their French-born children have created a vibrant and intensely identified community that has changed the face of French Jewry by replacing the classic *Israélite* pattern of accommodation with a more self-confident Jewish communal orientation. The problem with this momentous transformation is that it appears to be on a collision course with the notion of Republican unity, which opposes the concept of *communautarisme* (particularistic

communalism)⁴⁸—all the more so, at a time of increasing tension sparked by the assertive (and growing) Muslim population. In spite of French Jewry's personal attainments over the years, the concerns of Jewish identity are shifting from cultural continuity and social equality to the sphere of political survival. The comfort attained as a result of years of skillful cultural and socioeconomic integration is now at risk, and there is uncertainty regarding the future of the Jews in general (let alone North African Jews), in a context in which increasing Muslim ethnic unrest has led the government to initiate measures restricting religious freedom of expression.

Conclusion

Perhaps the main conclusion of this study concerns the importance of a comparative approach in investigating processes occurring in a given context, whether Israeli society or diaspora Jewish communities. In seeking to interpret the transformations of Jewish populations and communities over the course of the 20th century, it is a mistake to focus exclusively on the internal dynamics of Jewish society at the local level. As has been repeatedly demonstrated in the past few decades, external determinants have been of critical importance in the fate of Jewish communities worldwide. Israel, for example, would not be what it is—or might not exist at all—were it not for geopolitical developments in Europe, North Africa, and Asia. This obvious point is often overlooked by those who limit their analysis to internal Israeli politics and social trends.

This leads us to a more ideologically laden comment. In the process of immigrant absorption, Israel did not act in the manner of a utopian society, as some would have liked to believe.⁴⁹ Such an ideal society, dedicated to perfect equality, would either have ignored variations in human capital in its allocation of power and resources or else would have intervened more vigorously in order to achieve total equality. In the latter instance, given the significant gaps among Jewish groups originating in vastly different places and cultures, it would have been necessary to implement an extreme policy of affirmative action—the government in effect acting as Robin Hood, taking away resources from “stronger” groups so that others might “catch up.” Rather than following this path (which, for a democracy, would have entailed clear risks), the government by and large allowed free-market competition to prevail. Although government agencies and the Jewish Agency did implement corrective policies to ease social gaps, their primary focus was on overall national strategic goals such as security, infrastructure, and land development.

On further consideration, a country in which free-market mechanisms were in place and where competition between individuals was based on personal initiative and free association (as is the norm in most western societies) really *was* utopia for a people who historically had been dispersed, often discriminated against, alienated, and significantly dependent on philanthropy or other public support. Jews who went to Israel were seeking a return to “normalcy,” yet normalization exacted a much heavier price on some individuals than on others. The more veteran immigrants of the pre- and early post-1948 years, who were mainly of European origin, tended to be centrally located in Israel's physical and social space and as such were closer to

better market and educational opportunities. Immigrants of the subsequent period, from 1948 through the 1960s, many of whom came from Asian and African countries, were both more dispersed and more apt to reside in peripheral towns and settlements. As a result, they paid a higher price to enter Israeli society, even though they, too, reaped the benefits of rapidly improving standards of living. Significantly, the more decisive socioeconomic and technological take-off of Israeli society took place during the 1990s under the impact of the most recent immigration waves from the FSU. The latter—many of them armed with advanced technological training—arrived during a window of opportunity created by the temporary breakthrough in the Middle East security impasse and substantial economic investment in Israel.

The pace of development of each of the different demographic and sociological processes that I have examined has been quite unequal over time, encompassing phases of slow-down or even temporary reversal. Notwithstanding, the removal or downgrading of sub-ethnic identity (and of the more inclusive “Sephardic and Oriental” identity, for that matter) from its formerly central role as a social determinant has largely been accomplished.

In the diaspora, the absorption of Jewish immigrants relied somewhat less on normative-utopian expectations and considerably more on self-reliance and private networks. Yet some of the mechanisms of immigrant absorption were very similar to those seen in Israel. As noted, immigrant absorption outside of Israel also entailed a temporary loss of socioeconomic status. In France, as in Israel, the veteran European-born members of the Jewish community had acquired a more central location on the national and urban territory, whereas the mass of immigrants from North Africa who arrived in the 1950s and the 1960s were initially much more geographically dispersed in locations with lesser access to economic and educational opportunities. Although French Jewish organizations provided assistance, individual initiatives played a much more significant role. The crucial differences between the French and Israeli contexts were the French Jews’ status as a minority (as, of course, was true of Jewish immigrants in other countries of the diaspora), their freedom from responsibility in the realm of security and development, and the abundant availability of other, lower-status population groups to fulfill the less desirable functions in society. In consequence, Jewish upward mobility in France was faster and more visible than in Israel, albeit accompanied by periodic frustration reflecting periods of antisemitism and fear from the surrounding society. A certain compensation for the painful mobility experiences among immigrants to Israel may have been the pride and the privilege associated with citizenship in a Jewish state.⁵⁰

It is very difficult to predict whether the political and socioeconomic discontinuities that produced mass Jewish emigration in the past will recur in the future. Jewish history has had many such moments, and might have more in the future—some of which might generate new massive dislocations. No matter what the country of destination, migration brings with it the challenges of immigrant absorption. The goal of having different group identities coalesce—but not disappear—into a coherent national social structure is one facet of that challenge. The experience of “Sephardic and Oriental” Jewish migrants in Israel and in other environments highlights the challenges related to the maintenance of Jewish heritage versus the pursuit of social mobility; sub-ethnic clustering versus global geographical diffusion;

equality versus relative deprivation; and adherence to ideal norms versus pragmatic realism. The lessons of this experience need to be learned for the future.

Notes

Research for this essay was undertaken at the Division of Jewish Demography and Statistics, The Avraham Harman Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I thank Uzi Rebhun and Benjamin Anderman for processing of the Israeli 1995 population census. Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the Ben-Zvi Institute in Jerusalem, at the American University in Washington, D.C., and at the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies where I was a Skirball Visiting Fellow in 2002/3.

1. For general reference works, see Michel Abitbol, Shlomo Bar Asher, Ya'akov Barnai, Yoseph Toubi, and Shmuel Ettinger (eds.), *Toledot hayehudim be'arot ha'islam (History of the Jews in Muslim Countries)* (Jerusalem: 1986); Bernard Lewis, *Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice* (New York: 1986); Norman A. Stillman, *The Jews of Arab Lands in Modern Times* (Philadelphia: 1991); Jane S. Gerber, *The Jews of Spain: A History of the Sephardic Experience* (New York: 1994); Esther Benbassa and Aron Rodrigue, *Histoire des Juifs sépharades. De Tolède à Salonique* (Paris: 2002).

2. For an earlier, systematic evaluation of the issues discussed here, see Uziel O. Schmelz, "Be'ayot musagiyot bamehkar shel 'edot yisrael," *Pe'amim* 56 (1993), 125–139; for a short outline, see Sergio DellaPergola, "He'arot 'al hamehkar hasozio-demografi shel 'kehilot yisrael bamizrah," *Pe'amim* 93 (2002), 149–156

3. See, for instance, Ansley J. Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins (eds.), *The Decline of Fertility in Europe* (Princeton: 1986).

4. Uziel O. Schmelz, "'Aliyah hamonit measiyah uzefon afrikah: hebeitim demografiyim," *Pe'amim* 39 (1989), 15–63.

5. M.F. Hammer, A.J. Redd, E.T. Wood, M.R. Bonner, H. Jarjanazi, T. Karafet, S. Santachiara-Benerecetti, A. Oppenheim, M.A. Jobling, T. Jenkins, and B. Bonn -Tamir, "Jewish and Middle Eastern NJ Populations Share a Common Pool of Y-Chromosome Biallelic Haplotypes," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA* 97 (2000), 6769–6774. The analysis also indicates genetic similarities between Jews and Arabs.

6. In Israel, the Central Bureau of Statistics indicates the origin of Israeli-born children according to the father's birthplace. After two generations, the notion of ancestry is thus lost in official data. However, although less readily available, data on the mother's birthplace can also be obtained, thus making possible the attribution of origin by either parent. See Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Census of Population and Housing 1961* (Jerusalem: 1961); idem, *Census of Population and Housing 1995* (Jerusalem: 1995); idem, *Statistical Abstract of Israel* (Jerusalem: yearly publication).

7. Mary Waters, *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America* (Berkeley: 1990).

8. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: 1978).

9. On the problematics of this policy, see Chen Bram and Harvey E. Goldberg, "Sephardic/Mizrahi/Arab-Jews: Reflections on Critical Sociology and the Study of Middle Eastern Jewries within the Context of Israeli Society," in this volume, esp.

10. Unlike other Jewish communities, Spanish Jewry was exposed to both the Muslim and Christian cultures, albeit during different historical periods.

11. Ariel Toaff, "Culture ebraiche nel mondo," in *Atlante dell'alimentazione e della gastronomia*, vol. 1, ed. Massimo Montanari and Fran oise Saban (Turin: 2004), 229–241.

12. Pierre Chaunu, *La France: histoire de la sensibilit  des fran ais   la France* (Paris: 1982); Judit Bokser de Liwerant, "Imagines de un encuentro," in *La presencia judia en M xico durante la primera mitad del siglo XX* (Mexico: 1992).

13. Waters, *Ethnic Options*; Sergio DellaPergola, Georges Sabagh, Mehdi Bozorgmehr, Claudia Der-Martirosian, and Susana Lerner, "Hierarchic Levels of Subethnicity: Near Eastern Jews in the U.S., France and Mexico," in *Sociological Papers* 5, no. 2, ed. Ernest Krausz and Gitta Tulea (1996), 1–42; Richard Alba and Victor Nee, *Remaking the American Mainstream* (Cambridge, Mass.: 2003).

14. The analysis in this essay relies in the main on primary data available from the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics and on a systematic monitoring of diaspora Jewish communities as documented in Sergio DellaPergola, "World Jewish Population, 2005," in *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 105 (New York: 2005), 87–122; see also Sergio DellaPergola, Uzi Rebhun, and Mark Tolts, "Prospecting the Jewish Future: Population Projections 2000–2080," in *American Jewish Year Book*, vol. 100 (New York: 2000), 103–146.

15. Roberto Bachi, *The Population of Israel* (Jerusalem: 1977).

16. Sergio DellaPergola, "The Global Context of Migration to Israel," in *Immigration to Israel: Sociological Perspectives*, ed. Elazar Leshem and Judith T. Shuval (New Brunswick: 1998), 51–92; idem, "Jewish Diaspora," in *International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences: Demography*, ed. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Bates (Oxford: 2001), 7963–7969.

17. Sergio DellaPergola, Uzi Rebhun, and Mark Tolts, "Contemporary Jewish Diaspora in Global Context: Human Development Correlates of Population Trends," *Israel Studies* 10, no. 1 (2005), 61–95.

18. Minor inconsistencies in total population estimates reflect the provisional character of some of the data.

19. Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel* 57 (Jerusalem: 2006).

20. The Human Development Index is a composite measure of socioeconomic development based on country performances in the areas of health, educational attainment, and real income. See United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2005* (New York: 2005).

21. The main exception was the major wave of immigration from the FSU that began in December 1989, which included numerous non-Jewish spouses and children of mixed marriages.

22. The following discussion relates to a large data sample in the greater Paris area. However, a control sample collected in French provincial cities provides a similar picture, thus justifying the use of "France" rather than "greater Paris." See Doris Bensimon and Sergio DellaPergola, *La population juive de France: sociodémographie et identité* (Jerusalem and Paris: 1984).

23. Shaul Tuval, *The Jewish Community in Istanbul 1948–1992* (Jerusalem: 2004).

24. Simon Kuznets, *Economic Structure of U.S. Jewry: Recent Trends* (Jerusalem: 1972); Gabriel Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics: At Home Abroad* (Cambridge: 2003).

25. Erik H. Cohen with Maurice Ifergan, *Le Juifs de France: valeurs et identité* (Paris: 2002).

26. Sergio DellaPergola, "Some Occupational Characteristics of Western Jews in Israel," in *Papers in Jewish Demography 1977*, ed. Uziel O. Schmelz, Paul Glikson, and Sergio DellaPergola (Jerusalem: 1980), 255–281.

27. Given the limited scope of this essay, the comparable position of Israeli Arabs is not discussed, even though Jewish-Arab interactions undoubtedly influenced the nature of internal interactions among the various Jewish subgroups.

28. Uziel O. Schmelz, Sergio DellaPergola, and Uri Avner, *Ethnic Differences among Israeli Jews: A New Look* (Jerusalem: 1991).

29. One way of measuring the frequency of homogamy (that is, marital attraction between brides and grooms belonging to the same group) is provided by the Benini index, which measures actual versus theoretically expected frequencies of given combinations of marriage partners whose group of origin is known. An index value of 1 indicates exclusively in-group marriages; an index of –1 indicates exclusively out-group marriages; an index of 0 indicates random distribution of marriages reflecting the respective sizes of different population groups. The Benini index results from $(a-e)/(m-e)$, where: a = the actual number of homogamous

marriages in a given group; e = their expected number if marriages were proportionally distributed according to the size of groups; m = whichever of the total number of brides or grooms is the smaller or the upper limit of homogamous unions possible among the spouses of the given group. If there are only two categories, as in the present case, the index value is the same for both. For additional materials, see Schmelz, DellaPergola, and Avner, *Ethnic Differences among Israeli Jews*. The material here is computed on the basis of census data and vital statistics on marriages in which the origin of both the bride and the groom was specified.

30. Barbara Okon, "Insight into Ethnic Flux: Marriage Patterns among Jews of Mixed Ancestry in Israel," *Demography* 41, no. 1 (2004), 173–187.

31. Sergio DellaPergola and Susana Lerner, *La comunidad judia de Mexico: perfil demografico, social y cultural* (Jerusalem: 1995); Sergio DellaPergola, Salomon Benzaquen, and Tony Beker de Weintraub, *Perfil sociodemográfico y cultural de la comunidad judia de Caracas* (Caracas: 2000); Sergio DellaPergola, "Jewish Out-marriage: Mexico and Venezuela," paper presented at International Roundtable on Inter-marriage, Brandeis University, 2003.

32. Mehdi Bozorgmehr, "Internal Ethnicity: Armenian, Bahai, Jewish, and Muslim Iranians in Los Angeles" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 2002).

33. The Total Fertility Rate is a measure of fertility based on the assumption that current age-specific fertility rates will remain constant over time.

34. Cohen with Ifergan, *Les Juifs de France*; DellaPergola and Lerner, *La comunidad judia de Mexico*.

35. Chaim Adler, "Jewish Education in Israel: A Sociological Perspective," in *Jewish Education Worldwide: Cross-Cultural Perspectives*, ed. Harold S. Himmelfarb and Sergio DellaPergola (Lanham: 1989), 485–503.

36. In-depth follow-up conducted by Dov Friedlander, Zvi Eisenbach, Eliahu Ben-Moshe, Dan Ben-Hur, Shlomit Lunievski, Ahmed Hleihel, and Lilach Lion Elmakias, *Religion, Ethnicity, Type of Locality and Educational Attainments among Israel's Population: An Analysis of Change Over Time*, Working Paper Series, Parts 1–2 (Jerusalem: 2000). An article by Dov Friedlander, Barbara S. Okun, Zvi Eisenbach, and Lilach Lion Elmakias, "Immigration, Social Change and Assimilation: Educational Attainment among Birth Cohorts of Jewish Ethnic Groups in Israel, 1925–29 to 1965–69," *Population Studies* 56 (2002), 135–150, confirms the findings broadly outlined here.

37. Dov Friedlander, Eynat Aviv, and Lilach Lion-Elmakias, *Behinot habagrut bishnot hatish'im: pe'arim behekefe'i limud, ziyunim, zakaut* (Jerusalem: 2006).

38. The data reported in this respect are not entirely consistent for different Jewish populations. In some cases, the level of identification of "very important" was preferred, given the extremely high (close to 100 percent) and undifferentiated response given at the "important" level.

39. Cohen with Ifergan, *Les Juifs de France*.

40. Sergio DellaPergola and Uzi Rebhun, "Hebetim sozio-demografiyim udfusei hizdahut shel yehudim sefaradim veashkenazim beartzot habrit bishnat 1990," in *Hevrah vetarbut: yehudei sefarad le'ahar hagerush*, ed. Michel Abitbol, Galit Hazan-Rokem, and Yom-Tov Assis (Jerusalem: 1997), 105–135.

41. Shlomit Levy, Hanna Levinsohn, and Elihu Katz, *Beliefs, Observances and Social Interactions among Israeli Jews* (Jerusalem: 1993); idem, *A Portrait of Israeli Jewry: Beliefs, Observances and Values among Israeli Jews 2000* (Jerusalem: 2002).

42. Shlomit Levy and Elihu Katz, "Dynamics of Inter-Group Relations in Israel: 1967–2002," *Social Indicators Research* 74 (2005), 295–312.

43. Zeev Ben-Sira, *Hizdahut menukeret bahevrah hayisreelit hayehudit: yahasim bein'adatiyim veintegratiyah* (Jerusalem: 1987).

44. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants* (London: 1954); Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Stephen Sharot, *Ethnicity, Religion and Class in Israeli Society* (Cambridge: 1991); Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yochanan Peres, *Is Israel One? Religion, Nationalism, and Multiculturalism Confronted* (Leyden: 2005).

45. Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, *Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship* (Cambridge: 2002).
46. Shlomo Swirsky, *The Oriental Majority* (London: 1989); Yehouda Shenhav, *Hayehudim-ha'aravim: leumiyut, dat, veetmiyut* (Tel Aviv: 2003).
47. Sammy Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict* (London: 1978); Calvin Goldscheider, *Israel's Changing Society: Population, Ethnicity, and Development* (Boulder: 1996); Noah Lewin-Epstein, Yuval Elimelech, and Moshe Semyonov, "Ethnic Inequality in Home Ownership and the Value of Housing: The Case of Immigrants in Israel," *Social Forces* 74, no. 4 (1997), 1439–1462.
48. [Shmuel Trigano], "French Jewry—The End of an Era," *The Jewish People Policy Planning Institute Annual Assessment 2005* (Jerusalem: 2005), 48–51.
49. See a discussion in Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Trouble in Utopia: Overburdened Polity in Israel* (Albany: 1989).
50. See an earlier analysis in Michael Inbar and Chaim Adler, *Ethnic Integration in Israel: A Comparative Case Study of Brothers Who Settled in France and in Israel* (New Brunswick: 1977); and more recently, Cohen with Ifergan, *Les Juifs de France*.